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ABSTRACT

This is a critique of the principal claims made within Ludwig
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. It traces the development of his thought from the time he dictated the pre-Tractarian "Notes
on Logic" to Russell up until about 1932 when he began work on the
Philosophical Grammar. The influence exercised upon him by Frege,
Russell and Moore are considered at length. Chapter one examines
Moore's relational theory of judgment which Wittgenstein apparently accepted upon his arrival at Cambridge in 1911. From Moore Wittgenstein
would inherit one of the fundamental metaphysical theses of the
Tractatus, namely, that the world consists of facts rather than things.
Wittgenstein's attempt to overcome the relational theory's inability to
account for falsehood, negation, and the possibility of truly ascribing
false beliefs to others would herald some of the principal theses of
Tractarian semantics: that propositional signs must exhibit bipolarity,
that a distinction must be drawn between Sinn and Bedeutung, and that a
distinction holds between what can be said and what can only be shown.
Chapter Two examines how these theses are sharpened by considering the
influence of Frege and the manner in which Wittgenstein disposes of
Russell's Paradox. considerable attention is given to the issue of
whether Frege is to be interpreted as a semantic Platonist. It is argued that he is not, and that Tractarian semantics shores up the problematic features of Frege's philosophy which make it susceptible to the
paradox. From Frege Wittgenstein derives the idea that all representation requires a structured medium. The chapter concludes by considering
how this entails the falsehood of semantic Platonism. Chapter Three
studies Wittgenstein's argument for logical atomism and gives it a favorable assessment. The influence of Russell's conception of logical
analysis is considered. The chapter concludes by showing the way
Wittgenstein's thesis that there must be simple subsistent objects depends upon the truth of his Grundgedanke, i.e., the claim that the logical constants are not referring terms. Chapter Four examines the argument for the Grundgedanke, and defends it against criticism based upon
phenomenological considerations for objectifying negativity. It is
demonstrated that Wittgenstein's view entails that a distinction must be
drawn between propositions possessing sense and those that are senseless
but no less a part of our language. Chapter Five examines
Wittgenstein's claim that the essence of a proposition consists in a
propositional sign's projective relation to the world, and it considers
the Tractarian analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. It is
argued that the analysis of these sorts of sentences forms the principal
problem with the Tractatus. The chapter includes a discussion of why
the Color Exclusion Problem need not be considered problematic for the
author of the Tractatus, and it defends the realistic interpretation
given of the Tractatus throughout the dissertation against criticisms
arising from a consideration of Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism.
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NOMENCLATURE

Throughout this dissertation the following conventions will be
observed:
(l) References to linguistic expressions of natural language will
always appear within quotation marks. Hence, noesdemona loves
Cassio" is a linguistic expression made true by the fact that
Desdemona loves Cassio.
(2) Like the expressions mentioned in (1), formulae such as P,
Fa, (Bx) Fx, (x) Fx, F(FAb), etc., belong to the meta-language.
P and »Desdemona loves Cassio" belong to the same level of
language (as do "Pis true" and n•oesdemona loves Cassio' is
true") in that each refers to (or ranges over) sentence tokens of
the object-language. Because the use of variables plays a similar
role to the quotation marks in (l), I have omitted placing
quotation marks around them (or outer brackets as is often the
custom in logic texts). This practice is justified on the
grounds that were quotation marks placed around formal
expressions, consistency with (1) would produce a nearly endless
number of use/mention fallacies: rather than using formulae to
refer to sentences, formulae would merely be mentioned.
Furthermore, this convention is designed to make the text less
cumbersome to the reader.
(3) By not putting quotation marks around formal expressions, a
difficulty arises regarding the manner in which to refer to what
makes a formula like P true. Technically speaking, Pis true if
and only if the sentence it is interpreted as representing is
true. But we need to be able to refer to the fact which makes a
formula P under whatever interpretation true. A bold character
will be used in this instance. Thus: Pis true of P.
If Pis
synonymous with noesdemona loves Cassio," then P just is the fact
that Desdemona loves Cassio. Expressions that contain a
combination of natural and formal elements--like: »a is F"--will
be treated in the same way. Thus: what makes ua is F" true is
the fact that a is r. In Appendix I small Greek letters, a, p,
x, etc. are used in a manner similar to a, b, c, etc.
(4) Italics are reserved for foreign words which have not been
assimilated into English, and they are also used for emphasis.
Furthermore, italics are typically used in the translation of such
sentences from Frege as, "The concept horse is not a concept." I
have resisted the temptation to tamper with the translations so as
to comply with (3) above. Nevertheless, the reader should bear in
mind that they play a similar role to the boldface characters used
in discussing Russell's Paradox.
(5)

Wittgenstein, Moore, Russell and Frege often move from the

formal to the material mode without a change of symbolism.
Quotations will not be modified to accord with the above
conventions (except for the that mentioned in (6)). Any ambiguity
which results will be dealt with in the text or in a footnote.
(6) In Chapter Three it is necessary to represent the pictorial
elements of such representations as occur in pictographs,
hieroglyphics, photographs, and the like, which play a role within
a pictorial language Symbols such as Q¥6 will be used for this
purpose; details of their usage will be contained in the text. A
similar function is played by the circle figure in the Appendix:

0.
(7)

Various logical symbols are used throughout:
(a) P, Q, R, etc. are propositional variables;
(b.) (Bx) is the existential quantifier;
(c) (x) is the universal quantifier;
(d) x, y, z, etc are variables for which names or
singular terms in general may be substituted;
(e) F, G, H, are variables for which predicative
expressions may be substituted;
(f) ◊ is the modal operator for possibility;
(9) v, &, -, - , - , and~ are the symbols for disjunction,
conjunction, negation, biconditionality, material.
implication and strict implication;
(h) i is the Sheffer stroke corresponding to joint
negation;
(i) The carat within FAx functions as a Lambda operator,
as in A(Fx). In most books the carat appears above
the variable x, but due to production problems it is
here being placed between the two symbols. The
presence of the carat turns the function Fx into a
singular term. What singular term the function
becomes, in a given text, depends largely on the
purpose to which the symbolism shall be put and
whether it is to be deployed within an intensional or
extensional system. Typical candidates for
intensional systems include "the function Fx" or "the
class of F's." In the intensional predicate calculus
developed by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990) the
occurrence of any A-operator will have within its
scope a well-formed formula, "l', such that AX['lj.'] may
be interpreted as "the property of being an x such
that "l'" (1990, p. 319). Within an extensional
system the singular term might be interpreted as "the
members of the class of F's," provided one is
prepared to argue that the embedded phrase (" ••• the
class of F's") is to be interpreted instrumentally.
Although the Tractatus is essentially an
extensionalist work with respect to what can be said
(which means, among other things, that it does not
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countenance properties as belonging to the ultimate
furniture of the world), its author's use of the carat
differs from that just mentioned. Wittgenstein always uses
F x to denote the tact that xis F. we should note that he
does not think its use is legitimate, since it purports to
be the name of a fact, and, for him, facts cannot be named.
For Wittgenstein it is impossible to represent the
essential semantic properties of a propositional sign by
means of another propositional sign; it is only possible to
present the semantic properties of a propositional sign
through its use.
A
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INTRODUCTION
The way in which language signifies
is mirrored in i ta use.
Notebooks 1914-1916

1.

General Purposes.
This dissertation is designed to offer a critique of the principal

semantic and meta-semantic claims found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922b). 1

In particular, I want to show

the way in which the Tractatus is consistent with certain aspects of
Wittgenstein's.later Philosophical Investigations (1958).

The great ex-

tent to which there is continuity between the early and later philosophies has not generally been appreciated by commentators.

Even those

scholars who do lay stress upon what continuity there is often misinterpret what is essential.

Stenius (19601 1981), for example, looks upon

the Investigations as posing little challenge to the prospects of there
being an adequate truth-functional semantics.

In contrast, I hold the

Tractatus to be commensurate with the Philosophical Investigations precisely because the most important thesis of the Tractatus is that no

purely truth-functional semantics is possible.

That is a thesis to

which the later Wittgenstein would readily agree; in fact, it is one
whose implications are played out definitively in the later
Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Furthermore, the Tractatus holds that no

such theory is possible tor propositional attitude ascriptions.

Like

1 Meta-semantic theory seeks to clarify and articulate the methods
and the ultimate research goals of semantic theory. Typical meta-semantic questions are: Is a theory of reference (truth, consistency, etc.)
possible? Must an adequate semantic theory contain an account of how
communication is possible? Are the goals of theory construction in linguistics explanatory or merely predictive? Semantic theory, in contrast, seeks to answer such questions as: Bow is reference accomplished? Are meanings (or senses) entities? Is the meaning of a linguistic expression identical to its truth-conditions? And so forth.

1

the more general thesis, this is an idea consonant with the later philosophy.

The criteria! behaviorism of the Philosophical Investi-

gations is a form of Instrumentalism, and, so, treats our discourse
about the mind as not having a truth stating function at all.

These

theses are defensible ones1 and, I believe, the early Wittgenstein offers a strong argument on their behalf, although that argument remains
obscure within the pages of the Tractatus.

To appreciate its strength,

one must examine, not only the Tractatus, but some of the pre-Tractarian
writings.

This dissertation attmnpts to reconstruct the argument of the

Tractatus in l~eu of these other writings.

It also attempts to clarify

the respective influences exercised by Moore, Russell and Frege upon
Wittgenstein.
We proceed in the following way.

Chapter I examines Wittgen-

stein's pre-Tractarian views concerning the nature of judgment and the
ultimate eme~gence of his thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition.
The views he expressed during the Winter of 1911 in his conversations
with Russell show the deep influence upon him of Moore's relational theory of judgment.

That theory is fraught with many problems:

it cannot

explain the nature of negation (particularly negative existential judgments), the nature of falsehood (indeed it appears to be committed to
the idea that falsehood is impossible), nor can it explain how it is
possible to truly ascribe to another person a false belief.

The view

later becomes Wittgenstein's foil as he begins to formulate the principal semantic theses of the Tractatus.

The first section of the chapter

discusses Moore's rejection of Idealism, and his own unique attempt at
resolving these probleJllS by assimilating the conditions for existence to
the conditions of individuation.

The solution, we shall see, does not

sufficiently resolve the problems, and Moore was not inclined to pursue
the strategy in his later writings (presumably because it would have
committed him to a doctrine of internal relations, something he would
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have regarded as the earmark of Idealism).

Little of the early theory

of judgment is retained in the Tractatus, although I would venture to
say that the Tractarian claim that M[t)he world is the totality of
facts, not of things" (1922b, 1.1) stems from Moore.

The absurdities to

which Moore's theory of judgment lead would eventually occasion
Wittgenstein's adoption of the thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition.

This thesis--namely, that all propositions with a sense must be

possibly true and possibly false (that is to say, contingent)--is the
first principal thesis of Tractarian semantics to emerge in his writings.

It is also the thesis that underpins his own distinction between

sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung).

This distinction is easily misun-

derstood, especially if interpreted along Fregean lines (or at least
along what are thought to be Fregean lines).

Some attention will be

given toward the end of the chapter to demonstrating that such an interpretation does not enjoy the textual support often claimed for it.

That

it cannot do justice to what we know about the historical development of
Wittgenstein's thought should become apparent throughout the course of
the chapter.
Once Wittgenstein embraces the bipolarity of the proposition and
the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung the stage is set for his initial characterization of the difference between showing and saying.
Chapter II is devoted to examining the way the distinction between showing and saying allows Wittgenstein to to circumvent the class and semantic paradoxes introduced against Frege by Russell.
we

In an important way

can see Wittgenstein as shoring up elements of Frege's philosophy

against Russell's threat.

Russell believed that the paradoxes could

only be avoided by means of a theory of types that proscribes the formation of certain sentences.

Wittgenstein, in contrast, maintains that an

adequate theory of types is neither possible nor necessary.

Its impos-

sibility is a result of the incompleteness engendered by introducing

3

such proscriptions as the Vicious Circle Principle.

(These worries

occur to Wittgenstein, we might note, some seventeen years prior to
Godel's famous presentation to the Vienna Circle of his discovery of the
incompleteness of arithmetic. 2 )

That a theory of types is not necessary

stems from the fact that an illogical language (a term that will require
considerable unpacking) is impossible.

The very nature of language it-

self makes a theory of types unnecessary, and this is so partly because
representation requires the sub-sentential components of any formula or
propositional sign to have a structure which makes it impossible for the
paradoxes to arise.

This idea, crucial to the Picture Theory, has its

origin in Frege's distinction between concept-word (or function) and
name (or argument).

The chapter will give us an opportunity to look at

Frege's philosophy in some depth in order to determine just what
Wittgenstein takes from him in the course of formulating the semantic
theory of the Tractatus.

I suggested above that it is a mistake to in-

terpret Wittgenstein's distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung in too
Fregean a manner.

That usually involves treating Frege as a proponent

of linguistic Platonism.
great lengths to argue.

But in fact Frege was no Platonist, as I go to
It is a mistake to construe Fregean senses as

abstract, mind-independent entities.

Be is rather to be understood as a

systematic philosopher in the Kantian tradition for whom senses are intersubjective and binding upon all rational agents.

Furthermore, Frege

should be understood as advancing a minimal semantic theory, that is to
say, one which holds that it is impossible for there to be a theory of
reference or of truth (at least if truth is construed as involving a relation--e.g., correspondence--to something external to language).

For

Frege, semantic theory totally subserves the theory of inference.
Frege's views are extremely problematic, but not because they en2 See G<Sdel (1931).
It was Carnap who later saw the connection between Wittgenstein's and Godel's philosophies1 cf. Coffa (1993), particularly Chapter Fifteen, -The Road to syntax,n pp. 272ff.
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gender Russell's Paradox.
dox.

Wittgenstein does indeed circumvent the para-

What is problematic is how a distinction between Sinn and

Bedeutung can be maintained--indeed, how objectivity can be claimed for
language and thought--once one has renounced the possibility of conducting ontology.

One possibility would be to collapse the distinction in

such a way as to treat the Bedeutungen of propositional signs as objective and make the objectivity of Sinne somehow parasitic upon that of
the Bedeutungen.

That is precisely what Wittgenstein's Picture Theory

of the Proposition does; ultimately it overcomes Frege's problems by
means of a semantic theory whose essence is summed up by saying language
and world share a common logical form (1922b, 4.12).

In the process,

Frege's minimal semantics is replaced by a robust semantic theory that
enjoins us to accept an ontology of simple objects, facts, and states of
affairs.

In the end it is the realism of Moore and Russell that wins

out over the minimalism (or internalism) of Frege.

The metaphysics of

the Tractatus, however, is the topic of a later chapter.
our examination of Frege allows us to see the advantages
Tractarian semantics has over one very powerful alternative view.

It

enables us to see just what Wittgenstein does and does not take from
Frege.

In particular it lets us see just how far removed Wittgenstein's

semantics is from any form of linguistic Platonism.

The fact is that

the distinction between showing and saying that emerges undermines
Platonism, due to the fact that that distinction requires representation--whether in thought or language--to be conducted in a concrete
medium:

there can be neither meaning nor sense apart from a concrete

medium containing elements whose constituents stand in contingent relations to one another.
It is at this stage of the dissertation that we begin to see the
roots of what might be called a token theory of meaning.
is 'token' in two respects.

Such a theory

First, the requirement that representation
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must occur in a concrete, structured medium makes linguistic tokens--actual utterances, inscriptions, signings, etc.--the locus of meaning.

At

the very least it makes these tokens a necessary condition for the possibility of representation, which is a far cry from what the Platonist
would be willing to accept.

A Platonist, e.g., Katz (1990), would main-

tain that semantic properties (like meaningfulness) and semantic relations (like synonymy, antonymy, superordination, subordination and the
like) are capable of existing independently of any concrete instantiation.

Second, what becomes evident in the treatment of Russell's

Paradox, especially in the rejection of the the possibility of a theory
of types, is that the form (not the structure) of a propositional sign
cannot be the subject of a discursive meta-language.
what the form of a propositional sign shows.

One cannot say

This should not be con-

fused with the minimal semantics advocated by Frege.

In Frege•s case,

one cannot explain the relations of reference and truth that obtain between language and world, but one supposedly can draw inferences about
one level of language by means of another.

(Frege treats quantifiers,

for example, as second order predicative expressions.)

In contrast,

Wittgenstein's semantics is robust in the sense that it does provide an
ontology, but it denies the possibility of a hierarchy of forms (indeed
he treats quantifiers as eliminable from a logically perspicuous language).

So the Token Theory is token to the extent that it embodies the

meta-semantic claim that nothing about the semantic properties of a language is sayable.

In other words, the sentences that comprise these-

mantic theory of the Tractatus cannot be included within the domain of
that very theory.

Yhis, as we noted earlier, occasions the need to pos-

tulate nonsensical expressions within a language.

The semantics of the

Tractatus is only a token theory, because unlike the theories of natural

science it cannot claim for itself any genuine explanatory power.
Although it hardly sounds like a compliment to say so, the Tractatus es-
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capes Frege's minimalism by virtue of the nonsense it contains.
not be until a later chapter, Chapter
be

It will

v, that the nature of nonsense can

laid out in any detail.
By the end of Chapter II we have an account of the bipolarity of

the proposition and an initial characterization of the distinction between showing and saying~ together these comprise the general lines of
the Picture Theory of the Proposition.
rate upon the Picture Theory.

Chapters III, IV, and V elabo-

They bring its details into focus by con-

sidering three sorts of counter-examples to the thesis that the number
of pictorial or propositional elements must be isomorphic to the number
of objects thus represented.

The initial theory must be augmented so as

to accommodate sentences containing names of non-existent objects
(Chapter III), sentences containing logical constants, i.e., sentenceforming operators and quantifiers (Chapter IV), and sentences that appear to contain an intensional or non-truth-functional element as found
in propositional attitude ascriptions and oratio obliqua (Chapter V).
In each case we find it is Russell, rather than Moore or Frege, who
serves as Wittgenstein's greatest influence.
Chapter III begins by considering the problem of reference failure.

We will see how Russell's Theory of Descriptions provides

Wittgenstein with the tool necessary for dealing with this matter.
Although Russell's Theory of Descriptions receives little explicit
treatment in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is clearly sympathetic with the
manner in which it is used to eliminate ontological commitments to such

unwanted entities as the golden mountain and the present King of France.
As we will see, by distinguishing between the "apparent logical form of
a proposition ••• [and] its real one" (1922b, 4.0031), Wittgenstein is
able to expand his idea of pictorial form in such a way as to accommodate problematic cases in which the structures of sentences do not approximate the structures of pictures.

7

This expansion requires a commit-

ment to the existence (or subsistence) of simple objects that constitute
the substance of the world.

Russell and Wittgenstein would both become

logical atomists, but as we shall see, their respective atomisms differ
in important respects.
As it turns out, Russell's argument for atomism would remain

largely epistemological (baaed upon his distinction between knowledge by
acquaintance and knowledge by description), whereas Wittgenstein's would
stem purely from semantic considerations (that is, from a consideration
of what makes sense possible).

The two philosophers also differ with

regard to the degree to which they allow themselves to be committed ontologically to the existence of simple objects.

For Wittgenstein they

are the substance of the world; for Russell they are primarily the
residue of analysis, a residue that might be eliminated by means of
ugreater logical skill" (1924, p. 173)

Finally, both differ in terms of

their ontologies, although neither•s discussion of the matter is unambiguous.

Russell's ontology stays closely tied to his epistemology, so

that he eventually identifies simple objects with particulars with which
one may be acquainted.

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, adopts a much

more agnostic stance after a lengthy soliloquy (reproduced in his
Notebooks) in which he attempts to reconcile his belief that there must
be simple objects with his apparent inability to characterize them.
The strength and the real weakness of Wittgenstein's argument for
simple objects has generally gone unappreciated by commentators.

Most

commentators view the argument as one that calls for the existence of
simple objects in order to block one or another infinite regress.

Black

(1964, pp. 58ff), for example, suggests that Wittgenstein maintains
there must be a terminus for analysis if anyone is to know the meaning
of a proposition.

Unless there were such a terminus, a person would

have to know the meaning of an infinite number of propositions in order
to know the meaning of even one.

However, it will be demonstrated that
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this sort of epistemological regress flies in the face of a considerable
quantity of the text.
(1935).

Another possibility is that suggested by Weinberg

According to Weinberg, unless simple objects serve as the ter-

minus for analysis, propositions would never refer to an extra-linguistic reality (1935, p. 80).
and to nothing else.

Propositions would be related to one another

This construal of his argument at least does jus-

tice to Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with Frege•s minimalist semantics
in which semantic theory is reduced to the theory of inference.

But,

for reasons discussed below, the argument presented by Weinberg is so
obviously invalid that it hardly warrants consideration.
Weinberg's interpretations are now considered standard.

Black's and

Perhaps the

greatest virtue of Chapter III lies in the fact that it exploits the
texts (including those of the pre-Tractarian writings) in such a way as
to provide a considerably more charitable interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument than has heretofore been offered.

My interpretation

construes it as a valid deductive argument that has as one of its major
premises the thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition.

That there is

a link between bipolarity and logical atomism has not gone unnoticed,
for example by White (1974), but the exact way in which one moves from
premises concerning bipolarity to a conclusion concerning the existence
of simple objects has never been made explicit.
The weaknesses commentators attribute to Wittgenstein's argument
for atomism typically depend upon assigning him an overly weak argument.
If one accepts the usual interpretations of the argument, one cannot

help but notice their invalidity.

This leaves one with the opinion that

if one must accept the argument for logical atomism in order to accept
the rest of Tractarian se111antics, then one may as well give the whole
of Tractarian semantics up.

But this opinion is not justified.

The

Tractatus is stronger than that, as my rendition of the argument is designed to show.

If the argument has any major flaw, it resides in the
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unmet need to explain how complex objects could consist of objects that
are not composite.

I maintain that Wittgenstein has an answer to this

question in his ontological distinction between facts (Tatsachen) and
states of affairs (Sachverhalten).

In order for the distinction between

facts and states of affairs to assist in the resolution of the metaphysical problem of how complex objects can consist of non-composite objects, it is necessary to show that the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus is
true.

Thus the analysis the Picture Theory provides for elementary

propositions depends upon that which can be given for molecular propositions.

The defense of this thesis is what distinguishes this particular

account of the semantics of the Tractatus from all others offered thusfar.
Chapter IV presents Wittgenstein's argument for the Grundgedanke.
We begin in that chapter by considering Russell's position on the subject.

Although Russell does not want to admit molecular facts, he is

willing to countenance negative facts.

Furthermore, we consider

Sartre's phenomenological reasons for admitting negative facts
(negatites) into his ontology.

The argument for the Grundgedanke must

answer to these considerations.
Normally the thesis that the logical constants do not refer is
presented as an assumption that must be made if the account of molecular
propositions is to consistent with the Picture Theory's requirement that
there be an isomorphism between referring terms within language and objects within the world.

Where scholars do interpret Wittgenstein as

having an argument, the argument is readily seen as begging the question.

Chapter IV seeks to remedy this by providing a strong (though not

deductively valid) argument for the Grundgedanke.

I argue that this

claim can be defended on the basis of bipolarity without begging the
question.

To my knowledge only one scholar has noted the historical tie

between the Grundgedanke and Wittgenstein's earlier thoughts concerning
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the bipolarity of the proposition, namely, McGuiness (1974); but none
have demonstrated the way in which the one serves as premise in an argument for the other.

This I seek to do.

The task requires unpacking

Wittgenstein's comments concerning what he calls the general form of
the proposition.

It is argued that the general form of the proposition

is to be identified with what is expressed by what I call the minimal
truth table.

That this truth table can be construed as expressively

complete, whereas that countenanced by Wittgenstein's would-be adversary
cannot be considered as such, establishes the truth of the Grundgedanke.
The Grundgedanke carries with it two major implications.

The

first is that the logical propositions--tautologies and contradictions-must be considered senseless (sinnlos).

What chapter IV attempts to do

is explain how the semantics of the Tractatus must be expanded to include senseless as well as sensical propositions.
plication is ontological.

The other major im-

It is necessary to distinguish between facts

(Tatsachen) and states of affairs (Sachverhalten) such that the former
are not reducible to the latter.

This sort of metaphysics displaces

concerns raised in the previous chapter over the intelligibility of
there being complex objects or states of affairs that have as heir constituents other objects that in no way can be considered complex.
Whereas Chapter III takes up the question of sentences containing
names of non-existent objects (thereby bringing to completion the account of sense), and Chapter IV considers sentences containing sentenceforming operators (thus introducing the category of what is senseless),
Chapter v takes up the issue of how to interpret sentences that appear
to contain an intensional or non-truth-functional element as found in
propositional attitude ascriptions and oratio obliqua, and, indeed, as
found in the very sentences that make up the Tractatus itself.
Chapter v turns to those sentences that perhaps pose the most significant challenge to the principal theses constituting the Picture
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Theory of the Proposition.

Propositional attitude ascriptions, and

oratio obliqua, attempt to say something about the projective relation
that holds between a proposition or a propositional sign and the state
of affairs of which it is true or false.,

Considerations of the sort

that led Wittgenstein to reject Russell's Paradox lead him, in the

Tractatus, to conclude that one sentence cannot say what another sentence does or does not say--indeed, that a sentence cannot say of it-

self what it does or does not say.

The argument is not entirely evident

in the Tractatus, but it becomes so if the relation between the class
and semantic paradoxes is born in mind.

Nevertheless, it is necessary

for there to be a projective relation between proposition and fact if
the one is to be a model (Bild) of the other.

Sentences of proposition-

al attitude attempt to convey something about this relation.

Since this

relation must be a necessary condition for the possibility of representation, and since only propositions about what is contingent have sense,
it follows that sentences of propositional attitude should have no
sense.

Yet clearly a sentence of the form

us believes (says, etc.)

pn

is neither a tautology nor a contradiction.

Thus it would not be accu-

rate to label such sentences as senseless.

Wittgenstein's solution re-

quires viewing all sentences of propositional attitude as containing two
distinct semantic components.
Consider
tive clause

(us

us believes P." Let us distinguish between the ascripbelieves ••• ") which assigns a particular kind of propo-

sitional attitude to a particular subject and the content clause
(u ••• P")

which specifies what is believed by the subject.

On

Wittgenstein's view the ascriptive clause must be regarded as nonsensi-

cal (unsinnig).

In a manner to be described in detail below, it is that

aspect of the ascription which attempts to convey something of the proIn what follows I will speak only of propositional attitude ascriptions and not of oratio obliqua. Clearly Wittgenstein does not draw any
crucial distinction between the two.
3
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jective relation that makes representation possible.

This does not mean

one cannot say anything about propositional attitudes and other mental
states, even though Wittgenstein's sparse remarks on the subject tempt
one to adopt such an interpretation.

Certain remarks in the Tractatus

suggest, in fact, that much can be said about psychological states, but
that that is not a matter of importance to its author.

What is impor-

tant is that the existence of propositional attitudes presupposes that
there is a metaphysical subject whose willing forms the ground for all
representation whatsoever.

Because the subject and its will constitute

a necessary condition for the possibility of representation, it cannot
be the subject matter of any proposition with sense.

Instead, its pres-

ence is shown in the very act of believing, hoping, asserting (etc.)
that a given proposition with sense is true.

When one attempts to say

something about the willing subject (or about anything that constitutes
a necessary condition for the possibility of representation, as all the
sentences of the Tractatus attempt to do) what results is nonsense.

As

I understand that term, a sentence can be nonsensical without its individual terms failing to refer.

Sentences are nonsensical, not because

they lack semantic properties like reference, but because they are systematically misleading:

since all saying pertains to what is contin-

gent, and since the existence of the willing subject cannot (on
Wittgenstein's view) be contingent, any attempt to say something about
it will inevitably distort its nature.

Anyhow, it is that feature of

sentences which produces such nonsense that constitutes the second major
extension of Wittgenstein's conception of showing.

As we shall see

below, many of Wittgenstein's principal theses and the arguments upon
which they are based are highly contentious.
The preceding remarks pertain only to the ascriptive clause within
us believes that P."

ment.

The content clause upn receives separate treat-

It is regarded as having the very same semantic properties it
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would have if it were asserted and not merely ascribed to some subject.
Thus npn (i) can have a sense, provided it expresses a contingent truth,
or (ii) can be senseless, if it corresponds to a logical proposition,
i.e., a tautology or a contradiction, or (iii) it can be in part nonsensical, if upw is itself a sentence of propositional attitude.

As we

will see, this third possibility raises serious problems for the
Tractarian account of propositional attitudes as well as for Tractarian
semantics in general.

As mentioned earlier, the Tractatus can provide

no adequate account for second-order propositional attitude ascriptions.
Once this is acknowledged, the dominoes begin to fall.

The final domino

is the syntacticist or structuralist assumption concerning the roles
logical structure and form play within a semantic theory.

That is to

say, the presumption of an isomorphism between language and world, so
central to the Picture Theory, must be relinquished.
2.

Limitations.
The five chapters that comprise this work are limited to a discus-

sion of the strengths and weaknesses of Tractarian semantics.

With few

exceptions do I deal with any texts other than the pre-Tractarian writings, the Tractatus itself, and some of the material from his Cambridge
lectures of 1929-1930.

Nevertheless the unraveling of the Tractatus, as

recorded in the Philosophical Remarks (1930) and the Philosophical
Grammar (1932), and its ultimate replacement by what is contained in the
Philosophical Investigations (1958), is an intriguing topic.

Unfortunately, an adequate treatment of the historical development of
Wittgenstein's thought following the Tractatus and of the adequacy and
inadequacy of the arguments it contains would comprise a work many times
longer than the present one.

I would, however, like to conclude this

Introduction by giving some indication of how the principal claims attributed to Wittgenstein in this dissertation happened to evolve in his
later work.
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As I mentioned above, the principal thesis of the Tractatus is

that there can be no purely truth-functional semantic theory.

A truth-

functional semantic theory is one which maintains that an account of the
essence of language (and perhaps of thought) is to be cashed out in
terms of an account of what makes uttered sentences (and occasioned
thoughts) true or false.

The Tractatus presents three exceptions to any

theory that attempts to make truth its corverstone.

Bach falls under

the rubric of what cannot be said (i.e., evaluated as true or false) but
only shown1 there is (i) what is shown by a propositional sign that is
meaningful (namely, its sense), (ii) what is shown by a senseless propositional sign that is tautologous or contradictory (viz., something
Wittgenstein calls the form of language and the world, plus a certain
kind of know-how concerning how to operate with symbols), and (iii) what
is shown by nonsensical propositional signs (namely, the necessary conditions for the possibility of representation itself, including, most
importantly, what Wittgenstein refers to as the will which effects the
projective relation between propositional sign and world).

Underlying

each of these conceptions of showing (particularly the last two) is a
view of language as a human accomplishment.

This idea comes to fruition

in the later philosophy where the use of linguistic tokens is deemed the
most essential feature of language.
Even though the later philosophy shares none of the atomistic
metaphysics of the Tractatus, there exists considerable continuity in
the perpetuation of a semantic distinction between saying and showing.
In the early philosophy, the capacity of a propositional sign to say or
to show anything whatsoever is dependent upon it having both a structure
and form isomorphic to actual and possible states of affairs in the
world that constitute the meaning (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn) of the
sign.

Both ways in which language function, by saying and showing, de-

pend upon what is actual and possible in the world.
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Once shorn of its

metaphysical underpinnings the first of the three conceptions of showing
goes by the wayside, but the shadowy dimensions of the second and third-what is expressed in the senseless and nonsensical--takes on such substance as to make them the centerpiece of the new semantics.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of senseless tautologies and contradictions.

In the early philosophy, propositional

signs that share these structures cannot be regarded as making statements capable of truth or falsehood.

If they are informative at all, it

is by virtue of displaying the limits of language and the world, i.e.,
the limits of what can be said, and said of, the world.

Yet they do not

do this by virtue of being discursive elements of a meta-language.

(As

we shall see in the course of the chapters below, according to Wittgen-

stein, a propositional sign with one structure cannot say what a propositional sign with another structure says.)

Rather they provide speak-

ers with prototypes or linguistic exemplars of what can be said.

They

serve as rules of inference or transformational rules, although referring to them as such can be misleading if one has an overly rationalistic or cognitivistic conception of rules.

They are expressions of one's

know-how, and one may be said to understand them without ever having
consciously entertained them.

When they are uttered they constitute a

sort of demonstration (commentators often refer to them as presentations
rather than representations).

In the hands of the author of the

Philosophical Investigations and the Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics the so-called logical propositions become transformed into
the grammatical propositions of the later semantics.

These have a simi-

lar function to fulfill in that they determine what constitutes a meaningful utterance within a language~ they are the rules of language
games.

Like the earlier rules they do not need to be consciously enter-

tained.

Unlike the earlier rules, no particular grammatical proposition

lies implicit within the very nature of language itself~ their status is
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much more a matter of convention.

Whereas the employment of the earlier

rules could be said to reflect a reality having a crystalline logical
structure, the grammatical propositions of the later philosophy structure what is to count as possibly true and real.

Considered in them-

selves, they are neither true nor false but antecedent to truth.

They

provide their viewers with prototypical instances of linguistic behavior
that can be mimicked by those who are disposed to find in them a use.
Instructing someone in the use of signs by uttering a grammatical proposition can be likened to teaching a person how to shovel by pantomiming
the movements one makes with a shovel.
The fate of the nonsensical expressions is no less interesting.
In the Tractatus the semantic category of nonsense is introduced to accommodate statements, like those that make up the Tractatus itself, that
pertain to the essence of language.

This third semantic category is ne-

cessitated by the fact that these statements seem to be neither contingent (as are all sentences with a sense), nor do they seem tautologous
or contradictory (as are senseless sentences).

What is interesting is

that sentences that express propositional attitude ascriptions--e.g.,

•s

believes that P"--fall into this category, because the ascriptive clause
(us

believes ••• ") refers to something that essentially involves the

will.

It is the will that effects the projective relation that is es-

sential to making the propositional sign into a proposition; that is to
say, it is the will that accomplishes representation by means of the
sign that serves as medium

As I suggested above, we will see that the

Tractarian account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions turns out to be extremely problematic.

The problems that arise

here are more significant, and perhaps have more to do with why
Tractarian semantics ought to be abandoned, than the traditional problems (like the supposition that the world possesses a substance of simple immutable objects or the color exclusion problem) that are attribut-
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ed to the Tractatus.

The problems are two-fold.

First, the whole con-

ception of what is nonsensical rests on an untenable account of necessity (and of law-like statements) and of what is and is not necessarily
so.

Indeed, the Tractatus cannot provide any account whatsoever of sec-

ond-order propositional attitude ascriptions (like MJohn believes Mary
loves him") without relinquishing its conception of the nonsensical.
But this produces a series of irresolvable problems for the author of
the Tractatus.

Once we remove the need to see the psychological as be-

longing to the ineffable, one of the main threads of Tractarian semantics begins to unravel and with it the last barrier to a thorough-going
naturalistic account of the ascriptive clause in which one may say or
state what is essential to the projective relation itself.
dominoes begin to fall:

Here the

the de re necessity that constitutes the form

(but not the actual structure) of the world is lost, and with it is lost
the conditions of the world which fix the senses of the sentences of our
language.

Ultimately what would have to be abandoned would be what

Wittgenstein later disparagingly refers to as the conception of the
world as having a crystalline logical form and of sense as determinate.
What is retained in the later philosophy is something of the
Tractarian account given of the content clause of the propositional attitude ascription.

The Tractatus gives the content clause a disquota-

tional analysis which, as I suggested earlier, reemerges as the logical
(or criterial) behaviorism of the Philosophical Investigation, a doctrine that I take to be compatible with instrumentalism in the philoso-

phy of mind.

Here the role played by showing looms large.

To borrow a

phrase from a contemporary advocate of the disquotational analysis, the
utterance of a propositional attitude ascription constitutes a kind of
uplay-acting," a uskit or demonstration" (Stich, 1983, pp. 83-84).

The

fact is that it is difficult not to assimilate belief and other propositional attitude ascriptions to the grammatical propositions mentioned
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earlier.

So what we see as the later philosophy develops is the col-

lapse of the distinction between the nonsensical and the senseless; and
when the latter is stripped of its ontological underpinnings, the result
is a certain form of Instrumentalism.
Instrumentalism and other forms of skepticism concerning the
reification of intentional and semantic properties have recently come
under attack as upragmatically incoherent• (Baker (1987), pp. 134ff).
In uThe Wittgensteinian Consistency of scepticism:

An Antiseptic for

the Anti-Sceptic" (Levvis, 1992) I have argued that the incoherence attributed to Instrumentalism can be avoided by wedding Instrumentalism to
a Wittgensteinian account of grammatical propositions.
Although Criterial Behaviorism is a form of Instrumentalism, it
should not be assimilated to the Instrumentalism currently advanced in
the philosophy of mind.

While its principal proponent, Dennett (1978;

1989), is correct in saying that our talk of the mental plays no explanatory role, he is wrong to treat it merely as playing a predictive
role.

There is much more going on when we talk about the mental.

And

it is, I believe, to Wittgenstein's credit that he recognized that using
and understanding psychological predicates involve a hermeneutical element not required of statements that are purely predictive or hypothetical.

It is in fact the distinguishing mark of Wittgenstein's hermeneu-

tics that what we call understanding anothers' words or deeds requires
treating others' behavior as variable and unpredictable.

There is a

threshold beyond which behavior that is too predictable ceases to be behavior.

Levvis (1991) seeks to explain this by unpacking the seemingly

obscure passage in the Philosophical Investigations that u[i]f a lion
could talk, we could not understand him" (1958, p. 223).

(Bad

Wittgenstein been writing in a later time period, he probably would have
said that if computers could talk (which, of course, they can), we would
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not understand them.)•

Such a view stands in utter contrast to the

structuralist or syntacticist philosophy of the Tractatus.

It is ates-

timony to the genius that inspired that work that what is best in it
should support what is most contentious in the Philosophical
Investigations.

4 Both of the articles referred to above were originally intended to
be chapters of this dissertation. There inclusion became less practical
as the task of interpreting and evaluating Tractarian semantics grew
larger.
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CHAPTER I

PRE-TRACTARIAN SEMANTICS (I):
FROM MOORE'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT TO THE BIPOLARITY OF THE PROPOSITION

1.

Historical Background.
Wittgenstein suggests in the Preface to his Philosophical

Investigations that the ideas contained within that work are best understood in "contrast with and against the background of" the views he had
espoused in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1958, p. vi).

This

chapter and the next take Wittgenstein's advice one step further by examining the development of his thought prior to writing the Tractatus
and indeed even prior to writing the world war I Notebooks.

The pro-

gression of Wittgenstein's views during this time period offers an invaluable backdrop for our examination of Tractarian semantics.

His ear-

liest views were expressed in conversations with Russell that took place
in Cambridge during the winter of 1911.

If Russell's description of

these conversations is to be trusted, then it appears that Wittgenstein
at the time advocated a relational theory of judgment similar to that
held by G. E. Moore in "The Nature of Judgment" (1899).'

What is most

significant about such a theory is that it treats truth as a property of
facts or states of affairs that are judged rather than as a property of
the act or even the content of judgment.

In its unwillingness to coun-

tenance the existence of mental contents the theory stands diametrically
opposed to any any form of correspondence theory.

As will become clear-

er below, the theory is fraught with numerous difficulties, not the
least among which is its inability to adequately account for false
propositions and negative existential judgments.

During the two years

Baldwin (1993, p. vii) points out that this article originally appeared as a chapter in Moore's 1898 Fellowship dissertation for Trinity
College entitled, "The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics."
5
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following these conversations with Russell we find Wittgenstein
wrestling with these issues and with problems that he thinks are inherent in Russell's Theory of Types.

Bis -Notes on LogicH (1913b), uNotes

Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway" (1914a), and various letters penned to
Russell prior to 1914 show us the direction in which his thought
moving.

W"-S

we find him embracing the claim, for example, that there only

exist true propositions, i..e., that in a certain respect there are no
false propositions--or, as at least no false empirical propositions.•
Some of the oddity of this claim goes away when it is viewed in the context of a relational theory of judgment which equates propositions and
facts.

Nevertheless, the theory winds up with an untenable account of

false empirical judgments.

Furthermore, like Moore and like the Russell

of The Principles of Mathematics (1903), we find him willing to countenance the existence of negative facts in order to account for the possibility of negative existential judgments.

Finally, and most important-

ly, we find in his criticism of Russell's Theory of Types and his defense of certain Fregean doctrines the Tractarian distinction between
showing and saying in its embryonic form.

Needless to say, the influ-

ence of Frege upon Wittgenstein during this time is enormous.

In fact,

in certain respects, the distinction between showing and saying (which
to Wittgenstein's mind makes a theory of types unnecessary) is prefigured in that philosopher's writings.
This period of Wittgenstein's thinking comes to a close (no later
than June of 1913) when he raises certain objections to Russell's multiple object theory of judgment consonant with the principal semantic
themes of the Tractatus.

As is well known, these criticisms forced

Russell to abandon all work on his 1913 epistemological manuscript which
6 For Moore, we shall see, when one asserts a false statements, one's
utterance is about something (or about some set of things, namely, a
group of properties that fail to be concatenated) that has Being but not
existence. What is tenuous about his position is that when one makes a
false statement, one is not making a statement about empirical reality.
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would have provided an extensive explication of various theses presented
all too briefly in Problems of Philosophy (1912). 7

It is in this year

that the famous Grundgedanke of the Tractatus would occur to
Wittgenstein:

the idea that the logical constants do not serve as re-

ferring expressions.

The Grundgedanke, along with his theses concerning

the bipolarity of the proposition and (most importantly) the distinction
between showing and saying, constitute the three principal semantic doctrines of the Tractatus.

They are the essential doctrines of the

Picture Theory of the Proposition.

Of these three doctrines the dis-

tinction between showing and saying is, as mentioned earler, the most
important.

It would, indeed, continue to play a central role in his

later writings, only in that context it would serve the interests of a
deflationary semantic theory.
These first three chapters are devoted to Wittgenstein's theses
concerning the bipolarity of the proposition and the distinction between
showing and saying.

It would be accurate to say that the principal the-

sis concerning the bipolarity of the proposition emerges from concerns
over the inadequacy of Moore's theory of judgment, whereas the distinction between showing and saying emerges from concerns over Frege's vulnerability to Russell's Class Paradox.

Section Two below examines the

problems posed by Moore's theory of judgment.

Section Three is con-

cerned to show why it is necessary to countenance the bipolarity of the
proposition in order to overcome these problems.

One of the important

features of that section is that it enables us to see the uniqueness of
Wittgenstein's distinction between sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung).
Contrary to many commentators, I do not construe the sense of a proposition as a (that is to say, one) possible fact or state of affairs which
either obtains or fails to obtain.

Rather, I view the sense of a propo-

Russell's manuscript was published posthumously as Theory of
Knowledge (1913).
7
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sition as a set of possible facts or states of affairs.

In contrast,

the meaning of a proposition is the member of this set which actually
makes the proposition true or false.

This view of sense and meaning

carries important implications for how we are to understand
Wittgenstein's conception of truth conditions within the Tractatus.

If

one considers only the Tractatus, and neglects the Pre-Tractarian writings and some of the works written immediately after the Tractatus, one
is likely to think that Wittgenstein regarded falsehood merely as the
non-occurrence of a fact or state of affairs that is asserted by someone
to be the case.

one might be tempted, in other words, that Wittgenstein

countenances truth conditions but not falsifying conditions.

This, I

shall argue, is an incorrect interpretation of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus.
The first section of the next chapter examines Russell's Theory of
Types and Wittgenstein's initial reaction to it.

To fully appreciate

the force of Wittgenstein's views it will be necessary to examine
Frege's own views at some length.

In an important respect Wittgenstein

can be understood as retrieving aspects of Frege's semantic theory from
the threat posed by Russell's Class Paradox; yet his view is markedly
dissimilar from Frege's.

Like Frege, Wittgenstein would hold that the

semantic features of a language must be reflected in its syntactic or
logical form; unlike Frege, Wittgenstein would not be willing to regard
sentences and formulae as functioning like names.

Why that cannot be

the case will turn out to be the key to why he believes an illogical
language is impossible, and that, in turn, is the key to why he believes
a theory of types is not necessary.
It is only in this light that the distinction between showing and
saying may be appreciated--not merely as a conventional alternative to
Russell's Theory of Types--but as a necessary semantic distinction.

An

examination of the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus, which rounds out the
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principal semantic theses of the Tractatus, will be put off until
Chapter IV.

It, and the Picture Theory of the proposition as a whole,

will be treated as a consequence of the bipolarity of the proposition
and the distinction between showing and saying.•
2.

Moore's Relational Theory Qt Judgment.
Wittgenstein's earliest views bear the stamp of G. E. Moore.

This

much is evident from numerous conversations held between Wittgenstein
and Russell in the early winter months of 1911.

The contents of these

conversations were recorded on a nearly daily basis by Russell in his
letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell (reprinted in Monk, 1990, pp. 39-40):
My German engineer very argumentative & tiresome.
He wouldn't admit that it was certain that there was
not a rhinoceros in the room. (l November 1911)
My German engineer, I think, is a fool. He thinks nothing empirical is knowable--! asked him to admit that there
was not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldn't.
(2 November 1911)
[Wittgenstein] was refusing to admit the existence
of anything except asserted propositions.
(7 November 1911)
My German ex-engineer, as usual, maintained his thesis
that there is nothing in the world except asserted propositions ••• (13 November 1911)
Later in life Russell would mention that his own assessment of
Wittgenstein's intelligence was made difficult by the views he espoused
at the time:
He maintained, for example, at one time that all existtential propositions are meaningless ••• I invited him to
consider the proposition: 'There is no hippopotamus in
this room at present.' When he refused to believe this,
I looked under all the desks without finding one: but he
remained unconvinced (1951, p. 297: as quoted in McGuiness,

8 Let me point out that the title of this chapter is somewhat a misnomer. Themes that emerge prior to, but continue to play a major role
within, the Tractatus will be explicated with reference to passages from
that text.
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1988, p. 89).'
The set of theses to which Russell refers constitute a relational
theory of judgment such as that advocated by Moore in the 1899 article,
uThe Nature of Judgment.n

This article is one of several in which Moore

disputes the idealism of F.

e. Bradley by calling attention to an ambi-

guity in that author's use of the word Midea,n viz., that the word is
used to denote both the act of consciousness or judgment, as well as the
object of consciousness or judgment.••

In the Principles of Logic (1883)

Bradley had attacked the empiricist claim that an individual's ideas are
reducible to ~ollections of introspectable experiences.

Against this

reductivist claim Bradley had argued that the contents of consciousness
or judgment must be construed as possessing an irreducibly universal
character (1883, p. 4).

In saying this he intended not only to deny the

epistemological thesis that the contents of consciousness and judgment
are arrived at or produced by such mental operations as association and
abstraction, but to affirm the ontological thesis that the objects of
these states just are universals, i.e., abstract entities that are mindindependent.

9 Although Russell attributes to Wittgenstein the view that all existential propositions are meaningless, his example is a negative existential proposition. I think we can say confidently that the issue between
them at least pertained to negative existentials. That would be a supposition consistent with the letters to Ottoline Morrell. Whether the
the topic concerned all existential judgments we are not in a position
to say. one of the earlier letters does, however, assign to him the belief that nothing empirical is knowable. Nothing in the chapters ahead
really hangs on this issue. Clearly, by the time Wittgenstein wrote the
Tractatus he believed that existential propositions were not needed at
the atomic level, since at that level of analysis all names are assumed
to have reference to simple, subsistent objects. At any level other
than the atomic level existential propositions are to be construed as
assertions that some fact obtains.
10 one good indication that Wittgenstein was on board with those opposed to Idealism is his 1913 review of P. Coffey's The Science of
Logic (1913). Wittgenstein criticizes Coffey (perhaps unjustly) for believing #that reality is changed by becoming the object of our thoughts"
(1913a, p. 3).
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Bradley's use of the term uidea" to denote the objects of consciousness and judgment did not worry Moore.

For example, Moore would

have no difficulty with uses of a phrase such as uMy idea of greenness ••• " when the phrase is construed as being about greenness itself.
However, Bradley would also describe the meanings of signs or symbols as
universal in character (1883, p. 5), and often he would use the term
"idea" to denote a type of sign albeit one that is mental in nature
(1883, p. 5).
medium.

But the very idea of a sign is that of a representational

Thus Bradley had used the word to designate both that which is

represented a~ well as that which represents.

In this way he was com-

mitted to there being mental representations that occupy an intermediate
position between subjects and the objects concerning which judgments are
formed.

It was this commitment to mental representations that Moore

found objectionable.
The thrust of Moore's objection is epistemological.

on Bradley's

view the truth or falsehood of judgments is dependent upon the relations
that obtain between one's ideas (construed as mental representations)
and reality (1883, p. 2).

The relating of the mental representation to

reality, for Bradley, is an accomplishment on the part of the mind.

In

judgment a particular content is "cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign" (1883, p. 4).

But, coun-

ters Moore, in order for the mind to fix or determine some content that
is attributable to reality, it must have some idea of the reality to
which the content shall be affixed.

Forming true judgments would re-

quire of subjects a capacity to transcend the representation-world relation in order to determine whether the two correspond, indeed, in order
to determine which mental representation corresponds to reality.
Moore's point of view, this entails an infinite regress:

From

not only would

one have to form a secondary judgment about one's primary judgment, but
a tertiary judgment about one's secondary judgment, and so on.
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Moore

concludes,
[t]he theory would ••• seem to demand the completion
of an infinite number of psychological judgments before
any judgment can be made at all. But such a completion
is impossible~ and therefore all judgment is likewise
impossible. It follows, therefore, if we are to avoid
this absurdity, that the 'idea used in judgment' must be
something other than a part of the content of any idea
of mine (1899, p. 178).
For our purposes it matters little whether the infinite regress which
Moore attributes to Bradley can be blocked.

(To be sure, Moore greatly

underestimates the role assigned to intuition by Bradley and the extent
to which reality itself fixes the meanings of mental representations~
cf. 1883, p. 44ff.)

What is important is that if, as Moore believes,

one is unable to form a true judgment without first possessing both an
idea of the meaning of one's mental representation as well as an idea
of the reality thus represented, then it is superfluous to posit the ex-

istence of mental representations.

Mental representations are supposed

to make judgments about reality possible, yet their ability to do so
presupposes (on pain of infinite regress) a direct awareness of the reality which allegedly stands in need of such representation.
For Moore, then, the immediate objects of consciousness and judgment must be mind-independent realities rather than mere representations
of such realities.

To think otherwise would be to confuse the object of

consciousness with something subjective, that is, with something which
is more appropriately viewed as belonging to the act of consciousness.
Ideas (construed as contents or meanings) must not be confused with anything psychological.

Attempting to avoid the ambiguities inherent in

the word "idea," Moore chooses to use the word uconcept" to designate
the objects of consciousness.

For him there is nothing psychological

about concepts~ they are not, for example, mere products of a mental act
of conceiving.

"A concept," Moore tells us, "is not a mental fact, nor
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any part of a mental factw (1899, p. 179).
Concepts, for Moore, are universals.
which exist independent of any mind.

They are abstract entities

Moore is a metaphysical realist

(or Platonist) concerning the existence of universals:

being aware of a

red object involves a relation to an entity which is the redness of the
object, and this very same entity is a term of any relation involving an
awareness of some particular object to which the property of redness is
attributed.

Moore's theory should be distinguished from nominalistic

approaches which countenance the possibility of two objects possessing
similar but not identical properties.

Nominalistic accounts typically

view the nature of a property as being contingent in some manner or
other upon the particular object to which it is attributed.

But, for

Moore, concepts (properties) are in no way dependent upon the objects to
which they are assigned.

If they were, then it would not be possible to

form awarenesses or judgments about concepts themselves.

But it is pos-

sible, for example, to simply be aware of redness or to form a judgment
that red is a color, and in neither case does one's mental act involve a
relation to any particular object to which redness or coloredness is attributed.
places.

Such awarenesses can occur at different times and different
Since the objects of such awarenesses are not to be identified

with anything subjective, they too must persist from time to time and
from place to place.

Bence, like Plato's Forms, Moore's concepts are

immutable and eternal.
Typically realists describe the relation between particular objects and the properties attributable to them as one of the former participating in, partaking of, exemplifying, or instantiating the latter.
None of these phrases are accurate·in this case, since for Moore there
are no particulars truly distinguishable from universals.

Moore asserts

at one place that the world consists of nothing but concepts (1899, p.
182).

A particular object, on this view, is nothing more than a com.bi-
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nation (perhaps a unique combination) of concepts.

Put another way, an

object is but a certain concrescence of immutable (1899, p. 180) properties at a particular time and in a particular place. 11
the question we should consider is:

This being so,

what distinguishes concepts which

appear to be instantiated in space and time from those which are not?
After all, the concept of a unicorn is just as much a concept of a physical thing as is the concept of a horse.

Both are complex concepts

which would be analyzed in terms of their components.

(It should be

noted that Moore's model of analysis involves treating a complex concept
as a kind of object whose parts are to be enumerated: it does not involve defining a concept in terms of its genus and differentia.)

Since

both concepts are concepts of things which have physical parts, given
Moore's conception of analysis, both the concept of a unicorn and the
concept of a horse must be analyzed as physical things, even though the
latter exist but the former do not.
greater focus.

Allow me to bring the problem into

Suppose one perceives an actual horse.

one stands in a relation to the concept of a horse.

At that instant

But then suppose

one imagines a unicorn or, better, a unicorn that exists. 12

In each case

the objects of one's awareness are alike in terms of being physical.
One cannot say of the unicorn that its physicalness merely resides uin
the mind" of the person imagining it.

Clearly, for Moore, no recourse

Here we must be cautious not to inadvertently smuggle into our account of Moore's view entities that play the role of particulars that
may be instantiated. Above we spoke of the concatenation of concepts
at a particular time and at a particular place. This wording is forced
upon us, but it should not be taken to mean that times and places are
particulars of a peculiar sort. If the universe, for Moore, consists of
nothing but concepts (properties), then times and places are concepts
too. As we proceed we shall see just how problematic this is for Moore.
Once particulars are eliminated from an ontology, it becomes impossible
to devise a relation among concepts that can play the same role as instantiation. The problem then becomes one of how to distinguish what
merely possesses Being from what possesses existence.
12 I presume this is no more problematic than imagining that one's
great-great-great-great grandparents are still alive.
11
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can be made to entities Min# the mind.

so, how, on Moore's view, shall

we distinquish what is merely imaginary from what is actually perceivable?

If there is no way for Moore to draw this distinction, we have a

reductio of his view.

Moore's problem comes to thisa

how can a unicorn

be a physical object but not be located in physical space?

generally:

or, more

how can there be physical obiects which possess no physical

properties?
As we shall see, Moore does offer a solution to this problem by
assigning a special role to the concept of existence and to temporality.
Before examining his solution, however, let me dispel any worry the
reader might have that the problem introduced above is in some way
trite.

I want to do this because I think that although Moore may very

well be able to circumvent the particular problem just posed (namely as
to how there could be, external to the mind, something with physical
properties that is not located in physical space), once his solution is
on the table the very same kind of problem reoccurs.

If the reader be-

lieves that this kind of problem amounts to nothing more than an attack
upon a straw man, little of what follows may seem philosophically relevant.
The reason one might be tempted to regard this kind of problem as
an attack upon a straw man is that one is inclined to think it is a mistake to regard the concept of a physical thing as, itself, a physical
thing.

Although it is not possible for Moore to resolve the question by

treating the concept of a physical thing as a representational entity, 13
one might want to argue on Moore's behalf that we are failing to distinguish between concepts (or properties) and their instantiation.

If con-

This would resolve the problem by permitting a sentence such as
"John imagines that a unicorn is eating his slippers" to be construed
intensionally (i.e., by assigning a de dicto interpretation to the embedded noun clause). Someone could thus conceive of a unicorn while residing in a universe in which there are no actual unicorns, just
unicornness itself.
13
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cepts may be instantiated, then there is no reason to regard the concept
of being physical as a physical thinq.

Furthermore, goes the objection,

it there is no distinction between a concept and a physical thing, then
given what we said earlier about obiects (namely that they are immutable
and eternal), it would follow that objects would have to be immutable
and eternal.

Moore, one wants to say, ought to be interpreted in a more

charitable light.a
I will defer discussion of the would-be reductio until later.
Moore is not the first Platonist to be saddled with the difficulty of
explaining how change is possible.

Suffice it here to say that he

thinks he can overcome this problem by making temporality the essence of
existence.

Regarding the suggestion, though, that we have constructed a

straw man by ignoring the possibility of instantiation, let me remind
the reader that, for Moore, there are no particulars to instantiate concepts.

Moore's world consists completely of concepts (properties) and

nothing else (1899, p. 182).

What is typically regarded as a particular

object is nothing more than a concatenation of concepts or properties
(1899, p. 183) or, as he sometimes says, it is nothing more than a complex concept (1899, p. 183).

A fact (or, in Moore's terminology, a

proposition) is nothing but an even more complex concept (1899, p. 180).
Because Moore cannot appeal to particulars, he will have to find something that plays the same role as instantiation.

To be sure, he has a

proposal, but before examining it we should be perfectly clear on why
this is a difficult goal to achieve.

Part of the reason why it is dif-

ficult to imagine physicalness (external to the mind) belonging to no
physical thing is that we commonly take the distinguishing mark of a
physical thing to be the possession of physical properties (or the property of being physical.

The point is that the external occurrence of

physicalness is commonly taken to be the basis for our saying that there
14

For this criticism I am indebted to John Nolt.
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is a physical thing external to ourselves.

What we are being asked to

consider is the possibility of there being external physicalness but no
external thinq to which physicalness may be ascribed.

Trying to take

this possibility seriously immediately gets one into hot water with the
usual philosophical distinction between universals and particulars.
Ordinarily, universals are distinguished from particulars on the grounds
that particulars may only have properties predicated of them, whereas
universals may either be the objects of predication or be predicated of
other objects.

The classical conception of universals treats a property

as a kind of thing in its own right.

But if there are no thinqs that

are physical--that is, if there are no things to which physicalness may
be predicated--then we cannot even consider physicalness itself as a
thing to which physicalness may be attributed.

But how is it possible

that physicalness cannot be predicated ot physicalness?

If anything, we

would think that physicalness is identical to physicalness.
These considerations proceed from what I referred to as an ordinary conception of physical things.

That conception may be wrong, but

it does serve as a starting point.

That is, it shows us why an argument

is needed here in support of the claim that there are nothing but properties or concepts.

A major part of that burden consists in providing

an account of some relation among concepts that can play the same role
as instantiation.

What we want from Moore is some account of how ab-

stract entities can come together to form an existent object.
Moore's solution is to treat existence itself as a concept, so
that existent objects are complex concepts composed of one or more concepts (such as physicalness) which stands in a logical relation (presumably that of inclusion) to the concept of existence.

Existence itself

can be a concept, since it, like redness, can be an object of awareness
or judgment (1899, p. 180).

Thus all properties (including the property

of being a unicorn) are mind-independent and enjoy a kind of being, but
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only some properties have existence.

MAn existent,n Moore tells us, Mis

seen to be nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing in a
unique relation to the concept of existence" (1899, p. 183).
Here an implication of the utmost importance arises.
implies that there are no simple, unanalyzable existents.

Moore's view
Since what

exists necessarily involves relations among the objects of consciousness
(at a bare minimum it requires a relation between the property of existence and some other property), it is really more appropriate to say
that what exist are facts or states of affairs."

Or, to use Moore's

terminology at the time, what exist are propositions.

This may sound

peculiar, but, as Moore explains,
[T)he description of an existent as a proposition
seems to lose its strangeness, when it is remembered
that a proposition is here to be understood, not as anything subjective--an assertion or affirmation of something--but as the combination of concepts which is
affirmed (1899, p. 183).
The object of judgment (even, as we shall see, when the judgment is
false) is always a proposition or fact.

Indeed, perceptual belief (as

when one perceives that this rose is red) is defined by Moore as being
the cognition of an existential proposition {1889, p. 183).

This prima-

cy given to facts as the objects of judgment serves to distinguish
Moore's view from Russell's multiple object theory of judgment (1912;
1913).

We will examine Russell's view extensively in a later chapter.

15 One of the opening remarks in the Tractatus is MThe world is the
totality of facts, not of things" (1922b, 1.1). Although Wittgenstein's
ontology differs from Moore's, it is in Moore's philosophy that
Wittgenstein first encountered the idea that the world consists of
facts. Even though Moore's view eventually comes under criticism by
Wittgenstein, this particular thesis would never be relinquished by
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's retention of the thesis also owes much to
the influence of Frege, particularly Frege's context principle, according to which a word only has meaning in the context of a sentence. We
will have a chance in a later chapter to see how far the influence of
Frege extends. I think it is fair to say that Wittgenstein accepts
Frege's distinction between singular and predicative expressions for all
analyzable propositions but not for atomic propositions.
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Here suffice it to say that for Russell a judgment is the product of a
set of discrete mental acts (acquaintance with a universal, another acquaintance with a particular, etc.) whose objects are knit together into
a unified whole (that is, into a proposition) by the act of judgment.
On Moore's view, in contrast, perception begins with the proposition.
The facts presented to the perceiving subject are already combinations
of concepts.

This gives Moore's theory of judgment a certain advantage

over Russell's, given the difficulty Russell has in explaining how judgment knits together the objects of awareness into a unified whole. 11
Returning to the issue posed above, it might appear to be a mere
evasion of the issue to claim that what distinguishes instantiated concepts of physical objects (like that of a horse) from uninstantiated
concepts of physical objects (like that of a unicorn) is that the former
do, but the latter do not, have existence.

It hardly seems adequate to

answer the question of how there can be physicalness external to the
mind which is not itself physical by saying that some physicalness has
existence and some has not.

How the latter could be so is precisely the

issue.
For Moore, however, the essence of existence is temporality (1899,
p. 188).

The possession of temporal properties is precisely what dis-

tinguishes an existent object from a non-existent one. The point may be
expressed by saying that existence occurs at times, so that for a unicorn to exist, it would be necessary for the properties that make up a
unicorn to come together with the property of existence at some time.
What is meant in saying that a unicorn does not exist is that the properties that make up a unicorn do not now form a union with the property
of existence.
18 Russell (1913) even goes so far as to regard logical forms as being
among the objects of acquaintance. This, we will see in Chapter Five,
simply multiplies the problem. By giving metaphysical primacy to facts
and states of affairs, Wittgenstein, like Moore, avoids Russell's problem.
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He arrives at this conclusion through a consideration of Kant's
distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.

Moore desires

very much to preserve Kant's distinction between a priori and a poste-

riori judgments, and to preserve it in such a way that the former but
not latter might be characterized as necessarily true or false.
Consistent with his criticism of Bradley, Moore objects to Kant's way of
drawing the distinction in terms of the mental acts required.

Rather,

such judgments must be individuated in terms of the types of concepts
which occur in them.

Since the objects of consciousness, concepts, are

immutable (and thus lay claim to a certain kind of necessary existence),
it must be possible for there to be contingent relations among concepts;
and this, he believes, is possible only if these relations are not themselves immutable."
ity.

These relations must therefore have a temporal qual-

Thus, while all propositions consist in a certain concatenation of

concepts, those which are a posteriori in nature involve relations
which, conceivably, might not obtain.

For Moore, this means that empir-

ical propositions must relate concatenations of concepts to times.
(This should not be taken to mean that the sentences speakers use for
stating propositions must contain an explicitly temporal element; relations to times must here be regarded as belonging to the ontology of empirical judgments.

Nor should the presence of tense within a sentence

be regarded as any sort of evidence that the sentence somehow expresses
Like many philosophers, the most notable perhaps being Aquinas and
Plato, Moore conflates immutability and necessity. This is not to say
that such a view is unwarranted, but only that it stands in need of an
argument. (It has been remarked to me by Mary Sirridge in conversation
that this commits Moore to the modal language S4; of this I am dubious,
but this is not the place to pursue the issue.)
on the question of the relations among concepts, Moore is not consistent. Clearly if he is to account for change and consistency, he cannot
exclude the possibility that the relation among concepts change from
time to time. Yet he says, #(a) proposition is a synthesis of concepts1
and just as concepts are themselves immutably what they are, so they
stand in finite relations to one another equally immutable~ (1899, p.
17

180).
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an empirical judgment.)

What makes a judgment empirical is that it is

about objects with temporal properties.
One might suspect that the question which nagged Moore earlier
(namely, the question of how there could be physicalness external to the
mind that is not physical) might reappear in new garbs

is it not pos-

sible to have a thought about some particular object with certain temporal qualities which nevertheless does not exist?

Are we to be commit-

ted to the existence of the Martians who, according to the Orson Wells'
broadcast, invaded the Barth in 1938?

Clearly here is a case in which

something which never existed is given a temporal characterization.

Is

it not possible to imagine a unicorn that exists at a given place and
time?

As noted earlier, this would seem to be no less possible than

imagining having a conversation (now) with one's currently deceased ancestors.

How does a relation to the concept of existence (now under-

stood as having an essentially temporal character) accomplish the passage from mere Being to existence?

The role played by instantiation has

not been captured in the process.
I believe Moore has a better solution to this problem.

But before

we can bring it into focus, it will be necessary to consider his account
of truth and falsehood.
Consistent with his disavowal of mental representations, we find
Moore shunning any form of correspondence theory of truth.

Truth, for

Moore, is a property of the propositions towards which judgments are directed.

Since propositions, on this view, are facts, truth is a prop-

erty of facts.

But what kind of property?

Is it a property of a fact

in the sense that it is one of its constituents (so that truth is internally related to the proposition as a whole), or shall we say that
propositions can occur independently of their truth (so that truth is
externally related, i.e., an accidental property of) a proposition?
Moore's answer is ambiguous.

Indeed, the ambiguity may be traced to his
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vacillation over whether truth is an analyzable property or an unanalyzable property.

If it turns out that truth is analyzable, then it is in-

ternally related to the proposition to which it is ascribed and, as
such, is one of its components.

If truth is a simple, unanalyzable

property, then it is only externally related to the proposition to which
it is ascribed and is, therefore, not one of its components.
On the one hand, Moore tells us that the truth of a proposition is
a simple, unanalyzable property which "cannot be further defined, but
must be immediately recognized" (1899, p. 180).

Be even goes so far as

to suggest that knowledge of the existence of a particular state of affairs is inferred from an awareness of the truth of a proposition.

Thus

he maintains, "existence is logically subordinate to truth; that truth
cannot be defined by a reference to existence, but existence only by a
reference to truth" (1899, p. 180).

In this respect his account of

truth in "The Nature of Judgment" appears to parallel the sort of account he gave of goodness in Principia Bthica.

In that work goodness is

defined as a non-natural property; that is to say, it is a property
which has Being but not existence (1903, p. 110).

In the scanty remarks

concerning truth as simple and unanalyzable in "The Nature of Judgment"
we have the first traces of a conception of truth to emerge more fully

in Principia Bthica where Moore asserts, "[n)o truth does, in fact,
exist" (1903, p. 111).

This view of truth is largely motivated by a

concern for accommodating the possibility of truth for a priori propositions--particularly, mathematical propositions which refer to non-existent entities such as Two (1899, p. 180; 1903, p. 111).

11

On this view, truth is that self-same property whether it is ascribed to a priori or a posteriori propositions.

It is unique in the

sense that there is only one such property, but it can belong to diverse

In Moore (1903) existent objects are again distinguished from nonexistent ones by virtue of existing in time (1903, p. 111).
18
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propositions.

This rules out the possibility of truth being the compo-

nent of any proposition.

Since the fact that this rose is red shares

none of the components of the fact that two plus two is four, yet truth
may be ascribed to both, it follows that truth cannot be a component of
these facts.

Mit is ••• impossible," we are told, Mthat truth should de-

pend on a relation to existents, or to an existent ••• " (1899, p. 181).
On this view, falsehood consists in the non-obtaining of the fact
that is asserted.

That is to say, it consists in the failure of the

properties in question to come together with the property of existence
at some time.

He says,

[i]f the judgment is false, that is not because my
ideas do not correspond to reality, but because such a
conjunction of concepts is not to be found among existents
(1899, p. 179)."
But falsehood on this view (and indeed even on the alternative view
which we will examine below) is more than the mere failure of a certain
concatenation of concepts to occur.

Just as truth requires a relation

of inclusion or union with the concept of existence, so too does falsehood require some sort of relation among the non-existent concepts:
A proposition is constituted by any number of concepts,
together with a specific relation between them; and according to the nature of this relation the proposition may be
either true or false. What kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, cannot be further defined, but must
be innnediately recognized (1899, p. 180).
Although he maintains that truth and falsehood cannot be further defined, he is willing to characterize these relations as logical relations (1899, p. 183), and he suggests at least that these relations are
objective (in that they have Being) even though they do not exist.

The

19 Moore's reference to judgments rather than propositions as false
should not be taken to indicate that he regarded falsehood as the obtaining of a special kind of judging relation. Judgment (whether true
or false) always involves the very same kind of relation to whatever
happens to be its object. Two mental acts of the same mode (judging,
believing, perceiving, etc.) can only be differentiated in terms of
their objects. In any event the objects are propositions.
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particular passage with which we are concerned pertains primarily to the
nature of inference; the relation of a premise to a conclusion validly
drawn from it is an objective though non-existent relation.

However,

existence, too, requires that concepts ustand in a certain logical relation" (1899, p. 183).

Earlier I suggested this might be the logical re-

lation of inclusion (relative to a time) or that of union.

(As a

heuristic it is useful to imagine Moore's view in terms of Venn
Diagrams; an existent would be represented by the region that is the
union of the class symbols; when the proposition is false this region is
darkened.)

I can think of no other way to characterize the falsehood of

a proposition (i.e., the disunion of its properties) other than my saying that the concepts are excluded from the concept of existence (relative to a time).
This view is, however, very problematic.

For one thing, it ap-

pears to imply that there can be no such thing as a false empirical
proposition.

Whenever one forms a judgment there will be some fact

(proposition) that is the object of one's judgment.

Recall that for

Moore a proposition is made true or false by the kind of relation that
holds between the concepts in question (1899, p. 180).

To judge falsely

that unicorns e~ist involves a ~elation to the concepts of e~istence,
unicorn, and the relation of e~clusion.

The fact that unicorns are ex-

cluded from existence (at a given time) makes the judgment false.

This

is of the utmost importance, and it is a point that one may easily overlook if one thinks that falsehood for Moore is merely the non-concatenation of concepts.

In point of fact, he says:

(t]ruth ••• would certainly seem to involve at least two
terms, and some relation between them; falsehood involves
the same; and hence it would seem to remain, that we regard
truth and falsehood as properties of certain concepts, together with their relations--a whole to which we give the
name proposition (1899, p. 181).
Moore is clearly asserting that there is some fact (albeit a non-exis-
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tent one) that .makes one one's judgment false.
But now what is the object of one's belief when one believes
falsely that unicorns exist?

What is the fact to which one is related

when one believes that unicorns exist?

The only fact there is here is

the one that makes the judgment false, namely, the fact that unicorns
are excluded from existence (at a given time). 20

But that fact is sol

The proposition that unicorns are excluded from existence (at a given
time) is truel

The point is that all false empirical propositions must

be construed as true non-empirical propositions.

The implication is

that judgment can never be related to anything but what is true.

The

notion of a false empirical judgment collapses under the weight of
Being.

Moore acknowledges this implication (although not without trepi-

dation).

If there cannot be false empirical propositions, then all em-

pirical propositions must be true:

u[t]he simplest existential proposi-

tions are then to be regarded as necessary propositions of a peculiar
sort" (1899, p. 191).

To be sure, his article closes on just this note.

Our result then is as follows: That a judgment is universally a necessary combination of concepts, equally necessary whether it be true or false.
At bottom, Moore's problem comes down to the fact that the act of judgment effects a relation between a subject and something, but once this
object is identified, nothing remains that can be false.

Therefore,

Moore's theory cannot explain the nature of falsehood. 21
It is tempting to try to get Moore off the hook by finding something else besides the object of Moore's belief to be false.

one is

tempted to say that the act of judgment is untrue, like an arrow that
strays from its true course.

But this will not suffice, as the arrow

20 He proceeds to say, u ••• existential propositions which are false,
as well as those which are true, involve the same propositions about
s~ace and"timew (1899, p. 191).
21 Passmore (1966, p. 205) notes that a concern for this very issue
forced Moore to abandon his position by 1~11. His lectures at that time
are reprinted in Moore (1953).
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simile, when thought through, suggests:

for the arrow lands somewhere

even if it does not land at its intended target.
strikes.

That is the object it

Notice indeed that the analogy requires drawing a distinction

between the arrow's actual mark and its intended one.

I suspect this

attempt to get Moore off the hook owes its initially compelling appearance to the fact that it covertly introduces mental contents (the intended mark).

If one is willing to countenance mental contents, the

problem will not arise in the first place; of course, this is not a
strategy open to Moore.
employ it as a strategy:

Nor, we should note, was Moore ever tempted to
he always refers to truth and falsehood as

properties of concepts or propositions, never as properties of mental
acts.
In the end Moore's only suggestion, consistent with the idea that
one cannot form false empirical judgments, is to say that were it possible for false empirical propostions to occur, they would be the sorts of
things in which one could take no interest (1899, pp. 180-181).

It

would be a little like hybridizing a rose to smell like a skunk; not
many persons would want to buy one.

He seems to think no one would be

interested in asserting what is not true.

(This may be the key to

Wittgenstein's claim, reported in Moore's letters to Ottoline Morrell,
that only asserted propositions exist.)
False beliefs can be immensely important.

But Moore is mistaken here.
That it is false that water

boils at soc is an important fact, particularly if one is cooking pasta.
And if it were false that water boils at lOOc, that would be important
too, particularly to persons who design coolant for engines.

Moore's

strategy of trying to playdown the importance of falsehood simply does
not ring true.

We can also take an interest in the false beliefs of

other persons, which brings us to the next criticism.
Not only does his theory of judgment fail to account for falsehood
and for the contingency of (some) empirical propositions, it leaves ut-
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terly mysterious how we could ever truly ascribe a false belief to another person.

Suppose I assert

as

believes P, but Pis false."

This

would have to be regarded as a certain kind of nonsense.

If Pis false,

then it (i.e., P) cannot be that to which sis related.

Rather, the ob-

ject of S's belief would have to be -P.

Since the verb Hbelieves# is

logically transparent according to a relational theory of judgment (so
that its subordinate clause is interpreted de re), I would be required
to characterize whats believes as -P.

That is to say, the object of

the believing relation would be the true but non-existent proposition
-P.

Hence, the occurrence of Pin the first conjunct of "S believes P,

but Pis false" is illegitimate.

This is something that just cannot be

said.
The problems we have examined up to this point stem from Moore's
conception of truth as a simple, unanalyzable property that is not a
component of the facts to which it is ascribed. 22

Yet there is an alter-

native account hinted at in "The Nature of Judgment."

The fact is that

immediately upon pronouncing truth to be an unanalyzable property, Moore
provides us with just such an analysis.

The analysis does require truth

and falsehood to be components of facts, and it involves a strategy that
requires the distinction between identity and existence to be collapsed.
Consider what he says concerning the judgment that a particular
rose is red (expressed by the sentence, "This rose is red"):
What I am asserting is a specific connexion of certain
concepts forming the total concept "rose" with the concepts "this" and "now" and "red"~ and the judgment is
true if such a connexion is existent (1899, p. 179).
This passage can be interpreted in accordance with the interpretation of
Moore's view described above.

But bear in mind that, even though truth

was presented as unanalyzable, it was still capable of being character22 Here I say conception of truth rather than of truth and falsehood,
since on this view there is little room left for a conception of falsehood.
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ized to some extent.

The characterization of truth in terms of one or

more concepts standing in a logical relation to the concept of existence
is not intended to define truth~ it is only intended to be an account of
the conditions under which truth may be ascribed to a proposition.
Nevertheless, once the problem of accounting for falsehood is exposed,
it is difficult to distinguish this sort of characterization of the
truth of empirical propositions from a definition in terms of the occurrence of such a relation.

It begins to look as if being an empirical

proposition and being a true empirical proposition amount to the same
thing--namely, being a proposition in which there occurs some relation
between one or more concepts and the concept of truth.

If empirical

truth always involves that very relation, then it would have to be
regarded as a component of any fact to which it is predicated.

Against

this suggestion one would want to argue that, for Moore, truth remains
the very same thing regardless of the specific proposition to which it
is ascribed~ thus the view under proposal is incompatible with Moore's
view, provided we accept the assumption that the fact that this rose is
red shares no common components with the fact that that water is boiling.
We will not concern ourselves with the latter assumption.
However, doubts can be raised concerning the claim that truth is the
very same property when ascribed to different true propositions.

If the

distinction between being an empirical proposition and being a true empirical proposition collapses, such that the property of being true
amounts (in the case of empirical propositions) to nothing other than a
relation between a set of concepts and the concept of existence, then
what is referred to as the property of truth will vary among distinct
propositions.

This is because the particular relation to the concept of

existence will vary for distinct propositions.
It appears that the temporal nature of existence effects for any
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particular existent a certain uniqueness.

In the following passages

note the use of words like "specific" and "unique."

Consider:

When I say "This paper exists," ••• the concepts, which
are combined in specific relations in the concept of this
paper, are also combined in a specific manner with the concept of existence. That specific manner is something
immediately known, like red or two •••• All that exists is
thus composed of concepts related to one another in
specific manners, and likewise to the concept of existence (1899, pp. 180-1811 emphasis added).
[A}n existent is seen to be nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing in a unique relation to the
concept of existence (1899, p. 1831 emphasis added).
When we consider that being an existent involves a relation among concepts to specific times, it becomes apparent that being an existent and
being individuated from all other entities (i.e., all other Beings and
existents) amounts to the very same thing.

By the time all of the prop-

erties of an existent object have been enumerated 4 one has an account of
what distinguishes the object from all other objects as well as an account of what makes the object an existent.

This is obviously consis-

tent with Leibniz Law that no two individuals can share all of their
properties in common.

By the time one has stated that a given kind of

object occupies a certain location at a particular time, one has stated,
in effect, the conditions which actually exclude other entities from
that location at that time.
Any existent must possess a unique combination of properties.

The

uniqueness of an object (which would have to be specified through a complete enumeration of the object's properties and the relations among
them) is itself a property, one which no other object has.

What distin-

guishes things which are real but non-existent (like Goodness and Two)
from things which are both real and existent is that the latter have a

unique set of relational properties which cannot be predicated of any
other particular object, whereas the former consists of one or more
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properties which can be predicated of others.

The point here is not

merely that it is impossible for two existents to share all their properties in colD11lOn (though that is true), rather that the possibility of
them not sharing all their properties in common is precisely what makes
them existents.
scholars.

This fact has not been fully appreciated by Moore

Ryle (1970), for example, recognizes that the earmark of ex-

istence is temporality for Moore, but he fails to see how having temporal properties engenders uniqueness and thus particularity among the objects of awareness; and so he fails to recognize that being particular
in precisely this way is just what makes an object existent.
To be aware of an existent horse, then, is to stand in relation to
a unique concatenation of properties:

no other object could have this

combination of properties (including spatial location) at this particular time.

It

is unique in this respect.

And this just is the solution

to how a relation among concepts can serve the same function as instantiation.
Indeed the identity of an object over time would be accommodated
by extending the time-particularization of the object as well as the
enumeration of properties and the relations among them.

It should be

remembered that existent objects for Moore are always facts, so to form
a judgment about a given horse which exists (or has existed) over aperiod of time is simply to stand in relation to a more complex fact than
when one has, for example, an instantaneous awareness of a horse; the
latter fact would simply be a constituent of the former.
To be aware of a non-existent object, like a unicorn, is to stand
in relation to a set of propertieswhich are indeed mind-independent,
but which do not coalesce into a unique combination of properties:
there are no particular unicorns.

This does not mean that it is impos-

sible for unicorns to exist, since their existence remains a possibility
of the properties which would be their constituents; it does mean that
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the relations requisite for making this possibility an actuality do not
obtain.

That, though, is the answer to the question concerning how

there could be non-existent objects:

such objects remain possibilities

of real, mind-independent properties.

Just as it belongs to the very

nature of the property of redness that it be combinable with the property of squareness in particular red squares, so too the property of being
a horse is, by its very nature, combinable with the property of having a
horn.

It is, therefore, to the combinatorial possibilities of concepts

that one must turn in seeking an account of awarenesses of and judgments
about non-existent objects.
Before we turn to the account of truth and falsehood engendered by
this view, let us consider what recommends our attributing this interpretation to Moore.

Certainly the passages cited above, in which Moore

speaks of specific relations, specific manners of being related, unique
properties, and so forth, provide little more than a thumbnail upon
which to hang our interpretation.

That by itself is hardly convincing,

since these terms--particularly unigue--arise within the context of what
would become the central strain of Moore's thinking over the next five
years.

(Most obvious is the characterization of the property of truth

as a unique property in Principia Bthica, where truth remains the selfsame property regardless of the proposition to which it is ascribed. 23 )
Nevertheless, I have three reasons for thinking this view, undeveloped
as it is, is implicit within the early relational theory of judgment.
First, it is implied by the theory.

The relation of concepts to

times does indeed effect a unique concatenation of objects.
Second, when Moore's view is described in this manner, it accomplishes precisely what it is supposed to accomplishz

it explains how a

relation among concepts can play the same role as instantiation.

Yet consider the pluralism of goods introduced in (1903), pp. 147.
Each of these is said to be uniquely good.
23
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Finally, this interpretation of Moore's view comports well with
his account of perception.

Perception, you will recall, is nothing more

than the cognition of an existential proposition (1899, p. 183).

If the

relation between a set of concepts and the concept of existence were not
in each instance a unique relation (individuated by its terms, of which
one is a time), we would expect Moore to characterize perception in a
much more Russellian manner.

That is, we would expect him to distin-

guish between various mental acts within the perceptual judgment in accordance with the different kinds of components within the proposition.
For example, perceiving that a red rose exists would need to be regarded
as consisting (at least) of an act of sensing (for which redness is an
object) and (presumably) an act of intuiting (for which the unique logical relation is an object.)

Yet Moore does not do this.

Be presents

perception as a unified act to which is .made known the specific manner
in which objects are related (vis a vis) the proposition (1899, p. 180181).
we may now ask whether the concept of truth implied by this interpretation fares any better than its alternative with respect to thesemantic puzzles mentioned earlier.
must truth be conceived?
the key.

According to this interpretation, how

The account of perception just given provides

It was said that perception, for Moore, is a unified act to

which is made known the specific manner in which objects are related
(vis a vis) the proposition (1899, p. 180-181).
bears consideration.

Even though Moore says,

The italicized phrase

u •••

existence is logically

subordinated to truth~ that truth cannot be defined by a reference to
existence, but existence only by a reference to truth" (1899, p. 180),
such a claim does not square with his account of perception.

Clearly

Moore wants existence to presuppose truth, because he holds that the
class of true propositions is greater than the class of true empirical
propositions.

Hence, truth would have to be construed as a non-natural

48

property.

But in that case, once again, we would expect perception to

contain an intuitive component.

But it does not.

The full passage

reads:
When I say •This paper exists," I must require that this
proposition is true. If it is not true, it is unimportant
and I can have no interest in it. But if it is true, it
means only that the concepts, which are combined in specific
relations in the concept of this paper, are also combined in
a specific manner with the concept of existence. That specific manner is something immediately known, like red or two
(1899, pp. 180-181).
It is through perception that the truth of these propositions can be
known~ indeed, by means of perception they can be known immediately
(1899, p. 181).

We would not expect Moore to use this terminology if

truth happened to be an unanalyzable property.

In that case we would

expect Moore to say that intuition (or some other mental act), in addition to perception, is needed to judge whether an existential proposition is true.
edge.

Instead, he says that perception affords us such knowl-

so, like the pluralism of goods (of Principia Ethica) which are

uniquely good (and which stand in contrast to the unique property of
Goodness), we arrive at a pluralism of truths.

That is to say, the

truth of any empirical proposition will differ from the truth of another, because the specific relations that constitute the existence of the
complex object or fact to which truth is ascribed will differ.
The truth of a proposition amounts to nothing more than the obtaining of the fact in question.

What makes the judgment that this rose

is red true is that a particular rose is red, and what makes a particular rose red is a unique concatenation of properties at a particular

time and place.

By this account, the truth of an empirical proposition

is indeed to be analyzed in terms of the existence of a particular state
of affairs, where existence (or the property of being existent) is to be
analyzed as the obtaining of a unique set of relational properties.
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so,

while Moore explicitly denies that truth is a component of propositions
(1899, p. 181), it is difficult to see how he could fail to be committed
to just such a view.
As we noted earlier, the interpretation which runs in the direction of treating truth as a component of propositions fares much better
than its alternative with respect to the metaphysical issue with which
we opened.

The earlier view was simply unable to explain how relations

among concepts can play the same role as instantiation.

Our second ap-

proach, in contrast, deals with that problem handily by collapsing the
distinction between having existence and having an identity.
way it explains what a particular is.

In that

The question before us now is

whether it can also avoid the undesirable semantic puzzles with which
the earlier view was frought.
Although the second approach contains considerable resilience in
dealing with the metaphysical issue, its facility with the semantic issues is worsel
First of all, it fares no better in accounting for the possibility
of false empirical propositions.

If a proposition is false, then the

unique relationship among the constituents will not obtain, and the object of consciousness will be something (or a set of things) that have

Being but not existence.

There will be no particular which is the ob-

ject of consciousness, at least for those classes of empirical propositions with which Moore is mainly concerned (viz., existential propositions and propositions in which the grammatical subject fails to
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refer).••
Will it fare any better when it comes to our capacity to truly ascribe false beliefs to others?

I do not see how it could.

If I assert

that "S believes P, but Pis false,w I have still uttered a nonsensical
construction.

If Pis uunicorns exist," then I am asserting that no re-

lation (a fortiori no unique relation) between unicorns and existence
obtains at a given time.

So, if my use of ubelieves" is transparent, I

cannot assert of s any relation (of believing) to the proposition (or
fact) that unicorns exist.
But things get worse.

Consider what happens when someone believes

that a proposition of the form-Pis true.

Suppose, for example, that

someone believes that horses (currently) do not exist.
The question concerns how the negation sign is to be interpreted.
Does it represent something that is in some way the object of a mental
act, or does it characterize the mental act itself?
the case, then

If the latter is

us believes -P" is more perspicuously rendered "S disbe-

lieves (or denies) P."

This is problematic, however, since it repre-

sents s as standing in the disbelieving (or denying) relation to the
proposition P.

Since the verb ("believing" or "denying") is logically

transparent for adherents of relational theories of judgment, if it is
true that S believes P, it follows that Pis true.
whats denies.

But that just is

Here our problem is not the earlier one in which we were

It seems to this writer that certain empirical propositions do escape the criticism presented above. Suppose I believe "This cow is
blue" is true, and there happens to exist a cow of whom I falsely believe that it is blue. In this instance the grammatical subject of my
sentence would manage to refer to an existent, but the predicate would
refer to what merely has Being. I suspect that Moore did not consider
these cases problematic precisely because he equated propositions with
complex concepts. This in effect turns any proposition into a kind of
definition, so that it does not matter whether the subject or predicate
happens to fail to occur. To entertain the proposition that this cow is
blue is indistinguishable, on Moore's view, from conceiving of some object that is this blue cow. The idea that a proposition is a name for a
complex would eventually come under attack by Wittgenstein.
2~

51

unable to truly ascribe a false belief to another person; rather, the
problem is one of not being able to truly ascribe a disbelief.

If the

negation sign does not represent something on the object side of the believing relation, this problem is unavoidable.
In fact, Moore is committed to the objectivity of negation, since
negativity, like existence and truth, is something of which we can conceive.

So the question is how-Pis to be interpreted, when the nega-

tion sign designates something objective.

Here everything hangs on

whether-Pis true, and upon what makes it true when it is true.
Assume, first, that-Pis false.
relation to P.

In that case S stands in a believing

So, here we have a case, like that discussed earlier,

where we cannot truly ascribe a false belief to
-Pis true.

What makes it true?

s.

Assume, though, that

It cannot simply be made true by the

fact that the set of constituent properties of P (e.g., the constituent
properties of an existent horse) have Being but not existence, since
presumably S's belief is about more than merely a set of objects.
not merely asserting the Being of a set of properties.

sis

This construal

of the object of S's belief does not do justice to the fact that negation sign refers to some component of S's belief; that is, it does not
do justice to the relation among the members of the set to which Being
but not existence is ascribed.

If Pis •eorses do not exist," then it

consists in the properties typically assigned to horses standing in the
negative relation of exclusion to one another.
Is this an adequate solution?
lematic.

The fact is that it remains prob-

According to our newer version of the relational theory of

judgment, one of the constituent concepts of Pis the truth ot P.
is indeed something right about this.

There

In a certain manner of speaking,

when one believes -P, one believes something about P.
the existence or truth of P does not occur.

One affirms that

Needless to say it is this

fact that the act of affirming-Pis really the act of denying or disbe-
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lieving P.

(This particular phenomenological feature of the act of af-

firming-Pis manifest in the propositional or sentential logic by the
fact that the negation sign serves as an operator for propositions or
sentences as a whole.)

But once the truth of Pis admitted to the ob-

ject side of the believing relation, the cat is out of the bag.

To be-

lieve -P (when-Pis true) involves believing something about the truth
of P.

But even if one believes that the truth of P does not occur, the

fact remains that the truth of Pis among the objects of one's belief.
How, then, can it not be so?

Short of positing mental representations,

how are we to avoid the inevitable conclusion that believing -P requires
the objectivity of P? 25

Hence, believing -P entails believing (or stand-

ing in some relation to) P.

Given the logical transparency of the

verbs, this entails both -P and Pare true.
lows.

The reasoning is as fol-

Assume the following sentence is true:
(1) "S believes -P"

Given the logical transparency of the verb (and consistent with our inability to truly ascribe a false belief), this entails the truth of:
(2) -P

However, (1), in some manner or other presupposes a relation to (believing that ••• , countenancing the objectivity of ••• ) P; hence the truth of:
(3) "S believes (etc.) P"
However, again given the logical transparency of the verb, this entails
the truth of:
( 4)

p

The particular relational theory of truth which treats truth as a component of a fact thereby commits its adherents to the truth of:

~ It will not suffice to respond that S stands in some relation to P,
only not one of believing or affirming. That strategy, as we saw before, still requires Pas as a term of the relation.
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The augmented relational theory of judgment can only resolve the metaphysical problem (of instantiation) at great cost.

Surely the undesir-

able implications of either form of relational theory considered so far
call for their complete and utter rejection.
When Wittgenstein arrived on the scene at Cambridge in 1911 Moore
had already abandoned his earlier theory.

Nevertheless it is precisely

such a theory that we hear Wittgenstein expressing (according to
Russell's letters to Ottoline Morrell).

If Wittgenstein did in fact say

that only asserted propositions exist, then we are given a picture of
him embracing, not only the thesis that propositions are facts, but
Moore's attempt to play down the relevance of false believe.

As we

noted earlier, for Moore, a false belief (if one could occur) would be
something in which no one would take an interest.
assert a false proposition?

Why would one want to

We saw that this is a ludicrous position,

but it is easy to see why Wittgenstein might have found it compelling,
given his particular personality.

Wittgenstein exhibited complete and

open honesty with all those with whom he was intimate.

This led to the

break-up of his friendship with Russell, and it laid great stress upon
anyone with whom he was associated.

Needless to say this does not jus-

tify the position that only asserted propositions exists; it only suggests a possible explanation of why he held it.
It is curious that Russell would express such dismay over
Wittgenstein's views, since they are views which he himself had vehemently defended only ten years earlier in The Principles of Mathematics
(1903).

Russell's letters to Lady Ottoline speak, not of Wittgenstein's

It will not suffice for the proponent of this view to respond by
saying what is represented on line (5) has Being but not existence,
since the conjunct P asserts the existence of something. Nor can the
problem be avoided by saying that a use/mention fallacy is involved by
treating Pas being asserted; at least that is not an avenue available
to the proponent of this theory, since even conceiving of P requires P's
objectivity.
28
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views as simply being false, but as being rather absurd.

Yet in The

Principles of Mathematics he acknowledges his own indebtedness to Moore.
In the Preface to that work he says:
On fundamental questions of philosophy, my position, in
all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G. E. Moore. I
have accepted from him the non-existential nature of propositions ••• and their independence of any knowing mind; also
the pluralism which regards the world, both that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite number of mutually independent entities, with relations which
are ultimate, and not reducible to adjectives of their terms
or of the whole which these compose (1903, p. xviii) .
. Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to
every possible object of thought--in short to everything
that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false,
and to all such propositions themselves. Being belongs to
whatever can be counted. If A be any term that can be
counted as one, it is plain that A is something, and therefore that A is. "A is not" must always be either false or
meaningless. For if A were nothing, it would not be said
to be; "A is not" implies there is a term A whose being is
denied, and hence that A is. Thus unless "A is not" be an
empty sound, it must be false--whatever A may be, it certainly is. Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras,
and four-dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were
not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about
them. Thus being is a general attribute of everything, and
to mention anything is to show that it is (1903, p. 449;
cited in urmson, 1969, pp. 2-3).
Existence ••• is the prerogative of some only amongst beings.
To exist is to have a specific relation to existence •••
(1903, p. 449).
Although Russell would adopt his multiple object theory of judgment by
1911, in this earlier work he stands behind the objective and irreducible status of propositions.

Furthermore, the relations which obtain

among the constituents of propositions are not reducible to the constituents which are their terms.

In other words, such relations as ob-

tain among the constituents of propositions (i.e., among the concepts or
properties which are their constituents) are themselves genuine properties.

so, for example, if one is aware that red is different from blue,
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then the difference of which one is aware is as much a genuine object of
awareness as the redness and blueness which are its terms.

Like Moore,

Russell avoids any sort of nominalism with respect to properties or relations.

The pluralism to which he refers is the consequence of there

being infinitely many kinds of entities, due to the fact that each entity possesses a unique set of relations.

Clearly Russell adopts a dis-

tinction between Being and existence, and he holds (as the last passage
indicates) that a relation to the concept of existence is precisely what
makes a mere being into an existent being.
What makes Russell's comments to Lady Ottoline all the more peculiar, from a historical standpoint, is that even in the Autumn of 1911
Russell had not traveled very far from his earlier views.

In October of

1911 he had read his "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars"
(reprinted in Russell, 1971) before the Aristotelian Society, and in
January of 1912 his The Problems of Philosophy (Russell, 1912) was published.

While it is true that by this time he had adopted his multiple-

object theory of judgment, he still adhered to a relational theory of
judgment.

Although Russell's ontology at the time allows for acquain-

tance with particulars, he remains a realist concerning properties as
well as relations (1912, p. 98).

In fact, he even refers to properties

or universals in a rather Moore-like fashion as concepts (1912, p. 52).
There is nothing in Russell's view at the time which would lead him to
reject Moore's claim that concepts are among the constituents of the
world, even if he would reject the view that they are the only constituents of the world.

Nevertheless, as we have already had the oppor-

tunity to note, by 1911 Russell does part company with Moore, and presumably Wittgenstein, over whether the objects of judgment are propositions.
If I may speculate, the source of Russell's dismay over
Wittgenstein's remarks--and perhaps the source of his misunderstanding
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of Wittgenstein's character--resides in the latter's unwillingness to
assert that there is no rhinoceros (or hippopotamus, according to the
later account) in the room.
the negative existential.

Wittgenstein was retraining from asserting
we are seeing a tendency to which he would

eventually give expression at Tractatus, 7:
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent
(1922a, 7).
I believe this is the precursor of Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense.

we have already noted the semantic puzzles faced by relational

theories of judgment such as those held by Moore (or possibly held by
Moore).

we saw how the attempt to ascribe a false belief to another

person results in something somewhat nonsensical:

one cannot say "S be-

lieves P," if one also wants to say "Pis false."

Given the logical

transparency of the verb, it would be illegitimate to insert " ••• P"
after "S believes ••• ".

Negative existential judgments turn out to be

problematic for a somewhat different reason:

the attempt to assert -P

(or to deny P) leads invariably to paradox (i.e., to the claim that one
cannot believe -P without believing or countenancing the objectivity of
P) and to contradiction (in that if "S believes P" is true, then "P and
-P" is true).

Although the Tractatus does not regard contradictions as

nonsensical, it does hold that they are senseless and, so, among the

unsayable.
Wittgenstein's writings, from 1913 on, would always exhibit a distinction between what can and cannot be said.

When we examine these

early writings we find Wittgenstein wrestling with the problems inherent
in the relational theories of judgment.

we find him in search of a the-

ory of judgment that would escape the semantic puzzles described.

In

particular, we find him engaged in the task of defining the nature of a
proposition (Satz) such that believing a proposition does not entail believing its logical opposite as well.
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Wittgenstein's solution, as we

are about to see, is to countenance the bipolarity of the proposition.
From the thesis concerning bipolarity there follows a number of crucial
distinctions that lie at the heart of Tractarian semantics:

structure

and form, meaning and sense, the sayable and the unsayable (or what can
be said and what can only be shown).

Although Wittgenstein would fall

under Russell's influence, that final distinction--between what can be
said and what can only be shown--would always remain the focal point of
their greatest philosophical differences.
3.

The Bipolarity of the Proposition.
It does not matter which interpretation we are willing accept of

Moore's theory--the one which construes truth as a simple unanalyzable
property that is in no way a component of the proposition to which it is
ascribed or the one which construes truth as capable of analysis and as
a component within propositions--both views are incapable of accounting
for the possibility of falsehood.

Although Moore does provide a defini-

tion of falsehood in terms of the failure of a group of concepts to form
a certain concatenation or conjunction, when the theory is thought
through to its logical consequences it becomes evident that it leaves no
room for falsehood at all.

A proposition that is empirically false

winds up being a proposition true within the realm of Being:

the con-

cepts that comprise the proposition stand in a certain logical relation
to one another (presumably exclusion) in that very realm.

It is that

that is the object of S's (supposedly false) belief, but it is not in
any way false.

So, the concept of falsehood collapses.

As of 1913 Wittgenstein was prepared to war against this kind of
view.

Against Moore (and his own earlier view) Wittgenstein defends

what we now call the Thesis of the Bipolarity of the Proposition.

This

is the thesis that all sentences (or propositional signs) having the potential to be used in a truth-stating manner must be capable of being
possibly true and possibly false.

In other words, all sentences capable
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of stating or saying or picturing anything at all must be contingent. 21
In the 1913 "Notes on Logic" we are told:
..• a proposition has two poles, corresponding to the case
of its truth and the case of its falsehood (1913b, pp. 9899).

This point is expressed in the Tractatus most clearly on those occasions
where Wittgenstein denies that significant propositions can ever be a

priori true:
In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we
must compare it with reality (1922b, 2.223).
It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether
it is true or false (1922b, 2.224).
There are no pictures that are true a priori (1922b,
2.225). 28
Whether a proposition is true depends on how things are within what
Wittgenstein refers to above as reality.

This immediately serves to

distinguish the position under construction from that held by Moore.
a certain sense, for Moore, all propositions are a priori true.

In

This

follows from the fact that, for the particular relational theories of
judgment that we considered, the concept of falsehood collapses.

All

propositions are true by virtue of being existing facts or facts within
the realm of Being."

Against this, Wittgenstein urges that truth must

always be contingent.

This point is readily acknowledged by commenta-

tors.

Von Wright, for example, mentions:

Throughout this dissertation I will refer to sentences or propositional signs that fulfill this function as statements or propositions.
Wittgenstein's own preference was to use the latter term. Genuine
propositions may be described as stating or saying something. Sentences
that have this property may be called significant. Significant sentences are also meaningful and sensical. The nature of this last distinction will be explained in the text.
28 This claim is also made at Tractatus,
4. 05.
29 I am here using the term a priori solely in an epistemological
fashion. Nothing is meant to be implied concerning the ontological status of what is known a priori, i.e., whether it belongs to existence or
merely to Being.
27
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In the Tractatus ••• every significant proposition has a
characteristic bipolarity in relation to truth and falsehood. A significant proposition can be true and it can be
false (cf. 2.21, 2.23, and 2.24). Whether it is the one or
the other has to be determined on the basis of a comparison
between the proposition and reality (2.223, 4.05). There
are no significant propositions that are true (or false) a
priori (1982b, p. 192). 30
we must take care to distinguish bipolarity from bivalence.

For a

proposition to be bivalent, it must either be true or false.
Consequently, tautologies and contradictions, which are true and false
respectively under all occasions, are bivalent but lack bipolarity.
According to Wittgenstein, tautologies and propositions say nothing;
they are senseless (sinnlos), even though they are an important part of
our language.

we will postpone our discussion of them until after con-

sidering the Grundgedanke in Chapter Four, where their role as rules of
inference (or as syntactic transformation rules) will be considered.
Here it will suffice to make the reader aware of the fact that we are
concerned with only a particular class of sentences within language,
namely, those which are significant.
If significant sentences must exhibit bipolarity (we have yet to
consider the argument for this claim), a major implication may immediately be noted:

since one and the same fact cannot be both possibly

true and possibly false (facts just being what they are), a proposition
must be some sort of entity other than the fact which may be the object
of the judgment in question.

The bipolarity of the proposition is in-

compatible with the kind of direct realism advanced
al theory of judgment.
are mental contents.

by

Moore's relation-

However, this does not mean that propositions
As we shall see, one of the most interesting

things about Wittgenstein's view is that it posits a representational

medium, but this medium does not become, as it were, the immediate ob30 Von Wright's first set of citations is mistaken, since there is no
2.23, and 2.24. Presumably he means 2.223 and 2.224.
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ject of awareness and judgment.

The medium turns out to be that

through which sense and meaning is accomplished.

Thus Wittgenstein's

view retains an element of realism and avoids Idealism or phenomenalism.
It thereby accomplishes Moore's and Russell's goal of countering
Bradley's idealism without the direct realism of the relational theories.

These are topics for a later chapter. 31
What argument can be given in favor of bipolarity?

Why should we

not simply accept Moore's view, and bite the bullet with respect to its
rotten implications?

Wittgenstein's argument revolves around our very

idea of what it is for something to be a proposition and around our idea
of what it is to understand a proposition.

Before proceeding to the ar-

gument it is worth noting that the argument is an a priori one.

It's

conclusion, like all of the statements that make up the Tractatus (and
the body of philosophy in general, according to Wittgenstein) share in
an a priori status.

This, in effect, excludes them from significant or

sensical discourse.

This does not mean that they are not a part of lan-

guage, just that they (like senseless tautologies and contradictions)
have a different semantic status.

In this case, the sentences in ques-

tion are said to be nonsensical.

This is not intended in any way to be

perjorative.

In Chapter Five we shall consider the nature of nonsense

in great detail, and we will introduce a distinction between good nonsense and bad nonsense (or gibberish).
The argument for bipolarity may be called the Argument from the
Priority of Understanding over Knowledge.

Whatever else a proposition

is, it is something with the potential to be understood.

This fact is

31 It is important to note that what has been asserted up to this
point remains entirely neutral concerning the nature of propositions.
It is an open question whether propositions are to be identified with
Platonic, psychological, linguistic or quasi-linguistic entities, at
least nothing along these lines is being presupposed wi~h regards to the
argument which follows. It also remains an open question whether falsehood can be accommodated by some other relational theory of judgment besides Moore's.
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manifest in the language we use ev~ry day.

we say we understand a sen-

tence that has been uttered or a proposition that has been asserted or a
statement that has been made.
the language we use.

This is a trivial observation concerning

This is evidence to the effect that we conceive of

propositions as the sorts of things that get understood (or fail to get
understood).
Now what is it to understand a proposition?

In order to under-

stand a proposition it does not suffice simply to know what would be the
case if the proposition were to be true.

One must also be able to say

under what conditions the proposition would be false. If Othello is able
to ascertain that it is true that Desdemona loves Cassio under the appropriate conditions but unable to ascertain the falsehood of that
proposition under other conditions (for example, when Desdemona's words
and deeds speak to the contrary), then we would not say that Othello

understands (or perhaps that he does not completely understand) the
proposition in question.

Understanding a proposition is, therefore, in-

dependent of, and in an important respect epistemologically prior to,
knowledge of whether the proposition is true.

Thus Wittgenstein urges

against Moore, for whom it is only possible to assert true propositions:
What corresponds in reality to a proposition depends on
whether it is true or false. But we must be able to understand a proposition without knowing whether it is true or
false.
What
we know
what is
sarily)

we know when we understand a proposition is this:

what is the case if the proposition is true, and
the case if it is false. But we do not know (neceswhether it is true or false (1913b, p. 98).

Wittgenstein reiterates this point on numerous occasions:
Every proposition is essentially true-false: to understand it, we must know both what is the case if it is true,
and what must be the case if it is false (1913b, p. 98).
Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say: we understand
the proposition P when we know that 'Pis true'• P~ for
this would naturally always be the case if accidentally the
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propositions to right and left of the symbol '•' were both
true or both false (1913b, p. 104).
The point is also made in his letters to Russell during this time:
••• What I mean to say is that we only then understand a
proposition if we know both what would be the case if it was
false and what if it was true (1912, p. 124).
The world war II Notebooks also take note of the fact that if something
is to be called a proposition, then it must be the sort of thing of
which we may ask:

under what conditions is it true and under what con-

ditions is it false?
In connexion with any proposition it could really be
asked: what does it come to for it to be true? What does
it come to for it to be false?" (1914b, p. 59).
I believe the most significant of these passages is that from the "Notes
on Logic" which asserts "it is incorrect to say: we understand the proposition P when we know that 'Pis true'• P" (1913b, p. 113).

His point

is that we do not ascribe understanding to someone merely because they
utter P when (or even when and only when) Pis true.

That is not suffi-

cient for ascribing understanding, because it may accidentally be the
case that the two events, i.e., the uttering of P and P's being true,
occur.

A child, never having been exposed to snow, may mimic an adult's

speech by uttering "Snow is white," but that is no indication that the
child understands the sentence.

A fortiori, a child who has grasped the

concepts of sentence and truth who utters "'Snow is white' is true if
and only if snow is white" has not provided evidence of understanding
the sentence at all.

What counts as evidence of someone's being able to

understand a sentence is that the person in question uses the sentence
in the appropriate way.

At the very least this involves being able to

assert that it is true under the appropriate conditions and being able
to assert that it is false under the appropriate conditions.

The point

is that understanding involves a capacity to discriminate between those
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conditions that make the sentence true and those conditions that make it
false. 32

In other words one must be able to identify the truth condi-

tions for the sentence in question.
Before we turn to the metaphysical issue concerning the nature of
truth conditions, let me point out two things.

First this argument is

quite convincing and is subject to empirical verification.

If we exam-

ine the conditions under which we ascribe an understanding of declarative sentences to others, we find matters pretty much as Wittgenstein
says.

we do not say that a person understands a sentence merely on the

basis of that person being able to mimic or parrot the utterance of another person."

The reader is invited to look for counter-examples.

Second, this argument nowhere appears in the Tractatus.

The

Tractatus is a condensation of the many remarks that make up the pretractarian writings.

Nevertheless, this argument is introduced to jus-

tify the thesis of bipolarity, and that thesis is introduced in the
"Notes on Logic" and the "Notes Dictated to Moore" to explain the nature
of Wittgenstein's special ab-notation.

This ab-notation is retained in

the Tractatus (at 6.1203), and it presupposes that bipolarity holds for
This argument parallels epistemological arguments for treating
knowledge as more than merely true belief. One may believe, for example, that a felon is guilty of a crime, and it may be true that the
felon is guilty of the crime, but one's reason for believing so may be
inadequate (for example, the felon's worst enemy tells you he is
guilty). In this instance we would not say one possesses knowledge.
This sort of argument has been offered by philosophers as diverse as
Plato, Russell, Gettier, etc. It is interesting that at bottom such a
priori arguments always depend on the purportedly common conception of
knowledge. That raises the question of whether such a priori arguments
are really nothing more than ad populum arguments. This question can be
raised with regard to Wittgenstein's argument regarding understanding as
well. I suppose Wittgenstein would have to respond: but this is the
only language I understand; if you understand something else by the word
"understanding," what is it? How is one to take this question seriously
without accepting the very view Wittgenstein is advancing?
33 An exception might be someone who has been 'coached' to respond a
certain way on a game show. If we are tempted to ascribe understanding
under those conditions, the person's actions (including her utterances)
in a larger context serve a corrective function.
32
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all significant sentences.

Thus I find no problem whatsoever in at-

tributing this view to the author of the Tractatus.
our next concern is with the nature of truth conditions.

It would

be a mistake to interpret Wittgenstein as advancing the thesis, for example, that there are conditions that make a sentence true, but that
there are no conditions that make it false.

Such would be the case if

the falsehood of a proposition were to consist .merely in the non-obtaining of some fact or state of affairs that would make the proposition
true.

One might be tempted to misinterpret Wittgenstein this way by a

cursory reading of Tractatus 4.25:
If an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists~ if an elementary proposition is false, the
state of affairs does not exist (1922b, 4.24).
We can ignore for the time being what Wittgenstein means by elementary
proposition and state of affairs.

The important thing is that one might

take the second half of this passage to indicate that Wittgenstein adhered to a conception of falsehood similar to that advocated by Moore.
It sounds as if falsehood consists in some fact's not occurring and
nothing else.

This interpretation involves •reading into' the passage

the "and nothing else" clause.

such a reading is unjustified however.

The pre-tractarian writings make it abundantly clear that there must be
something that makes a proposition false.
falsifying condition as negative facts.

Wittgenstein refers to these
That falsifying conditions are

said to be negative, turns out to be problematic given the Grundgedanke
of the Tractatus; but that is a topic that will be taken up later.

Here

what is important is that Wittgenstein makes reference to facts (of some
sort or another) that makes a sentence true.

Thus, we read:

There are positive and negative facts: if the proposition "this rose is not red" is true, then what it signifies
is negative (1913b, p. 97).
Positive and negative facts there are, but not true or
false facts (1913b, p. 97).
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This terminology is retained, as I noted above, in the Tractatus:
The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is
reality.
(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact (1922b,
2.06).
An analogy to illustrate the concept of truth: imagine a
black spot on white paper: you can describe the shape of
the spot by saying, for each point on the sheet, whether
it is black or white. To the fact that a point is black
there corresponds a positive fact, and to the fact that a
point is white, a negative fact. If I designate a point on
the sheet ••• then this corresponds to the supposition that is
put forward for judgement, etc. etc. (1922b, 4.063).

I do not believe he would have used the term "fact" in either the pretractarian writings or in the Tractatus, had he meant to identify the
conditions under which an elementary proposition is false with the mere
occurrence or existence of objects that are unrelated to one another.
In fact, Tractatus 2.013 denies the possibility of conceiving of objects
apart from their capacity for being related to other objects, i.e., as
being in some relation or other.

There he says,

Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states
of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot
imagine the thing without the space (1922b, 2.013).
A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (a
spatial point is an argument-place.)
A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red,
must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by
colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the
sense some degree of hardness, and so on (1922b, 2.0131).
To say that a space can be imagined empty means that it is possible to
conceive of a property or relation as uninstantiated.

To say that the

thing cannot be imagined without the space means that it is impossible
to imagine an object apart from imagining it as having one or another
property or as being involved in one or another relation.

Nothing can

be said about an object in isolation, even though, as Tractatus 2.0232
maintains, objects in themselves are propertyless and relationless (a
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claim I take to be consistent with the thesis that whatever can be said
of an object is contingent).
Nevertheless, we should consider is whether Tractatus 2.06 and
4.063 raise anew the possibility that a proposition's falsehood consists
in the nonoccurrence of a fact or state of affairs rather than the occurrence of some other fact incompatible with that asserted in the
proposition.

After all, Tractatus 2.06 appears to define negative facts

in precisely those terms.

And 4.063 does not present the white field as

another object which excludes and takes the place of the black object;
rather it is presented as the absence of blackness.••

There is, in fact,

a very good reason for holding such a view, and it is an epistemological
one.

Often one may know that a proposition is false without knowing why

it is false.

Suppose I believe that I am about to buy a particular car

on a dealer's lot.

The dealer tells me that I will not be able to pur-

chase it, and I come to believe that what the dealer says is true.

In

this case I know (or can presume) my former belief was false, but I do
not know why it is false.

The fact that this is an epistemological mat-

ter also plays into the hands of a conceptual analysis of the concept of
falsehood, for one may use it as a basis for saying that under these
conditions one says one's belief is false or this is how we conceive of
falsehood.
I believe that if Wittgenstein thought (in writing the Tractatus)
that he was committed to nothing more than the nonoccurrence of a state
of affairs when it comes to explaining falsehood, that he was gravely
mistaken.

(I am fairly certain that he did not think this, as I shall

explain momentarily.)

The fact is that semantic theory, no less than

nature, deplores a vacuum (and for pretty much the same reason).
we

When

set aside the epistemological issue in order to consider the meta-

physical basis for falsehood, we find that even if we do not know why a
34

I am indebted to John Nolt for raising this criticism.
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belief we happened to hold is false, we know that there is a reason it
is false.

I may not know why I am not to buy that car, but there is

something about that car that precludes its being bought by me:

it has

already been sold, it requires repair before it is placed on the market,
the owner of the dealership wants to use it for a while and sell it
later, etc."

If my belief was false, I may not know which proposition

it is that happens to be incompatible with what I believed is true (that
is to say, I may not know what alternative fact ruled out the possibility of my buying that car), and, so, I speak of the negative fact that I
am not going to buy the car or of the nonoccurrence of my buying the
car.

But surely that is just a manner of speaking!

Assuming there is

an object of my belief (a car), that object is in some state other than
that of being owned by me at the time at which I thought I would own it.
This is what makes my belief false.
-a nothing--cannot make anything.

The mere nonoccurence of somethingIn regards to Tractatus 4.063, I

would suggest we take the metaphor more literally than Wittgenstein perhaps may have intended (or more literally than Wittgenstein is thought
to have intended), since obviously the background is not colorless; it
is white, and being white excludes the possibility of being black.

If

Wittgenstein did not believe this in the Tractatus, it is fairly ludicrous that he did not, since it is indeed a fact that the actual physical world does not contain nonoccurrences of states of affair:
tual physical world is a plenum.

the ac-

I know of no counter-examples to this

claim, except those which introduce suspicious phenomenal or phenomenological factors, and, so, provide for an alternative explanation.

For

35 The assumption here is that there is at least some object that is
the object of my false belief. If my belief is about something non-existent the issue changes dramatically. we will see in a later chapter
that in those cases where the object of belief is non-existent,
Wittgenstein employs Russell's Theory of Descriptions to replace the
non-referring terms with one or more referring terms. The argument
above really pertains to atomic propositions where reference is guaranteed for all terms. That will be the topic of Chapter Three.
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example, the fact that I discover that Pierre is not in the cafe can be
explained in terms of my expectations; the physical description of the
cafe from which Pierre is absent will not contain this negative fact.
The sentence that makes apparent reference to a negative fact simply
goes proxy for some other state description ...
As I said before, if Wittgenstein really did believe that the full
story concerning falsehood is that it consists merely in the nonoccurrence of a state of affairs, then this would be fairly ludicrous.

I do,

in fact, believe that Wittgenstein can and must be interpreted in a more
charitable light.

It happens that in the writings authored prior to the

Tractatus, as well as in those written immediately afterwards, he does

explicitly assert the alternative view (of which I have only given a
thumbnail sketch so far).
sages already cited.

we have already noted it somewhat in the pas-

For example, when Wittgenstein talks about the un-

derstanding of a proposition he talks about what would be the case if
the proposition is false (1912, p. 124).

More explicitly yet is his

claim that:
[a)t a pinch, one is tempted to interpret "not-P" as
"everything else only not P" (1913b, p. 100).
This remains for him only a temptation here, because he is still willing
to countenance negative facts; but the point here is just that there is
something--either a negative fact or something else--that would be the
case in the event that a proposition is false.
The most convincing evidence comes from a 5 June 1915 entry in the
Notebooks:

••• There are certainly propositions that allow Pas well as
-P but none that assert Pas well as -P.
p
Q

-p
-g

-p
-g

A greater consideration will be given to phenomenological data, including this example from Sartre, in Chapter Four.
38
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The possibility of MP v Q" when #P" is given, is a possibility in a different dimension from the impossibility of
"-P".
"P v -P" is A QUITE SPECIAL CASE of "P v 0" (1914b, P•
56).

The point here is that if a sentence of the form P v -P could be used as
an assertion, then it would have to be the case that -P goes proxy for
some other alternative sentence that is incompatible with P.

In fact, P

v -P cannot be used to make an assertion due to its tautologous form.
(It is actually a rule, and its actual form, according to Wittgenstein,
is (P) P v -P--which, in effect, makes it about possible utterances of
sentences.)
After Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus he met with members of the
Vienna Circle to try to explain its key ideas.

At that time he tells

the members that he was confused in the Tractatus over what should be
called the sense of a proposition.

(As we shall shortly see, the issue

of the nature of falsehood bears greatly upon how Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and meaning is to be understood.)

In these dis-

cussions he attempts to articulate what he should have said in the
Tractatus:

I once wrote: 'A proposition is laid like a yardstick
against reality. Only the outermost tips of the graduation
marks touch the object to be measured.' I should now prefer
to say: a system of propositions is laid like a yardstick
against reality. What I mean by this is: when I lay a
yardstick against a spatial object, I apply all the graduation marks simultaneously. It's not the individual graduation marks that are applied, it's the whole scale. If I
know that the object reaches up to the tenth graduation
mark, I also know immediately that it doesn't reach the
eleventh, twelfth, etc. The assertions telling me the
length of an object form a system, a system of propositions.
It's such a whole system which is compared with reality, not
a single proposition. If, for instance, such and such a
point in the visual field is blue, I not only know that the
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point isn't green, isn't red, isn't yellow etc. I have
simultaneously applied the whole colour scale. This is also
the reason why a point can't have different colours
simultaneously; why there is a syntactical rule against fx
being true for more than one value of x. For if I apply a
system of propositions to reality, that of itself already
implies--as in the spatial case--that in every case only
one state of affairs can obtain, never several.
When I was working on my book I was still unaware of all
this and thought then that every inference depended on the
form of a tautology (1930, p. 317).
Syntax prohibits a construction such as 'A is green and A
is red' (one's first feeling is that it's almost as if this
proposition had been done an injustice; as though it had
been cheated of its rights as a proposition), but for 'A is
green', the proposition 'A is red' is not, so to speak, an
other proposition--and that strictly is what the syntax
fixes--but another (aspect of the] form of the same proposition (1930, p. 86).
You could say that the colors have an elementary affinity
with one another (1930, p. 105). 37
The references in these passages to sense shall be discussed below.
Here what is important is that being of one color is precisely what excludes the possibility of being another color.

Thus, the falsification

conditions for "This is red" include the truth conditions for "This is
green," "This is yellow," "This is blue," etc.
I think that view does not contradict anything of importance in
the Tractatus.

In fact, it is the only view compatible with some of the

central claims of that work.

One might, however, be tempted to point to

Tractatus 2.061, which appears altogether incompatible with the views
expressed here:
States of affairs are independent of one another (1922b,
2.061).
Before we hastily interpret this to be incompatible with what I have argued above, it should be born in mind that a corollary of 2.061 is:
••• Two elementary propositions cannot contradict one another

(1930, p. 109).
37 These passages provide the key to the so-called Color Exclusion
Problem. we shall return to them in Chapter Five.
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The latter passage, however, hails directly from the Philosophical
RP.marks.

(Tn fact it occurs in close proximity to one of the passages

cited above.)

This should raise suspicions as to t.hA mAaning of
Row r.ould it be compatible with both views?

Trar.t:at:us ,.061.

that the word •independent" in 2.061 is vague:

I suspect

w:hArARA t.hA t.rnt.h anci

RP.nRP. of two Aimnlt.Anfmnsly assertable elementary propositional signs is
indepAndent of one another (e.g., •ThiA iR rAci" anci •rrhiA iA ronnci"):
there are elementary propositional signs that cannot. hA

aAAArt-.Aci

Aimnl-

tAneoni:;Jy (A.g., "This is red" and •This is blue") due to their shared
sense.

I think, too, that the wrong thing iA maciA of ,.061 anrl relat.eci

pAAAAgP.A (e.g., 1922b, 2.062 and 4.211), due to a failure to distinguish
between a sentence or propositional Aign (whir.h may hP. ciP.Ar.riheci t-hnronghly in terms of its syntax) and a proposition or statement (which
must be characterized in term.R of it.A fnnr.t-.ion).

One of t.he prinr.ipal

theses of the Tractatus, I take it, is that concrete nt.t.eranr.eA ;mci inAr.ri pt: i onR ( 1 i ngn i At:i r. t.o'keni:; th.at: are actually used for stating what is
t:rue or false) are the basic semantic units of a language.

assert both P and

Q

One r.Annot.

at the same time if they are incompatible and one

refers to the falsification condition of the other.

YAt. hot.h Are AignA:

i.e., sentences that could be used separat.Aly:
".Not-P" and "P" contradict each other, both cannot be
true~ but I can surely expreAA hot.h, oot:h pir.t:nrP.R P.~ist:.
They are to be found side by side (1914b, p. 28).
I also said that the view: I have exprARAP.ci r.onr.erning falAifir.AHon r.onnit.ions is the only view compatible with certain key theses of
the Tractatus.

Here I will mention only one1 otheri:; will becomA ;tppar-

ent. in RnhRP.(!nAnt. r.hApt.erA.

'T'hA i ciAA t:hat. fAl sehood consists merely in

the non-obtaining of a state of affairs is incompatible with t.hA
c;r11nrigP.rianlcP. of t:hP. Trar.t:at:us.

Wittgenstein maintains that his most

fundamental idea is that the logical constant.A (inr.lnciing t:he nAg-'lt.ion
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sign) do not serve as referring terms, that there are no logical objects.

What is the nanoccurrence of a state of affairs?

It cannot con-

sist in the non-existence of the object(s) to which a sentence does
re£er; remember that we are assuming there is some object about which
one has a belief.

Are we

to say that some sort 0£ negative relation

holds among the constituents of the would-be state of affairs?

One of

the implications of Wittgenstein's Grundgedanke just is that there is no
such thing as a nonoccurrence of a state of affairs.

So, how is one to

characterize the relation among the elements of the would-be state of
affairs?

I conclude that if Wittgenstein did not hold the view I am at-

tributing to him, he should have.

Perhaps there is some confusion about

this point in the Tractatus; the Pre-Tractatns and thA Pnst:-'T'rar.tat:ns
WittgAnstein knew better.
In the end, thA view of falsehood t:hat:

T

a.m att-.ribut:ing t:n him

produces a very charitable interpretation of t:hA 'T'rilct:nt11R~ it-. r.P.rt-.ainly
produces one according to which the arguments of the Tractatus take on
greater force than is usually attributed to them.

'T'hP. argmnent:s agninst

Russell's Theory of Descriptions, for logical atomism and for the
r.r11nrigP.riilnkP., for AxamplA, r.an hP. SP.P.n in A much stronger light than is

customary among commentators.

FurthermorP., t:hP. dist:inct:ions hP.tWP.P.n

sP.nsP. And mP.Aning, form and structure, and showing and saying can be
brought into alignment in such a way as to produce a consist:P.nt: and powerful set of core concepts for a semantic theory.
4.

S.inn

anri RP.rlP.11t:11na.

We shAll nssn111P. thP. viAw of falsehood defAndP.d ahovA is correct:.
Tt:

r.ArriP.s with it: a mAjor implication:

namely, that a distinction must

be drawn between the sense ( Sinn) and meanin.g ( RedP.ut:ung) nf a propositional sign.

The distinction comes to this.

The

Sinn

of a proposition-

.,,., sign r.nnsist-.s in its truth r.nnditinns (intArprAtP.d broadly so as to
include its falsification conditions).
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The senAe is t-tn.1A " RP.t: nf pns-

sible facts or states of affairs.

The Bedeutung of a propositional sign

consists in the member of this set that actually obtains, and which renders the propositional sign true or false.

It is to note that both the

Sinn and the Bedeutung are independent of what the speaker asserts.
consider the following passages:
The Bedeutung of a proposition is the fact that corresponds to it, e.g., if our proposition be 'aRb', if it's
true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, if
false, the fact -aRb (1913b, p. 112).
That a proposition has a relation (in (a) wide sense) to
Reality, other than that of Bedeutung, is shown by the fact
that you can understand it when you don't know its
Bedeutung, i.e., don't know whether it is true or false.
Let us express this by saying 'It has sense' (Sinn) (1913b,
p. 112).
Every proposition is essentially true-false: to understand it, we must know both what must be the case if it is
true, and what must be the case if it is false. Thus a
proposition has two poles, corresponding to the case of its
truth and the case of its falsehood. We call this the
sense of a proposition (1913b, p. 99).
It is clear that we understand propositions without
knowing whether they are true or false. But we can only
know the meaning (Bedeutung) of a proposition when we know
if it is true or false. What we understand is the sense
(Sinn) of the proposition (1913b, p. 103) •
••• In analysing Bedeutung, you come upon Sinn as follows:
We want to explain the relation of propositions to reality.
The relation is as follows: Its simples have meaning= are
names of simples~ and its relations have a quite different
relation to relations~ and these two facts already establish
a sort of correspondence between a proposition that contains
these and only these, and reality: i.e., if all the simples
of a proposition are known, we already know that we CAN describe reality by saying that it behaves in a certain way to
the whole proposition. (This amounts to saying that we can
compare reality with the proposition. In the case of two
lines we can compare them with respect of their length without any convention: the comparison is automatic. But in
our case the possibility of comparison depends upon the conventions by which we have given meanings to our simples
(names and relations).
It only remains to fix the method of comparison by saying
what about our simples is to say what about reality. E.g.,
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suppose we take two lines of unequal length; and say that
the fact that the shorter is of the length it is is to mean
that the longer is of the length it is. we should then have
established a convention as to the meaning of the shorter,
of the sort we are now to give.
From this it results that 'True' and 'False' are not accidental properties of a proposition, such t.hat:: whA.n it has
meaning: WA can say .it is alAo trne or fa.lee: on the contrary: to have meaning means to be true or false: the being
true or false actually constitutes the relation of the
proposition to reality, which we mean by saying that it has
meaning (Sinn) (1913b, pp. 112-113).
The first two passages are definitions of Bedeutung and Sinn respectively.

The reference to Reality in the wide sense in the first bears

noticing.

Reality, for Wittgenstein, is more than any one actual fact,

and it is more than the sum of all actual facts (past, present, and future).

Rather, Reality is the set of all possible

wor1riR.

Jn t:he case

of an individual propositional sign, the sign stands in relation to the
complete set of truth conditions that. comprises the sense of a proposition.

This carries a significant implication concerning language anci

thought.

It means that language and thought are to be regarded as al-

wayR heing ahout: more t.ha.n jnst actual states of affairs.

The implica-

t.inn is not. Rimply that. what. an individual Rays or thinks may or may not:
happen

to be about actual states of affairs.

Rather, it: is that lan-

guage and thought necessarily always involve more than a relation to
what is actual, and this is so regardless of whether what one says is
true or what one says is false.

This means that when one believes or

asserts the proposition P, even if Pis true, the sense of P must contain the possibility of -P.

Or if one believes or asserts the proposi-

tion -P, even if-Pis true, the sense of the proposition must contain
the possibility of --P (or P).

(This point will be articulated in

greater detail when we consider the argument for the Grundgedanke.)
When one's belief or assertion that-Pis true, then the positive fact
that makes P true is the Bedeutung of the propositional sign.
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When

one's belief or assertion that Pis false, then the negative fact (to
use Wittgenstein's terminology) that makes P false (i.e., that makes the
propositional sign P false) is the Bedeutung of the propositional sign.
The distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung enables us to speak of
two very different ways in which propositions (or propositional signs)
may be about: something. 3 '
false propositions.

This is particularly important in the case of

When S judges (falsely) that P, we want to say that

in one respect S's judgment is about P, since that is whats believes to
hA trnA; yet: WA w;iint to say that in another respect S's judgment is
about -P (or some fact which is incompatible with P), since-Pis the
object, i.e., the actual fact, about which S has a false opin:ion.
this rAason Wittgenstein maintains:
meaning as not-P" (1913b, p. 95).

For

"[_i]n my t:heory P has t:hA samA
Although the nistinr.rion between the

ways a proposition may be about something may not be felt to hA

ai:1

ur-

gent :in those cases where one's belief is true, nevertheless it iR.

On

pain of committing ourselves to the absurd idea that we do not (ever)
understand those with whom we disagree, such must be the case.

If com-

munication is to be possible (hence, if genuine disagreement is to be
possible), then S's true belief that P must be related in some way to
the falsehood of -P.

In other words, in some respect S's helief must be

about -P (viz., about its being false), and that does require a d:ist:inction between Sinn and Bedeutung.
Let it be perfectly clear that nothing said up to this point concerns what propositions must be like in order for them to exhibit bipolarity and for there to be a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.
Wittgenstein's answer to the question of what propositions must be like
38 These correspond to the distinction between showing and saying
which we shall examine in greater detail in the next two chapters.
Briefly, a propositional sign has both a structure and a form; the
structure represents (says or depicts) what would be the case if it is
true, whereas the form represents (shows) the sense of the proposition.
Wittgenstein is not always consistent in his use of the terms form and
structure, but this is the view that shines through.
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would be the Picture Theory of the Proposition.

What has been said thus

far, however, is not neutral with respect to the nature of the senses
of propositions.

The sense of a proposition is a set of possible facts

of which only one will be actual.

The senses of all propositions, taken

collectively, would be the set of all possible worlds.

This is what

Wittgenstein refers to as reality (1914a, p. 112), and it is to be distinguished from the actual world which .is to be identified with the
Bedeutungen of all propositions taken collectively.

Thus the relation

between the Sinn and Bedeutung of a proposition is to be understood as
that of a set to one of its members.
We have been discussing the first two passages from "Notes on
Logic" cited at the beginning of this section.

The nP.xt t-.wo passagAs

(1913b, pp. 99 and 103) draw out the relation between sense and understanding.

What is understood is the sense of a proposition.

These pas-

sages are significant because they tie the views that Wittgenstein held
in 1913 to those (quoted from the Philosophical Remarks earlier) that he
heJd in 1929.

To understand a proposition and to understand its sense

amounts to one and the same thing.

In the later writings we see

Wittg~mstein maintaining that a proposjtion is morP. than a propositional
sign in relation to the actual fact that makes it true or false.

The

whole set. of SP.ntences that describe the truth conditions (for a given
sentence within that set) is more accurately regarded as representing
the proposition.

This leaves little doubt that the Wittgenstein of 1929

was retrieving some of his fundamental insights of 1913.
The final, lengthy, passage with which we began (1913b, pp. 112113) begins the business of explaining what features a sentence must
possess if it is to have both a sense and a meaning.
thing is that a sentence's singular terms must refer.
earlier.

The most striking
We noted this

On those occasions when an apparent singular term dOP.s not

refer (as when one speaks of the present King of France), the term in
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question is to be subjected to an analysis similar to that contained in
Russell's Theory of Descriptions.

We shall see in Chapter Three the ex-

tent to which Wittgenstein accepts Russell's view.
The next crucial point that is made concerns the fact that these
singular terms must be the subject of syntactic rules that permit them
to enter into various constructions in such a way as to be able to assert various relations among their referents.

(This provides, by the

way, further abductive confirmation that Wittgenstein held the views I
havA At-.t:rihut:Ac'I t-.o h.im r.onr.erning sAnse and meaning.)

This lays the

groundwork for the distinction between structure and form.

Any sentence

that someone utters has an actual structure; it can be described syntactically.

But other possible sentences may be constructed using the very

same terms.

The set of structures that results (which of course cannot

be asserted at once) is the form of a propositional sign.

This thesis

is stated more fully in the Tractatus:
Form is the possibility of structure (1922b, 2.033).
The fact that the elements of a picture are related to
one another in a determinate way represents that things are
related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure
of the picture, and let us call the posA i hi l i t:y of t-.h is
Atructure the pictorial form of the picture ( 1922b, 2 .15).
Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related
to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture (1922b, 2.151).
Form and structure will be taken up in greater detail in the next chapter.

What I want to emphasize here is simply the fact that rules for

the construction of particular structures play an essential role in representation.

At the end of the next chapter we shall see that this en-

tails the falsehood of semantic Platonism.
Let me close this section by briefly considering a misinterpretation of the distinction between meaning and sense.
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The distinction is

easily misunderstood: indeed it is easily ignored.

In one recent work

Carruthers (1989) appears unwilling to acknowledge any significant distinction at all.

He argues that the Sinn of a proposition (or of a

propositional sign) is a type of Bedeutung.

This does not mean: as one

might think: that he takes the sense of a proposition to be an actual:
mind-independent fact: on the contrary, he holds that the Bedeutung of a
proposition (or even of a name) need not involve any existent object or
fact at all.

so, when he collapses the distinction, he collapses it

into what we have been calling "sense".

He then reserves the word

"sense" to ta~k about the Bedeutung of sentences.

we shall digress long

enough to unravel this confusion, since if Carruthers is correct, then
our own interpretation of the distinction would be radically mistaken.
Carruthers correctly maintains that the sense of a propositional
sign is that which is understood and communicated by speakers of a language.

He also correctly holds that the sense of a sign is not to be

limited to the fact that determines its truth value.

Re i.s incorrect,

however: in believing that its Bedeutung need not exist in the actual
world as well.

His argument i.s based on the fact that Wittgenstein

speaks of various items besides propositional signs as having a
Redeutung_. some of which can lay no claim to being about anything in the
world.

He appears to suggest that scholars have reached this misunder-

standing by placing too much emphasis on Tractatus 3.203 where
Wittgenstein tells us that a name bedeutet (means) somP. ohjeC'!t.• "
Carruthers objects to reading "bedeutet" here as "refers to" and thus to
regarding the Bedeutung of a name as its referent.

That would indeed

entail that the Bedeutung of any propositional sign consists at least in
part in some existent object, for while a name can only refer within the
context of such a sign (for example, within the context of a sentence),
The Pears and McGuinness translation of the noun "Dedeut:ung" as
"meaning" and of the verb "bedeuten" as "to mean" can be misleading,
since the nouns "meaning" and "sense" are often synonymous in English.
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each propositional sign must contain names.

Against this view

Carruthers cites Tractatus 5.02 where Wittgenstein discusses Frege's
failure to distinguish between the argument of a function and an affix
of a name.

In Carruthers' own words:
[B]oth the argument 'P' in '-P', and the affix 'c' in
'+c', enable us to recognize the Bedeutungen of '-P' and
'+c' respectively. Yet it is extremely doubtful, to say the
least, whether Wittgenstein would regard either a sentence
or a plus sign as having reference (1989, p. 26).

Obviously, though, it does not follow from the fact that these items
help us recognize the Bedeutung of the respective propositional signs to
which they beiong, that they themselves have a Bedeutung.

Indeed the

passage cited by Carruthers nowhere attributes Bedeutung to these items
but rather to the propositional signs containing them.
Carruthers is on a more solid footing, however, in citing
Tract.at:11!'l 5.451 where Wittgenstein apparently refers to the Bedeutung of

the negation sign, since the logical constants clearly play no referential role according to Wittgenstein (1989, pp. 26-27).

In this passage

Wittgenstein is concerned with Russell and Whitehead's (1910) practice
of introducing logical primitives in a piecemeal fashion, such that the
negation sign as it is used in the propositional logic might not have
the same meaning as it has when used in the predicate logic.

This does

not appear to be consistent with the idea that the Bedeutung of some
item is an existent object or fact.

Nevertheless, the rest of the text

makes it clear that he is really concerned with whether one and the same
proposition could be expressed with different propositional signs, so
that, for example, -(Ex) -Fx and (x) Fx may be about (bedeutet) the
same fact (cf. 1922b, 5.4-5.441).

So again, even though his wording is

misleading, Wittgenstein's principal concern seems to be the
Bedeutungen of sentences.

In fact Tractatus 5.451 does hail, almost

verbatim, from the "Notes on Logic" (1913, p. 105).

80

At that time the

non-referential character of the logical constants was as yet unclear to
him.

When the passage was incorporated into the Tractatus it was proba-

bly a mere oversight on Wittgenstein's part that prevented him from not
changing the wording in light of his new ideas.
Carruthers' final counter-example stems from an analysis of
Tractatus 6.232 where Wittgenstein asserts, contra Frege, that in a logically perspicuous notation the equality sign of mathematic111 wnnlci

hP.

rendered superfluous, because it would be apparent from the notation
alone that the propositions on either side of the equality sign share
the same meaning (Bedeutung).

But, a111 Carruthers points out, "it is

snreJy part. of the import. of 6.02-6.03 and 6.2-6.241 that. Frege is wrong
to believe numbers to be objects, and ••• that numerals ••• refer to them"
(1989, p. 27).

According t.o t.he Tractatus, mathematical eqn;tt-.inm::1,

1 ikP.

t-.hP. t-.;m-

tnlogies of logic, are senseless (sinnlos) and, therefore, they are to
be regarded as pseudo-propositions incapable even of expressing a
t.hought. (19?2b, 6.2-6.21).' 0

When Wittgenstein does speak of "mathemati-

cal propositions" (as in 6.21, 6.211, and 6.2321), it must always be remembered that he is speaking the language of his principal adversary in
the philosophy of mathematics, Frege.

The same holds true when he

speaks of the sides of an equation as having meaning (Bedeutung), and
indeed Tractatus 6.232, which Carruthers cites, is explicitly about
Frege's doctrines.

But in this and the surrounding passages

Wittgenstein is interested in discovering the source of the confusion
that leads persons to speak (erroneously) of "the meanings of mathematical propositions".

His answer is to be found at 6.211 in a passage rem-

iniscent of his later philosophy in more than one way:
Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never
The distinction between what is senseless and what is nonsensical
will receive greater treatment in Chapter IV. In a word, what is senseless serves as a prototype (Urbild) for what has sense, whereas what is
nonsensical lacks even this potential.
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what we want. Rather, we make use of mathematical propositions only in inferences from propositions that do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to
mathematics. (In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word or proposition for?' repP.atedly leads t-.o
vAl uable jnsights) ( 1922b, 6.211) • .,
Mathematical equations, like logical tautologies, function as inferential or transformational rules for pairs of sentences that possess the
forms of the respective sides of the equation.

Equations are neither

true nor false, rather they simply #mark the point of view from which I
consider ••• two expressions" (1922b, 6.2323).

The confusion concerning

their meaningfulness arises from the fact that they are applied to
propositions that are genuinely meaningful.

Our talk of their meaning-

fulness is, as it we.re, borrowed from our talk of the meaningfulness of
the sentences of which they are the forms.

Unlike the propositions to

which they are applied, however, they are mere forms devoid of empirical
content.

Thus they lack both Bedeutung and Sinn.

So it is a bit sur-

prising to find Carruthers attributing to Wittgenstein the view that
these expressions have any kind of Bedeutung, regardless of whether
Bedeutung is to be understood as an existent object or fact or simply as
the sense (Sjnn) of a sentence, as Carruthers thinks.
We may conclude that Carruthers' attempt to collapse the
Sinn/Bedeutung distinction does not enjoy the kind of textual support

that he claims.

Nevertheless he is prepared to argue that his view of

RP.deutung as something other than an actual object or fact is the only
view compatible with the Tractarian account of the semantics of names.
Here let it be noted that for Carruthers the Bedeutung of an expression
The passage cited is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's later philosophy in a couple of ways. The emphasis placed upon examining the function
of an expression would later become part of the methodology of the
Phi1n~nphir.a1 Tnvestigations. That mathematical equations function as
nothing more than transformational or inferential rnlei:i ii:i ~oni:ioni'tnt
with the content of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Mathematics where
mathematical equations are described as grammatical propositions belonging to our frame of reference.
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(whether the expression is a name, a sentence, a logical connective,
etc.) is to be identified with its semantic content or its contribution
to the semantic content of an expression of which it is a constituent.
The semantic content of an expression is whatever it is that speakers of
a language share in common in virtue of which they understand the expression in question (1989, pp. 28-29).

Semantic content is that which

is communicated by speakers of a language.

As Carruthers sees matters,

the dispute is over whether only names may be said to have Bedeutung
(1989, p. 23).

Obviously if this is taken merely as a question concern-

ing whether anything besides names contribute to the sense of sentences,
there can be no dispute (in that case this would appear almost to be a
verbal dispute), since for Wittgenstein a sentence cannot be said to be
composed only of names (the exception in the Tractatus being elementary
propositions), nor can it be considered a kind of name itself.
is not merely a verbal dispute.

But this

What is at stake is whether the

Tractatus is to be interpreted in a quasi-Fregean light (as Carruthers

would have it) where the senses of propositions are to be construed as
representations of possible facts in the world, or whether it should be
interpreted in a more Russellian and Moorean light (as I would have it)
where senses do not stop short of being actual possibilities within the
world.

When Carruthers says that only his reading of Bedeutung can ac-

commodate Wittgenstein's views concerning the semantics of names, he has
in mind the fact that sentences containing singular expressions that do
not refer will, on Wittgenstein's view, be nonsensical rather than
false.

For example, an atomic proposition containing a name for which

there is no simple object as referent will be said, not merely to lack
any sense, but to lack even the potential for sense and, therefore,
meaning.

This suggests to Carruthers that to speak of a sub-sentential

expression as having a "Bedeutung" is to speak of nothing more than its
having some role to play in the composition of a sentence's sense.
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But

surely what this suggests, especially in the absence of adequate
counter-examples, is that the referent of the name (which must be an existent object) is what contributes to the sense of the sentence as a
whole.

So, what sense is there to be made out of Carruther's claim that

the Bedeutung of a expression need not be some actual entity in the
world?
Aside from Carruther's difficulties, one further problem must be
entertained.

In a variety of places, Wittgenstein speaks of P and-Pas

having the same meaning but opposite senses (1913b, p. 93; 1922b,
4.0621), and he mentions that the introduction of the negation sign re-

My thoughts on this

verses the sense of a proposition 1922b, 5.2341).

are that a propositional sign is not neutral with respect to the set of
possible facts that comprise its sense.

In lieu of its structure, it

asserts that one of the members of the set obtains.

To speak of the

negation sign as reversing the sense of a proposition means just that -P
asserts the disjunction of P's falsification conditions.

The set of

disjuncts refers to the members of P's sense that are the complement to
that member asserted to obtain.

Reversing the sense means affirming one

or more members of the complement.

To speak of opposite senses is not

to speak of different senses; again, the opposites are the complements
within a set.

Wittgenstein could have expressed this point better.

My interpretation of these difficult passages is not uncommon
among Wittgenstein scholars.

For all our differences on other topics,

McDonough (1986) views the matter in a similar light.

McDonough'& view

of sense differs from my own in that he accepts the idea that sense is
to be identified with a possible fact.
of a proposition.

This he refers to as the sense 1

To account for the passages in which Wittgenstein

speaks of negation as changing the direction of the sense, he countenances what he refers to as a proposition's sense 2 •
(1986, p. 28) as an attitude toward the sense 1 •
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This he defines

Thus he resolves the

problem by saying P and -P have the same sense 1 •s but different sense2•s.

This comes close to what I have in mind in saying that the struc-

ture of a proposition is not neutral with regard to the members of the
set of truth conditions.

The structure that is actually used expresses

the speaker's preference to assert this rather than that.
In closing, let me just point out that what has been introduced in
this chapter really constitutes little more than a thumbnail sketch of
of semantic theory to emerge in full in the Tractatus.

Most of what we

have examined stems from Wittgenstein's desire to extricate himself from
the problems associated with Moore's relational theory(-ies) of judgment, while yet retaining an element of realism.

This he has done.

To

proceed now to the particular way in which the distinction between showing and saying is developed, we must turn to the influences exerted upon
him by Russell and Frege.

The distinction between showing and saying

receives its greatest impetus from his desire to resolve the logico-linguistic difficulties confronting Frege in the face of Russell's Paradox.
The focus of his attention is Russell's theory of types that was introduced to resolve the logical and semantic paradoxes that arise when language is used self-referentially.

However, whereas Russell's Theory of

Types seeks to secure the possibility of making assertions about language without becoming entangled in the paradoxes, Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying is an attempt to demonstrate that it
is not only impossible but unnecessary to make assertions about language."

Upon the completion of this dissertation I became aware of a serious flaw with the conception Sinn presented in this chapter. The reader
is asked to turn to Appendix I for a full account of the objection and
its significance.
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CHAPTER II
PRE-TRACTARIAN SEMANTICS (II):

THB INITIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN SHOWING AND SAYING

1.

Russell's Paradox.
Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying emerges as

an alternative to Russell's theory of types.

The theory of types

is

offered as a remedy to Russell's Class Paradox and the Liar Paradox.
Russell's Paradox is engendered by the fairly commonplace belief that a
class may consist of any kind of combination of objects whatsoever.
Members of a class need not belong to the same genus:

{dogs, cats}.

Nor do they need to be of the same level of abstraction:

{Fido, cats}.

Some classes can be members of themselves~ others cannot.

For example,

the class consisting of all objects that are not cats is not a cat, and
so it is a member of itself.

On the other hand, the class that consists

of all cats is not a cat, and so it is not a member of itself.

What

shall we say, though, about the class of all classes that are not members of themselves?
member of itself.

Is it a member of itself, or not?

Suppose it is a

In that case it would have to satisfy the condition

of class membership, namely, that it not be a member of itself.

So, on

the supposition that it is a member of itself, it is not a member of itself.

This in itself need not be construed as paradoxical, as one might

simply conclude, consequentia mirabilis, that the class in question is
not a member of itself ...
is not a member of itself.

Suppose, however, that the class in question
That would be sufficient for belonging to

the class.

Hence, if it is not a member of itself, then it is a member

of itself.

Again we might infer, consequentia mirabilis, that it is a

member of itself.

But this conclusion conjoined to the earlier one gen-

This point parallels a similar one made by Sainsbury (1989, p. 115)
concerning the Liar Paradox. We need not proceed all the way to the
contradiction for the situation to be unacceptable.
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erates the contradiction that it both is and is not a member of itself.
Consider next the Liar Paradox.
of forms.

The Liar may occur in a variety

The simplest version arises out of a consideration of a claim

such as uThis sentence is falsew that involves reference to itself.
this claim true, or false?

Suppose it is true.

Is

In that case, what it

asserts to hold true will be the case, but what it asserts is that it is
false.

So if it is true, then it is false.

the claim in question is false.

On the other hand, assume

In that case, what it asserts as true

will not be the case, but again, what it asserts is that it is false.
So if it is false, then it is not false.

Once again, a pair of infer-

ences analogous to those in the class paradox enables us to derive the
two conjuncts of a contradiction.

Consequently, the claim with which we

began is both false and not false.
Although it may be argued that the two paradoxes are essentially
different in nature since the former employs the logical concept of a
set, and the latter the semantic concept of truth (cf. Ramsey, 1925, pp.
171-172), there are marked similarities between them; so much so that
Russell regards them as springing from a common source ...

The Class

Paradox, it will be noted, can be reconstrued as a paradox about properties.

we may speak of the conditions of class membership as the

properties an object must possess in order to belong to that class.
Thus being a cat is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a
member of the class which consists of all and only cats.
said that classes may or may not be members of themselves.
properties may or may not be ascribed to themselves.

Earlier it was
Similarly,

For example, the

The discussion which follows is based primarily upon a reading of
Russell (1910) and certain sections of Russell and Whitehead (1910).
The terminology and the examples used by Wittgenstein in his 1913 •Notes
on Logic" indicate an acquaintance with both. The account given of the
Theory of Types, particularly its Vicious Circle Principle, borrows
heavily from Sainsbury (1989) and Chihara (1973).
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property of being a cat is not itself a cat."

That is to say, being a

cat is not ascribable to the property of being a cat.

on the other

hand, the property of being a non-cat (that is, of being anything that
is not a cat) is itself not a cat.

Thus being something other than a

cat can be ascribed to the property of not being a cat.

The Class

Paradox can be restated as a paradox about properties, then, by substituting ,,the class of all classes that are not members of themselvesw
with uthe property of being a property that cannot be ascribed to itself", and by asking whether this property can, or cannot, be ascribed
to itself.

In turn, the Liar Paradox appears to be analogous to (if not
'
a version of) this paradox about properties. In order for
this to be
seen, we will have to modify the original Liar so as to use the predicate "is not true" in place of "is false".

This is not problematic,

since neither Russell nor Wittgenstein would have regarded sentences
(propositional signs) as capable of being neither true nor false.
(Indeed we could have begun with a consideration of ,,This sentence is
not true" which would led us to the contradiction both that it is the
case that it is not true and that it is not the case that it is not
true.)

Next, it should be born in mind that sentences like ,,This sen-

tence is falsen and ,,This sentence is not true" attribute to themselves
certain properties~ in the latter case it is the property of not being
true (or, better, of not being true of something).

While an object-lan-

guage sentence like "This paper is white", if true, is true of an object
to which it attributes the properties of being white and being made of
paper, so the Liar, if true, is true of some object to which it ascribes
the property of not being true, and that object happens to be itself.
So if the Liar possesses the property of being true (or belongs to the
class of objects that are true), then it must possess the property of
Recall our earlier difficulty with Moore's apparent commitment to
the the property (or concept of) physicalness itself being physical.
The statement made above might not be acceptable to a bundle theorist.
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being not true (or it must belong to the class of objects that are not
true).

So, it can possess the property of being not true, only if it

possesses the property of being true (cf. Sainsbury, 1988, p. 133).
Notice that both the Class Paradox and the Liar Paradox involve a
reflexive element:

the former involves self-inclusion or self-member-

ship within a class, whereas the latter involves self-reference.

Their

assimilation to a property paradox de1DOnstrates that the sentence which
in each case gives rise to the paradox involves self-predication in some
manner or other.
doxes.

Here is where Russell locates the source of the para-

In each case the sentence that gives rise to the paradox vio-

lates what he refers to as the Vicious Circle Principle.

Russell formu-

lates the principle in a variety of ways (cf. Russell, (1908, pp. 63 and
75), and (1910, pp. 215 and 219); Russell and Whitehead, (1910, pp. 31
and 37)), but its guiding idea is that no finite set of objects can contain members that would be defined in terms of the set itself. 0
matter can be put formally as follows.

The

Let Fx be a propositional func-

tion that takes Fa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc. as values, so that (x)Fx implies Fa
& Fb & Fe ••• , etc.

According to Russell, the expression Fx ambiguously

denotes Pa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc (1910, p. 217).

That is to say, the func-

tion denotes some one of {a, b, c, ••• , etc.} as being F, but not any
definite one.

The Vicious Circle Principle prohibits a function from

being its own argument; consequently Fx could not have as one of its arguments FAx, which supposedly denotes the function itself (however, as a
later discussion shall make clear, this is not unproblematic, and it
would be more appropriate to say that it denotes the fact that z ia P,

p.
' 8 This way of expressing the matter is closest to Russell (1910,
215).
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if it denotes anything at all)."

Russell's argument stems from a con-

sideration of the fact that while Fx is indefinite in terms of its denotation, it is nevertheless a determinate function (1910, p. 219) with a
well-defined meaning (1910, p. 217).

To say that Fx is a determinate

function is to say, for some set of objects {a, b, c, .•. , etc.}, that
Pa

or

Pb

or

Pc • •• ,

etc.

In order for a function to be determinate, its

set of possible values {Fa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc.} must be determinate.

This

does not mean that in order to understand a function it is necessary to
know each of its values.

It is possible to understand the function "x

is human" (or the sentence "Someone is human") without knowing that
"Socrates is human" is one of its values (1910, p. 218).

If such were

not the case, it would be impossible to understand a function at all,
since its values are potentially infinite in number.

What it does mean,

however, is that the arguments for Fx must fall determinately inside the
range of its variable, so that each of the values of Fx (whether true or
false) will be, as Russell says, definite or well-defined (1910, pp.
217-218).

What Russell has in mind is that the values for Fx, i.e., the

members of the set consisting of {Fa, Fb, Fe, ••• , etc.}, must be determinately true or false, if Fx (and sentences like "Someone is a human")
are to be considered meaningful at all, that is to say, if they are to
be considered capable of being true of, or false of, anything whatsoever.
This requirement can only be met, Russell supposes, by observing a
hierarchy of types or orders and by restricting quantification to the
47 Russell and Wittgenstein place the carat directly over the variable: here I place it immediately to the variable's left. The carat
might be described as an abstraction operator somewhat similar to the
more contemporary Lamda-operator inasmuch as it provides a way to definitely denote that which denotes indefinitely. Russell describes the
symbol, FAx, as a function: this is misleading because the symbol is actually the name of a function, as is evident from the fact that it
serves as argument for Fx. For Wittgenstein, it appararently designates
a fact: specifically, it designates the fact of which some propositional
sign consists upon substitution of the variable.
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order below that of the predicate.
names of objects.

The lowest order would consist of

These and only these would serve as the arguments for

first-order predicates.

Second-order predicates may then take the names

of first-order predicates as arguments.

Third-order predicates may take

the names of second-order predicates as arguments, etc.

A function is

termed predicative if it belongs to the order immediately above that of
its argument (1910, 237).

The principal violations of the Vicious

Circle Principle occur when the argument is of an order equal to or
higher than the function.

For example, the subject of uThe color green

is square" is the name of a first-order predicate and is at the same
level in the hierarchy of types as the sentence's predicate.

The sen-

tence "The property of being an uninstantiated property is blue" would
likewise violate the rule, since its subject belongs (at least) to the
third order, whereas its predicate belongs to the first:

we

may say

that the property of being an uninstantiated property is many things,
but we cannot say it is blue.

To violate the Vicious Circle Principle

is to fail to adhere to the Theory of Types in a very specific way.

It

was mentioned that this principle is violated when a function takes itself as argument.

Less formally, the Vicious Circle Principle is vio-

lated when the subject of a sentence, not only operates at the same
level as the predicate, but refers to the very property predicated by
the predicate.

The sorts of claims generated by

the ontological com-

mitments of Moore's theory of judgment (claims like uThe physicalness of
a unicorn is a physical thing") serve as prime examples.

Moore, we have

seen, affords an objective status to all properties, including, for example, the property of being a unicorn.

Since to conceive of a unicorn

is to conceive of a physical thing, the physicalness of a unicorn must
be afforded an objective status.

As we saw, this gave rise to the prob-

lem of how there could be physicalness external to the mind that is not
itself physical, and it launched Moore on an attempt to extricate him-
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self from such claims as that the physicalness of a unicorn is itself a
physical thing.

By forcing a distinction between a property and the ob-

ject of which it is predicated, the Theory of Types avoids this problem.
While the Theory of Types would permit the ascription of physicalness to
a particular thing, it would deem as meaningless the ascription of physicalness to the property physicalness itself.
is generated:

Here the vicious circle

to attribute physicalness to physicalness is not to pro-

vide information about anything at all.

When subject and predicate

(function and argument) are one and the same there is, at it were, no
escape from the circle of language.
The form of argument leading to the Class Paradox violates the
Vicious Circle Principle precisely at that point at which it defines
membership in the problematic class in terms of its not being a member
of itself.
themselves.

Let

c be the class of all classes that are not members of

The question is whether

c can be a member of itself.

Since nothing can be a member of C unless it is a class that is not a
member of itself, class membership in C may be defined thus:
member of c if and only if xis not a member of x.
whether

xis a

In consideration of

c is a member of itself, we are given the paradoxical result

that c is a member of c if and only if c is not a member of itself.
This paradox can be avoided, according to Russell, if we do not permit
ex (which corresponds to the function ux is a member of the class of all
classes that are not members of themselves") to have as one of its values C(CAx).

If we do not regard C(CAx) as a possible value of the func-

tion, then no sense can be attached to the supposition that c is a member of itself or to its denial.
The reasoning that leads to the Liar Paradox violates the Vicious
Circle Principle in its assumption that it makes sense for a sentence to
ascribe falsehood or the property of not being true to itself.
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Lets be

the sentence "This sentence is not true."

When we consider whether sis

true, we are led to the paradoxical claim thats is
sis not true.
true".

true if and only if

Here let Fx be the function corresponding to "xis not

The paradox arises as a result of regarding Fs as a legitimate

construction; whereas, in fact, it is illegitimate insofar ass names a
value of that very function.

That is to say, it presupposes F(Fx) which

says, in effect, that "the function 'is not true' is not truen (or in
Wittgenstein's terminology "something that is not true is not true").
But "no function," says Russell, "can have among its values anything
which presupposes the function" (1910, p. 217, italics added).

Just as

classification and predication are essentially classification and predication of something other than the very act (or class or predicate)
which does the classifying or predicating, so too the ascription of
truth or falsehood essentially involves its ascription to something
other than very act (or sentence token) that does the ascribing.

The

vicious circle can only be avoided by observing a semantic hierarchy
comparable to the hierarchy of classes.

Russell, to be sure, believes

that the tendency to infringe upon the Vicious Circle Principle is, in
this instance, largely due to the systematic ambiguity of the concepts
of truth and falsehood as expressed in ordinary language (1910, p. 222),
and he seeks to remedy the situation, in a manner similar to Tarski
(1937; 1969), by countenancing orders of truth and falsehood and by restricting the sorts of entities to which they may be ascribed.
Accordingly, sentences like "Socrates is a philosopher," "Desdemona
loves Cassio," etc. comprise an object language that, when true, are
true of certain facts.

Such sentences possess what Russell refers to as

first truth (1910, p. 222).

Sentences that are used to assert the truth

or falsehood of these sentences, like "The sentence 'Socrates is a
philosopher' is true" or The sentence "'Desdemona loves Cassio' is
false" comprise the first level of a meta-language, and have what
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Russell calls second truth ...

A second level of meta-language would con-

sist of sentences--such as uThe sentence 'The sentence Socrates is a

philosopher is true' is truen--that ascribe some semantic property (in
this case the property of second truth) to a sentence of the first level
of meta-language.

Its own truth will be truth of the third order.

Each

of these sentences may be symbolized used the appropriate level of predicative function.

By allowing T1x, T2x, T3x, ••• , Tnx

to be predicative

functions of an ascending order, and p to be the object language sentence "Socrates is a philosopher," we may symbolize the sentence described above as T2 (T 1p).

Problems such as those associated with the

Liar Paradox result from attempts to to ascribe a semantic property to
an argument that does not belong to the order immediately below that of
the function.

The sentences uThis sentence is falsen and uThis sentence

is not true" (which we will here regard as synonymous) ascribe to themselves a second-order semantic property, viz., second falsehood ...
Although the latter was rendered earlier as Fs, it may be more perspicuously rendered as F2s.

Accordingly, the exact way in which the Vicious

Circle Principle is violated can now be seen.

Since s refers to some-

thing (namely itself) that ascribes second falsehood, F2s presupposes
F2 (F 2x).

However, in order to be meaningful at all, F2s would have to

be a value of F2 (F 1x).

Only thus, with the variable ranging over object

language sentences, is it possible to escape the circle of language.
Wittgenstein's reaction to the Theory of Types forms the basis for
his distinction between showing and saying.

It is that distinction

which he regarded as the cornerstone of his semantics; it is also that
which drew the most fire from his critics (among the most stalwart of
whom would be Russell).

Wittgenstein's views on what cannot be said but

48 Russell does not employ the terms uobject language" and umeta-language" but it is only natural to use them in describing his position.
Here I follow the practice of Brockhaus (1991), p. 182.
49 It must be a second-order semantic property which is being assigned, because neither is an object language sentence.
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only shown are of the utmost importance given our own ultimate goal,
outlined earlier, of demonstrating the manner in which criterial behaviorism is a form of instrumentalism.

The early and later Wittgenstein

differ in many respects, but that there is a distinction between what
can be said and what can only be shown is not one of them.

Although the

status of what cannot be said would undergo a major transition, that
certain things cannot be meaningfully asserted would remain constant
from his earliest days (recall Russell's attribution to him that all existential claims are meaningless) until the days of the Philosophical
Investigations and on Certainty.

In either event the effects upon the

analysis of propositional attitude sentences are profound.

As we shall

see below, the doctrine of showing which emerges from the criticism of
the Theory of Types forms the basis of an attack upon Russell's theory
of judgment, an attack which leaves the subject of judgment incapable of
being a term of a relation (as Russell's theory requires).

Like our

earlier examination of the bipolarity of the proposition, an examination
of the distinction between showing and saying will carry us far into the
heart of the Tractatus.

It is worth noting that both the argument for

the bipolarity of the proposition with its commitment to a particular
Sinn/Bedeutung distinction, as well as the argument for a distinction

between showing and saying are independent of the arguments for the
Grundgedanke and the Picture Theory of the Proposition.

According to Wittgenstein, it is neither possible nor necessary to
construct a Theory of Types. The impossibility of a Theory of Types is
related to the fact that it is necessary to introduce sentences of
English (in the form of rules like the Vicious Circle Principle) into

the supposedly logically perspicuous language of Principia.

The intro-

duction of these rules makes English a meta-language for the language of
Principia.

But Principia, like Frege•s Begriffsschrift (1879), is a

work that seeks to escape the vagueness and inconsistency inherent in
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natural language.

Bow is this goal to be achieved, if a logic must con-

tain a natural language as its meta-language?

"Logic," Wittgenstein de-

clares, "must take care of itself" (1914b, p. 2; 1922b, 5.473).

Just as

an adequate theory of judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense
(1918, p. 95~ 1922b, 5.5422), so too in logic it must be "impossible for
us to go wrong" (1914b, p. 2: 1922b, 5.473).

The symbolism itself must

exclude the possibility of error: it cannot be the case that restrictions are imposed upon logic from. without.

In this instance the intro-

duction of English sentences is particularly grievous, because the rule
says precisely what supposedly cannot be said.

Whatever else a logical-

ly perspicuous language should be, it should be expressively complete.
That is to say, it should be capable of expressing all and only those
propositions that may be true or false.

(That Wittgenstein is concerned

with expressive completeness becomes most apparent in the "Notes
Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway" in 1914; see, for example, 1914a,
p.108.)

If some sense can be assigned the rule itself, that is, if it

is possible to say what the rule proscribes, then the language for which
it is a rule will have already exceeded its expressive capabilities by
containing in its meta-language a proposition (i.e., a propositional
sign) to which no sense may be attached.

In effect, when the Vicious

Circle Principle says that no function may take itself as argument it is
saying the unsayable.

It is impossible to either assert or deny that a

function may be its own argument.

Urging reticence in such matters,

Wittgenstein says, "Ii]f logic can be completed without answering certain questions, then it must be completed without answering them"
( 1914b, p. 3) •
Similar problems beleaguer any attempt to speak of the semantic
properties of a propositional sign.

As Brockhaus (1991, p. 185) points

out, any attempt to state the meaning of an atomic proposition (i.e.,
one whose truth is not a function of the truth of other propositions and
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whose singular expressions do not refer to composite objects) will, like
the proscription contained within the Vicious Circle Principle, simply
generate another proposition to be accounted for (if it can be accounted
for).

Assuming that the meaning (Bedeutung) of a proposition is the

fact to which it corresponds, how could the relation between proposition
and fact be conveyed by means of another proposition without generating
a regress?

If "a is F" is a true atomic proposition, how would we go

about describing the relation between it and the fact that makes it
true?

we might say "'a is F' is true of the fact that bis G", but this

contains a noun clause that is, at most, a translation of the original
propositional sign.

Rather than revealing an interesting semantic fact

about the sign •a is pn, we have merely demonstrated the rather pedestrian fact that the conventions we use for saying what "a is pn says
might have been different.
This argument, which Brockhaus attributes to Wittgenstein, is not
to be found in any explicit form in either the Tractatus or any of the
pre-Tractarian writings.

Nevertheless, the claim that such a regress

would occur does follow from the Picture Theory's thesis that propositional signs and the facts they represent share a common logical form.
The noun clause in "'a is F' is true of the fact that (or means that) b
is G" replicates the form common to "a is pn and the fact corresponding
to it without saying anything about that form.

The point is that any

attempt to say what that form is will require another token of the very
same form.

(Of course, the same could not be said for non-elementary

propositions that are susceptible to analysis~ it is worth repeating
that here we are concerned solely with elementary or atomic propositions.)

Any attempt to get outside of the nexus of propositional sign

and fact to represent the relation of one to the other will be futile.
Since we are concerned principally with pre-Tractarian semantic
doctrines, it might be objected that it is improper to attribute to

97

be its own argument. The point is first made in a letter to Russell
dated January of 1913 and is expanded upon in the uuotes on Logic" of
the very same year.
[T}here cannot be different Types of thingsl In other
words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name
must belong to one type. And further, every theory of
types must be rendered superfluous by a proper theory of
symbolism ••• What I am most certain of is not ••• the correctness of my present way of analysis, but of the fact that
all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of
symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of
things are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which
cannot be substituted in one another's places (1912, p.
122).
Bo proposition can say anything about itself, because
the symbol of the proposition cannot be contained in itself1
this must be the basis of the theory of logical types (1913,
p. 107; cf. 1913, p. 96 and 1922b, 3.332).
Most striking about these passages is the fact that the symbolism of the
language makes a Theory of Types unnecessary:

a function cannot be its

own argument, because a symbol cannot contain itself.
ly simple actually.

The idea is fair-

Symbols or signs are physical objects.

Some sym-

bols are simple, like a, b, c, etc. which function as names; others are
complex, like Fa, Fb, Fe, etc. which function as propositional signs.
Inasmuch as propositional signs are complex, they may be regarded as
facts of a certain sort.

It is impossible for a function to be its own

argument, because it is impossible for a fact (the propositional sign)
to contain itself as one of its constituents.

But what sense can be at-

tached to the idea of a fact being one of its own constituents?

A fact

that per impossibile is its own constituent would not be the fact it is.
Suppose it is a fact that Desdemona loves Cassio.

In that case we would

have a fact whose constituents consist, at the very least, of Desdemona,
Cassio, and the relation of loving.

Bow could the fact that Desdemona

loves Cassio be a constituent of that fact?

If Desdemona's love for

Cassio were to be a constituent of a fact, for example, of the fact that
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Desdemona's love for Cassio is fleeting or the fact that Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, then the fact of which it would be a
constituent would have to be some fact other than itself.

To be a con-

stituent of a fact just is to be something that possesses a property or
that stands in relation to other things.

Facts are essentially complex.

The same is true of propositional signs, for they are facts (1913,
p. 97).

Each contains two necessary constituents: a subject and a pred-

icate (1913, pp. 96, 107.)

That these are what Wittgenstein identifies

as the constituents of a propositional sign is extremely important.

In

contrast to a view he attributes to Russell (1912, pp. 121-122), a
propositional sign cannot be a mere concatenation of names.

If, for ex-

ample, "Socrates is mortal" were to be analyzed merely as affirming the
existence of a particular set of objects whose constituents happen to be
Socrates and mortality, then nothing would prohibit the nonsensical construction "mortality is Socrates" from being admissible.

Wittgenstein

explains,
[I]f I treat 'mortality' as a proper name, there is nothing to
prevent me to make the substitution the wrong way round. But if I
analyse [it] into Socrates and (Bx) • xis mortal it becomes impossible to substitute the wrong way round because the two symbols
are of a different kind themselves (1912, p. 122).
The view expressed here is reminiscent of Frege and may well have been
inspired by conversations the two had had only weeks before.

For Frege,

it is of the utmost importance not to treat the predicate of a sentence
(in particular, the concept-words contained within the predicate) as
having the same kind of meaning as (or as contributing to the meaning of
the sentence as a whole in the same manner as) proper names.

Although

Wittgenstein would not accept Frege's conception of senses
(Wittgenstein's own conception of senses as possible states of affairs

belonging to the actual world makes them contingent upon the actual
world), he would accept that the infrastructure of a sentence or of any
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propositional sign plays an integral role in the representation of
facts.

A fact, he maintains, cannot be represented merely with a name

(1913, pp. 96, 107), since names lack the structure required for saying
how things are.

To be a description of a fact, a propositional sign

must not be a name, nor DIUSt its constituents merely be names: which is
why neither "Othello" nor "Othello Desdemona# are capable of being
propositional signs.

Rather, sentences must have constituents that

stand in relation to one another as subject and predicate.

The subject

and predicate (what Wittgenstein sometimes calls a form) function in essentially different wayss names name objects, predicates predicate of
objects certain properties or relations.

It is thus the relation of

subject to predicate that effects the representation (i.e., the description) of a fact. The precise physical arrangement of the symbols within
a propositional sign is conventional and arbitrary (1913, pp. 97, 101).
It matters not whether a one-place predicate occurs to the left or right
of a proper name, nor whether a two-place predicate occurs to the left,
to the right or between two proper names.

What is not arbitrary is that

there should be two kinds of symbols (ignoring for now sentences involving variables or sentence-forming operators) and that they should be related in some form or other to one another.

"In 'aRb' it is not the

complex that symbolises," explains Wittgenstein, "but the fact that the
symbol 'a' stands in a certain relation to the symbol 'b'" (1913, p.
96).

The same will hold true for sentences of ordinary language with

the myriad conventions governing their alternate forms and orders (as
with "Desdemona loves Cassio" and "Cassio is loved by Desdemona").

In

each case it must be possible to distinguish subject and predicate.
What makes a theory of types unnecessary is the fact that the symbols that serve as the constituents of sentences are different kinds of
symbols.

By this token we are able to recognize meaningful sentences

for what they are.

Provided we adopt such conventions as (i) letting F,
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G, H, etc. function as predicates, (ii) letting a, b, c, etc. function
as names, and (iii) allowing the positioning of a predicate letter immediately to the left of a name to predicate of the bearer of that name a
particular property, we should be able to tell straightaway whether a
sentence (or formula) is well-formed and meaningful.

Provided meanings

have been assigned to the logical constants, all and only those sentences that are well-formed will be meaningful.

What a sentence says

depends upon the meanings assigned to its constituents; that

a sentence

says something is shown by the fact that it possesses the type of constituents it does.

As Wittgenstein declares in the passage which was

cited above, "different kinds of things are symbolized by different
kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's
places" (1912, p. 122).
Consider, then, the function Fx.

Russell regards such expressions

as having indefinite reference to some unspecified member of a class.
In contrast, Wittgenstein denies that the variable plays any referential
role at all.

Taking up a position to which even the much later Remarks

on the Foundations of Mathematics (1937) would remain loyal, Wittgen-

stein declares that it is the role of the variable to serve as an
Urbild or linguistic prototype (1914b, p. 33; 1922b, 3.333 and 5.522).

Its function can be compared to that of a model home used by realtors:
the model is not used as a home, but it is used to show prospective buyers the physical characteristics and functional capabilities of a home
they might purchase. Similarly, the character of the variable shows what
sort of symbol may appear to the right of the predicate as a value.

If

it is our convention to let lower case letters from the alphabet serve
as names, then that choice is reflected by the fact that Fx and x are
not formally identical; it is that fact which shows that it is not possible for the former to replace the latter so as to be its own argument.
The result would be a piece of nonsense.
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Just why it would be nonsensi-

A

cal turns upon the interpretation to be assigned to F(F x).
Wittgenstein is not explicit concerning this matter.

Ishiguro

(1981, pp. 50-51) suggests that the alternatives amount either to treating the inner and outer F's as names (yielding, e.g., noesdemona
Desdemona") or as predicates (hence, uis green is greenu).
case would the result be a well-formed sentence.

In neither

Another interpretation

is offered by Brockhaus (1991, p 187) who suggests that F(Fx) says precisely the same thing as Fx, thereby sharing the redundancy found in
uThat which is green is green".

This interpretation is appealing in

light of our earlier consideration of the kind of regress that is generated in attempting to state the semantic properties of one proposition
by means of another.

However, neither analysis does justice to the fact

that Russell employs a device (the carat above the variable) that, when
embedded within Fx, turns the function expression into a singular term.
Ishiguro's two-predicate account contains no singular term at all.

On

the other hand, although the interpretation offered by Brockhaus contains a singular term, it contains the wrong one.

A

If F(F x) may be said

to refer at all, it refers to the property (or function) of something
being F~ whereas if F(Fx) refers to anything, it refers to some indefinite thing which is F.

The expressions F(FAx) and F(Fx) are not syn-

onymous. Strictly speaking, the issue is not whether a function can be
its own argument, but whether the singular term FAx (which stands for
the property of something being an F) may legitimately be a value of
Fx. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding is facilitated by
Wittgenstein's own misstatement of the problem at Tractatus 3.333 where
he, too, neglects the singular expression which plays such a crucial
role in Russell's formulation of the paradox.

Technically speaking, the

passage from the Tractatus is an attack upon a straw man.
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However, similar arguments that do happen to hit their target are
to be found within such Pre-Tractarian writings as the uNotes on Logic"
and the "Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in Norway" in which the distinction between showing and saying emerges in full force.

There it becomes

obvious that he is not concerned to show that the form suffers from a
harmless redundancy; rather he is out to show that the form is nonsensical, i.e., that it is incapable of being true or false at all.

He is

not concerned with sentences like "That which is green is green• as
might be suggested by the passage in the Tractatus.

Instead he is con-

cerned to sh~ the nonsense contained in sentences such as •The property
of being green is green" and "The property of not being green is not
green" which are in an important respect analogous to •The property of
being physical is physical" or uThe physicalness of a unicorn is itself
something physical" that we described earlier as posing difficulties for
Moore.

The real issue is why are these sentences inadmissible?
In a passage similar in spirit both to the 1913 letter to Russell

(quoted above) and Tractatus 3.333 we read:
The reason why uThe property of not being green is not
green" is nonsense, is because we have only given meaning to
the fact that ugreen" stands to the right of a name; and
uthe property of not being green" is obviously not that.
F cannot possibly stand to the left of (or in any relation to) the symbol of a property. For the symbol of a
property, e.g., Gx is that G stands to the left of a name
form, and another symbol F cannot possibly stand to the left
of such a fact: if it could, we should have an illogical
language, which is impossible (1914a, p. 116).
Wittgenstein argues that expressions like "the property of not being
green," "something's not being green,• "being green," etc. cannot possibly serve as the subject of a propositional sign.

This is a major break

from the tradition in which Russell and Moore were operating, according
to which expressions that refer to properties may occur either as predicates or as subjects.

Such a practice is thought to be legitimate in
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light of the fact that properties can both be predicated of objects as
well as be the objects of predication.

If this is not possible, if ex-

pressions that refer to properties can only occur in the predicate position, then Russell's Paradox cannot even be formulated.
fication can be given for this claim?

But what justi-

If the answer is simply that the

conventions governing the symbolism do not permit it (i.e., Mwe have
only given meaning to the fact Mgreen" stands to the right of a name"),
then those conventions are in need of justification.
I suspect that the answer lies in the very last remark concerning
a notation in which a function is its own argument being an illogical
language.

our examination of Wittgenstein's Pre-Tractarian views clear-

ly suggests that he meant two things by an illogical language.

First,

an illogical language would be one that admits nonsense, i.e., one that
permits the formulation of sentences incapable of having a sense.

An

adequate semantic theory, like a theory of judgment makes it impossible
to judge nonsense, must restrict meaningful sentences to those that may
possess a sense.

Second, an illogical language would be one that per-

mits illegitimate inferences.

we already know that Wittgenstein accept-

ed the bipolarity of the proposition and the thesis that logic must be
concerned with unasserted propositions, because he thought that an adequate account of language and judgment must sanction inferences from "P
is true" to "Pis not false" and so forth. Clearly, too, the Tractatus
requires of any adequate theory of meaning that it provide an account of
the nature and limits of inference (1922b, 4.023, 5.13-5.14).

Indeed,

in the end it would be the inability of the Tractatus to provide a coherent account of the limits of inference (the so-called color exclusion
problem) that would prove its undoing according to many scholars.
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(We

will have an occasion to examine that claim in the next chapter.' 0 )
Although Wittgenstein would remain preoccupied with the nature of inference and proof throughout his career (indeed the greater portion of the
Remarks on the Foundations ot Mathematics (1937) pertains to this subject), his concern with the subject first appears in letters written to
Russell between January and July of 1913.
The fact that Wittgenstein imposes these two conditions upon an
adequate semantic theory and theory of judgment, when considered in the
context of his claim that uditterent kinds ot things are symbolized by
different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one
another's places" (1912, p. 122), suggests that Wittgenstein was deeply
influenced by Frege in these matters.

If we are to understand why

Wittgenstein thinks that sentences like uThe property of being green is
not green" are nonsensical, we must consider both his debt to Frege as
well as the way in which his views diverge from those of Frege.

Only

then will the full argument for a distinction between showing and saying
emerge.

I would go so far as to suggest that Wittgenstein's distinction

between showing and saying is introduced, in part, to shore up elements
of Frege's philosophy against Russell's Paradox without appealing to the
Vicious Circle Principle or, in the end, to Frege's own ontology.
2.

The Genesis of the Paradox and The Shape of Its Solution.
In this section we continue to examine the development of

Wittgenstein's views--but with special consideration to the influence of
Frege:

with those elements of his philosophy that give rise to the

paradox and with the shape its solution might take were one inclined to
accept some of Frege's basic insights into the nature of language.
Wittgenstein was so inclined.

Frege's thesis that a sentence's sub-sen-

50 It is my view that the color exclusion problem does not pose any
sort of serious problem for the author of the Tractatus at all. The
problem can be reconciled by bearing in mind the sense/meaning and
form/structure (or form/content) distinctions Wittgenstein draws.
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tential components perform. distinct logical and semantic roles, as well
as his thesis that quantifiers function as second-order predicative expressions, are acknowledged by Wittgenstein as among the greatest advances of modern logic.

To preserve these insights it would be neces-

sary for Wittgenstein to launch an attack along both a logical front as
well as a metaphysical front.

The logical front Frege would well ac-

knowledge; the metaphysical front (in spite of his own ontological assumptions) he would not.

Along the logical front Wittgenstein would

launch his defense of the claim that an illogical language is impossible.

The very nature of representation requires that a semantic dis-

tinction be drawn between what can be said and what can only be shown;
such a distinction makes a theory of types neither necessary nor possible.

Along the metaphysical front we are given the ontology of the

Picture Theory.

That ontology begins to emerge quite early in consider-

ation of the requirement (inherited from Frege but also derivable from
the bipolarity of the proposition) that sense be determinate.

The two

lines of development in Wittgenstein's thought will be examined in the
next section of this chapter and in the following chapter.

Here I am

concerned to show how those lines of development are shaped by Frege's
influence.
It is fair to say that Frege would be wholly unsympathetic to the
direction taken by Wittgenstein's thought.

His own initial response to

Russell's Paradox, like his responses to so many other problems (for example, the problem arising over the fact that the expression uthe concept horse" does not denote a concept) would remain one-dimensional in
its attempt to discern logically relevant features of syntax that might
both resolve his own problems as well as deflate the claims of his critics.

It is for this reason that Frege so often appears to be quibbling

over the terminology used by his adversaries.

Nevertheless, that fea-

ture of his philosophical style, along with his reasons for regarding
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truth as an indefinable and primitive term, plus the influence upon him

of Lotze•s conception of objectivity, all point to the fact that for
Frege a semantic theory is wholly subservient to the theory of inference.

This, in turn, creates a serious tension within Frege•s philoso-

phy that cannot be reconciled within that philosopher's own terms.

If

the only function of a semantic theory is to provide an account of the
preservation of truth, then such a theory can say nothing informative

concerning the nature of extra-linguistic entities (such as the
Bedeutungen and Sinne of signs).

Yet Frege•s writings are replete with

what appear to be ontological distinctions.

Not only JllUSt the

Bedeutung of a linguistic expression be distinguished from its Sinn,

among the Bedeutungen of expressions one must distinguish bet-ween concepts, objects, relations and truth-values (which are a kind of object).
Thus the principal task facing any student of Frege is to find an adequate ontological interpretation of his remarks pertaining to those entities (including senses) that are said to exist independent of the linguistic expressions that either express them or refer to them.

As I

shall argue below, Frege's commitment to the Lotzean conception of objectivity and his own view concerning the function of a semantic theory
preclude any possibility of interpreting his remarks about Sinn along

customary Platonistic lines.

However not being able to do so raises se-

rious problems concerning the objectivity of senses.

Their objectivity

could be secured, I suggest, if it were somehow dependent upon the
Bedeutungen of expressions.

In spite of Frege•s unwillingness to offer

a substantive metaphysics, his writings contain numerous suggestions
that the logical properties of language reflect logical features of the
world.

It would be left to Wittgenstein to unearth this potential and

declare that language and world share the same logical form.

That form

cannot be described, but only shown by the structure of the signs which
serve as representatives.

So in an important respect both the Picture
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Theory of the proposition as well as certain aspects of its ontology are
foreshadowed in Frege's works.

Since Frege would be amenable neither to

a distinction between showing and saying nor to the prospect of developing a substantive ontology, it is not surprising to discover that
philosopher's utter dismay over Wittgenstein's ideas upon being presented with a manuscript of the Tractatus in 1919.

That would be an event

which would forever mark the divergence between these two philosophers'
views."
Russell's Paradox has its origin in the distinction between function (or conc~pt) and argument (or object) when no restriction (such as
the Vicious Circle Principle) is placed upon the arguments for a given
function.

Here I would like to show that the liberal nature of the

function/argument distinction, especially when conjoined with the linguistic criteria introduced by Frege for calling something an object,
produces a critical problem concerning the nature of truth.

This prob-

lem Frege treats as irresolvable, but it is one that must be resolved if
Russell's Paradox is not to be insurmountable.
It was Frege (1891a; 1892a; 1892b) who had originally insisted
upon applying the distinction between function and argument to sentences
of natural language.

Although Frege cannot be grouped with Moore, the

very early Wittgenstein, Meinong and Russell as adhering to a relational
theory of judgment (given his account of a sign's Sinn as its mode of
presentation), he does belong to the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth-Century reaction to Idealism and the subjectivism thought to
be entailed by it.

In The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) he insists

that sentences, rather than words, should be regarded as the fundamental

An excellent discussion of Frege's reaction and how it affected
Wittgenstein can be found in Monk (1990), pp. 163-165, 174-176, 189-191.
11
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loci of meaning or sense.'2

If one considers it possible for a word to

have a meaning apart from its context within a sentence, then -one is
almost forced to take as the meanings of words mental pictures or acts
of the individual mind" (1884, p. x).

This, in turn, fails to do jus-

tice to the fact that the meaning (sense) of an expression is something
objective and constant.

The sense of an expression is what is grasped

by all those who understand it.

Since two individuals can apprehend the

sense of an expression even though they differ in terms of the images or
feelings they associate with its use, that which is merely psychological
cannot constitute its sense (1892a, pp. 159-160).

Frege thought that by

treating the sentence as the locus of sense logic could avoid psychologism.

The assumption, not unreasonable, underlying Frege's move is that

connotation primarily attaches to words rather than sentences.

By iden-

tifying the sense of a word with its contribution to the sense of a sentence as a whole, one gains some measure of objectivity.

Ultimately,

though, Frege is motivated by his concern for logic, for whatever else
the sense of an expression may be, besides that which is grasped by all
those who understand it, it must be the sort of thing that supports
valid inferences (1890, p. 5).
ference.

Connotation fails to support valid in-

Therefore, the sense of an expression cannot be identified

with its connotation.

Rather it is the cognitive content--the proposi-

tion or thought (Gedanke) expressed by a sentence--that serves as its
u1ogical kernel" (1890, p. 6; 1897 p. 142) and thus as its sense. This
way of construing Frege's argument is suggested by conjoining elements
from •Logic" (1890), in which Frege claims that an account of sense must
subserve a theory of inference by expunging all references to the psychological, with elements from -on Sense and Meaningw (1892a) where the
52 In this early work Frege used the terms meaning (Bedeutung) and
sense (Sinn) interchangeably. It is clear from the context that here
the word Bedeutung in this case refers to what he would later call Sinn
or sense. He remarks upon his inconsistency in using these words in
uconcept and Object" (1892b, p. 187).
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connotations of expressions (i.e., the images and feelings associated
with their use) are presented as the culprits to be expunged.

A recent

version of this argument has been presented by Jerrold Katz, who defends
a Fregean account of senses (construed as Platonic entities) in The
Metaphysics of Meaning (1990, pp. 40-41).

As Katz points out, a token

of the sentence •There is pee-pee on the floor" entails there is some
kind of liquid on the floor, given the meaning or sense of the word
"pee-pee" within the context of that sentence.

The sentence connotes,

but does not entail, that a child is speaking or that a child is being
spoken to.
The necessity of treating sentences as the loci of meaning or
sense nevertheless poses a significant difficulty for Frege.

For while

sentences secure an element of objectivity and form the basis for valid
inferences, traditional subject-predicate analyses fall short on both
counts.

That approach, prevalent among logicians as diverse as

Aristotle and Leibniz, construes whatever happens to be the grammatical
subject of a sentence as a kind of thing to which some property or characteristic is assigned.

Among its proponents we find Russell who argues

in The Principles of Mathematics (1903, p. 77) that expressions such as
"a man",

11

entities."

every man",

11

some man" and "any man" denote different kinds of

Frege argues that in most instances such analyses are mis-

leading, since what counts as the grammatical subject (as opposed to the
grammatical predicate) is merely a subjective matter.

Criticizing a

view reminiscent of Bradley, according to which a sentence is merely the
expression of something "cut off (and] fixed by the mind'" (1883, p. 3),
Frege maintains,
[W]e can only say: "The subject is the concept with
which the judgement is chiefly concerned." In (ordinary)
language, the subject-place has the significance in the
word-order of a special place where one puts what he wishes
the listener to heed (1879b, p. 113.).
53 Russell (1903) is not consistent on these matters: compare p. 90.
For a discussion of these inconsistencies, see Coffa (1993), p. 106-107.

---.,-----------
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That thoughts are expressed in a medium involving a subject and a predicate thus belongs to those uaspects of [ordinary] language which result ••• from the interaction of speaker and listener" (1879b, p. 113).
Consider, for example, the sentences uoesdemona loves Cassio" and
ucassio is loved by Desdemonaw which differ in grammatical form but possess the same conceptual content.

The traditional account would treat

the first sentence as ascribing to Desdemona a particular property,
namely, the property of loving Cassio.

On the other hand,

the second

sentence ascribes to a different subject a quite different property,
inasmuch as it attributes to Cassio the property of being loved by
Desdemona.

Even if we allow ourselves symbols for each of the subjects

and predicates, we will not be able to find in their formalization any
clue as to their semantic similarity.

By laying too much stress upon

the grammatical form, upon what is merely psychological according to
Frege, what is essential to the semantics of the two sentences is lost.
The examples drawn from Russell are even more severe.

If any grammati-

cal difference entails a difference in semantics, then ua man" and usome
man" can not be considered synonymous when used as subjects~ yet, they
certainly appear to be so.

Whatever differences attach to the uses of

these expressions, Frege would say, can be accounted for in terms of individuals' linguistic preferences, which is a purely subjective matter.
Their differences, therefore, cannot be regarded as semantic.
I should point out thatthere is a certain ambiguity in my saying
that the differences between these expressions cannot be semantic, given
Frege's distinction between the Sinn and the Bedeutung of an expression.
That ambiguity is matched in Frege's writings prior to the 1890'& when
the distinction was explicitly drawn.

In lieu of the theory that would

emerge in that decade, it would be more appropriate to say that such expressions cannot differ in terms of their Bedeutung, i.e., their extension or (more accurately) their role in determining a truth-value.
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It

seems that Frege's later writings are ambivalent on whether these expressions could differ in terms of their Sinne.

Clearly Frege would

translate both •an and •some 8 using the existential quantifier which,
for him, symbolizes a second-order function.

Since formalization aims

to reveal the thought (Gedanke) that is the sense of the sentence, one
would expect the senses to be identical.

Nevertheless, Frege (1892a, p.

158) does suggest that differences in grammatical form betoken differences of sense.

•Tom and Jerry• differs in sense from •Jerry and Tom

8

apparently solely in virtue of the grammatical ordering of the names.
Their order would be relevant within the context of a function expressing an assymmetrical relationi in the passage cited such is not the
case.

There the terms appear as components within definite descrip-

tions, viz., "the intersection of a and b" and" the intersection of b
and a" which Frege claims have different senses.
As discussed above, for Frege, an adequate account of sense must
not only avoid psychologism, it must provide the basis for an adequate
theory of inference.

The two conditions are closely related.

Because

traditional subject-predicate analyses of sentences cannot represent the
sameness of sense shared, e.g., by "Desdemona loves Cassio" and •cassio
is loved by Desdemona," they cannot do justice to the fact that the one
may be logically inferred from the other.

Similarly, one would expect

the inferential roles of sentences whose only difference is the use of
"a" rather than •some" to be identical, in spite of their possible connotative differences.

For example, "Some man approached the door" may

evoke an air of mystery which is not evoked by •A man approached the
door"; nevertheless, neither entails that the situation is a mysterious
one.

These problems could, of course, be reconciled if the the sense of

the sentences in question could be expressed in a common symbolism.
Replacing overly restrictive subject-predicate analyses with more
liberal analyses based upon the distinction between function and argu-
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ment offered Frege a way out of the dilemma with which he was faced.

In

mathematics, from which the distinction is drawn, a function effects a
correlation anong members of diverse sets.

For example, supposing num-

bers to be objects of a certain sort, multiplication would be a function
by means of which 2 and 3 would be correlated with the number 6.

We ex-

press this by saying that the function of multiplication yields a value
of 6 for arguments 2 and 3.

Frege believed that in any scientifically

respectable language the predicates of sentences would behave logically
like functions of mathematical formulae for which proper names and other
singular terms serve as arguments.

More accurately, any concept-word,

whether it belongs to the grammatical subject or the grammatical predicate, should be treated as such.

A concept-word is any expression that

serves a predicative function, that is, one that is not itself a singular term but which takes singular terms as arguments.

The set of syn-

tactic criteria Frege offers for distinguishing between singular terms
and concept-words provides the single most valuable clue as to why he
felt a function could not be its own argument.

Before turning to that

topic, let me point out that the utility of function-argument analyses
for semantic theory lies in the fact that different functions may share
the same value ranges. For example, multiplication of 2 and 3, addition
of 3 and 3, and the subtraction of 3 from 9 all yield the same value of
6.

The expressions u2 x 3w, •J + 3n, u9 - 3n and •6", Frege tells us,

uall mean [bedeuten] the same thing" (1891, p. 139).

When applied to

sentences of natural language, Frege's analysis has an extensionalizing
effect.

By individuating the contents of judgments along grammatical

lines traditional analyses in terms of subject, copula and predicate remained intensional to such a degree that they could not accommodate the
fact that uoesdemona loves Cassio" and ucassio is loved by Desdemona"
entail each other.

However, function-argument analyses can accommodate

this fact precisely because different formulae can designate, i.e., can
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be about, the very same thing.

In such cases the different functions

simply constitute different •modes of determination" (1879b, p.125).
Precisely what is designated by a sentence (construed in this manner} is controversial.

In arithmetic the value range of a given func-

tion is comprised of numbers.
a truth-value:

For Frege, sentences refer to (bedeutet)

when combined into sentences, concept-words and singular

terms yield either the True or the False.
are are objects named by sentences.

What the True and the False

That sentences are names of objects

is a consequence of Frege's criteria for distinguishing singular terms
and concept-words.

One such criterion, the importance of which will be

discussed below, is that singular terms (and only singular terms) may
flank identity (or equality) signs.

That sentences meet this criterion

is a direct result of the set-theoretic model applied to them, inasmuch
as a function that takes an argument occurs within the context of an
equation.

Thus, the "is" of sentences of the form "Fx is true" must be

construed as expressing identity.

And the word "true" in such contexts

must be regarded as the name of an object (hence Frege's preference for
"the True") rather than one that expresses or refers to a concept or
property.

But what kinds of objects are the True and the False, and is

it not an unhappy consequence of this theory that all true sentences are
about the very same thing?
The issues here are immensely complex and cannot be adequately
dealt with apart from a consideration of, among other things, Frege's
views on second-order functions and his arguments for treating universal
categorical statements as conditionals (cf. Sluga, 1980, p. 87ff~ Baker
and Hacker, 1984, pp. lBlff), as well as his changing views on the relation between sentences of the form "Fx" and "Fx is true"(cf. Grossmann,
1969, pp. 18lff).

To do this would carry us much too far away from our

central concern, which is to describe the manner in which Wittgenstein's
doctrine of showing arises out of concerns over Frege's problems with
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Russell's Paradox.

Consequently, only enough of Frege's view as will

suffice to draw the requisite contrast with Wittgenstein will be presented here.

Much of the controversy concerns the need for abandoning

one or more of the axioms of the Grundlagen (1884} or of their supplementation, and whether Frege himself abandoned his so-called context
principle, i.e., the thesis that a word has a meaning only within the
context of a sentence (for a comparison of views cf. Dummett, 1978, pp.
110-115; Sluga, 1980, pp. 133-134; Baker and Backer, 1984, pp. 194ff)
Attention will primarily be given here to the views that he expressed
prior to the late 1890's, that is, the period running from
Begriffsschrift (1879a) to •Logic" (1897).

(Later writings will be con-

sidered when we try to come to grips with the ontological status of
Frege's senses.)
Anyhow, Frege's answer to the first question is that uthe True"
and "the False" are primitive terms that cannot be defined (1897, p.
126).

Be was led to this conclusion by considerations analogous to

those which, as we saw earlier, led Moore (1889, p. 178) to reject correspondence theories of truth:
[I]t would be futile to employ a definition in order to
make it clearer what is to be understood as 'true•. If, for
example, we wished to say 'an idea is true if it agrees with
reality' nothing would have been achieved, since in order to
apply this definition we should have to decide whether some
idea or other did agree with reality. Thus we would have to
presuppose the very thing that is being defined. The same
would hold for any definition of the form 'A is true if and
only if it has such-and-such properties or stands in suchand-such a relation to such-and-such a thing• (1897, pp.
128-129).
Against Bradley Moore had argued that correspondence theories of truth
require an infinite number of mental acts to fix or determine the content of any one true judgment.

Earlier it was suggested that Moore may

not have done justice to the role afforded by Bradley to intuition in
the determination of mental content.

Frege's objection circumvents
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questions concerning the determination of content.

For him the problem

lies in the fact that any attempt to define truth will necessarily require applying the very concept under consideration or at least one very
much like it.
lar.

This makes any attempt to define truth hopelessly circu-

As in Moore's case, a regress is generated.

To know whether pis

true, one would have to know whether it is true that p corresponds with
reality, that is, one would have to know whether it is true that th~t
relation holds between p and the fact of which it is true.

That,

though, would require knowing whether the proposition expre~~ed by Mit
is true that~ corresponds with reality" is true, and so on.

Frege con-

cludes that it is not possible to define truth and, a fortiori, that it
is not possible to define truth as correspondence."
The argument is not particularly strong, especially if taken as an
argument against the correspondence theory.

one could hold that it is

possible for one's thoughts to correspond with reality even if it is not
possible to define what it is for them to correspond as such.
Contemporary advocates of reliability theories of knowledge, for whom
knowing p does not require that one know that one know that p, would
argue as much."

Indeed, Wittgenstein's own Picture Theory of the propo-

sition just is a form of correspondence theory that consigns the semantic properties of a language to the unsayable.

Nevertheless these prop-

erties may be exhibited in a certain manner~ and they may be recognized
by speakers; even if they cannot be explicitly defined.'"

Wittgenstein's

own distinction between showing and saying entails that speakers' knowlThis argument does not originate with Frege. Versions can be found
in Spinoza and even Aristotle. Sluga (1980, p. 114) suggests that Frege
inherited this argument from Kant via Lotze.
55 On reliability theories of knowledge, see Armstrong (1973), Dretske
(1981) and Goldman (1967).
58 The fact that the rractatus says a great deal concerning what supposedly can only be shown is, as Russell remarked in his Introduction to
that work, a source of Mintellectual discomfort# (1922b, p. xxi). This
problem shall be discussed in greater detail below.
54
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edge of the semantic properties of a language is a form of know-how,
i.e., as a kind of ability, rather than as a form of propositional
knowledge.
Even if Frege's argument does not undermine the possibility of a
correspondence theory of truth, it should be recognized as posing a particular challenge to such theories.

The challenge is to provide an ac-

count of what it is for speakers to be aware of the truth or falsehood
of propositions if that does not involve applying a definition and categorizing propositions as belonging to one or the other class.

It is at

this juncture that we find one of the most striking differences between
Frege and Wittgenstein.

Frege admits the undefinability of the True and

the False but then provides procedures (the axioms of the
Begriffsschrift) by means of which one or the other value may be assigned to propositions.

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, would not re-

gard as adequate a semantic theory that only accounts for the preservation of truth.
inference.

An adequate semantic theory cannot be merely a theory of

Thus Wittgenstein writes to Russell around the time of his

conversation with Frege in 1912, u1 believe that our problems can be
traced down to the atomic propositionsn (1912, p. 121).

For

Wittgenstein, but not for Frege, it is essential to provide an account
of the original truth that is preserved by means of valid inference.
Now even if the True and the False are undefinable for Frege, is
it not an undesirable consequence of the theory that all true propositions would have to be about the very same thing (just as all false
propositions would have to be about the very same thing)?

The proposi-

tions expressed, for example, by "Snow is white" and "The sky is blue"
would have to be regarded as designating the same thing.

The problem

becomes even more acute when viewed in terms of the vocabulary of the
Begriffsschrift, for there it is maintained that the assertion sign that
precedes each judgment corresponds to the predicate uis a fact" (1879b,
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p. 113).

so it would seem that these propositions would have to desig-

nate the very same facts that, of course, they do not.
There appear to be two possible ways to get Frege off the hook.
One is for Frege to relinquish the idea that the relation of identity
holds between a function which takes an argument and its value.
Propositions regarded as functions need not be considered analogous to
equations.

Indeed, even within mathematics it is not clear that the

equality sign should be taken to express identity.

As Wittgenstein re-

marks in his 1914 Notebook, uif 2 x 2 were really the same as 4, then
this proposit~on would say no more than a= a" (1914b, p. 4).

We know

that it was just such a concern that led Frege ultimately to distinguish
between the sense and reference of sentences.

That distinction never-

theless preserves the identity that obtains between a function taking an
argument and a truth value, all of which happen to be Bedeutungen of expressions.

One alternative would have been for Frege to regard the

yielding of a truth value as something other than the establishing of an
identity; perhaps the yielding of a truth value could be viewed as the
assigning of a property.

This manner of dealing with the problem would

not run up against Frege's contention that truth is indefinable.

One

could, like Moore, regard truth as an indefinable property (even if, as
I have argued, there is a sense in which Moore does provide an analysis
of truth).

What seems to prevent Frege from adopting this strategy is

his adherence to certain linguistic criteria that determine when an expression functions as a singular term.
A second way to get Frege off the hook is to interpret his work as
a precursor to the semantic conception of truth advocated by Tarski
(1937) and Davidson (1969).

I intimated as much earlier in saying that,

for Frege, nothing could be said about the True or the False over and
above what is already said to the left of the equality sign.

To say

u'The sky is blue' is (identical to the) True" amounts to an explica-
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tion of what is meant by the term ntrue.n

An adequate theory of infer-

ence provides a tool for the further explication of that term.

If being

blue entails having a color, then u'The sky has a color' is (identical
to the) True" offers a further explication of what is meant by "true."
The similarity to the semantic conception of truth follows from the fact
that if the sky is blue is (identical to the) True, then the sky is blue
is (identical to the) True if and only if the sky is blue.

Put in the

formal mode what is named by "The sky is bluen is (identical to the)
True if and only if the sky is blue.

The fact that a proposition of the

form "pis true" entails a sentence of the same form as that required by
the semantic conception's Convention T--viz., up is true if and only if
P"--is not so remarkable, since the semantic conception is supposedly

consistent with any theory of truth.

What is remarkable is that for

Frege, as for Tarski and Davidson, what appears on the right side of the
biconditional (and what entails and is entailed by what is on the right
side of the biconditional) serves to elucidate the concept of truth (or,
in Frege's case, what is named by "the Truen) within a language. 57

This

is not to say that there are not significant differences between Frege's
view and the views of Tarski and Davidson.

For the latter philosophers,

what appears within quotation marks on the left side of the biconditional serves as the name of a sentence to which truth is predicated.

For

Frege, what appears within the quotation marks is a name as well, but it
57 For an interesting comparison of Frege's and Wittgenstein's use of
explications or elucidations (Erlauterungen), see P. M. s. Backer
(1975). Racker maintains that the explication of primitive terms, which
often requires the use of simile and metaphor (as when, for example, an
object is said to "satisfy," "fall under," or,, saturate" a concept)
constitutes a necessary but unfortunate concession to ordinary language
for Frege. Explications, accordingly, belong to the preamble or
propaedeutic of a science (1975, p. 603). I disagree with Hacker that
explication serves only this role for Frege, since the explication of
the True by means of Begriffsschritt-sanctioned inferences just is a
part of science. What is essential to the explication of a concept is
its goal of locating the concept within a network or family of concepts.
Designating a concept's inferential role, then, would be a form of explication.
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is not the name of a sentence; rather the sentence itself is the name of
some thing that happens to be identical to the True.

In spite of these

differences, Frege can be helped out of the difficulty described above
by means of a device peculiar to the semantic conception of truth.

Each

T-sentence is said to constitute only a partial analysis of the concept
of truth within a language.

A complete analysis of the concept of

truth, if such were possible, would correspond to the entire set of Tsentences, and the right side of the biconditional for each member of
the set would have to contain every proposition (or sentence) that entails or is entailed by that which is named the left side.

Whether or

not there could be such an analysis for a language would depend upon
whether the language is expressively incomplete, that is to say, on
whether there can be novel meanings, and not merely novel notations for
expressing meanings, within the language.

If a language is expressively

complete, then it would in principle be possible for such an account to
be given.

we do not have to decide whether Frege's distinction between

sense and reference, and particularly his views concerning the nature of
thoughts (Gedanken) support this thesis; certainly contemporary linguistic Platonists, like Katz (1990), construe Frege in this light.
However, on the assumption that Frege's views on sense are compatible
with the possibility of language being expressively complete, we might
say that "the True" designates the Bedeutungen of the entire set of sentences which comprise a science in accordance with the Begritfsschritt."
~Most relevant for the purposes of comparison is Davidson's statement in "Truth and Meaningn that
If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure,
and we understand the meaning of each item in the
structure only as an abstraction from the totality of
sentences in which it features, then we can give the
meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the
meaning of every sentence (and word) in the language.
Frege said that only in the context of a sentence does a
word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added
that only in the context of the language does a sentence
(and therefore a word) have meaning (1967, p. 22).
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On this view usnow is whiten and •The sky is blue- and, indeed,
even "2 + 2 • 4" do designate the very same things

they designate the

entirety of that which Frege refers to as objective (1890, p. 7; 1897,
pp. 137-148; 1906a, p.198)

Objectivity may be ascribed to, and only to,

those things that are not the products of an inner, psychological processes but which may be apprehended by ("is exactly the same for") all
rational beings (1890, p. 7).

That which is objective includes that

which is wirklich or capable of entering into causal relations but also
whAt-.P.vP-r t.rnt-.hs there .may be concerning mathematical, logical and
semantic objects and properties. 5 •

All a priori as well a.s all a post.e-

riori truths are thus to be included under the heading of what is objec-

tiw~.

In spite of specific dj_fferences in ontology, Frege's inP.;t nf

what is objective is similar to what Moore refers to as reality that includes not only what is actual (or wirk.1 ir.h) hnt-. whM· h-"A RP.ing.
point is that true sentences are about something that is
same" for all rational beings, namely, reality itself.
ality which is identical to the True.

11

'l'hP.

exactly t.he

It is all of re-

This solution to the problem en-

compasses the earlier one to the extent that if "Snow is white" and "The
sky is

hJ nP."

r'ln in

tion to t:hem mnst

fAr.t-. hAvP.
~

RAtiP.nt-.nngRn

other than identity:

of their own, then their relawhat is designated by "The

sky js hlue" must be constitutive of the True, and nothing more.

In

other words, '"The sky is blue' is (identical to the) True" tells us
th;:it "ThP. R'ky i R hJ nA" mAn;:igeR t:o hA ahont-. Aome AR[>ACt-. or constituent of
what is True.

We have here the basis for a form of linguistic holism.
language as a whole that refers to the True.

It is

Whether the individual

components of the language take individual referents remains an open
question, as well it should, since Frege's semantic theory, as mentioned

59

Concerning Frege's use of the term wirklich, cf. Sluga (1980), pp.

118 and 195.
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earlier, is wholly subservient to the theory of inference and provides
no account of original truth.
The view described here is identir.al t.o what. Slnga (lQAO, pp.
117ff) rP.fArs to as Frege's Lotzean notion of objectivity.

Apparently,

Lotze's Logik (1843) provides the source for three theses ar.r.P.pt:P.d hy
Frege:

(i) that what is objective must be capable of being grasped by

more than one rational hP.ing, i.P.. 1 it-. mnAt-. hA int:P.r111nhjP.t'!t:ivP.; (ii)
that what is objective is not the product of some psychological process
(t-hn!'I mP.rP. i nt-.P.rRnhjectivity is not sufficient for objectivity, a point
that will become important below) ; and ( iii) that what is objective must
be distinguished from that which is wirklich (since the psychological is
itself wirklich) (Sluga, 1980, pp. 117-118).

There can be little ques-

tion of Lotze's influence on Frege; indeed, an examination of the texts
reveals that Frege's argument against the correspondence theory occurs
nearly verbatim in the former's Logik (Sluga, p. 114)., The historical
connection between Frege and Lotze interests us because the Lotzean conr.Apt. of an object is an epistemological, rather than ontological one.
This means that there is a certain pragmatic necessity that attaches to
the notion of an object:

one must assume that there is something that

one's beliefs are about, if one's beliefs are about anything at all.
unJes!'I then:i werP. t::rnth!'I v;:ilid (Lot-~e•s t.erm) for all rational beings,
it would not be possible to form any judgment whatsoever.

It

jA

impor-

tant to realize that Frege and Lotze do not provide any sort of proof
that there is objective truth.

It cannot even be said that objective

truth is a necessary condition for the possibility of inference.

All

t-hat:. r.rin hP. F1r1in iR t:hat: it: is .nACARRary to talk about (talk as if there
is) objective trnt:h if it: is poRsihlP. t:o R()'V'llc i.n. any infnrnv1t:i.VA way
,11ho11t: i. nfAr.P.nr.P..

'T'h.is

ciOP.A.

not:. mP.an. t:hat. whAt: i.f.' r.onnt:A.rt as. ohjAr.t:ivAly

t-.rnP. i A mP.rAly psychological:

the True is conceived of as having objec-

tive, mind-independent existence.

It simply means (and again this in-
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volves viewing Frege as a precursor to Tarski and Davidson) that there
is no way to get outside of language to describe its relation to the
world.

This is not to say that. language cannot hP- seJ f-referent: ia 1.

Qmmt:ifien expreRAionR 11nt1 propositional attitude ascriptions are construed as forms of oratio obliqua.

In the case of the former, a sen-

tence like "Dogs exist" is said to be synonymous with "There is some
thing that falls under the concept dog" or »The concept dog is satis-

fied by at least one object" or "The concApt.
ject."

ring ;

A

R1tt:nr11t:Rtf hy

An nh-

However, falling under, satisfying, and being saturated by are

metaphors belonging to the elucidation nf FrAgA'R primitivA termR.

Tn

spite of belonging to Frege's meta-language, they play no part within a
RPmAn·Hr. P.xpl;mAt-inn: i.P..r within A t:hAnry of reference and predication.

We wi.11 see this theme played out in Wit.t.genst:ein' s unwillingness

t-.n ARRi gn Any ,:,ixplanat.ory stat.us to a 1.11E!t:a-langullge and, more particularly, in his disavowal of a theory of types and his own distinction betw~~n what can be said and what can only be shown.
What makes this interpretation of Frege philnRophir.Ally 1=1ignificant is that it minimizes his ontological commitments and allows us to
make sense out of the fact that he offers merely linguistic criteria for
something's being an object rather than A r.onr.P[lt-

OnP wnnlrl nnt P.YpPr.t-

A philn1=1nphPr whn intends to draw a distinction between two broad metaphysical r.ategori.es to draw that distinction in syntactir. ,u,nrl.

VP.t,

the distinction between an object on the one hand and a concept (or
function) on the other is drawn by means of the distinction between a
proper name and concept word.

An

exprP.AAion r.nnnt.R AR A prnpP.r nAmP

(and therefore takes an object as its Bedeutung) if and only if
(l) The expression does not begin with an indefinite article;
(2) The expression contains no free variAh1ARJ
(3) The expression cannot occur as the predicate of a sentence;
(4) The expression can occur on the l~f~ Ano righ~ nf Rn
identity sign (Sluga, 1980, 122).
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Dummett makes a similar point in reference to an objection raised
by Marshall "that 'Frege has taken a linguistic difference to be a rift
in nature," (1955, p. 74). Be claims that Marshall has overlooked the
f"'ct- t:hAt- FrPIJP'R prinr.iplP gn.<1]

WAR

t-n ]Ry nnt-. t-.hP .logical roles of

proper names, concept-words, and quantifiers.

That Frege slipped from

the formal to the material mode makes it appAar t:hAt hP. WAR P.ngaqAd in A
metaphysical enterprise, but this is not true.

Even when he says that

sentences that share the form of "Spot falls under the concept dogn and
"'T'n hA

A

dog iR A property of Spot" are synonymous (1892b, p, 190), we

should not take him to be asserting the metaphysical thesis that there
are properties.

In fact, the sentence -There are properties," while not

ill-formed, must be construed, according to Frege, as involving secondorder quantification; it says, basically, that some concept falls with-

in that which is expressed by "is a property" (or alternately "is a concept"},

Notice that even here the reference by one level of language to

r1nnt-hP.r is characterized by means of metaphor.
This brings us to why Frege believed that a function could not be
its own argument and to what that entai]R.

A

fnnr.rion r.Annnt-.

argument, because a concept (or property) cannot be an object.

hP.

it-.R

own

This,

however, should not be taken as asserting a certa:i n rift-. in nAt-.nrP..

Tf

Dummett (1955) and Sluga (1980) are correct, then the matter could be
put purely formally:
lar terms).

concept-words cannot be proper names (i.e., singn-

Because concept-words play

P.RRl'>nt-ir1lly inr.nmJ:)lP..tA expressions.

A

prAdir.AtivP. fnnr.t-.ion, t-hP.y

ATP.

The predicate of a sentence, e.g.,

" ____is a man," contains a gap that must be filled by a propP.r nnmA
(if the sentence is of the first order) or by a bound variable (if it is
of the second order).

That concept-words hAvP. no mARning in iRolr1t:ion

is, as we saw earlier, necessitated by Frege's belief that psychologism
~An only hP. 1tvoidP.ri hy t-.rARting RP.ntAnr-AA nr formnlaP. a11 -t.hA hasic units
of meaning.

And, as we saw, the replacement of subject-predir.ArA AnAly-
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ses with function-argument analyses extensionalizes the language in such
a way as to sanction what seem intuitively to be valid inferences.
Since concept-words and proper names are defined in terms of their funct-.jon;:il rolP.A rP.lat-.ivP. t-.n onP. ;:innt-.hP..r: ;:ind A;nr.A

these ro.les are mutually

exclusive within any given sentence, within any given sentence no concept-word can be a proper name and vice versa.
When the point is put in the material mode by saying that no concept can be an object, what is essential to Frege•s view is lost.

In

that mode quandaries arise over how to explain the apparent truth of
sentences like "The concept horse is not a conceptn or •The property of
being blue is not a property" ( 1892b., p. 184).

If Frege is interpreted

as advancing metaphysical theses, then it is necessary to find (and it
would have been necessary for Frege to argue that there exists) some
characteristic possessed by objects but not by concepts, such that what
is named by "The concept horse" cannot be a concept (a difficult task,
given that the word uconcept" which is contained within the definite description appears to play the same predicative role as "red" in "Put it
in the red barn") • ••

In this vein, Dummett ( 1967, p. 97) suggests that

in the Grundlagen Frege holds that for every object there must be some
"'criterion of identity' ••• for •recognizing the object as the same
again'".

To that kind of response it may be objected that it is entire-

ly possible to speak of concepts or properties as the same or different.
or it may be objected that asserting there to be some criterion of identity is not the same thing as specifying some such criterion: and,
therefore, Frege's conditions are incomplete.

To overcome this problem

Frege would need to advance substantive metaphysical claims, but that is
precisely what is precluded by the undefinability of truth.
Rather than view Frege as a bad metaphysician, one should construe

80

0n the predicative nature of definite descriptions, cf. Donnellan

(1966).
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his work as belonging to the philosophy of logic.

Commentators who have

taken the distinction between concept and object to be ontological fail
to take into account that Frege's responses to the problem, far from
being metaphysical, are always formal in nature.

That is to say, he al-

ways attempts to reconcile such difficulties by identifying logically
relevant features of syntax.

For example, as Dummett (1973, p. 245)

points out, many difficulties of this kind are treated by Frege as resolvable if the problematic sentenc.es are translated as involving second
order quantification.

or, again, as Rusinoff (1992, p. 64) points out,

in ucomments on sense and Meaningn (1892c, p. 118) Frege tries to arrive
at a purely formal solution to the problem of the concept horse by suggesting that 'what-phrases' (as in UJesus is what •man' refers to") may
function both predicatively and as singularly.

The point is that we

would not expect Frege to pursue this sort of solution if his principal
interest consisted in defending a metaphysical thesis.

Frege•s concern,

first and last, is with the theory of inference.
This de-ontologized interpretation of Frege•s work carries major
implications concerning the way that philosopher's distinction between
Sinn and Bedeutung is to be understood.

Frege introduces that distinc-

tion most explicitly in uon Sense and Meaning" (1892a) in order to accommodate the apparent semantic difference between sentences of the form
a= a and a= b.

Whereas a sentence like uThe Morning Star is the

Morning Star" is analytic and a priori true, uThe Morning Star is the
Evening Star# is synthetic and true only a posteriori.

Although the two

sentences share the same reference (namely, Venus), they differ with respect to their "cognitive value" (1892a, p. 157).

That is to say, they

express different uthoughts" (1892a, p. 162), where a thought is to be
understood, not as anything subjective, but a something objective that
can be grasped by more than one individual.
refers to as the sense of a sentence.

It is this that Prege

The sense of a sentence is the
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"mode of presentationn (1892a, p. 158) of whatever is designated by (is
the Bedeutung of) the sentence.

Although Frege maintains (in 1892b, p.

187) that his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung is fully compatible
with his earlier views in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), such is
not the case.

The reader will recall that Frege. was earlier described

as maintaining (specifically in 1879b, but this characterization is no
less applicable to Frege,. 1884) that what appears on the left side of
the equality sign in "2 x 3 =- 6" and "3 + 3 • 6" is in each instance the
"mode of determination" of. that which appears on the right side of the
sign.

It can be assumed that "mode of presentation" and "mode of deter-

mination" denote the very same thing.

In that case, what is earlier re-

ferred to as the mode of determination belongs entirely to the
Bedeutung of a sentence: the Bedeutung of a concept-word is a concept;

the Bedeutung of a proper name (i.e., a singular term) is an object; and
the Bedeutung of a sentence is the truth-value determined by the former
taking the latter as argument.

In an important respect it appears the

early Frege can counted among those who accept a relational theory of
judgment.

The description of the judgment stroke in the

Begrittsschritt (1879b, pp.111-112) as a predicate equivalent to "is a

fact" and the corresponding view of judgment as the countenancing of a
fact suggests as much.

Judgment is not viewed as involving a relation

to a mental content or sense.

What Frege refers to as the assertable

content of an expression appears then to be the fact thus countenanced.
It seems as if what Frege calls the assertable content of an expression
corresponds to what Wittgenstein refers to as the Bedeutung of a true
propositional sign.

Nevertheless, if the interpretation of Frege as ad-

hering to a Lotzean conception of objectivity is correct, then this way
of reading Frege is inaccurate.

Object-talk and concept-talk do not

carry ontological commitments, but rather express a commitment to the
sanctioning of certain inferences.
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Frege's later reference to senses, consequently, appears to involve the positing of an entity external to the act of assertion which
mediates or determines the reference. of signs.

But if the interpreta-

tion of Frege as adhering to a Lotzean conception of objectivity is correct, then the introduction of senses should not be construed as the introduction of a new entity; rather, it is the introduction of terminology necessary both for sanctioning and prohibiting certain inferences.
In regard to the latter case, talk of senses does introduce an intensional element into the language, but this should not be taken to mean
that it involves positing intensions as objects.

Thus, to say that

oratio obliqua refers to the senses, rather than the referents, of ex-

pressions is just to say that inferences will not be sanctioned among
sentences containing certain psychological verbs that take, as their object, noun clauses in which there occur co-referential terms.

It is to

prohibit inferences, for example, from uJohn believes that Washington is
president" to "John believes the husband of Martha is president."
Nevertheless, a terminology that allows us to speak of senses as if they
are objects does enable us to say (without ontological commitment) that
there is something about which John has a belief.

In this way the form

of expression allows a certain type of quantification that appears most
natural.
Aquila (1977, p. 88) points out that a similar function is fulfilled by David Kaplan's (1969) angle-bracket notation.

That notation

does permit a particular type of quantification within intensional contexts.

Aquila, it should be noted, does assign an ontological interpre-

tation to Frege's senses according to which the sense of an expression
11

is in some way an 'object' of the act whose content it is ••• something

which is apprehended by that judgment or at least by the mind in making
the judgment" (1977, p. 89).

A useful antidote is Frege's remark that

to speak of ugrasping" or "apprehending# the sense of an expression is
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to speak metaphoricallys
The expression Ngrasp" is as metaphorical as Hcontent of
consciousness." The nature of language does not permit any
thing else. What I hold in my hand can certainly be regarded as the content of my hand; but all the same it is the
content of my hand in quite another and more extraneous way
than are the bones and muscles of which the hand consists or
again the tension these undergo (1918, p. 368).
As Sluga points out, this passage suggests that "Frege does not hold
that thoughts are in the mind as the bird is in the hand, but rather as
the muscles and bones are in the hand.

The objective is not something

alien or external to the mind, but constitutive of it" (1980, p. 121).
The passage suggests that Frege should be regarded as an adherent, not
of Platonism, but of what might best be called inter-subjectivism.

Thus

(in a passage not far removed from the analogy just sighted) Frege maintains:
Neither logic nor mathematics has the task of investigating minds and contents of consciousness owned by individual
men. Their task could perhaps be represented rather as the
investigation of the mind; of the mind, not of minds (1918,
pp. 368-369).
Although acceptance of Sluga's non-Platonistic interpretation of
Frege's senses has the advantages described above, it is not without its
problems.

Frege (in the very work just cited, which dates from 1918)

argues that a thought, which is the sense of a sentence, is to be identified with an entity of a certain sort that "belongs neither to my
inner world as an idea, nor yet to the external world, the world of
things perceptible to the sensesn (1918, p. 369).

Thoughts are de-

scribed as belonging to a third realm consisting of eternal, changeless
things (1918, p. 370).

Frege goes so far as to say that a thought would

remain true even if there were no thinker to entertain it (1918, pp.
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371-372).n

This would entail that the senses of expressions would con-

tinue to exist, they would still be there to be grasped, even if there
were no speakers to utter the expressions of which they are the senses.
If credence is to be given to Sluga's position, it is necessary to give
some account of this third realm that senses occupy, and this account
must do justice to Frege's assertion that senses would exist even if
there were no language-users to grasp them.

It is difficult to see how

inter-subjectivism--the Lotzean conception of objectivity--could fit the
bill.

Inter-subjectivity looks like a great deal of subjectivity.

If

by inter-subjective we mean (what Lotze may well have meant, given his
Kantian bearings) transcendental or necessary features common to all rational agents, then the non-existence of rational agents would entail
the non-existence of senses.
The Platonistic interpretation, on the other hand, is saddled with
what may be referred to as the problem of distinguishing the Sinn and
the Bedeutung of a predicate, and I believe this problem proves to be

considerably more intransigent than the problem facing proponents of the
non-Platonistic interpretation which, as shall be explained below, identifies the senses of expressions with their inferential roles.

If there

is some sort of ontological distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung,
then--on pain of Leibniz's Law--the Sinn and the Bedeutung of an expression must differ with respect to one or more properties.

How this can

be achieved, if both the Sinn and the Bedeutung are abstract entities,
remains utterly mysterious.

A

Platonist with respect to numbers would

be in a position to distinguish between numbers by distinguishing their
different roles within the number system, by describing their various
properties (e.g., being prime), etc.

Bow shall one carry out such a

Whether thoughts or senses, construed Platonistically, can be true
in the manner required by Wittgenstein and, hence, whether
Wittgenstein's own semantic theory is compatible with semantic Platonism
will be considered at the end of this chapter.
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project when it comes to the Sinn and Bedeutung of a predicate?
the Bedeutung of ured" is the concept or property redness.
"red" would be abstract as well.

Suppose

The Sinn of

It could not be distinguished from the

Bedeutung in the way, for example, the Bedeutung "one" may be distin-

guished from the Bedeutung of "two."

It is difficult to see what could

serve to distinguish the two.
Nor, in contrast with Frege's tendency to resolve philosophical
disputes by introducing linguistic distinctions and criteria, can the
property which distinguishes Sinn from Bedeutung merely be notional;
that is, Sinn and Bedeutung cannot be distinguished solely on the
grounds, for example, that the former is referred to by an embedded noun
clause whereas the latter is not.

That would be like Descartes distin-

guishing between mind and matter on the grounds that the former has,
whereas the latter lacks, indubitable existence.

Now of the various

types of expressions said to have both Sinn and Bedeutung--i.e., sentences, singular expressions and predicative expressions--it is most important to explain what distinguishes the Sinn of a predicative expression from its Bedeutung.

This is due to the fact that there is acer-

tain semantic primacy to the sense of a predicative expression.

The

sense of a sentence is composed of the senses of its component expressions.

Concerning the components, the senses of predicative expressions

or concept-words seem more important than those of singular expressions,
because Frege appears to think that the senses of singular terms need to
be explicated in terms of the senses of predicative expressions"'

In "On

Sense and Reference" he suggests that the sense of a proper name is to
be identified with the sense of the definite description that the speaker associates with the name (1892a, p. 158n.).

Thus for a given speaker

82 Note that this does not mean that the referents of singular expressions need or can be explicated in terms of the referents of predicative
expressions. As noted earlier, what is designated by uthe concept
'horse'" is not to be identified with a concept.
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the sense of "Aristotlew may be that of "the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great" or that of some other definite description
uniquely satisfied by Aristotle.

For Frege the sense of a singular ex-

pression is identical to the sense of some predicative expression that
is uniquely satisfied.

Using both Kaplanish hindsight concerning the

potential of definite descriptions to function predicatively, as well as
our own hindsight concerning Frege•s attempts at providing a logical
link between singular and predicative expressions (as described, for example, by Russinoff, 1992), it is clear that an account of the sense of
a singular expression must include an account of the senses of predicative expressions along with an account of what it is for such expressions to be uniquely satisfiable.

Consequently, much turns on the ac-

count to be provided of predicative expressions.

The problem comes in

discerning a Platonic entity to be the sense of a predicate.
The traditional caricature of Frege's view, which I contend is inaccurate, runs like this:

(i) the sense of a sentence is a proposition

or thought; its referent is a truth-value; (ii) the sense of a singular
term consists in the cognitive content expressed by the definite description associated with it; its referent is an object; (iii) the sense
of a predicative expression or concept-word is a concept; its referent
is the extension of the concept.

This caricature of Frege's position,

particularly the attribution to Frege of (iii), is quite commonplace.
We see it, for example, in Putnam (1975).

Putnam, who in that article

wants to attack the assumption that Sinn (or intension) determines

Bedeutung (or extension), counts Frege among his adversaries.

Regarding

the first clause of (iii), Putnam says,
Frege and more recently Carnap and his followers ••• rebelled against ••• 'psychologism', as they termed it. Feeling
that (senses) are public property--that the same (sense) can
be 'grasped' by more than one person and by persons at different times--they identified concepts (and hence 'intensions' or [senses)) with abstract entities rather than men-
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tal entities (1975, p. 218). 03
And concerning its second clause:
The e~tension of a term, in customary logical parlance,
is simply the set of things the term is true of. Thus •rabbit', in its most common English sense, is true of all and
only rabbits, so the extension of 'rabbit' is precisely the
set of rabbits (1975, p. 216;)."'
Customary logical parlance it may be, Frege (I shall argue below) it is
not.

Anyhow, it is precisely this sort of distinction that one must at-

tribute to Frege if one is to construe his concepts as Platonic entities.
Once the· requisite Platonic status has been attributed to concepts, the issue becomes defined as one of isolating the difference between concepts and their extensions.

Concepts, it is maintained are es-

sentially incomplete and in need of saturation or satisfaction from objects.

The objects that make up the extension of the concept, on the

other hand, are in some sense complete, which (perhaps) means that they
can undergo modifications regarding certain non-essential properties
while yet retaining their identity.

Any modification of a concept, how-

ever, would create a new concept, which is just to say that concepts
cannot be modified.

Consequently, claim proponents of this interpreta-

tion, particular objects are wirklich, concepts are not.
I contend that this caricature of Frege's position is inaccurate
and incoherent.

It may be dismissed on the grounds of charity as well

as fidelity to the text.
First, with respect to fidelity to the text, Frege never says that
83 I have substituted the word nsenses" for Putnam's •meanings," since
it is clear from the context that that is what he means. One of
Putnam's theses just is that the word •meaning• as traditionally used is
ambiguous, i.e., in some occurrences it is synonymous with reference,
Bedeutung, or extension but in other occurrences it is synonymous with
sense, Sinn, or intension.
64 That Frege' s senses are to be understood as Platonic entities is
reiterated (1975, p. 222.).
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the sense of a predicate is a concept1 on the contrary, a concept is always said to be the Bedeutung of a predicate!

This view is expressed

not only in such early writings as Begritfsschritt (1879a) and The

Foundations ot Arithmetic (1884) but in many writings published around
the same time as non sense and Meaning" (1892a) and •on Concept and
Object" (1892b) in which the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction first appears in
full force.

That concepts are the Bedeutungen of concept-words is made

abundantly clear by the chart contained in his May 1891 letter to
Husserl (1891b, p. 118), as well as by his #Foundations of Geometry I
(1903, p. 282) and nFoundations of Geometry II (1906b, p. 307).

This

flagrant misinterpretation is exacerbated by a misunderstanding of what
Frege means by the extension of a concept.

A careful examination of

nFunction and Object" (1891a, pp. 146ff.) reveals that although the extension of a concept (or, more generally, of a function) is a set of objects, it is not the set of objects which fall under the concept (or the
arguments of the function).

The extension of a concept or function is

identified with the value-range of the sentence or formula in which the
concept-word or function-expression occurs.

The extension of a concept

is thus a set of truth-values (1891a, p. 146).

The point is expressed

perhaps most succinctly in his critique of Schr&ler.

There he warns his

readers u[t]he extension of a concept does not consist of objects
falling under the concept" (1895, p. 228).

Rather, "the extension of a

concept is constituted in being, not by the individuals, but by the concept itself; i.e. by what is said ot an object when it is brought under
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a concept (1895, pp. 224-225, emphasis added).•'

So if we let b denote

some object that falls under the concept denoted by uis red," it would
not be appropriate to say that bis within the extension of that concept.

Rather, the extension is what is true of b.

we may state the

point more accurately by saying that the set of truths (the value-range)
designated by "is redn for a set of arguments, {a, b, c, ••• n}, are the
extension of the concept.

As will become clearer below, this is a mat-

ter of the utmost importance, if we are to understand what Frege thinks
is problematic about Russell's Paradox and if we are to fully appreciate
what Wittgenstein is up to in introducing his distinction between showing and saying.

Here it suffices to point out that it is the failure to

distinguish the relation of falling under (or subsumption under) a concept from that of being a member of the extension of a concept that lies
at the heart of the Platonistic misinterpretation of Frege.

The rela-

tion of falling under is, in fact, a relation that obtains among the
Bedeutungen of a sentence's components: it is not, as the above inter-

pretation suggests, one that holds between the Sinn of a predicative expression and the Bedeutung of a proper name.

The senses of predicative

expressions must indeed be distinguished from their Bedeutungen (see especially the diagram he offers to Husserl in 1891b, p. 118), but now
what those senses could be, on the Platonistic interpretation, poses an

~ Here, I think, we should resist any temptation to interpret this
passage so as to identify the extension of a predicate with the concept
or function itself. Notice that Frege does not use the phrase "extension of a predicaten when articulating his view. Rather, he speaks of
the extension of a concept. In order to even pose the alternative reading of this passage, one must regard a concept and the extension of a
concept as the very same thing. Surely this is unjustified; it certainly involves treating Frege as speaking in as convoluted a fashion as
possible. Needless to say, this leaves us with the question of what the
extension of a concept is, if it is neither the objects that fall under
the concept nor the concept itself. As noted above, this burden becomes
relatively light in lieu of the discussion Frege gives the subject in
"Function and Objectn (1891a).
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insurmountable problem."
There is also something incoherent in the Platonistic interpretation.

It is quite ludicrous to attribute to Frege the view that the

Bedeutungen of predicative expressions are to be identified with exten-

sions, since extensions of concepts are objects, and objects can never,
for Frege, be considered the Bedeutungen of predicative expressions.
This objection is even applicable to the view that identifies the extension of a concept with the set of objects that fall under it, since for
Frege both classes and their members can be regarded as objects (1895,
p. 224)."

Because the extension of a concept is a kind of object, it

must be designated by a singular term rather than a predicative expression.

What makes the view being considered incoherent is that it breaks

down the distinction between concept and object and fails to distinguish
the logical roles of singular and predicative expressions, and these are
the most fundamental distinctions in all of Frege's philosophy.

This is

not to deny that Frege's philosophy contains much that is problematic
(perhaps incoherent); that it is susceptible to Russell's Paradox indicates as much.

The point here is rather that it is impossible to even

begin to interpret Frege, let alone judge whether what he says is true
or false, on the above interpretation.

The above interpretation fails

Passmore's (1966, p. 150) account of Frege also identifies concepts
(and more generally functions) as the senses expressed by concept-words.
Unlike Putnam, he resists identifying the Bedeutungen of predicates with
sets of objects falling under the concept. In fact, he appears to deny
they have any Bedeutung at all; quoting the Foundations of Arithmetic
(1884) out of context, Passmore suggests this is a question which should
not be raised.
67 Frege maintains, against Schr5der, that classes must be considered
objects in their own right and not merely collections of individuals.
His argument is based on the premise that the identification of a class
with the collection of its members would make discourse regarding empty
classes impossible. Yet Frege is willing to permit the use of predicative expressions under which no objects fall within an exact science;
negative existentials such as uThere are no frictionless plains" are a
case in point. What he is unwilling to permit is the use of singular
expressions which designate no object (1895, p. 228).
66
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to break Frege apart at the crucial joints.
It is easier to overcome the charge that a Lotzean conception of
objectivity entails the subjectivity of senses than it is to find

Platonic entities to be the senses of predicates.

The key is to make

their objectivity somehow parasitic upon that of their Bedeutungen.
Such a suggestion seems wildly problematic at first, given the fact that
the Lotzean conception of objectivity makes the Bedeutungen of expressions themselves merely inter-subjective.

It seems highly unlikely that

something so lacking of full-blooded ontological status could ground the
objectivity of senses.

It even appears that the interpretation of Frege

as accepting the Lotzean conception of objectivity could crumble under
the weight of this problem: after all, if Sinn and Bedeutung are both
assigned the status of being merely inter-subjective, what could serve
to distinguish them?

Sluga's interpretation of Frege seems to flounder

in a way not unlike the competing interpretation:

it fails to do jus-

tice to a (the) crucial distinction operating in Frege's writings.
Sluga's view is defensible, nonetheless.

The Bedeutungen of ex-

pressions are not merely inter-subjective, even if one is restricted to
describing them solely in terms of the logical properties of the terms
that refer to them.

It does not follow from the fact that one cannot,

as it were, step outside of language to characterize the way in which
language corresponds to reality, that there is no reality to which language corresponds.

It does not follow from the fact that there is no

neutral observation point from which to characterize correspondence,
that correspondence does not occur.

It would clearly be wrong, for ex-

ample, to regard Frege as an Idealist."'
the formal conditions for truth.

What Frege has done is specify

The three criteria for objectivity de-

scribed earlier--viz., that what is objective must at least be inter-

88 A letter dated 3 April 1920 from Frege to Wittgenstein makes the
former's dissatisfaction with Idealism abundantly clear.
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subjective, that it must not be the mere product of a psychological process, and that it must not be identified merely with that which is

wirklich--specify formal conditions for saying that something has objective existence.

Such conditions apply to our talk of both the Sinn and

the Bedeutung of linguistic expressions.

But their objectivity does not

consist in their mere satisfaction of these formal conditions.
Language, for Frege is not a mere shuffling of empty symbols, as his
numerous attacks upon Hilbert and his followers make clear (see, for example, 1906b, pp. 326-327); language is not simply about language.
Truth and its preservation require the satisfaction of material as well
as formal conditions.

The sciences (including the science of

mathmatics••) provide this material.

Thus I stand opposed to the assump-

tion which animates interpretations of Frege by Church (1956, pp. 24ff)
and Davidson (1969, pp. 39-40 and 1990, pp. 303-304) according to which,
in Davidson's words:
The correct objection to correspondence theories is
not ••• that they make truth something to which humans can
never legitimately aspirei the real objection is that such
theories fail to provide entities to which truth vehicles ••• can be said to correspond. If this is right, and I
am convinced it is, we ought also question the popular assumption that sentences, or their spoken tokens, or sentence-like entities or configurations in our brains, can
properly be called urepresentations," since there is nothing
for them to represent (1990, p. 304).
The assumption is that if neither the relation nor the relatum of correspondence can be characterized or described (an epistemological point),
then there can be no such relation or relatum (a metaphysical point) and
the very idea of language being a representational medium loses its
force.

We need not accept this assumption.

The very purpose of

Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying and the Picture
Theory of the proposition is to provide an account of how linguistic ex88 Mathematics is to be included among the sciences, this is to be understood in light of the fact that not everything which is objective is
wirchlich.
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pressions may be related to the world in spite of the fact that nothing
can be said about their relation.

The seed from which Wittgenstein's

theory would grow is contained, however, in Frege's philosophy.
The Lotzean conception of objectivity does not rule out the possibility of there being entities that correspond to linguistic expressions.

(In fact, Frege's criticism of formalism may well also hold

against the sort of view, described above, attributed to him by Church
and Davidson, since that view makes language self-contained in the manner of a game~ see Frege, 1906b, p. 327.)
here concerning what is at issue.

But let us be quite clear

What is not at issue is whether a

semantic relation holds between the Sinn of an expression and its
Bedeutung.

In interpreting Frege this much is uncontroversial:

(i) the

senses of sub-sentential components determine or compose the sense of a
sentence~ (ii) the sense of a sentence (a) determines the truth-value of
the sentence that is used to express it, which is to say it picks out or
accomplishes reference to the True (what is true) or the False (what is
false), (b)

determines in part the truth-value of molecular proposi-

tions into which it figures, and (c) serves as a necessary condition for
the preservation of truth in valid inference, provided it designates
what is true.

What is more, it is uncontroversial that for Frege the

sense of an expression, or rather the grasping of an expression's sense
determines what a speaker is referring to.
What is controversial is whether there exists an ontological relation between Sinn and Bedeutung, such that the nature of the former is
determined by the nature of the latter.

It is precisely the apparent

absence of such a relation that enables Putnam (1975) to include Frege
among those who incorrectly believe that intension determines extension.
I contend that Frege's senses could not perform their semantic roles unless their structures and relations are determined by the structures and
relations of their Bedeutung.

I think there is in Frege a tendency to
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accept the thesis which would remain undeveloped until Wittgenstein's
Tractatus, namely, that the structure of a thought and the relations
that obtain among thoughts are isomorphic to structures and relations
among the referents of expressions.

In other words:

language and

thought share the logical form of the world, and that it is by virtue of
this shared form that the former perform their semantic roles.
What evidence there is for this may be found in the fact that
Frege always finds in the semantically and logically relevant features
of language and thought features that the world must presumably share.
Indeed, in reference to what he feels is his apparent good fortune in
being a native· German speaker, Frege observes:

"[i)t is here very much

to my advantage that there is such good accord between the linguistic
distinction and the real oneH (1892b, p. 185).

Consider first the rela-

tion that holds between a predicative and singular expression.

The

predicative expression is essentially incomplete, having meaning only
insofar as it modifies a proper name or some other singular expression.
Thus it is with the Bedeutungen, the meanings, of predicative expressions:

concepts or functions have a "predicative nature" (1892b, p.

187), i.e., are essentially incomplete and in need of "supplementation"
(1892, p. 187n) by an object.

Objects, on the other hand, are not only

identified by the logical properties of the expressions that refer to
them (particularly by the fact that expressions that refer to them are
capable of flanking the identity sign), they are said to be be capable
of sustaining their identity across changes in their mode of presentation.

This cannot be said of concepts.

Any change in their mode of

presentation is a change in what is presented.

The concepts that are

designated by nis Plato's greatest pupil" and "is Alexander's greatest
teacher" may be satisfied by one and the same individual, but what those
predicative expressions designate are two different concepts.
Presumably, then, objects are capable of retaining their identity under
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one or another determination.
Just as the senses of sub-sentential components determine or compose the sense of a sentence, the referents of sub-sentential components
comprise a sentence's truth-value~ which is to say they compose the
Bedeutung of the sentence as a whole, i.e., they constitute •the circum-

stance that it is true or false" (1892a. p. 163).

It is impossible to

imagine that the senses of a sentence's sub-sentential components could
determine the sense of the the sentence as a whole (whose function is to
determine a truth value) unless the component senses stand in a logical
relation to one another in a way that is analogous to the relations that
obtain among the referents of the sentence's sub-sentential components.
If the sense of a sentence is not structured so that the sense of a
predicate, F, does not stand in relation to the sense of a singular
term, a, then how would it be possible for the senses of the sub-sentential components to comprise the sense of a sentence:

that a is F?

In

fact, Frege does employ the metaphors •saturated" and •unsaturated" both
to relations among the senses and to relations among the referents of a
sentence's components (1892b, p. 193; also 1923, p. 390).
It is difficult to see how the semantic function of a sentence's
sense to determine a truth-value could be carried out unless there is
some object (truth-values are objects for Frege), some circumstance,
that makes the thought expressed by the sentence true or false.

And

that thought, the sentence's sense, must be structured in order to represent the fact that a is F.

Indeed if Sinn and Bedeutung were not to

share the same structure, it would be impossible to distinguish the True
from the False.

Since, for Frege, the singular terms of a science must

refer (1892a, p. 169; 1895, p. 228), the only way the falsehood of an
atomic sentence may arise is if a given object fails to fall under a
concept.

Given the reference of the singular term, a true and a false

thought will be about the very same thing.
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What then distinguishes

them?

Clearly the fact that the thought represents an object as stand-

ing in relation to a concept that in fact does not obtain is decisive.
This point, implicit in Frege, becomes explicit in Wittgenstein's dictum
that a propositional sign cannot be a name and that it must convey
(show) by means of its structure the possibility of its falsehood.

This

will be discussed in greater detail below.
The matter does not essentially change when we consider sentences
containing quantifiers or connectives.

Both quantifiers and connectives

contribute to the sense of a sentencei they designate (bedeuten) relations.

Quantifiers function as second-order predicative expressions

that designate relations among concepts (1884, pp. 64-65~ 1892b, p.
187ff)

To say "Something is green" is to assert that the concept green

falls within the concept not nought (or has the property not nought).
To say "Everything is green" is tantamount to saying that the concept
green falls within (or may be assigned the number) n, which is identical to the number of objects in the domain of discourse.

To say

"Nothing is green" is to assert that green falls within the concept
zero or nought.

Indeed "Something is not green" may be taken as meaning that not
everything is green, i.e., that it does not fall within the concept (or
may be assigned a number other than) n, which is identical to the number of objects in the domain of discourse.

Categorical propositions may

be dealt with in similar ways, for example:

to say "All dogs are mam-

mals" is to assert that the concept dog falls within or is subordinate
to the concept mammal.

The point here is that quantifiers, like other

sub-sentential components, have reference as well as sense.

Their ref-

erents are relations among concepts, and it is crucial to note that
these are logical relations.
The other logical constants, the connectives, also have
Bedeutungen, inasmuch as they designate relations among truth-values
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(1892a, p. 173).
ues of S:

For example, •Ifs, then P" asserts that for all val-

ifs is true, then Pis not false.

It is important to keep

in mind that truth-values, for Frege, are objects, and, therefore, that
the connectives designate logical relations among objects.
It is fair to say that the other two functions assigned to the
senses of atomic propositions--viz., to determine in part the truth-values of the molecular propositions in which they occur and to serve as a
necessary condition for the preservation of truth across inferences-could not be accomplished unless the requisite relations obtain among
the concepts and among the truth-values to which quantifiers and connectives refer.

In the first instance, were there not logical relations

among the truth-values of atomic propositions, molecular propositions
could never be true.
not obtain.

What molecular propositions assert simply could

But neither could they be false!

What makes a proposition

false is that what it denotes stands in a logical relation other than
that which is asserted, but if there are no such relations, then there
is nothing to falsify the propositions in question.
would then be, not true or false, but nonsensical.

Those propositions
In that event the

sense of the molecular proposition could not determine a truth-value
(and a fortiori the sense of an atomic proposition could not contribute
to the determination of the molecular proposition's truth-value) as
there would be no such values to determine.
One can see that this entails the impossibility of the preservation of truth through inference.

A form of inference, such as modus

ponens, can be sound if and only if it is possible for the conjunction
of the formulae of which it consists to be true in at least one instance.

But that would be impossible, since that conjunction would be a

molecular proposition that, as we have seen, could have no truth-value
(i.e., could be assigned no value range) at all.

To anticipate the ob-

vious objection that validity does not require consistency, let me point
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out that for Frege it does (1906b, p. 335: 1923, p. 402).

Thus Frege

drops the distinction between validity and soundness (a practice found
in some logic texts, e.g., Lemmon, 1978).
To return to our question:
are not Platonic entities?

how can senses be objective if they

Senses could not fulfill their essential

functions if they happened not to stand in relation to, or to stand in
relations to one another in ways analogous to, the Bedeutungen of a sentence's components (including those of the logical constants).

It is

this sharing of logical form that bestows objectivity upon senses.

This

may sound contrary to the usual cliche', attributed to Frege, that sense
determines reference, but such is not the case.

It is the grasping of

sense that makes it possible for a speaker to accomplish reference, and
so forth.

That says nothing at all about the ontological relation be-

tween Sinn and Bedeutung.

ontologically, Sinn (the essential function

of Sinn) is determined by Bedeutung.

Because, on this view, the objec-

tivity of sense is determined by the isomorphism that exists between

Sinn and Bedeutung, and because the principal determinant of that isomorphism are the logical relations that exist among (and partly comprise) the Bedeutungen, I can think of no better way to describe the
sense of an expression than as its logical role.

Actually, even this is

somewhat misleading, since it locates the sense of an expression among
expressions or signs themselves.

To do so would be to give up too much

to Hilbert and his followers: that is to say, we would not be able to
adequately distinguish between the views of Frege and at least one of
his principal adversaries.

To rectify this I suggest that the sense of

an expression is an aspect of what Frege refers to by the word "idea."
Ideas, for Frege, clearly are subjective.

But the text distinguishes

between what is merely an idea and the sense of an expression #which is
indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself" (1982a, p. 160, emphasis added).
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What distinguishes mere ideas

from senses, suggests Frege, is that the former are uwholly subjective"
(1892a, p. 160, emphasis added).

I suggest that senses are not wholly

subjective, because their properties and relations mimic those of their
Bedeutung.

Senses are made out of the same material as ideas (whatever

that might be), but they are to be distinguished from mere ideas (what
is purely subjective) by this.feature (this isomorphism) that they possess.

It is their link to the Bedeutung and to the relations among the

Bedeutungen.

Thus it would be more accurate to say that a sense is the

cognitive content of an idea that is expressed by a sign, where #cognitive content" must be understood as designating that aspect of the idea
which plays a logical role.
Because sense can be made out of the objectivity of Sinn without
appealing to Platonic entities, and because the Platonistic version is
incapable of accounting for the senses of predicates (something we cannot imagine Frege leaving undone), the non-Platonistic version is to be
preferred.
Let it be noted that one does not need to accept the Lotzean conception of objectivity, in order to accept this non-Platonistic account
of senses. That Frege accepted it, that he would be content to venture
only formal criteria for objectivity, reveals his unwillingness to acknowledge the metaphysical dimensions of his problems (or of their solutions), in spite of the implicit role this metaphysical dimension plays
in securing the objectivity of senses.
Russell's paradox is problematic for Frege, not so much

because

it

raises ontological difficulties concerning classes as objects (even
though it is true it does), but because it introduces an invidious inconsistency. into a system that is to serve as a model for all valid inference.

The paradox produces inconsistent value-ranges, rendering the

system as a whole useless to protect against invalid inference.

Taking

the name of the problematic class as argument(s), the Bedeutung of the
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sentence is both the True and the False.

It is for this reason that

Frege wrote to Russell in 1902 ,,[y)our discovery of the contradiction
has surprised me beyond words and, I should almost like to say, left me
thunderstruck, because it has rocked the ground on which I meant to
build arithmeticw (1902, p. 132).
It is interesting to note that in his initial response to Russell
Frege does attempt some semblance of a counter-argument.

Frege notes

what he perceives as Russell's inexact use of the expression "predicaten
in "A predicate is predicated of itself," and responds, •ca] predicate
is as a rule a first level function which requires an object as argument
and which cannot therefore have itself as argument (subject) (1902, p.
132). It sounds as if Frege is introducing a theory of types not unlike
Russell's own.

Although the way the objection is phrased is character-

istically Fregean (in that it attempts to undermine the intelligibility
of the opponent's position by clarifying the meanings of certain key
words), the message contained in it is not.

It is true that Frege coun-

tenanced hierarchies of concepts, so that quantifiers are second-order
predicates to which first-order predicates may be subordinated.
However, the subordination does not extend all the way down to the relation that obtains between a first order concept and the object which
falls under it.

The expression ,,falls under" is misleading, because

first-order concepts and objects are on the same level ontologically.
When the term is applied to the subordination of first- to second-level
concepts it is being used ambiguously.

His letter to Russell aside,

Frege is usually quite cautious in this matter~ for example, ,,Concept
and Object" states:
Second-level concepts, which concepts fall under, are
essentially different from first-level concepts, which objects fall under. The relation of an object to a first
level concept that it falls under is different from the (admittedly similar) relation of a first-level to a secondlevel concept. (To do justice at once to the distinction
and to the similarity, we might perhaps say: An object
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falls under a first-level concept~ a concept falls within a
second-level concept) (1892b, 190).
Here we should note that the similarity to which Frege refers consists
in the fact that correlated with any predicative expression there exists
a singular expression which, in turn, may fall under higher-level predicative expressions. 10
the paradox:

And that just is what permits the formation of

does the problematic class (i.e., the class of all classes

not members of itself) now conceived as a kind of object fall under the
concept to which "is a member of itself" refers?

The paradox is cer-

tainly not blocked by the sort of consideration raised in his letter to
Russell

If Frege thought that it might be, he did not feel that way for

long.
Even if Frege did consider the possibility of developing a theory
of types along the same lines as Russell, doing so would have taken him
far from the center of his philosophy.

Be would have had to engage in

just the sort of metaphysical inquiry precluded by the Lotzean conception of objectivity he accepted.

Be would have had to provide some

metaphysical account of the distinction between what is referred to by
proper names and by concept-words.

The problem of the concept horse,

for example, would have had to have been settled once and for all, and
not by appealing to features of syntax whose logical role is to mediate
the apparent referential gap between proper names and concept-words, but
by an account of the referents of those terms.

What would be required

of Frege would be the sort of account offered by Russell in his numerous
writings:

of universals, particulars and forms as the objects of judg-

ment, of acquaintance as the way in which reference to objects is effected, and so forth.

But for Frege an account of reference, of corre-

Again, it is hard to understand how it is possible for this correlation to occur and the paradox to ensue while at the same time it is
maintained that concepts cannot be named, unless one is willing toquestion the depth Frege attributes to the metaphysical waters in which the
concept/object distinction floats.
70
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spondence, is clearly out of the question.

As we saw earlier, Frege re-

pudiates the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth.

Terms

like utruth" and #validity" must remain primitive and indefinable.

They

may be elucidated by way of metaphor or further explicated by listing
the sentences or sets of sentences of which they may be predicated, but
they cannot constitute the subject matter for a semantic theory, that
is, one that goes beyond a theory of inference (the preservation of
truth) to include an account of reference and correspondence (or original truth).

For Frege the sentences comprising such a theory would have

to fall beyond the pale of the concept-script.

That the coherence of

logic and mathematics must depend upon saying the unsayable would surely
have been regarded by him as undermining the whole project.

It is this

complaint which we see Wittgenstein registering against Russell's theory
of types when he maintains that an adequate theory of types is impossible.
It is to Wittgenstein's credit to have found a way to render a
theory of types unnecessary.

From Frege he retrieves the idea that

primitive semantic terms can only be elucidated; only in Wittgenstein's
hands this idea develops into a full-blown semantic distinction between
what can be said and what can be shown.
3.

The Distinction Between Showing and Saying.
we can view Wittgenstein's account of what is shown as the succes-

sor to Frege's notion of an elucidation (Brlauterung).

In fact, well

into the Tractatus Wittgenstein retains Frege's terminology:
The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means
of elucidations ••• (1922b, 3.262).
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions,' but rather in the clarification of propositions ••• (
1922b, 4.112).
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My propositions serve as elucidations in the
following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has
used them--as steps--to climb up beyond them •••
(1922b, 6.54).
The account of showing also provides us with the predecessor to what in
the later Wittgenstein's philosophy are called grammatical remarks or
grammatical propositions, which are characterized as being neither true
nor false but (in a sense to be explained in a later chapter) antecedent
to truth.

We see the later view already present in the Tractatus:
The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent [ste11en]
it. They have no 'subject-matter'.(1922b, 6.124) 71

The unavoidability of a distinction between what can be said and what
can only be shown carries major implications concerning how we view the
nature of language.

A complete characterization of the view which is

entailed will have to await a later chapter~ however, let me say here
that the view entails:

(i) that linguistic tokens (i.e., particular ut-

terances and inscriptions), rather than one or another sort of linguistic type (e.g., propositions that are individuated in terms of their socalled cognitive content or statements that are individuated in terms of
their truth-conditions), can be said to be the bearers of meaning~" and
(ii) that a radical conventionalism with respect to what we call true
The verb stellen is perhaps more accurately rendered as uthey present" as found in the Ogden (1922a) translation. That this is the case
will become apparent below.
72 I say "said to be the bearers of meaning" rather than "are the
bearers of meaning," because on the later view, our talk of meanings
must be understood instrumentally. on that view, there are no meanings
(although on this Wittgenstein's early views concerning negative existentials would return to haunt him. What there is is our talk of meaning. Tokens of such (which can be individuated along structural and
functional lines) play a certain role in our discourse, but do not constitute a meta-language. It would be more accurate to say that such remarks function as linguistic exemplars or prototypes. I am convinced,
for reasons to be presented in this and a forthcoming chapter, that this
idea originates in the Tractarian (and Pre-Tractarian) account of showing.
71
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and false and a certain conceptual relativism with respect to what we
call rationality is possible.

That possibility is already acknowledged

in the Tractarian declaration that u[t]he world of the happy man is a
different one from that of the unhappy man" (1922b, 6.43).

What does

not go unnoticed, even in the Tractatus, is that conceptual relativism
requires what we might call, for lack of a better term, a token theory
of meaning.

That theory holds that the existence of language-users is a

necessary condition for the possibility of there being sense or meaning
at all.

In the Tractatus the view is implicit in the claim that u[w]e

use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a
projection of a possible situation ••• a proposition is a propositional
sign in its projective relation to the world" (1922b, 3.11-3.12).

(What

Wittgenstein means by projection, and how it differs from Russell's acquaintance will be taken up in Chapter Three.)
philosophy the point becomes explicit:

In Wittgenstein's later

an account of the meaning of an

expression is exhausted by a description of the uses to which that expression is put by language-users.

The point is that meaning something

with symbols is a human activity--nothing more, nor less.

Both the

early and late Wittgenstein can be viewed as setting up positions opposed to the linguistic Platonism which is (rightly or wrongly) attributed to Frege and which informs the work of philosophers from GBdel
to Katz.

Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian attack upon the theory of types

and upon meta-languages generally is the first leg of a life-long process that would move him further and further in the direction of naturalistic (and realistic) semantics.
in the Tractatus:

This naturalism is already present

»[e]veryday language is a part of the human organism

and is no less complicated than it" (1922b, 4.002).

Anyhow, to under-

stand the way the distinction between showing and saying resolves
Russell's and Frege's difficulties, it is necessary to appreciate how,
for Wittgenstein, a sentence's meaning and sense (i.e., its relation to
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reality uin [the) wide sensew 1914a, p. 112) are the product a human
activity that shows or displays what .may be said.
Wittgenstein's World war I Notebooks open with the observation
that:
If syntactical rules for functions can be set up at all,
then the whole theory of things, properties, etc., is superfluous. It is also all too obvious that this theory isn't
what is in question either in the Grundgesetze, or in
Principia Hathematica. Once more: logic must take care of
itself. A possible sign must also be capable of signifying.
Everything that is possible at all, is also legitimate. Let
us remember the explanation why usocrates is Plato" is nonsense. That is, because we have not made an arbitrary specification, NOT because a sign is, shall we say, illegitimate
irt itself (1914b, p. 2)1
This entry, dated 22 August 1914, is followed about a week later by the
following:
Frege says: Every well formed sentence must make sense;
and I say: Every possible sentence is well-formed, and if
it does not make sense that can only come of our not having
given any meaning to certain of its parts. Even when we believe we have done so (1914b, p. 2).
These claims appear virtually unaltered in the Tractatus as 5.473 and
5.4733 respectively. 73

They are also largely anticipated in the remarks

found in his 1913 "Notes on Logic" and early letters to Russell regarding the fact that different kinds of things must be symbolized by different kinds of symbols.

Language users determine what type of symbol

will represent what type of thing.

Thus if it is specified as a matter

of arbitrary convention (1913, 101) that small letters (a, b, c, etc.)
shall function as names (and only these will function as names), and
that capital letters (F, G, B, etc.) will function predicatively (and
only these will function predicatively), then formulae of the form F(Fx)
or F(FAx) will be patently nonsensical, since we will not have given

One difference is that the example of "Socrates is Plato" in the
first passage has been replaced by "Socrates is identical" at Tractatus
5.473.
73
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such a construction meaning.

Hence, u[t)he reason why 'The property of

not being green is not green' is nonsense is because we have only given
meaning to the fact that •green' stands to the right of a name" (1914a,
116).

For formulae taking but one argument (hence for sentences con-

taining one-place predicates), the difference in syntactic type will
suffice to show which expressions may be used singularly and which predicatively.

For formulae that take two or more arguments (and sentences

containing two- (or more-) place predicates), the positioning of symbols
will effect the appropriate ordering of arguments (cf., 1913, p. 104).
In essence, the syntactic formation rules of the language would render a
theory of types unnecessary:

given conventions concerning legitimate

syntactic types and their relations, the fact that F(F,.x) is nonsensical
is shown by the symbolism itself.

we have given this expression no

meaning.
Before Frege's views were examined, a question was posed concerning the apparent arbitrariness of this view.
convention, what justifies the convention?
tion in a more succinct manner.

If F(F

,.
x)

is excluded by

we may now state this objec-

According to Frege, a phrase like F"x

functions as a singular expression precisely because it corresponds to a
phrase which begins with a definite article.
"the so-and-so" functions for Frege as a name.

Any expression of the form
Names name objects.

The

names of objects (and, for the later Frege, objects themselves) are the
arguments of functions.

Why should we prefer a set of linguistic con-

ventions that exclude the possibility of the problematic forms from
arising over those criteria laid down by Frege for distinguishing singular and predicative expressions?

And why should the Vicious Circle

Principle not simply be viewed as a convention of the very sort envisioned by Wittgenstein?

Wittgenstein is faced with a dilemma.

If the

class and semantic paradoxes are to be avoided by adopting a particular

153

set of conventions, then he must explain why Frege's set of conventions
(the liberality of which afford certain advantages over classical accounts of inference that fail to heed the function/argument distinction)
should be rejected.

If his answer to this is that it is necessary to

reject such conventions in order to avoid an illogical language, then he
is left with the task of explaining what distinguishes the sorts of conventions or rules he has in mind from those which are stated by Russell
and Frege in their theory of types.

Even if we attribute to Wittgen-

stein something like the view he would later express in the Philosoph-

ical Investigations, according to which uthere is a way of grasping a
rule that is not an interpretation" (1958, sec 201), that is, even if we
ascribe to him the view that language users can adopt conventions and
abide by rules without consciously entertaining discursive sets of
rules, the problem is not resolved, for it is Wittgenstein's contention
that a theory of types is neither possible nor necessary.

It seems as

if the factors which make a theory of types unnecessary just are those
which make one possible.

To avoid this dilemma it is necessary for

Wittgenstein to demonstrate that what can be shown cannot be said.
The key is Wittgenstein's remark, cited earlier, concerning the
impossibility of an illogical language.
For the symbol of a property, e.g., Gx is that G stands
to the left of a name form, and another symbol F cannot
possibly stand to the left of such a fact: if it could,
we should have an illogical language, which is impossible
(1914a, p. 116).
Clearly what distinguishes Wittgenstein from Russell and Frege is that
the latter two believe that steps must be taken to insure language
against the possibility of becoming illogical.

Both Russell and Frege

have as their goal the construction of a logically perspicuous language
free of the vagueness and inconsistency supposedly inherent in natural
language.

Neither ever acknowledges that what guides the development of
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their systems is a desire to accommodate the inferential intuitions of
natural language users (particularly with respect to intensional contexts).

Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believes that an illogical

language is impossible.

Bis view is that if language--any language, in-

cluding natural langueage--is capable of being a representational system, then it must be logical.

An illogical language would be incapable

of representing anything at all.

This is because no contradictory

statement is capable of saying anything whatsoever, and so, in an important sense, no such statement (although that term is a misnomer here)
can belong to.the language.

This theme echoes loudly in the Tractatus

where Wittgenstein declares:
It used to be said that God could create anything except
what could be contrary to the laws of logic.--The truth is
that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look
like (1922b, 3.031).
The point is easy to miss.

Using the hindsight afforded by the

Tractatus, it is tempting to think that an illogical language is impossible, since--on the Picture Theory of the Proposition--any propositional sign must be capable of signifying, given the fact that its pictorial
properties allow it to share the logical form of the possible states of
affairs that it may picture.

It is tempting, in other words, to see the

picture theory of the proposition and its ontology as providing the
grounds for the idea that an illogical language is impossible.

Such an

approach is taken by McGuiness who, in describing Wittgenstein's 19121913 views, says:
Signs go proxy for objects precisely because when properly constructed--or, what comes to the same thing, properly
understood--they cannot be combined in ways which are impossible for the objects. This guarantees that every possible
proposition is well-constructed; that no nonsensical proposition can be formulated; and consequently that no theory
of types is necessary (1974, p. 56).
The idea that signs go proxy for objects can be traced to a December
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1914 entry into the Notebooks (1914b, p. 37).

McGuiness, however, be-

lieves the thesis is implicit even in the 16 January 1913 letter to
Russell (a portion of which was cited earlier):
I now think that qualities, relations (like love) etc.
are all copulael That means I for instance analyse a subject predicate proposition, say, usocrates is humann into
usocratesw and usomething is human,n (which I think is not
complex). The reason for this is a very fundamental one: I
think there cannot be different Types of thingsl In other
words whatever can be symbolized by a simple proper name
must belong to one type ••• (1912, pp. 121-122).
we can agree with McGuiness that the Tractarian idea that signs go proxy
for objects p~ovides added detail as to why an illogical language is impossible.

we can also agree that the Picture Theory of the Proposition

owes much to the Fregean idea that different kinds of things are symbolized by different kinds of symbols (which is remarked upon later in the
very same letter).

Wittgenstein's declaration that qualities and rela-

tions (or, rather, that the expressions which stand for them) are copulae makes abundantly clear his acceptance of Frege's thesis that they
(or the symbols which stand for them) are essentially incomplete.
this cannot be the complete answer.

But

It was, after all, Frege's distinc-

tion between concept and object that permitted the construction of
Russell's paradox in the first placel

Later in that same letter he does

mention that an adequate theory of symbolism must render a theory of
types superfluous, but it should not be supposed that that has been accomplished in the mere reference to theses held in common with Frege.
That the relations which may hold among syntactically different types of
symbols make representation possible (i.e., make the possession of a
sense possible), for Wittgenstein, cannot be doubted.

But it does not

explain why it is impossible for there to be an illogical language.
The issue becomes all the more puzzling in light of the later
Wittgenstein's views on inconsistency.
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In the Remarks on the

Foundations of Mathematics (1937) and elsewhere

Wittgenstein maintains

that illogical language games are perfectly possible, but that they
would just be the sorts of things no one would take an interest in.
Like measuring with a flexible ruler, such a procedure would get one
nowhere (1937, p. 38).

In a more radical vein he goes so far as to sug-

gest that we can °[i]magine being taught Frege•s calculus, contradiction
and all.

But the contradiction is not presented as a disease.

It is

rather an accepted part of the calculus, and we calculate with it. (The
calculations do not serve the usual purpose of logical calculations)"
(1937, pp. 209-210).

(This author has no desire to speculate how the

parenthetical remark could be true.)

Surely, however, such sentiments

are not shared by the early Wittgenstein.

What is wanted is some ac-

count of why a contradiction must be assigned a degenerate status.

As I

mentioned above, what is distinctive about Wittgenstein's early view is
that contradictions cannot say anything at all~ they lack significance
or sense.

His early view stands in contrast to his later view as well

as to classical accounts of contradiction according to which contradictions say too much.
The traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein's response to the
paradoxes, as found, for example, in Ishiguro (1981) and McGuiness
(1974), has always placed emphasis upon Wittgenstein's similarities with
Frege--as if Frege's view just needs to be tidied up a bit.

However

while it is clear that Wittgenstein's view is in much the same spirit as
Frege's (in that the symbolism itself shows the nonsensical nature of
the paradoxes), in his solution he diverges from Frege's view greatly.
Frege is to be credited with the idea that different kinds of symbols
play different logical roles.
predicative roles respectively.

Names and concept-words play singular and
What Frege failed to realize is that

sentences play a role different in nature from names.

He believed that

sentences are singular terms precisely because they are able to flank
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the identity sign.

The source of that assumption in the analogy between

sentences and equations was discussed earlier.
that assul'llption.

Wittgenstein questions

As early as 1913 he writes Russell that M[i]dentity is

the very Devil and immensely important.

It hangs ••• with the most funda-

mental questions, especially with the questions concerning the occurrence of the same argument in different places of a function" (1912, p.
123).
Wittgenstein's doctrine of the bipolarity of the proposition entails that sentences cannot be names.
are themselve~ names of objects.
of Frege's difficulties.

Recall that, for Frege, sentences

It is that thesis which is the source

Once the way in which propositional signs do

refer is made clear, the superfluousness of a theory of types becomes
apparent.
Earlier the bipolarity of the proposition was presented as
Wittgenstein's solution to (i) the problem of falsehood, (ii) the problem concerning the logical relationship of affirmative propositions to
their denial, and (iii) the problem concerning counter-intuitive beliefascriptions when the subject of belief believes or asserts a falsehood.
If one accepts the interpretation of Frege which imputes to his work ontological significance, then Wittgenstein's views concerning (i) are antithetical to Frege's inasmuch as they deny the possibility of objective
falsehoods.

Of even greater significance is the difference that exists

between Frege's and Wittgenstein's conception of sense, and this difference exists regardless of whether one interprets Frege's notion of objectivity ontologically or epistemologicallly.

The ontological inter-

pretation construes Fregean senses as Platonic entities that are
grasped by the mind:

one understands (i.e., is able to pick out) the

meaning (i.e., the Bedeutung) of an expression by grasping the sense
(Sinn) expressed by its use within a particular context.

The epistemo-

logical interpretation construes Frege's talk of senses as a ta9on de
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parler made necessary by an adequate theory of inference.
Wittgenstein's conception of sense, in contrast, is to be interpreted ontologically but not along Platonistic lines.
described earlier, are possible states of affairs.

His senses, as

The Bedeutung of a

given propositional sign is that actual state of affairs that renders
the sign either true or false.

Earlier, too, it was mentioned that, for

the very early Wittgenstein, negative propositions are aaade true (and
affirmative propositions are made false) by negative facts that are
later replaced by the Sachverhalte of the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein tries

to express the relation of a propositional sign to its sense by way of
his ab-notation.

The proposition is represented as standing between

poles:

The signs a and b correspond to the two possible

a--P--b.

states of affairs that can render P either true or false and which constitute the sign's sense (Sinn) (1913, pp. 98-99). 74

It is the sum of

such possibilities that Wittgenstein refers to as Reality in the wide
sense.

The actual state of affairs that renders P true or false is the

sign's meaning (Bedeutung).

Because a propositional sign has both a

sense and a meaning, it cannot be a kind of name.
what makes P true.

Suppose that a is

Although the person who utters P asserts (i.e.,

means) that a is the case, the sense of P would have to be expressed by
saying that ueither a orb is the case" (although this will have to be
qualified below, as the sense of Pis shown rather than said).

The ex-

pression of the sense of a propositional sign is essentially disjunctive.

Indeed, inasmuch as b's being the case entails -P, the sense of

74 This marks a divergence from the
symbolism ordinarily used in this
dissertation. Ordinarily, a, b. c, etc. denote singular terms1 here
Wittgenstein uses them to denote states of affairs. Under no condition
should this be taken to mean that Wittgenstein thinks states of affairs
can be named. To avoid confusion I have taken the liberty of placing
Wittgenstein's symbols in bold characters. It must be remembered that
a and bare possible states of affairs (belonging to Reality in the
wide sense), and that only one will be the actual state of affairs which
is P's meaning.
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P (as well as -P) may be expressed by saying that either a or not-a is
the case; consequently, the expression of the sense of a proposition is
essentially disjunctive and negative (1913, pp. 99-100).

Because a

propositional sign has a Sinn, it will, as stated earlier, always be
about more than what is actual; because a propositional sign possesses a
Bedeutung, it will always at least be about what is actual.

This is not

true of names, even though some names have referents and others do not.
If a name--such as usherlock Bolmes,"--lacks a referent, then in a
manner of speaking it is about what is not.
will fail to have a Bedeutung.

In that case, however, it

Since all sentences must have a

Bedeutung but some names lack a Bedeutung, it follows that sentences

cannot be names.

Of course, it might be argued that it is false that

all sentences have a Bedeutung, since sentences occurring within literature (e.g., sentences about Sherlock Holmes) may not be made true by
anything.

Be that as it may, such sentences do possess a Bedeutung;

they may not be made true by anything, but they are made false by the
facts that do happen to obtain.

The Bedeutung of the sentence neolmes

walked the streets of London in February of 1875" is the circumstance
which makes that sentence false.

In Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian ter-

minology, that sentence is made false by the negative fact consisting of
Holmes not walking the streets of London in February of 1875.
If a name has a referent, then it is only about (that is, it
refers to) what is actual; there is no sense in which it can be about
what is possible but not actual.

A name, therefore, may

have

Bedeutung,

but it cannot have Sinn (a thesis retained in the Tractatus, cf. 1922b,
3.3).

For this reason, Wittgenstein says, u[n]ames are points, proposi-

tions arrows--they have sense" (1913, p. 101; cf. 1922b 3.144).

He

means by this that names isolate some thing that is existent.
Propositions, or propositional signs, on the other hand, divide the ontological terrain into what is and what is not.
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Since what a proposi-

tional sign P asserts (or says) is a, rather than b, it divides Reality
what is presumed to be actual and

(in the wide sense) into two parts:

what is presumed to be merely possible but not actual.

With the excep-

tion of McGuiness (1974), the nature of this matter has gone unappreciated by Wittgenstein's commentators.

For example, Black (1964, p. 106),

commenting upon Tractatus 3.144 where the analogy between a propositional sign and an arrow reoccurs, maintains simply that propositions are
like arrows in that they are aimed at facts.

Nevertheless while it is

true that a proposition has a direction in that P says a but not b, the
purpose of the analogy is lost if one equates the sense of a propositional sign with a target, that is to say, a point.

That interpretation

misses the point of the analogy by assimilating propositions to names.
What is important in the analogy is that the path of the arrow circumscribes an area of, what Wittgenstein would later call, logical space.
In the uNotes on Logic" he puts the matter by saying that the propositional sign effects a udiscrimination of facts" (1913, p. 105).
lineates between positive and negative facts.

It de-

Just how it does so is

important and will be discussed below, as it is the mechanics of sense
that form the true basis for the showing/saying distinction.

What is of

importance here is that a propositional sign accomplishes something that
no name can accomplish.

So, it follows (again) that sentences cannot be

names.
When Wittgenstein says in his 16 January 1913 letter to Russell
that uthere cannot be different Types of things" (1912, p. 122) and in
his uNotes on Logic" that [n)either the sense nor the meaning of a
proposition is a thing" (1913, p. 102), he is expressing this very conclusion.

If by a thing we understand (as Wittgenstein did) something

that can be named, then facts are not things.

This is not to say that

Wittgenstein fails to countenance facts within his ontology~ as noted
earlier the Bedeutung of a propositional sign is the fact that makes it
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true or false (1913, p. 94); they are not, however, nameable things
(1913, pp. 96 and 107).

A

fact can only be represented by another fact

(a propositional sign) that has a structure isomorphic to it (1913, p.
97; 1922b, 2.141 and 3.14).
We finally arrive at Wittgenstein's real solution to Russell's
Paradox.

Earlier it was maintained that both Brockhaus (1991) and

Ishiguro (1981) misconstrue Wittgenstein's solution.

Ishiguro's misin-

terpretation construes the problematic function--which, following
Wittgenstein's own misstatement of the issue at Tractatus 3.333, he
takes to be F(Fx)--as being as ill-formed as Mis green is green.w
Consequently, the issue is viewed as concerning whether a function can
be its own argument and whether the predicate of a sentence can also be

its subject.

This way of viewing matters does not do justice to the

fact that what is being considered as argument at least purports to be a
singular term.

Brockhaus, on the other hand, does justice to that fact

by construing the problematic expression as analogous to "That which is
green is green."

Yet he does not do justice to the fact that

Wittgenstein is not merely worried about a certain redundancy.
redundant statements do have a sense.

Indeed,

Wittgenstein, in contrast, will

want to say that the problematic expression--which is really F(FAx)-lacks a sense entirely.
Given that Wittgenstein maintains that sense is given to signs by
means of arbitrary conventions (1913, p. 101), the problem of how to explain Wittgenstein's dismissal of the problem as anything other than an
arbitrary stipulation arose.

The question became:

how could

Wittgenstein's approach be any less ad hoc than Russell's own introduction of the Vicious Circle Principle?

The answer is:

named; they cannot be represented simply with a name.
A

facts cannot be
The expression

F x attempts to name a fact, but because it cannot do so it cannot serve
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as an argument for F(x).

A

Consequently, F(F x) cannot be a propositional

sign.
All sentences of the form F(FAx)--e.g., MThe fact that something
is green is green"--are nonsensical.

That is to say, they fail to .ef-

fect a discrimination of facts, and, consequently, they lack sense.
Consider, per impossibile, what this would be like.
a name, it presumably must instantiate the formula

Since FAX is to be
(Bx)

Fx.

The sense

of this expression may be expressed by means of a disjunction formed of
it and its negation:

[(Bx) Fx) v [-(Bx) Fx].

Even though (Bx) Fx does

not assert the disjunction (indeed what it asserts is [(Bx) Fx]
(--(Bx) Fx]) it does divide reality into these possibilities.

&

Perhaps

a way to express this (a way that remains neutral with respect to the
evolution of Wittgenstein's ontology from negative facts to
Schverhalten) is by employing modal quantifiers.

Thus

(Bx)

Fx has a

sense if and only if it is possible for there to be something that is F
and it is possible that there not be anything that is F: [O(Bx) Fx)
(◊-(Ex)

Fx].

&

The formula obtained by instantiating the variable with a

name, Fa, will have a sense if and only if

The question is

◊Fa & ◊-Fa.

whether FAx can instantiate the variable in the same way.
sion F(FAx) can have a sense if and only if [◊F(FAx)J
However, this condition cannot be satisfied.

&

The expres-

[◊-F(FAx)].

If FAx is to function as a

name at all, then it must have a referent~ its referent must exist.
Presumably this referent would have to be the fact that xis F~ it could
not be the negative fact that xis not F, since in that case FAX would
not refer at alls

FAX does not refer to a negative fact.

The only

thing to which it can refer (if we allow that it does refer) is the pos-

itive fact that xis F.

But if it must refer to such a fact, then it
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refers to something that is necessarily so.

sition F(FAx) is necessarily true.
not possibly be true.

That means that the propo-

But that entails that ◊-F(FAx) can-

As that is required for F(FAx) to have sense, ex-

pressions of the form F(FAx) can have no sense.
Here, I think, an objection must be entertained.

A

If F(F x) is the

name of something complex (cf. 1922b, 3.322), so that x and F designate
A

its components, might not F(F x) serve as a name even if there is no
fact that x is F?

After all, the propositional sign Fx can refer to x

even if "xis F" is false.
ily true.

A

It follows that F(F x) need not be necessar-

With its contingency thus intact, it may be said to have a

sense.
Wittgenstein appears to be aware of the possibility of this objection.

In the "Notes on Logic" he writes,
Frege said "propositions are names"; Russell said "propositions correspond to complexes". Both are false; and especially false is the statement "propositions are names of
complexes" (1913, p. 97). 75

Ultimately the Tractatus would offer a defense of the claim that propositional signs cannot be names of complexes on the grounds that names
must always name simple objects which are the immutable substance of the
world.

This requirement is said to be necessary in order for sense to

be determinate (1922b, 3.23) and for the complete analysis of propositional signs (including sentences of ordinary language) to be possible
(1922b, 3.201 and 4.221)."

Both the ontology of simple objects and the

75 Wittgenstein might well have added Moore to this list.
In the
early months of 1912 Wittgenstein had attended numerous lectures by
Moore (McGuiness, 1988, p. 117). These lectures, collected in what is
now Moore (1953), describe sentences and noun clauses as names of propositions, i.e., facts. See particularly Moore (1911, pp. 263-265).
76 Wittgenstein's argument will be given considerable attention
in the
next chapter.
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concept of analysis underlying this argument are motivated by a desire
to create a semantic theory that is more than a mere theory of inference.

Even though that desire is expressed very early in Wittgenstein's

career (e.g., 1914a, p. 117), we are unable to avail ourselves of the
ensuing argument, precisely because the positing of simple objects constitutes an elaboration of the picture theory and of the way a proposition shows its sense; whereas we are trying to provide the justification
for those very doctrines.

At the very least we need an argument whose

conclusion is that names must be semantically simple.
The argument in the uNotes on Logic

u

is obscured by the fact that

it appears to require the abandonment of negative facts, yet that work
makes abundant reference to such facts.
but it appears to be as follows.

The argument is quite sketchy,

To begin with, an expression can serve

as a name if and only if it names something determinate.

we have al-

ready seen that Wittgenstein rejects Russell's account of quantified expressions as possessing indeterminate reference.

In this respect

Wittgenstein is like Frege, since that philosopher does not treat quantified expressions as first-order assertions about objects and concepts.
(Wittgenstein, though, would not view them as second-order assertions
either but as meaningless prototypes for first-order assertions.)

It

follows that (FAx) can be an argument for Fx only if it names something
determinate; but this it cannot do.
itself has sense.

This follows from the fact that it

In its propositional form, its ability to assert xis

F depends upon the possibility of x being Pas well as the possibility
of x not being P.

If the situation is represented using the ab-nota-

tion, using a--Fx--b, then Fx refers to (bedeutet) either a orb;
hence, (FAx) must have indeterminate reference.
false

In the case where Fx is

the problem is compounded, since there is more than one way for

it to be false:

there may be some object x that happens not to be P
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(in which case (Bx) -Fx would be true), or there may not be an z at all
that happens to be F (thereby rendering -[(Bx) Fx] true).

The point is

that when Fx is false, even if we grant that FAx refers to something,
A

since it is not clear what makes Fx false, the reference of F x cannot
be determinate.
It is this last point that Wittgenstein is trying to express when
he says that no sense can be attached to the negation of a name (1913,
p. 97).

If Fx can function as a name, then we should be able to substi-

tute "Socrates" for it.

And since propositional signs can be negated,

it should be possible to form the construction "-Socrates," but such
cannot be done.

What would "-Socrates" mean?

that "-Socrates" sounds like nonsense.

The point is not just

Indeed the objector might main-

tain that it refers to the negative fact that makes Fx false.
fact is that?

Is it the fact represented by (Bx) -Fx, or the fact rep-

resented by -[(Bx) Fx]?
ence.

But what

Again we arrive at an indeterminacy of refer-

(I believe this is ultimately the basis for Wittgenstein's rejec-

tion of negative facts~ the expression "negative fact" cannot refer to
anything determinate.)

In the next chapter we will consider his claim

that "[t]he false assumption that propositions are names leads us to believe that there must be logical objects" (1913, p. 107).

In that chap-

ter, too, the fact that negative existentials (like -[(Ex) Fx]) fail to
effect a discrimination within reality will turn out to be crucial to
his argument that there must be simple objects that constitute the substance of the world.
A last attempt on the part of the objector might be this:

since

Wittgenstein requires genuine propositional signs to contain no variables (1913, p. 100), might the indeterminacy be eliminated by instantiating the variable and insisting that reference to a given object is established?

could it not be maintained that Wittgenstein's attack upon

166

the possibility of F " x being a name is an attack upon a straw man?

If

instead we consider whether F"b can be a name, the same indeterminacy
cannot arise, since F(Fb) cannot be made false by b not existing.
on Wittgenstein's behalf it may be argued that the indeterminacy
cannot be avoided in this way.
in two different ways.
PAb not being P.

The expression F(Fb) can be made false

If Fb is true, then F(F,..b) can be made false by

This would be the case, for example, if one to assert

"The fact that the Empire State Building is tall is tall."

One may say

that the fact.that the Empire State Building is tall (or of the tall-

ness of the Empire State Building) is overwhelming, unimpressive, or a
long time in the making, but one cannot say it is tall:

it is the

Empire State building, not the fact that the Empire State building is
tall, which is tall.

The second way F(F,..b) could be made false is by b

not being P (which would constitute a kind of reference failure for F " b
even if it does not fail to refer to b).

If the Empire State Building

were not tall, then regardless of whether or not its tallness can be
tall, the statement corresponding to F(F,..b) would be false.

A better

example, one that comes closer to the class paradox itself, would be the
following.

Consider two objects designated as a and b.

Let Rab stand

for "a is not to the left of b," and let Rab function as the name of the
fact that a is not to the left of b.

Also let sx correspond to the

one-place predicate "is not to the left of b."

We could then form a

propositional sign, S(R"ab), which would be synonymous with •The fact
that a is not to the left of b is not to the left of b."

Now

suppose what is designated by a is to the left of what is designated by
b.

In that case the sentence is false, not because the fact that it ac-

tually denotes fails to bes, but because it is false that Rab.
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As I

said before, this is a kind of reference failure.
not to tbe left of b does not exist.

The fact that a ia

The point is that indetermina-

cy cannot be avoided simply by instantiating the variables, since expressions like F(FAb) and S(RAab) retain the possibility of being false
in more than one way.

So long as the formula contains (what purports to

be) a singular term that is itself complex, no discrimination of facts
is effected.
This is apparently what Wittgenstein has in mind when he says,
u(t]he question whether a proposition has sense (Sinn) can never depend
on the truth of another proposition about a constituent of the firstn
(1914a, p. 117).

If whether F(FAb) has sense depends on the truth of

the proposition uF"'b names the fact that b is P," then its having sense
will depend upon whether Fb is true.

But it is precisely that contin-

gency which precludes F(FAb) from having a sense, for our earlier discussion of the bipolarity of the proposition demonstrates that in order
to understand the sense of a propositional sign, one must know both what
would be the case if the sign is true and what would be the case if the
sign is false.

This should not be taken to mean that the propositional

sign might have a sense but that language-users might not know what that
sense is.

Rather, the sign is incapable of projecting the possible

states of affairs that are its sense.

The reason why an illogical lan-

guage is impossible is that the very possibility of representation requires determinancy of sense, and that insures inferences from P to --P
or from u1t is false that the building is tall" to "The building is not
tall," etc.
The suppositions that lead to Russell's Paradox are specific instances of the kind of formulae or sentences that Wittgenstein regards
as lacking sense.

These two suppositions are (i) that the class of all
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classes that are not members of themselves is a member of itself, and
(ii) that the class of all classes that are not members of itself is
not a member of itself.

In order to see how they are special instances

of what Wittgenstein has in mind, it is necessary to construe the subject of both sentences as a name of a fact.

What is named--the class of

all classes that are not members of themselves--must be thought of as
the fact consisting ot the class of all classes that are not members of
themselves.

Earlier we saw that Russell's Vicious Circle Principle

seeks to prohibit C(CAx) from becoming a value for

ex

which we said cor-

responds to "xis a member of the class of all classes that are not members of themselves."

Now that we have seen that Wittgenstein's dictum

that facts cannot be named entails, not just that a name alone is incapable of saying how things are, but that propositional signs themselves
cannot be names, we see why a theory of types is unnecessary.

Since CAx

attempts to name a fact, C(CAx) cannot possibly have a sense.
I think there are two important ways in which Wittgenstein's view
may be misunderstood, both stemming from an uncritical reading of the
passage from the uNotes Dictated to Moore" quoted earlier:
The reason why "The property of not being green is not
green" is nonsense, is because we have only given meaning to
the fact "green" stands to the right of a name~ and "the
property of not being green" is obviously not that.
F cannot possibly stand to the left of (or in any relation to) the symbol of a property. For the symbol of a
property, e.g., Gx is that G stands to the left of a name
form, and another symbol F cannot possibly stand to the left
of such a tacts if it could, we should have an illogical
language, which is impossible (1914a, p. 116).
one way is to misconstrue the character of the singular term which is in
question.

This was the problem we found with the interpretation of this

passage and of Tractatus 3.333 offered by Ishiguro (1981) and Brockhaus
(1991).

The other way is to read the last line as somehow suggesting
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that the reason why the suppositions underlying the class and semantic
paradoxes are nonsensical is that they entail something that is impossibly illogical:
sense.

a contradiction among sentences that presumably have

But those suppositions are nonsensical, not for that reason (ac-

tually that would provide grounds merely for saying they are false), but
for the reason they fail to effect a discrimination among facts.
Contradictions and tautologies are without sense for the very same reason, namely, that they do not respect the bipolarity of the proposition.
To understand the sense of a proposition one must be able to know what
would be the case if it is true and what would be the case if it is
false (1913, p. 98 and 1922b, 4.024).

This condition is not met by

propositions traditionally regarded as necessarily true or false.
Concerning tautologies Wittgenstein says,
Signs of the form up v -pn are senseless, but not the
proposition "(p) p v -p.n If I know that this rose is
either red or not red, I know nothing. The same holds for
all ab-functions (1913, p. 104).
Naming is like pointing. A function is like a line
dividing points of a plane into right and left ones~ then
"p or not-pn has no meaning because it does not divide
a plane (1913, p. 94)."
The expression (P) P v -P quantifies over propositional signs that have
a sense.

In effect it tells us that one may say p or one may say -P,

but one cannot say P v -P.

All propositional signs may either affirm

something (and be made false by whatever makes its denial true), or deny
something (and be made false by whatever makes the affirmative sign
true).
-P).

Such does not hold. for P v -P or for its presumed denial -(P v
There is nothing that makes, or that could make, the denial of P v

-P true.

The short way to say this is to say that only contingent

Here again Wittgenstein's use of lower case letters as propositional variables has not been modified to conform to the conventions used in
the body of this dissertation. His use of quotation marks has been retained as well.
77
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propositions may have a sense and be true or false."

What are tradi-

tionally held to be logical truths and falsehoods are, strictly speaking, neither true nor false.

An

illogical language is impossible, be-

cause contradictions lack sense and, therefore, are not a part of language, the contradiction derivable from Russell's Paradox not withstanding.
What emerges from these considerations is the rudimentary distinction between showing and saying.

The claim that what can be shown can-

not be said may be fleshed out in terms of the following theses.

Some

of these thes~s are the basis for the Picture Theory.
First, a propositional sign is always about more than what it asserts.

It has a sense as well as a meaning.

This entails that the

propositional sign will always stand in relation to some possible (but
not actual) state of affairs that (were it actual) would have made false
a true propositional sign or true a false propositional sign.
Wittgenstein would later put this matter by saying that u[a] proposition
shows its sensen (1922b, 4.022).

Second, a non-molecular propositional sign is itself a fact whose
constituents must be structurally isomorphic to what the sign represents.

Although it is simply an arbitrary convention which symbols are

used, that symbols of different syntactic types are used to represent
function and argument (or predicate and singular term), that they differ
syntactically from the propositional sign which is composite, and that
they can stand in determinate relations to one another (so that M[a]

Thus we have the 2 December 1916 Notebooks remark which would
evolve into Tractatus 6.53:
The correct method in philosophy would really be to
say nothing except what can be said, i.e., what belongs
to natural science, i.e., something that has nothing to do
with philosophy, and then whenever someone else tried to
say something metaphysical to shew him that he had not
given any reference to certain signs in his sentences
(1914b, p. 91).
78
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proposition cannot occur in itself" (1913, p. 96)) is essential if representation is to be possible.

It is misleading, says Wittgenstein to

describe how a propositional sign represents by saying, for example,
that the complex sign aRb says that a stands in relation R to b; the
fact of the matter is more accurately put by saying that a stands in a
certain relation to b says that aRb (1913, p. 106; 1922b, 3.1432).

It

takes a fact with a certain kind of structure to say how things are.

In

the Tractatus Wittgenstein would express this by saying, u[a] proposition shows how things stand if is true.
stand" (1922b, 4.022).

And it says that they do so

It is this that forms the basis of the Picture

Theory, of the idea that names go proxy for objects.

It thus pictures,

provides a model for, the facts.
The structure exhibited by the sign not only makes saying possible, it makes possible the expression of the propositional sign's sense.
If the fact that my humidor is to the left of my desk can represent the
fact that my brother is taller than me, then the full sense of the
propositional sign is conveyed by that fact (that arrangement of furniture) and by the possibility that the furniture could have been arranged
otherwise.

To perceive a set of signs as arranged in some way, one must

be able to imagine or conceive of them as arrangeable in other possible
ways.

The contingency of the fact represented is thereby mirrored in

the contingent arrangement of signs.

In this way the sense of the

proposition can be read off from the signs themselves.

And if a set of

symbols lacks a sense, then that too is exhibited by the arrangement of
the symbols themselves.

This is what makes it possible for logic to

take care of itself (1914b, p. 2; 1922b, 5.473).
A third important thesis, entailed by the others, is that sense
and meaning require a representational medium.

Here Wittgenstein's view

achieves nearly complete opposition to the view of G. E. Moore outlined
at the beginning of this chapter.

Propositional signs as well as the
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thoughts that they express (1922b, 3) must be models or pictures of the
facts: they are not acts of consciousness or judgment.

Consequently,

for Wittgenstein, truth is a kind of correspondence, a sharing of logical or pictorial form.

It is the point at which he recognizes the need

to posit a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung which constitutes the
point at which he clearly breaks away from Moore's relational theory of
judgment. Alluding to his ab-notation he says, in the #Notes on Logic,"
u(t]he epistemological questions concerning the nature of judgment and
belief cannot be solved without a correct apprehension of the form of
the propositi~n" (1913, p. 106).

It would be accurate to say that

Moore's theory of judgment allows for the possibility of Bedeutung but
not Sinn, in spite of its own distinction between what is real but not
actual.

on that view the only difference between the properties of an

existent versus a non-existent object is that in the former all the
properties coalesce in a certain time and place (which gives the existent object a unique relational property).

But what properties a uni-

corn has are as real as those possessed by an actual horse.

Such objec-

tive falsehoods (which should not be confused with Wittgenstein's negative facts) we saw to be extremely problematic.

Wittgenstein's own dis-

tinction between what is possible but not actual and what is both possible and actual is offered as an antidote to Moore's ontology.

What is

possible but not actual remains a mere possibility of what is actual.
To say the world is more than what is actual, that it in some sense contains what is possible, is not to postulate the existence of a Platonic
realm of universals.

Nevertheless, for Wittgenstein, both the sense and

the meaning of an expression are something objective.
Frege, it is true, recognized that the structure of a sign is significant.

Regardless of where one stands with respect to the ontologi-

cal status of Fregean senses, one finds in Frege's work the thesis that
meaning is only possible if different logical roles are assigned to syn-
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tactically distinguishable components of formulae or sentences.

For

Frege, as for Wittgenstein, syntactic differences are indicative of ontological differences.

Frege•s predicates, or concept-words, or func-

tion expressions refer to concepts or functions~ names name objects.
Wittgenstein's remark that different kinds of things are symbolized by
different kinds of symbols reflects an indebtedness to Frege, although
there is little indication that he accepted the underlying Fregean ontology.

we have said little about Wittgenstein's own ontology except

that the determinancy of sense requires there to be simple objects which
are the substance of the world.
the following chapter.

More will be said on that subject in

The point here is that for Frege meaning is only

possible given the existence of something--language itself (i.e., a system of physical signs) or senses (if these are to be construed
Platonistically)--in possession of an ontologically significant structure.

For Frege and Wittgenstein, but not for Moore, meaning requires

some intermediary between the act of consciousness or judgment and its
object.
The claim that the existence of meaning requires some medium that
has meaning should not be confused with the claim that there are mental
contents.

Nothing in Wittgenstein's view either entails or precludes

that mental contents exist.

What his view does entail is that the exis-

tence of meaning requires there to be bearers of meaning (mental or
otherwise).

Although the Tractatus would continue to add greater con-

straints upon what could count as a propositional sign, it would remain
largely neutral with respect to what these meaning-bearers (and sensebearers) are.

What is essential to being a meaning-bearer, as shall be

explained in greater detail in the next chapter, is the capacity to
stand in a projective relation to the world, and this the propositional
sign can do only if it shares the pictorial or logical form of the
Sachverhalte it depicts.

Wittgenstein's view is incompatible with
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Moore's and his own earlier view, because the relational theory of judgments posits no meaning-bearers with such properties.

It would, of

course, be misleading to say on behalf of Moore that the mental act of
judging has a meaning (in the sense required by Wittgenstein);
Wittgenstein has demonstrated that whatever possesses a meaning must
also possess a sense, and this is something, given the direct realism of
Moore's relational theory of judgment, no mental act can have.

And

while it may be true that, for Moore, one may form a judgment about what
is real but non-existent as well as about what is real and existent, one
cannot do so ~imultaneously.

That a judgment is always simultaneously

about two possible states of affairs that differ in their ontological

status (one being possible but not actual, the other being possible and
actual) is the moral of the bipolarity of the proposition.
As stated thus far, Wittgenstein's semantic theory seems compatible with a variety of accounts concerning the nature of meaning-bearers:
it remains neutral as to whether these should be construed as mental
contents, or as sounds, inscriptions, gestures, etc. produced by language-users, or even as physical facts within the language-user's environment (as when Wittgenstein mentions that the fact uthat this inkpot
is on the table may express that I sit in this chair," 1913, p. 97).
The bearers of meaning must be facts of some sort or another.

However

what we want to ask at this stage is whether Wittgenstein's view is compatible with semantic Platonism.
It would be tempting to dismiss their compatibility straightaway
on the grounds that abstract entities could not provide the requisite
structured medium.

The very idea of a medium is that of some substance

(presumably physical but we are allowing for non-physical, upsychical"
substances as countenanced by Dualists as well) that can be arranged in
one way or another according to convention.
constitute facts.

The elements so arranged

Abstract entities, being neither physical nor psycho-
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logical, can have no parts or elements that can be arranged into facts.
Platonists like Katz (1990) do speak of sense structures and of
relations among senses.

The sense structure of a sentence is aaid to be

composed of the senses of its constituent expressions.

Relations among

senses (for example, the relation of antonymy that holds between the
senses of uopened" and uclosed") constitute semantic facts according to
Katz.

Indeed Katz argues that semantic structures so conceived are not

reducible to syntactic structures, not even to the syntactic structures
of a logically perspicuous language such as envisaged by Frege (1879a),
Russell (1918) or Wittgenstein (1922b).
argument will be examined in some detail.

In a later chapter his specific
Here the only point is that a

Platonist could very well maintain that abstract entities have structure
and are capable of entering into facts.
It does seem, however, that Wittgenstein's semantic theory is incompatible with Platonism for another reason.

In order for a proposi-

tional sign to show its sense (as Wittgenstein uses that word), the elements of the sign must stand in relations to one another that are contingent~ the contingency of the state of affairs which is the sign's
Bedeutung is reflected in the contingency of their own relations to one

another.

Even if there were Platonic senses that mediate reference,

could their elements be contingently related?

Apparently not.

For that

to be the case sentences like uThe sense of 'opened' is antonymous to
the sense of 'closed'" or uThe word 'bachelor' is synonymous with the
expression 'unmarried adult human male'" would have to be contingently
true.

Yet these and their material mode counter-parts are typically

held to be analytic and thus necessarily true.

Perhaps these sentences

can be regarded as contingently true, but that would require giving up
the analytic/synthetic distinction--something no self-respecting
Platonist would be willing to do.

It follows that Platonic senses can-

not be the bearers of meaning (Bedeutung) in the manner required by
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Wittgenstein, thus rendering the two views incompatible.
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CHAPTER III
REFERENCE FAILURE, DECOMPOSITIONALITY AND THE PICTURE THEORY
1.

Structure and IQm.
In the last chapter we followed Wittgenstein's argument up to the

point at which he concluded that language and thought may represent
facts only if the former are structurally isomorphic to the latter.

It

is in virtue of their pictorial properties that language and thought are
said to be able to represent.

Such a claim is not unproblematic.

Consider the nature of pictorial representation.

It is not necessary to

imagine a painting or a photograph; one may as well imagine actors on a
stage or children playing with toys.

(Indeed, the idea, central to the

Picture Theory, that names go proxy for objects, is said to have occurred to Wittgenstein upon reading about the way in which an automobile
accident was represented in a courtroom by means of model cars and dolls
(1914b, p. 7; cf. Wright, 1955, p. 532).)

Or recall the example taken

from the "Notes on Logic" "that this inkpot is on this table may express
that I sit in this chair" (1913, p. 97).
At a bare minimum a picture or model (Bild) must contain as many
elements as there are objects in the scene to be depicted.

If an auto

accident involving two cars and a pedestrian is to be represented, the
courtroom model must contain three elements.

It is not essential that

these elements resemble the objects they represent (as do hieroglyphics), but it is essential that the elements and the objects be identical
in number so that a one-to-one correspondence exists between the members
of the two sets (1922b, 2.13).
Next, the picture or model must be capable of representing the relations among the objects.
What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way (1922b, 2.14).

178

The fact that the elements of a picture are related to
one another in a determinate way represents that things are
related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure
of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this
structure the pictorial form of the picture (1922b, 2.15).
If the pedestrian was crushed between two cars, then the elements of the
courtroom model must be able to stand in relation to one another in an
analogous fashion.

This does not mean that the element which represents

the pedestrian must actually be positioned between the elements which
which represent the two cars.

Rather they must simply stand in some re-

lation so as to represent the relation among the objects.

For example,

that the pedestrian was crushed between two cars might be represented by
stacking the two model cars on top of the doll representing the pedestrian~ here the relation of being beneath (the other two elements) would
represent the relation of being between (the objects represented by
those elements).
It is crucial here to distinguish, as Wittgenstein does in the
passage above, between a picture's structure and its form.

(The two can

be easily confused, since the words Mstructure" and -form• are often
used synonymously.)
ment of its elements.

The structure of a picture is the actual arrangePictorial form, on the other hand, consists in

the set of possible arrangements which may occur among the elements.
For example, let the two cars be depicted by the symbols Oand 6, and
let the pedestrian be depicted by¥.

For the sake of convenience, let

the fact that an object is between two others be represented by the appropriate element being between the other two elements.

Let a similar

convention hold for the relations of to the left ot and to the right ot.
And let these exhaust the conventions governing the arrangement of elements, so that elements can only occur beside or between one another but
never, for example, above or below one another.
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In order to depict the

pedestrian as being between the two cars (struck on the left by the car
represented by

n and

on the right by the car represented by 6), the

picture would have to be structured thus I

n ¥ 6.

But the pictorial

form consists in a set of possible configurations:

¥6n, 6¥n, 6n¥}.

{0¥6, 06¥, ¥n6,

To speak of the pictorial form of n¥6 just is to

speak of its being one possible configuration of elements among many;
the form of a picture is identical with the combinatorial possibilities
of its elements.
The distinction between structure and form is semantically significant.

It is the structure of the picture (i.e., how it depicts things)

which determines, along with how things actually stand, whether it is
accurate or inaccurate, true or false (1922b, 2.21).

Just as the struc-

ture of a picture consists in elements urelated to one another in a determinate wayn (2.14), so too
The determinate way in which objects are connected in a
state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs
(1922b, 2.032).
A picture will be accurate or true, if and only if its structure corre-

sponds (1922b, 2.13) to the structure of the state of affairs.
The form of a picture, however, corresponds to the possible ways
the objects depicted may be related to one another.

This is why

Wittgenstein says,
Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related
to one another in the same way as the elements of the pic-

ture (1922b, 2.151, emphasis added).
What a picture must have in common with reality, in order
to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the
way it does, is its pictorial form (1922b, 2.17, emphasis
added).
The possible states of affairs corresponding to the form of 0¥6 (i.e.,
to the set of structures to which n¥6 belongs), minus that which corre-
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sponds to 0¥6 itself, are the conditions which would make 0¥6 false.
Thus the picture exhibits bi-polarity in the manner discussed in the
previous chapter.

This means the picture contains the possibility both

of being accurate or true and of being inaccurate or false."
Consequently,
In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we
must compare it with reality (1922b, 2.223).
It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether
it is true or false (1922b, 2.224).
There are no pictures that are true a priori (1922b,
2.225).
There cannot be tautologous or contradictory pictures, that is, pictures
which are necessarily true or false on a priori grounds.

This is so,

not for the question-begging reason that there cannot be tautologous or
contradictory states of affairs, but because the nature of picturing
precludes any such possibility.

A contradictory picture (so to speak)

would need to represent the same object at two places at once.

That

would require a picture with one and the same element in two places at
once; but that is impossible, since elements occupying two distinct locations would just be distinct elements.

If the elements of a contra-

dictory picture would be in two places at once, those of a tautologous
picture would be nowhere in particular.

How would one picture the pos-

sibility of an object either occupying or not occupying a particular position?

One could perhaps place a faint resemblance of the element

which represents the object in various locations.

But in that event an

79 A reminder:
the terms "bipolar" and •bivalent" are not equivalent.
A picture or propositional sign is bipolar if and only if it is possibly
true and possibly false; a picture or propositional sign is bivalent if
and only if it is either true or false. Bipolarity requires contingency; bivalence does not. Thus contradictions and tautologies (as traditionally understood) are bivalent but not bipolar. Since, for
Wittgenstein, all meaningful propositions must be bipolar, contradictions and tautologies must be regarded by him as senseless pseudo-propositions.
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element would be placed nowhere.

(The alternative is to think of the

faint images of elements as genuine elements, in which case we would
have a contradictory picture.)
Because a picture has both a form and a structure and exhibits bipolarity, it may be said to have both a sense and a meaning.

The .mean-

ing of a picture is the state of affairs (consisting of objects in

SOiie

determinate relation) which renders the picture accurate or inaccurate.
If OV4 is accurate, then its meaning consists in the state of affairs
which shares that very structure; if it is inaccurate, its meaning is a
state of affai~s with some other structure.

If one knows what objects

the elements of a picture stand for, then one can simply read off from
the structure of the picture what would make it true.••
The possible states of affairs which correspond to the form of a
picture constitute its sense.

It is this which Wittgenstein has in mind

when he says,
What a picture represents [darste11t] is its sense
(1922b, 2.221).
Perhaps it would be less ambiguous to say that a picture displays
(aufweist) or shows (zeigt) its sense (cf. 1922b, 4.022), since the picture depicts but one of various possible states of affairs.

But how can

a picture show its sense, if it depicts but one possible state of affairs?

Ultimately, the contingent truth of a picture is grounded in the

contingent arrangement of objects depicted by the picture's elements.
The contingent arrangement of objects upon which the accuracy of the
Wittgenstein rarely speaks of the meaning of a picture or propositional sign as a whole; usually he speaks of the meanings (referents) of
names (and so, presumably, of a picture's elements). This is not problematic. Names only have reference within the context of a propositional sign (1922b, 3.3), and it is an essential trait of the objects which
are denoted by names that they be able to enter into relations with one
another. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, it is inconceivable that there be
objects independent of states of affairs. Thus to speak of the meaning
of a picture or propositional sign is to speak of the objects as so related. That just is what a state of affairs is.
80
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picture depends is matched by (reflected in) the contingent arrangement
of the picture's elements; and anyone who recognizes the picture for
anything other than an empty label (that is, anyone who recognizes it as
something which depicts how things are) will recognize this potential in
its elements.

Of objects Wittgenstein says,

If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs •
••• Every one of these possibilities must be part of the
nature of the object ••• (1922b, 2.0123).
Similarly, if one knows what object an element stands for and that its
possibilities tor combination in various states of affairs is written
into its very nature, then presumably being able to construe the element

as an element of a picture entails being able to construe the element
as capable of entering into various relations with the other elements
which comprise the picture.
It should be noted that not every passage in the Tractatus comports neatly with this account of the sense of a picture. At 2.222 we
read:
The agreement [UbereinstimmungJ or disagreement
[NichtubereinstimmungJ of [a picture's) sense with reality
constitutes its truth or falsity (1922b, 2.222).
This passage suggests that the sense of a picture is not a set of possible states of affairs, but some kind of entity which occupies an intermediary position between the picture (which is a human construct) and
the fact which makes the picture true or false.

The passage, for this

reason, appears to support a Fregean interpretation of Wittgensteinian
senses (this regardless of one's interpretation of Frege).

Such a view,

endorsed by Carruthers (1989), was attacked in the previous chapter.
The fact is that 2.222 is atypical and makes little sense in the context
in which it occurs.

That context, 2.15-2.225, examines the relationship

between the form of a picture and the form of a state of affairs, such
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that a picture nreaches right out to" reality without the aid of any intermediary (1922b, 2.1551).

(Actually the picture just is such an in-

termediary, so positing a further entity would be pointless.)

It is

difficult not to conclude that Wittgenstein's wording at 2.222 is careless.

In a later passage, 4.2, after having shown that propositional

signs are logical pictures (a point to be discussed below), Wittgenstein
asserts,
[t]he sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence
of states of affairs (1922b, 4.2).
Here it is clear that sense consists in the relation which obtains between a proposition (or propositional sign) and reality in the wide
sense, i.e., with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states
of affairs.

Presumably the same holds for ordinary (non-discursive)

pictures as well.
A final word about pictorial representation is in order:
ture cannot depict its own pictorial form (1922b, 2.172).

a pic-

Above it was

noted that a picture depicts its meaning, and that it displays or shows
its sense.

The actual structure of the picture accomplishes the former;

the possibility of the picture's elements occurring in other structures,
i.e., its form, accomplishes the latter.
for the picture to depict its sense.

It is physically impossible

If anything, the attempt to do so

would produce what was earlier referred to as a tautologous picture.
Just as a sentence with the structure of P v -P or

◊P &

◊-P

asserts

neither P nor -P, any attempt to depict all the possible states of affairs into which a set of objects may enter will result in nothing being
depicted whatsoever.

For depiction to be possible at all an actual

structure must be presented rather than a mere array of possible structures.
Now the question before us is:

to what extent are the sentences
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of ordinary language like pictures?
are some similarities.

The answer isz

There

For example, what is said or depicted may often

be said or depicted in various media.
or falsehood may be irrelevant.
enormous.

not much.

The particular vehicle of truth

But beyond that the differences are

In ordinary pictures, for example, spatial relations among

objects are represented by spatial relations among the elements of the
picture.

Clearly, it is not necessary for spatial relations to be rep-

resented in this way.

In point of fact, the decision to represent spa-

tial relations among objects by means of similar spatial relations among
the elements of a picture--as when we represented the pedestrian between
the two cars by means of

n ¥ A--is

itself a decision to adopt a particu-

lar convention, namely to represent the relation of being between by
placing the appropriate element between other elements.

Even if we re-

tain the convention that spatial relations among objects are to be represented by spatial relations among elements, this can be done in a variety of ways:

being between could be represented by putting the appro-

priate element to the left of, to the right of, above, below, or anywhere else in the proximity of the other elements.

But the relation of

being between need not be represented by any spatial relations among the

elements at all.

We might adopt the rule that the symbol* after an

element indicates that the object so represented is between the other
objects regardless of the order in which they are listed.

Using this

convention and the symbols described earlier, the fact consisting of a
person being between two cars could be represented by means of a variety
of strings: 0¥•A, DA¥*, ¥ •DA, ¥ •An, A ¥+0, AO¥*.

If we also re-

tained the earlier convention pertaining to to the left of and to the
right of for all elements not followed by*, then any of the first

three in this list would be capable of conveying that the pedestrian was
caught between (what is represented by) Don the left and (what is rep-
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resented by) 6 on the right.
laid aside.

Of course, even this convention could be

We could easily adopt the rule that any element not fol-

lowed by*, but which is followed by a, is to the left of the others.
In that case, the very same state of affairs could be represented by any

The conventions adopted could even vary depending upon the contexti one
convention might be appropriate in formal contexts, another in informal
contexts.
Ordinary language does not even remotely approximate a picture
that represent~ spatial relations among objects in virtue of the spatial
relations among its elements.

Nor are temporal relations among events

represented by analogous temporal relations among the elements of a narrative:

the fact that the phrase "He murdered her" occurs before the

phrase "she finished her dissertationn in the sentence "Be murdered her
after she finished her dissertationn does not mean he murdered her before she finished her dissertation.

The spatio-temporal relations that

occur among the elements of a sentence need in no way correspond to the
spatio-temporal relations that obtain among the referents of a sentence's elements.

Generally speaking, reference and predication is not

accomplished by the resemblance the representational medium bears to
possible states of affairs it represents.
To accommodate this fact, the Tractatus displaces the idea of pictorial form with that of logical form.

Indeed, pictures are said to

represent by virtue of their logical form:
What any picture, of whatever form, must have in
common with reality, in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in any way at all, is logical form,
i.e. the form of reality (1922b, 2.18).
A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is
called a logical picture (1922b, 2.181).
Every picture is at the same ti.me a logical one.
(On the other hand, not every picture is, for example, a
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spatial one) (1922b, 2.182).
Logical form is to be cashed out in terms of mathematical multiplicity.
This means that there must be at least a one to one correspondence between possible combinations of symbols and possible combinations of objects.

Since ordinary objects, like chairs, happen to be complex facts

(Tatsachen) contingent for their existence upon relations that hold
among their constituents, it must be possible to refer to these constituents.

In principle, then, any statement about a complex object

must be capable of an analysis in which reference to the complex object
is replaced by statements that refer to simpler objects.

This at least

is the case for sentences in which singular reference occurs. 11

A sen-

tence like uThe chair is brown" would be analyzed in such a way as to
eliminate reference to the chair in favor of a series of descriptions of
its constituents, i.e., of its arms, legs and seat or of its wood, metal
and cloth, etc.

In this regard the semantics of the Tractatus is decom-

positional in nature.

The meanings of singular terms that refer to com-

plex objects are composed of (or decompose into) the meanings of statements containing terms for simpler objects (1922b, 2.0201).
2.

The Argument for Logical Atomism.
The specific form of decompositional semantics to which

Wittgenstein adheres is logical atomism.

This is the view that analysis

terminates in sets of sentences that refer to simple objects that are in
no way composite.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein describes these simple

objects as the uaubstance of the world" (1922b, 2.021)~ they are uunalterable" (1922b, 2.023, 2.026, 2.027) and -subsistent" (1922b, 2.024,
2.027, 2.0271), whereas "their configuration is what is changing and unstable" (1922b, 2.0271).

It is their configuration that produces states

of affairs (Sachverha1ten)(l922b, 2.0272).

States of affairs are what

correspond to (are the Bedeutungen of) elementary propositions
81

Sentences lacking singular reference will be dealt with below.
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(Elementarsatz) that describe configurations of simple objects when such
propositions are true (1912, p. 130).
The question now becomes:
jects?

why is it necessary to posit simple ob-

Why must they be required for representation to be possible?

Off hand, it seems the Picture Theory only requires there to be names
for the constituents or parts of complex objects provided one wants to
speak of the complexity of those objects.

Yet one might want to speak

of tables and chairs and never have any inclination to speak of their
complexity or the events upon which their existence is contingent.
Tables and chairs might well be among the basic objects of which one
speaks.

Perhaps speaking of a fact of which the chair is a constituent

e.g., the fact that the chair is to the left of the table) requires a
word for something simpler than the fact itself.

But unless one wants

to speak of the fact that is the chair, nothing simpler, not even in
principle, seems to be required.
Against the logical atomism of the Tractatus one wants to argue,
as did the author of the Philosophical Investigations several decades
later,
But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?--What are the simple constituents of a
chair?--The bits of wood of which it is made? or the
molecules, or the atoms?--"Simple" means: not composite.
And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes
no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of
a chair' (1958, 47).u
The point here is not that physical atoms or their components are infinitely divisible, even though that may very well be true.

It is

rather that human concern, what counts as simple and complex, is relative to a context in which humans act and communicate.

If humans have a

need to speak of ultimate simples, then fine~ but the question for the
82 References to Part One of the Philosophical Investigations will be
to section rather than page. As is customary, references to Part Two
will cite page numbers.
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later Wittgenstein would bez in what context, if any, does (or would)
the need to talk this way arise?
Wittgenstein does, however, provide an argument in the Tractatus:
If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition
had sense would depend on whether another proposition was
true.
In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world
(true or false) (1922b, 2.0211-2.0212).
That there is a link between the possibility of sense and the existence
of simple objects (i.e., the referents of simple signs) is repeated:
The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requ'irement that sense be determinate (1922b, 3.23).
These passages provide no easy task for interpretation.

we have

already encountered one case in which it is problematic for the truth of
one proposition to be dependent upon that of another:
with -P containing (and thus entailing) P.

Moore's problem

But that cannot be the

problem here, since for Wittgenstein P and-Pare about the same thing
to the extent that they share the same Sinn.

Moore had failed to make

that distinction and, was consequently beset by the troubles described
in Chapter I.

However, Wittgenstein's semantic theory avoids those dif-

ficulties.
Most commentators interpret Wittgenstein's argument as one in
which one or another infinite regress is to be avoided.

I am in agree-

ment with this strategy, however I think neither the nature of the
regress, nor the way in which it is avoided, has been appreciated.
Black (1964, pp. 58ff) suggests that Wittgenstein maintains there
must be a terminus for analysis if anyone is to know the meaning of a
proposition.

unless there were such a terminus, a person would have to

know the meaning of an infinite number of propositions in order to know
the meaning of even one.

This interpretation, however, does not seem to

be motivated by the text.

To the contrary, a Notebooks entry dated 16
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June 1915 devoted to the question of whether the names of ordinary objects might serve as logical simples concludes,

u •••

a proposition may

indeed be an incomplete picture of a certain fact, but it is ALWAYS a
complete- picture" (1914b, p. 61)."

The moral here, which goes substan-

tially unchallenged throughout the Notebooks' discussion of the issue,
is that the propositions of ordinary language can possess sense (and so
can be understood by speakers as having a sense) without being complete,
i.e., without being fully analyzed.

This is what Wittgenstein is after

when he says:
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable
of. expressing every sense, without having any idea how each
word has a meaning or what its meaning is--just as people
speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced
(1922b, 4.002: emphasis added).
A second way a regress can be run is suggested by Weinberg (1935).
Here it is supposed that unless simple objects serve as the terminus for
analysis, propositions would never refer to an extra-linguistic reality
(1935, p. 80).
nothing else.

Propositions would be related to one another and to
This construal of his argument at least does do justice

to Wittgenstein's dissatisfaction with Frege's minimalist semantics
which reduces semantic theory to the theory of inference.
argument, as described, is wholly unconvincing.••

However, the

What could justify the

assumption that reference is impossible unless reference to ultimate
simples is possible--as if one stands in need of a complete physics in
order to refer to chairs and tables?

That is precisely the question

that stands in need of an answer.
A

third possibility would be the following.

This, at least, does

do some justice to the fact that determinateness of sense requires the
existence of simple objects and to the importance we know Wittgenstein
83 This passage is retained in the Tractatus at 5.156 where it occurs
within a discussion of probability and generality.
84 As Weinberg notes.
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ascribed to the bipolarity of the proposition."

Recall that a proposi-

tion must effect a discrimination within reality.

It must distinguish

what, if it is true, is actual from what is merely possible but not actual.

This is made possible by the fact that a propositional sign

shares with a fact both a form and a structure.

The sense of a proposi-

tional sign is said to be determinate inasmuch as it represents precisely what would make it true (by virtue of its structure) or false (which
it represents by virtue of its form).

There is, furthermore, an onto-

logical side to the determinate nature of sense as well.

The world must

be such that, given objects {a, b, c, ••• n} and their relations {R,

s,

T, ••• N}, a proposition about those objects must be rendered determinate-

ly true or false.

In other words, the bipolarity of the proposition en-

tails the world must be such as to make bivalence possible ...

A

sentence

must be rendered true or false, and nothing else, by the objects and relations (or possible relations) to which it refers.
Now let us suppose there are no simple objects.

Consider what

this would entail, given Wittgenstein's assumption that all propositions
possessing sense are contingent.

A

sentence that makes reference to a

complex entity--as does "You are to give the hemlock only to Socrates"-will effect a discrimination within reality (and thus have a determinate
sense) if and only if "Socrates" actually refers to some complex entity.
If Socrates is a complex entity, then it is the kind of thing whose constituents can be described by means of sets of sentences.

Since these

sentences, in order to have a sense, must be contingent, it follows that

whether usocrates" refers is contingent.

(The assumption here is that

M Few scholars explicate Wittgenstein's argument in terms of suppressed premises concerning bipolarity. one notable exception is White

(1974).
88 The bipolarity of the proposition, we now see, incorporates four
distinct ideass the law of excluded middle, the law of contradiction,
the thesis that all propositions with sense are contingent, and the thesis that all sentences with a sense are bivalent, i.e., exclusively
true or false.
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the truth conditions of the sentences that describe Socrates' constituents are identical to the referential conditions for the word
"Socrates".) 07

If the set of sentences describing the constituents were

to be false, then "Socrates., would not refer~ in which case the sentence
MYou are to give the hemlock only to Socrates• would fail to effect the
requisite discrimination to possess a sense.

This is because no partic-

ular object (Socrates) would have been singled out among objects as the
term of the dyadic relation expressed by Mare to give the hemlock only
to".

one is left asking:

give the hemlock to this object as opposed to

that object, or to that object as opposed to this object?

The sense of

the proposition would be indeterminate.
The point is that if there were no simple objects, objects that
necessarily exist, then it would be possible for all the sentences of
our everyday language to lack any determinate sense.

In other words, it

would be possible for the sentences of our everyday language not to be a
representational medium at all, for the contingency would go on and onl
But as we noted earlier in course of rejecting Weinberg's interpretation
of the argument, this is not a possibility Wittgenstein is prepared to
accept.

on the contrary, "{m]an possesses the ability to construct lan-

guages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how
each word has a meaning or what its meaning is,, (1922b, 4.002).
If representation is possible, then a propositional sign (or those
sentences into which it is analyzed when the names of complex objects
are eliminated) must have as many referring expressions as there are objects in the state of affairs represented.

Since representation does

occur, there must be at some level of analysis just this sort of isomorphism.

If there were no simple objects, then it would be possible for

there never to be any such level, since for any level of analysis the
87 One can already get a feel for the problematic character of this
argument. we immediately want to ask, which descriptions of Socrates
are essential here?
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objects would remain contingent.

Since there must be some such level,

there must be simple objects that necessarily exist.
I think this comes very close to being Wittgenstein's argument,
although I believe it is possible to exploit the text and our understanding of Russell's influence upon Wittgenstein to produce a stronger
one.

As it stands the argument described above is invalid.

I have

tried to give expression to this to an extent in the last couple sentences of the previous paragraph.

Clearly a modal fallacy occurs in the

inference from:
( 1)

Each of the referring terms of a given propositional
sign or its analysand must refer to what exists.

to:
(2) Each of the referring terms of a given propositional
sign or its analysand refers to what must exist.

The two claims differ greatly.

The first assigns a necessary semantic

property to the vehicle of representation, whereas the second amounts to
a countenancing of de re necessity.

If the argument is valid, we have a

case in which a significant metaphysical thesis is derived from a claim
solely about language.

Clearly, as it stands, (2) does not derive from

(1) without further ado~ intermediary premises are required.

Here is an

analogous case:

Let the class of F's be the class of terms that refer

to what exists.

It is definitive of F that its terms refer to some-

thing.

In other words, it is a necessary condition for membership in F

that there exists (or there has existed or there will exist) some object
to which the member refers.

The singular term usocrates" satisfies the

necessary condition for membership in F without, however, Socrates necessarily existing.

Now what case can be made for thinking that

"Socrates• can be analyzed into a string of sentences concerning
Socrates-components--indeed, subsistent and eternal Socrates-components?
It is at this juncture that we would do well to consider the influence of Russell upon Wittgenstein.

The true strength of
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Wittgenstein's position can only be appreciated when viewed against the
backdrop of Russell's own argument for logical atomism.

we begin by

considering why, for Russell, #Socrates" is to be regarded as a special
kind of predicate rather than a genuine name.
In The Philosophy of Logical Atomlsm (1918) Russell asserts:
The names we conunonly use, like 'Socrates', are really
abbreviations for descriptions; not only that, but what they
describe are not particulars, but complicated systems of
classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical sense of a
word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a
particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because
you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with •••• we
are not acquainted with Socrates, and therefore cannot name
h~m. When we use the word 'Socrates,' we are really using a
description. Our thought may be rendered by some such
phrase as, 'The Master of Plato', or 'The philosopher who
drank the hemlock', or 'The person whom logicians assert to
be mortal', but we certainly do not use the name as a name
in the proper sense of the word.
That makes it very difficult to get any instance of a
name at all in the proper logical sense of the word. The
only words one does use as names in the logical sense are
words like 'this' or 'that' ( 1918, p. 62)."'
Russell's argument may be sketched as follows:

(i) an expression, n, is

a proper name, if and only if n refers to a particular with which one is
acquainted;

(ii) many common expressions {"Socrates," "Plato,•

"Aristotle," ••• "Hegel"} that seem to be names do not in fact refer to
particulars with which one may be acquainted; therefore, (iii) many common expressions that seem to be names are not genuine names at all (let
us refer to this class of expressions as R); (iv) if the members of R
are do not denote particulars with which one may be acquainted, then
they denote objects (i.e., "complicated systems of classes or series•)
that are known by description; so, (v) the members of R denote objects
known by description; (vi) if the members of R denote objects known by
description, then R's members function essentially as predicative exThe argument here is consistent with that offered in The Problems
of Philosophy (1912), pp. 52-58.
88
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pressions, i.e., as disguised definite descriptions1 thus, (vii) the
members of R function essentially as predicative expressions, i.e., as
disguised definite descriptions.
Let us begin in the middle of the argument with premise (iv) as it
is one of the more substantive claims.

Premise (iv) gives expression to

Russell's famous distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by
description.

These are two ways subjects may be related to the objects

of awareness and judgment.

uwe shall say that we have acquaintance with

anything," Russell explains, uof which we are directly aware, without
the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths"
(1912, p. 46).

In The Problems of Philosophy Russell countenances vari-

ous modes of acquaintance, each involving it own peculiar kind of object.
46).

Perception allows one to be acquainted with sense data (1912, p.
Introspection has as its objects one's own acquaintances and the

self that is acquainted (1912, pp. 50-51).

Memory allows one to. be ac-

quainted with past objects of perception and introspection (1912, p.
48).

And, finally, conception is the mode of acquaintance by virtue of

which one is aware of universals (1912, p. 52)."
Knowledge of an object by description occurs uwhen we know that it
is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and no
more, having a certain property~ and it will generally be implied that
we do not have the same knowledge by acquaintance" (1912, p. 53).

It is

tempting to think of the distinction as one that obtains between mere
awareness or consciousness of an object and judgment or knowledge that
such and such is true of an object.

The latter will not, however, suf-

fice as a definition of knowledge by description.

Knowledge by descrip-

tion should not be identified with propositional knowledge1 one would
not possess knowledge by description, for example, if one knows that

ei His willingness to countenance universals continues in (1918), pp.
36 and 128-129 and (1924) p. 166.
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Socrates was under six feet tall, even if being under six feet tall is
(somehow) a necessary condition for being Socrates.

Knowledge by de-

scription requires the subject to be aware that a particular object, and
only that object, possesses a given property.•0

As Russell suggests in

the passage from the Lectures on Logical Atomism, the description
uniquely satisfied might well be very complicated in the event that it
is necessary to advert to Mcomplicated systems of classes or series#
(1918, p. 62).

It may well be that knowledge by description of Socrates

involves knowing that Socrates is identical to the object consisting of
k-type sense data occurring at times t 1 ••• tn, 1-type sense data occurring at times

tn ... t 0 ,

etc.

For the sake of simplicity we will follow

Russell in saying that one has knowledge by description of Socrates when
one knows, for example, that Socrates was the Master of Plato.
we will save specific criticisms of Russell's theory of judgment
until later when further details will be spelled out.

Although there

are several passages within the world War I Notebooks (dating from May
1915) where Wittgenstein shares Russell's terminology (1914b, pp. 50 and
52), there is no question that Wittgenstein rejected Russell's epistemology.

There can also be no question concerning Wittgenstein's unwill-

ingness to proceed in these matters on the basis of epistemological

This is the definition given in (1912) and suggested by the examples in (1918), both cited above. A less restrictive definition appears
to be operating in (1913)~ cf. pp. 57 and 69.
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premises.ti

However, Wittgenstein would accept that not every expression

that appears to be a name is one in fact (i.e., premise (iii))~ and he
would accept that these expressions (which Russell would refer to as
relative names) are really disguised definite descriptions to be analyzed in accordance with Russell's Theory of Incomplete Symbols (i.e.,
the conclusion at (vii)).

For Wittgenstein the class of expressions to

be analyzed this way is the class of expressions that appear to denote

complex entities rather than the class that appears to denote objects

other than particulars with which one may be acquaintedi consequently,
he would not accept the stipulation in premise (i) that genuine names
refer to, and only to, particulars with which one may be acquainted.
Nor would he regard (ii) as relevant, since it discounts an expression's
status as a name on the basis of membership in the class of objects
other than particulars with which one may be acquainted.

Presumably,

Wittgenstein would reject (v) and (vi), too, since they are founded upon
the same epistemological considerations.

Fortunately, the Theory of

Descriptions and the Theory of Incomplete Symbols can be defended on
grounds independent of Russell's epistemological views.
According to Russell's Theory of Descriptions, the relative name
"Socrates" can be said to denote the very same individual as that denot-

The rejection of any such strategy occurs very early in
Wittgenstein's writings1 for examples
The "self-evidence" of which Russell has talked so much
can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake. And it is clear that uself-evidenceH is and always was wholly deceptive (1914b, p. 4).
This early (8 September 1914) passage from the Notebooks forms the
basis of Tractatus 5.4731).
It is somewhat a historical curiosity that Russell's epistemological
theses concerning acquaintance and description would play such a heavy
hand in the 1918 Lectures on Logical Atomism, given the way work on his
1913 Theory of Knowledge ground to a halt in the face of Wittgenstein's
criticism that the theory left room for the possibility of judging nonsense. This possibility, as the passage just cited indicates, is to be
ruled out by the nature of the symbolism itself. uwhat makes logic a
priori is the impossibility of illogical thought" (1922b, 5.4731).
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ed by a definite description such as uThe Master of Plato•.

Although

Wittgenstein would never consider basing a semantic thesis (such as that
objects can only be named) upon an epistemological premise, he could ap-

preciate Russell's belief that "(a] logical theory may be tested by its
capacity for dealing with puzzles" (1905, p. 110).

One cluster of prob-

lems revolves around the puzzle, to use Russell's words, of uhow ••• a
non-entity [can] be the subject of a proposition" (1905, p. 110).
Whereas Wittgenstein had found a foil in Moore (1899) and the early
Russell (1903), it was not until Russell began wrestling with Meinong's
(1899) philosophy that the paradoxes associated with (apparent) reference to non-existents occurred to him.

However, as time passed both be-

came concerned with these issues, that is, with how there could be false
judgments, negative existential propositions, and true belief ascriptions concerning persons with false beliefs.

Russell's Theory of

Descriptions provides answers to some of these problems consistent with
his epistemological views and his Theory of Types.

For Wittgenstein, in

contrast, the search for answers to these problems leads to the bipolarity of the proposition and to the Picture Theory's thesis of structural
isomorphism.

For him the Theory of Descriptions offers a solution to

some of the cases in which it appears that a propositional sign is not
structurally isomorphic to the world.
Consider "Pegasus has wings" and "The present King of France is
bald".

Are these sentences true or false?

In either event on

Wittgenstein's view it would be necessary for each sentence to contain
as many elements in it as there are objects represented by it.

But nei-

ther "Pegasus" nor "The present King of France" have any referent.
could these sentences possess name-object isomorphism?

How

And yet these

sentences do not seem to stand outside the bounds of sense in the manner
in which the problematic sentences that give rise to the class and semantic paradoxes do.
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Russell's proposal, accepted by Wittgenstein (1922b, 3.24), is to
treat "Pegasus," "Socrates," etc. as disguised descriptions, and to
treat definite descriptions like "The winged horse," uThe Master of
Plato," and "The present King of France" as affirming that "there is one
object, and no more, having a certain property" (1912, p.53).

Definite

descriptions, Russell maintains, are to be understood as incomplete
symbols~ that is to say, when viewed in isolation apart from a series of

claims, they have no meaning whatsoever.

Their use in a sentence must

be seen as entailing (and being entailed by) a series of claims.
The sentence "The present King of France is bald" is then analyzed
as a conjunction of the following:
(1) There is at least one present King of France.
(2) There is at most one present King of France.
(3) Whoever is the present King of France is bald.
Symbolically (allowing K to stand for uis a present King of France" and
B to stand for "is bald") the original sentence may be represented:
(Bx) [Kx & (Y) (Ky -

y = x) & Bx].

Rather than being nonsensical or of

some indeterminate truth-value, the original sentence turns out to be
false, due to the falsity of the first conjunct.
x such that xis a present King of France.

There are no values of

Thus the semantics of the

sentence can be explained without either introducing a new semantic category or positing a nonexistent object as referent.
Russell's Theory of Descriptions has been the subject of considerable controversy.

The principal criticism of it pertains to what are

perceived as its undesirable logical consequences.

These come about in

the following way. Consider the sentence ,,Socrates is the Master of
Plato" which expresses a contingent truth.

Since "Socrates" is synony-

mous with "the Master of Plato," this sentence is equivalent to .,The
Master of Plato is the Master of Plato" and may be represented:
[Mx &

(y) (My -

y

= x)

&

x

= x).

(Bx)

But this claim may be deduced from
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(Bx)

(Mx

&

(Y) (My -

y = x)J, which asserts that Socrates (i.e., the

Master of Plato) exists, as the conjunction of it and the law of identity.

It, therefore, follows from the fact that Socrates exists that

Socrates is the Master of Plato.
ter~ thus:
x)

&

{ (BX)

[Mx &

x = x]} is true.

The former strictly implies the lat-

(Y) (My -

y ,..

X)]} ... { (Bx)

[Mx &

(Y) (My -

y =

That is to say, if Socrates exists, then Socrates

is necessarily the Master of Plato.

The possibility of Socrates exist-

ing but not being the Master of Plato is ruled out.
Russell, we should note, believed these problems could be avoided.
The fact of the matter is that Russell expressed grave reservations over
treating names as synonymous with definite descriptions.

These reserva-

tions are expressed as early as uon Denoting" (1905, p. 113) where he
quips that we can hardly credit George IV with an interest in the law of
identity when he desired to know if Scott was the author of Waverly.
Indeed, in the Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, written within a
year of the passage quoted above, he asserts "'Scott is the author of
Waverly' is not the same proposition as results from substituting a name
for 'the author of Waverly'" (1919, p. 172).

In that work, too, he sug-

gests that the substitution that creates the unwanted analyticity runs
afoul of the Theory of Types (1919, p. 171).

This can be seen from the

fact that if usocrates" is synonymous with "the Master of Plato" or
"Scott" is synonymous with "the author of Waverly", then the names and
the definite descriptions would be of the same type.

Consequently,

•Socrates is the Master of Plato# becomes an illegitimate construction,
and, so, the substitution that generates the unwanted analyticity is
blocked.

While this gets Russell off the hook with respect to the prob-

lem described here, he appears to be impaled upon the horn of a dilemma,
since, after all, •socrates is the Master of Plato" is true.
Wittgenstein, we will see, circumvents this problem by construing
the elementary propositions into which •Socrates is the Master of Plato"
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decomposes as logically independent~ this has the consequence of ma.king
the sentence contingent, as the Picture Theory requires if the sentence
is to have a sense.
Having noted the potential problem associated with Russell's conclusion (at (vii)), several comments concerning the argument in general
are in order before we turn to Wittgenstein's argument.

First, note

that the argument does not establish in any way that there are simple
objects.

All of the ontology enters via the first premise where it is

stipulated that names name objects of acquaintance.

In the Lectures

Russell appears simply to assume the existence of simple objects.

Be

clearly acknowledges the lack of support he has given the claim:
I think it is perfectly possible to suppose that complex
things are capable of analysis ad infinitum, and that you
never reach the simple. I do not think it is true, but it
is a thing one might argue, certainly. I do myself think
that complexes--I do not like to think of complexes--are
composed of simples, but I admit that is a difficult argument, and it might be that analysis could go on forever
(1918, p. 64).
The fact is that Russell's ontological commitment to simple objects was
never great.

It is perhaps its greatest in the Lectures.

There he com-

ments upon the fact that all names are eliminated within the notation of
Principia Mathematica (1910) saying:

u ••• in the logical language set

forth in Principia Mathematica there are not any names, because there we
are not interested in particular particulars but only in general particulars, if I may be allowed such a phrase" (1918, p. 63).

(Russell means

by the last phrase that in Principia Mathematica he was interested in
particulars only to the extent that they are subject to quantification.)
Nevertheless, although Russell would continue to find it desirable to
posit simple objects, he would remain cautious in his commitment.

The

1924 article, uLogical Atomism," put the matter this way:
When I speak of 'simples', I ought to explain that I am
speaking of something not experienced as such, but known
only inferentially as the limit of analysis. I t is quite
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possible that, by greater logical skill, the need for as
suming them could be avoided. A logical language will not
lead to error if its simple symbols (i.e. those not having
any parts that are symbols, or any significant structure)
all stand for objects of some one type, even if these objects are not simple. The only drawback to such a
language is that it is incapable of dealing with anything
simpler than the objects which it represents by simple symbols. But I confess it seems obvious to me (as it did to
Leibniz) that what is complex must be composed of simples,
though the number of constituents may be infinite (1924, p.
173; emphasis added).
It is interesting that the tradition has largely remembered
Russell's belief in ineliminability as a criterion for ontological commitment but not his reluctance to view names as elim.inable.

Quine, for

example, maintains that uthe singular noun ••• can always be expanded into
a singular description, trivially or otherwise, and then analyzed out a

la Russell" (1948, p. 8).

This belief becomes the basis of Quine's own

position on ontological commitment, namely, that a theory is committed
to the kinds of entities over which it quantifies, since (on his view)
quantifiers but not names are ineliminable.

It would be more accurate

to describe Russell as believing that all relative names are eliminable,
and that it is possible but not likely for analysis to terminate with
names of objects that are not simple.

Be that as it may, the tradition

has come to identify the Russell view with the view that it is possible
to eliminate all names by means of analysis (Haack (1978), pp. 62-63;
Coffa (1993), pp. 111-112).

And, indeed, he did take the elimination of

names to be possible.
Wittgenstein's view may be sharply contrasted with Russell's,
since for him it is not even possible to eliminate reference to simple
objects if analysis is to be complete and representation is to be possible.
Given what we know about Russell's influence upon Wittgenstein, we
can reconstruct his argument as follows:

202

(i) if the name of a complex

entity, n, occurring within a propositional signs which has a determinate sense can be eliminated upon analysis, then n possesses complex
logical structure (or a decompositional semantic structure); (ii) If n
possesses a complex logical structure, then this structure will be revealed by either a two-stage analysis (in which the first stage replaces
the name with a definite description and the second stage replaces the
definite description with a series of quantified expressions) or by a
three-stage analysis (in which the variables of the second stage are replaced by names); (iii) if a two-stage analysis were complete, then it
would be possible to analyze propositions with determinate sense as
functions of propositions whose sense is indeterminate; (iv) it is impossible for a propositional sign that has determinate sense to be analyzed into components whose senses are indeterminate; therefore, (vi) a
propositional signs that contains the name of a complex to be eliminated upon analysis must be given a three-stage analysis; and, therefore,
(vii) the sense of a propositional signs is determined by the referents
of those names into which it decomposes.

What makes this conclusion so

important is the fact that, following Frege, Wittgenstein holds that any
propositional sign that has a sense must contain both argument and function, that is, they must contain both singular and predicative expressions; hence, (viii) there must be names. But what analysis demonstrates
is that (ix) nothing which purports to be the name of a complex is a
name.

so, if there are names (and (viii) affirms that there are), then

(x) names must name simples.

In other words, there must be simple ob-

jects.
The first premise is a truism implicit within the project of logical analysis.

Wittgenstein credits Russell with ushowing that the ap-

parent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one" (1922b,
4.0031).

The early analysts sought to free themselves from what they

viewed as the metaphysical excesses of their predecessors and, indeed,
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the commitments imposed on them by their own early theories of judgment.
They believed an uncritical attitude toward ordinary language with its
various forms to be at the source of these excesses.

Consequently they

regarded a mistrust of ordinary forms as a prerequisite for doing philosophy.

There was thus initiated--primarily in the writings of Frege

(1879a), Russell (1903) and Russell and Whitehead (1910)--the search for
a logically perspicuous language.

But as we saw earlier, for

Wittgenstein, "the propositions of our everyday language, just as they
stand, are in perfect logical order" (1922b, 5.5563), because an illogical representational medium is impossible.

Thus:

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the
outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the
form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of
the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body,
but for entirely different purposes.
The tacit conventions on which the understanding of
everyday language depends are enormously complicated (1922b,
4.002) •
••• Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our
language (1922b, 4.003).
The task would not be simply to construct an ideal language and then to
begin conducting business within it.

Rather, the task would be to cut

through the numerous conventions that govern the use of language in ordinary contexts to discover the underlying logical form.

Beneath the

conventional forms there lies the "logical syntax" of our language
(1922b, 3.325, 3.33, 3.334).

The process of analysis involves, at the very least, the clarification of propositions, that is, the clarification of what makes them
true.

When a proposition names an object that is complex, then certain

facts about that object will contribute to the conditions that make the

proposition truei at the very least it does this by determining the referential conditions for the name of the object.
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The first premise sim-

ply takes stock of this fact.

If facts about the referent contribute to

the truth or falsehood of a proposition, then it will upon analysis have
to be eliminated in favor of descriptions of those facts.

Thus analysis

yields more complex syntactic forms.
The second premise asserts that there are two principal candidates
for what counts as a complete analysis.

The first alternative, at-

tributed to Russell (by Wittgenstein among others), has it that analysis
is complete once all proper names are eliminated in favor of one or more
definite descriptions that are, in turn, eliminated in favor of quantiifiers, predicates and variables.
On Wittgenstein's view such an analysis is incomplete.

To be com-

plete the analysis must be carried out so as to replace the quantifiers
and variables with names of actual existents.

This involves replacing

the existential quantifier with the logical sum, and the universal quantifier with the logical product, of those names for which the predicate
is possibly a function.

It is to this possibility that the second dis-

junct in premise (ii) points.
This might seem like a trivial distinction to draw, since today it
is generally accepted that a formula containing quantifiers is made true
either by the fact that its predicates are satisfied for some values of
the variables it contains (on an objectual reading of the variables), or
by the fact that one of its substituends is true (on a substitutional
interpretation of variables). 02

In either event it turns out that ex-

pressions containing names or other singular terms are truth-bearers.
The view that sentences containing quantifiers are true (or false) depending upon their relation to sentences containing names or other singular terms is commonplace, however, as a consequence of Wittgenstein's
I take Wittgenstein to adhere to a substitutional interpretation of
variables, since, for him, variables function as prototypes or exemplars
of symbol types rather than as referring expressions of either an object
language or a meta-language.
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and Russell's work.

Its actual significance can only be appreciated

when viewed against a historical background dominated by the logic and
metaphysics of British Idealism.

Frege, Wittgenstein, and eventually

Russell had, as we discussed in a previous chapter, abandoned subjectpredicate analyses of sentences in favor of analyses based upon function
and argument.

The Wittgensteinian idea that sentences containing quan-

tifiers, not only are made true, but have a sense in virtue of their relations to sentences containing names of objects entails the falsehood
of the doctrine of internal relations so integral to Idealism.

This be-

comes apparent if the reason why the analysis must be extended is considered.
Unless sentences containing quantifiers are treated as sums or
products of sentences containing names, no discrimination will beeffected within reality and no sentence containing quantifiers will have a
sense.

Considered in themselves, apart from any such relation, sen-

tences containing quantifiers remain indeterminate, as do the sentences
that contain names of complex entities for which they provide an analysis:
When a propositional element signifies a complex, this
can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in
which it occurs. In such cases we know that the proposition
leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for
generality contains a prototype) (1922b, 3.24).
What is left undetermined is any discrimination within reality of what
would be the case if the formula or sentence were true and what would be
the case if it were false.

This can be done by saying that, for a given

domain {a, b, c, ••• , n}, (Bx) Fx is made true by Fa v Fb v Fc ••• Fn, and
it is made false by -Fa & -Fb & -Fc ••• -Fn.

The reason it does not suf-

fice to say simply that (Bx) Fx is made false by -{(Bx) Fx] is that
what makes the latter true just is the fact that, for a given object a,
Gav Ba v Ja v Na is true.

The possibilities referred to by these dis-
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juncts belong to the sense of Fa~ and should any of them obtain, Fa
would be false. For example, the sentence uNothing is blue" would be
made true by every object within a given domain being red or yellow or
green or some other color incompatible with the object being blue.••
Ultimately it is the determinate nature of objects that secures for
quantified expressions a determinate sense.
we can see how this thesis runs contrary to any sort of doctrine
of internal relations that holds all relational properties of objects to
be essential.

Although this is not the place to go into details on such

matters, that view has it that an object's identity conditions are determined by all of the object's actual relations at a given time.

Given

any change in actual relation, the object would fail to persist.

To re-

turn to our earlier example of the pedestrian between the two cars, a
doctrine of internal relations would maintain that the pedestrian--if it
makes sense at all to talk about the pedestrian per se--ceases to be the
object it once was once it stands in a different relation to the two
cars.

on Wittgenstein's view, in contrast, what an object is cannot be

determined by the relations into which it actually enters.

Rather an

object's possibility of being related thus-and-so is written into the
very nature of the object itself.

Thus:

If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.
(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible.
Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are
its facts.)
Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects
outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there
is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.
If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I
In later years Wittgenstein (1929a) would regard what has been described here as posing a problem concerning the logical independence of
elementary propositions. Concerning the so-called color exclusion problem more will be said below.
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cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such
combinations (1922b, 2.0121).
If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.
(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the
nature of the object) (1922b, 2.0123).
Ultimately, the ontological primacy given to objects and their possibilities rests upon the need for propositions with sense to effect a discrimination within reality in such a way as to make their own truth or
falsehood contingent.

There must be objects of a determinate nature,

and in some way reference must be made to these objects if quantified
expressions are to have a sense.
premise (iii):

In this way we arrive at the truth of

if a two-stage analysis were complete, then it would be

possible to analyze propositions with determinate sense as functions of
propositions whose sense is indeterminate.
Premise (iv), how.ever, asserts that it is impossible for a propositional sign that has determinate sense to be analyzed into components
whose senses are indeterminate.

This follows from the fact that a sen-

tence containing a quantifier only has a sense in virtue of its logical
relation to a sentence containing names that do refer to actual objects.
If the former has a determinate sense, the latter must.

One might ask

whether this claim is generally true and not merely true of propositions
containing quantified expressions.

But, in fact, this question does not

arise for Wittgenstein, since, for him, any proposition about anything
complex can be analyzed by means of sums or products of propositional
signs containing only quantifiers, names and predicates.

At the bottom

of premise (iv), then, lies the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
the two Russellian assumptions that names of complexes are disguised
definite descriptions and that definite descriptions are to be understood primarily as playing a predicative role.
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The latter assumption

has been questioned on more than one occasion (Strawson, 1950; Donellan,
1966).

These criticisms are particularly relevant in that they reach to

the very heart of the syntacticist tradition by raising the possibility
that a linguistic token's use within a context, rather than its logical
or syntactic form, determines its semantic properties.

Since

Wittgenstein (1953), too, eventually shared these concerns, a full
treatment of the issue is best left until later when we consider
Wittgenstein's own abandonment of syntacticism.
Russell, as we know, accepted these theses in order to eliminate
the need to posit non-existent beings.

They also permit him to accommo-

date falsehood without making falsehood contingent upon truth; and, when
conjoined with his theory of judgment, they enable him to accommodate
true ascriptions of false beliefs to others.

For Wittgenstein, on the

other hand, the two theses serve to augment the Picture Theory's requirement of logical isomorphism.

So the question that should really be

raised here is that of whether the Picture Theory does indeed require
this kind of augmentation.

I would suggest that it does.

The alterna-

tive would entail that a propositional sign contain either more or less
elements than there are objects to be represented.

In the case of too

few elements, ambiguity enters the proposition due to the fact that an
element must represent more than one object.

(Consider:

under this

interpretation a is to the left of b, but under that interpretation bis

to the left of a.)
ty is effected.

In the limiting case no discrimination within reali-

But, and more germane to the present issue, the same

holds when there are too many elements, as is the case when •the present
King of France" is taken as a singular term.

Given that there is no

such object, a sentence containing such a phrase would leave undetermined what object possesses a given property or is the term of a given
relation.

That is to say, if •the present King of Francew is construed

merely as a singular term within the sentences in which occurs, then it
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will remain unclear just how to interpret such sentences:
a given property or relation be predicated?

of what shall

It is as if one would not

know where to look for a state of affairs that would render the sentence
true or false.

One could, as it were, survey all objects and determine

that the denoting phrase refers to none of them, thereby determining the
falsehood of the sentence~ but that sort of procedure involves treating
the denoting phrase as a predicate that goes unsatisfied.

And that is

precisely what the theory of descriptions calls for.
That sense must be determinate thus requires (vi), namely, that a
propositional sign containing the name of a complex must be given a
three-stage analysis.

Consequently, we get the following progression:
(x = s).

LL

"Socrates exists" or

L2.

uThe Master of Plato exists" or

(Bx)

(Bx)

(Mx & (Y)

(My -

y =

x)).

L3.

uEither a is the Master of
Plato, or c is the Master
= a) J V [Mb & (Y) (My C) ••• v [Mn & (Y) (My - y

Plato, orb is the Master of
of Plato ••• " or [Ma & (y) (My y - b)] V [Mc & (Y) (My - y =
= n)J.

The first level consists of the original unanalyzed sentence.

y

At the

second level the name of the complex is eliminated in favor of the definite description, and the the resulting sentence is analyzed according
to Russell's theory.

The third level initiates the sort of analysis

countenanced by Wittgenstein.
replaced by its logical sum.

In L3 the existential quantifier has been
The analysis would proceed with the elimi-

nation of the universal quantifier in favor of its logical product.
for example, the first disjunct in L3 would become:
a) ]

&

[ ( Mc

-

c = a) J

&

[ ( Md

-

d =

a) ] ••• [ ( Mn -

[Ma)

&

[(Mb -

so,
b =

n = a) ] •

The third level of analysis is not yet complete however.

The log-

ical sums and products that appear upon analysis of L2 disappear, along
with the identity sign (1914b, p. 19), if the convention is observed
that each object has one and only one name and no two objects have the
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same name (1914b, p. 34; 1922b, 5.53).
L3'

Consequently, we get:

Ma & -Mb & -Mc ••• -Mn.

Let me point out that in the actual presentation in the

Tractatus the existential quantifier is retained.

That is because this

portion of the text, 5.53-5.534, is intended only to show how the identity sign is eliminated and no more.

Thus he provides various examples

and retains the existential quantifier for the sake of simplicity.

For

example, he says, uthe proposition, 'Only one x satisfies f()', will
read '(3x).fx: -(3x,y) .fx.fy•n (1922b, 5.5321).

But the existential

quantifier is dispensable too, because all names are taken to refer to
existents, since symbols that purport to be names of entities possessing
Being but not existence are eliminated upon analysis.

In this way the

use of names and the differences between names show what is usually

said by means of quantifiers."

Wittgenstein, like Quine, can be under-

stood to be taking logical ineliminability as a criterion for ontological comm.itment1 but, in contrast to Quine, he holds quantifiers rather
than names to be unnecessary.
Is it an arbitrary matter which convention is accepted?
not.

I think

For Wittgenstein, at any rate, the need to eliminate the identity

sign results from the demand that sentences with sense not decompose
into sentences that lack sense.

That such would occur given the con-

vention concerning naming is obvious enough, since a= a and a= b would
be tautologous and contradictory respectfully; and because they would
fail to be contingent, they would fail to have a sense.

But

Wittgenstein does provide an independent, and less question begging, argument.

Roughly, it is this:

(i) either a= a and a= b can be inter-

preted formally as being merely about symbols, or they can be interpreted materially as being about extra-linguistic objects and their rela94 Difficulties arising from the elimination of the identity sign are
discussed in Black (1964), pp. 290-295. A strong defense of the technique may be found in Hintikka (1957).
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tions; (ii) assume for the sake of argument that they are to be interpreted materially; (iii) "to say of two things that they are identical
is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is
to say nothing at all" (1922b, 5.5303; cf. 1914b, p. 4); therefore, (iv)
neither a= a nor a= b may possess sense; for which reason, (v) they
cannot be interpreted materially; and therefore, (vi) they must be interpreted as merely formal devices (1922b, 4.241-4.242).

The only claim

here that stands in need of explanation is the first clause of (iii).
The reason it would be nonsense to say of two things that they are identical is that no relation (i.e., no object, as u(r]elations and properties, etc. are objects too" (1914b, p. 61)•'

has been designated as the

referent of "the relation of identity between two different objects.
or, at least, none shall be designated as such so long as words like
"identity" and "difference" are used as they are, i.e., in ways consistent with Leibniz' Laws.
lation is a logical one."

(Here one wants to say:

"But the identity re-

But what does that mean in this context?

That it is merely a formal one?

In that case no state of affairs will

have been asserted as existing.

If it is a formal concept, then it ex-

presses a relation between signs.)
We now have a complete picture of how the final stage of analysis
is to be conducted according to Wittgenstein; and we can now make sense
of premise (vii), i.e., that the sense of a propositional sign is determined by the referents of those names into which it decomposes.

The

form (as distinguished from the structure) of a propositional sign corresponds to a range of possible facts which constitute its sense.

These

possible facts are possibilities of the objects that are their constituents.

Names are required to refer to these.

Therefore, (ix) there must be names.

The Notebooks are illuminat-

95 The extent to which this passage is useful in clarifying the relation between Wittgenstein's and Frege's conception of an object will be
discussed below.
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ing on this points
one cannot achieve any more by using names in describing
the world than by means of the general description of the
worldl 11
Could one then manage without names?

Surely not.

Names are necessary for an assertion that this thing possesses that property and so on.
They link the propositional form with quite definite objects.
And if the general description of the world is like a
stencil of the world, the names pin it to the world so that
the world is wholly covered by it (1914b, p. 53).
One day later he observes:
The great problem round which everything that I write
turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if
so what does it consist in (1914b, p.53)?
What makes Wittgenstein's philosophy a priori is that it proceeds from
an examination of the necessary conditions for the possibility of representation.

The sentences that make up the Tractatus are not, at least

according to its author, a priori true in the same way as, say, "All
bachelors are unmarried" is true, given the meaning of the word -bachelor", even if being unmarried is a necessary condition for being a bachelor.

For it is not from the meanings of any particular words that the

claims that make up the Tractatus issue.

They stem, rather, from argu-

ments concerning what must be necessary if language and thought are able
to represent (that is, to be able to refer to and be true of) a world
external to itself. 96
These conditions include bipolarity and logico-pictorial form.
The latter requires a form/structure distinction and names of objects as
~ That the statements of the Tractatus can be reconstructed as a set
of arguments, as I have attempted to do in this dissertation, is itself
an important fact to consider when evaluating whether those claims are
nonsensical as its author maintains. Bow can entailment relations obtain among sentences that are alleged to be nonsense? In a later section I will describe a fallacy to which Wittgenstein has fallen susceptible in thinking that a statement P describing a necessary condition
for O cannot be contingent.
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pictorial elements.

Furthermore, the world must be such as to contain

objects, and these objects must have a determinate nature.

This entails

that their possibilities for being related to one another must be determined by their very nature.
In the final stage of the argument the a priori order of the world
is extended to include simple objects.

The fact is there must be names,

yet analysis shows that (ix) nothing which purports to be the name of a
complex is a name.

The 'names' of complex objects are really disguised

descriptions (1914b, p. 52).

Yet if there must be names, but 'names' of

complexes do not function as such, then names must be names of non-complex or simple objects.

Therefore, (x) there must be simple objects."'

What are simple objects?
mained notoriously reticent.

On this the author of the Tractatus reBe does tell us what simple objects must

be like: but he does not believe himself able to name and ostensively

define such an object.

This reticence follows considerable soliloquy on

the subject during the composition of the Notebooks.
waxes Russellian:

"[t]the simple thing for us IS1

that we are acquainted with" (1914b, p. 47).'"

At one point he
the simplest thing

The simplest thing with

which we are acquainted, he goes on to suggest, "need appear only as a
prototype, as a variable in our propositions" (1914b, p. 47).

The argu-

ment for the Grundgedanke of the Tractatus, discussed in the next section of this chapter, constitutes his rejection of that idea.
Wittgenstein there can be no logical objects.

For

In the Notebooks he also

considers and rejects the identification of simple objects with sense
data, as there is no "minima sensibiliaH (1914b, p. 451 see also p. 51).

Wittgenstein suggests at one point that it is not appropriate to
label as names both symbols that refer to complexes as well as to simples. The word "name" should be reserved for the latter.(1914b, p. 52).
98 Compare Russell:
" ••• any entity with which something is acquainted
will be called an 'object' ••• An entity with which nothing is acquainted will not be called an object" (1914a, p. 162). Objects, on this
view, are construed de dicto, i.e., as objects of awareness.
97
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Furthermore, he rejects (presumably for the same reason) the identification of simple objects with uparts of space" (1914b, p. 47), though he
notes how "instinctive# (1914b, p. 48) it is to regard them as objects.••
Perhaps most telling is his consideration and rejection of a
Fregean position:
But if there are simple objects, is it correct to call
both the signs for them and those other signs [i.e., signs
for complexes) •names"?
Or is "name" so to speak a logical concept?
Names signalise what is common to a single form and a
single content ••• (1914b, pp. 52-53).
The question being raised in the second paragraph pertains to whether
names must be characterized merely in terms of their logical role as argument, or whether it is possible to go further by explaining their potential for reference.

we have seen in a previous chapter that Frege is

skeptical about the latter possibility.

He believed that at most the

relations between symbols and their referents could be the subject of
eludidations or metaphors such as "satisfaction," "falling under," and
the like.

From Frege Wittgenstein would inherit a sense for the prob-

lematic nature of a theory of reference, but from Russell and Moore he
inherited a realism that requires reference and the referents of names

98 Interestingly, the very next entry into the Notebooks, one day
later on 14 May 1915, finds its way into the Tractatus at 4.002:
"Language is a part of our organism, and no less complicated than it"
(1914b, p. 48). As I mentioned earlier, I believe Wittgenstein's naturalism emerges very early in his career. This entry constitutes one of
its earliest and most forcible expressions.--Slightly more contentious
is Wittgenstein's remark in the "Notes on Logic," which found its way
into the Tractatus at 4.1121 that "[e)pistemology is the philosophy of
psychology (1913, p. 106). Be that as it may, naturalism--as discussed
in the Introduction to this work--is implicit in the methodology employed by adherents of relational theories of awareness and judgment.
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to be characterized. 10•

When Wittgenstein says, u[n]ames signalise what

is common to a single form and a single content ••• " (1914b, p. 53), he
takes his stand against Frege and with Russell and Moore. 1 • 1

What is

common to "a single form and a single content" are the objects whose
various possibilities for combination correspond to the form of the
proposition (thereby constituting its sense) and whose actual combination constitute the proposition's content or meaning. 102

The fact of the

matter is that Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and meaning
(which is first and foremost a metaphysical distinction between possible
and actual states of affairs) along with the ontology of the Picture
Theory required to sustain it are the outcome of philosophical investigations initially undertaken to secure, among other things, inferences
from --P to P.

Securing the possibility of an adequate theory of infer-

ence without falling prey to Russell's Paradox was the task with which
Wittgenstein began his philosophical career.

The point is that the dif-

ference between Frege and Wittgenstein is not merely a difference in
program or research goal.

Wittgenstein began with very much the same

goal as Frege, but found that the theory of inference needs to be
grounded in the theory of reference.

Thus, "if the general description

of the world is like a stencil of the world, the names pin it to the
In the 1903 Principles of Mathematics, a work with which
Wittgenstein was very familiar, Russell says:
That the meaning of an assertion about all men or any man
is different from the meaning of an equivalent assertion
about the concept man, appears to me, I must confess, to be
a self-evident truth--as evident as the fact that propositions about John are not about the name John (1903, p.90).
For further discussion see Coffa (1993), pp. 100-107.
101 Of course his Fregean inheritance would become manifest in his unwillingness to regard sentences like this one as straightforwardly
truth-functional.
102 The word "content" ( Inhal ts) is here used as a synonym for the
"meaning" of a sentence. It is what corresponds to (or fails to correspond to) a propositional sign's structure; the term is used in the
Tractatus at 2.025, 3.13, and 3.31. The sense of a proposition are the
array of possibilities that correspond to its form.
100
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world so that the world is wholly covered by it (1914b, p.53).
But what are the simple objects that make up the substance of the
world?

No answer is given.

Looking back upon his work years later, he

would remark to Malcolm,
••• that at that time his thought had been that he was a
logician~ and that it was not his business, as a logician,
to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple
thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matterl (Malcolm, 1972, p. 86).
In spite of the fairly obvious objection that any nameable object could
turn out to be complex, Wittgenstein would maintain that "the infinitely complex si~uation seems to be a chimera" (1914b, p.50), and that em-

pirical science could prove it to be such.
Wittgenstein's view is not so ludicrous as common sense might
think.

The common sense idea that objects are located in a space that

is infinitely divisible and of infinite extent is a Newtonian idea~ it
is one that was as contentious in Newton's time as it was in Russell's
and Wittgenstein's time.

Wittgenstein's own view is similar to

Leibniz's in that both regard space as an emergent property of objects
(monads in Leibniz's case) that make up the substance of the world.
This appears to be what Wittgenstein has in mind when he says, uspace,
time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects" (1922b,
2. 0251). '

0'

Needless to say, if relativity theory or the theory of quan-

103 This does not constitute a major divergence from the use of "form"
described earlier in this dissertation. The form of a proposition just
is its truth-conditions. The truth-conditions are none other than the
possible ways in which objects named may be related to one another. So
to speak of the form of an object just is to speak of its possibilities
for combination:

Objects contain the possibility of all situations.
The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is
the form of an object (1922b, 2.014-2.0141).
Black describes the form of an object as ua power or capacity to combine with other objects in atomic facts: objects have different logical
forms when they have different liberties of association" (1964, p. 55).
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ta are true, then the Newtonian picture is incorrect. 10•
My principal concern with the argument up to this point is not
that countenancing simple objects requires one to abandon the idea of
space as infinitely divisible.
intelligibility of that idea.

At least, I am not concerned with the
What is difficult to understand is how to

reconcile that possibility with Wittgenstein's contention that:
the propositions of our everyday language, just as they
stand, are in perfect logical order.--That utterly simple
thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of
the truth, but the truth in its entirety (1922b, 5.5563).
For if the substance of the world is without the kinds of attributes attributed to it by Newtonian physics and by and large by common sense,
then everyday language (Umgangssprache) cannot be in perfect logical
order, since the propositions which comprise it would all be false!

The

point is.that one cannot give up the idea of infinite divisibility without modifying one's conception of ordinary, composite objects.

What

sense can be made out of the idea of a composite object composed of nonspatial and non-temporal objects?

If the objects to which we ascribe

extension as well as the extensionless objects that supposedly make up
the substance of the world are of equal ontological standing, then the
manner of their relating constitutes a metaphysical mystery on a par
with how Aquinas' God could cause Aquinas' universe or how Descartes'
,~ Even though Wittgenstein's later discussions with members of the
Vienna Circle suggest he is willing for elementary proposition to be
very unlike the propositions of ordinary language (cf. Waismann, 1979,
p. 42), it might appear we are getting Wittgenstein out of the pot and
into the fire by invoking the possibility of non-Newtonian physics. The
so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which is now
accepted by most physicists, appears to entail subjectivism (which would
be contrary to the realism of the Tractatus), primarily in its interpretation of the law of excluded middle as not holding for objects within
its domain. Clearly, that would make quanta ineligible as
Wittgensteinian simple objects, since bipolarity requires the exclusion
of the middle in order for sense to be determinate. Recently, however,
Albert (1993) has argued that Bohm's alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics can avoid these un-Wittgensteinian consequences.
Russell (1925) was concerned to dispel similar fears concerning
Einstein's research.
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mind could cause motion in Descartes' body.

The alternative is to not

think of ordinary objects as sharing an equal ontological footing.

For

example, they might be construed along phenomenalistic lines, that is,
as having a kind of existence in virtue of their relation(s) to perceiving subjects.

But this just does not square with the realism that ani-

mates the Tractatus, and certainly it is not consistent with the claim
that "the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are
in perfect logical order" (1922b, 5.5563).
Here an interesting objection can be raised against the exposition
of the Tractatus thus far offered in this dissertation.

This disserta-

tion has gone 'to great lengths to argue that the Tractatus is a realist
work; and that, indeed, Wittgenstein is to be regarded as more of a realist than Frege, who, we have argued, is to be understood as advocating
a minimalist conception of semantics.

Perhaps the principal criticism

facing this line of interpretation stems from Wittgenstein's remarks
about solipsism in the Tractatus.

Such claims as that "[t)he world is

my world" (1922b, 5.62) seem hard to reconcile with realism.

The burden

of meeting this objection will have to be postponed until Section Three
below.

There reasons shall be given for why the remarks on solipsism

should be regarded as semantic rather than metaphysical theses.

The

trick to this is to explain how this is possible without lapsing into
Fregean minimalism.
Although the problem of how composite objects are related to noncomposite ones is not articulated in the Tractatus, a solution does seem
to be posed within the work.

The solution is to draw an ontological

distinction between molecular facts (Tatsachen) and atomic facts or
states of affairs (Sachverhalten) such that the former are not reducible
to the latter.

For this to be the case the Grundgedanke of the

Tractatus must be true.

The distinction between Tatsachen and

Sachverhalten, and the thesis that the logical constants are not refer-
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ring terms, together constitute a theory of how the composite can consist of the non-composite.

Although all Wittgenstein scholars admit

that an adequate account of Tractarian semantics requires a discussion
of the logical constants (particularly since the sentences of ordinary
language are to be analyzed into sets of sentences or formulae containing them), few if any appear to recognize that the compositionality of
the Picture Theory hangs on such an account.

Nevertheless that there is

a connection between the two seems clear:
The possibility of propositions is based on the principle
that objects have signs as their representatives.
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are
not representatives; that there can be no representatives of
the logic of facts (1922b, 4.0312).
It is quite relevant that the Grundgedanke follows, within the same numbered passage, a claim fundamental to the Picture Theory concerning the
necessity of names.

Typically when Wittgenstein does this it means he

regards the two sentences either as different elucidations of the very
same point or as being such that the former entails (i.e., presupposes)
the latter.

It is to the Grundgedanke that we turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GRUNDGEDANKE OF THE TRACTATUS
1.

Introductory Remarks.
Wittgenstein's fundamental idea is that the logical constants--

i.e., the sentence-forming operators of the propositional or sentential
logic, the quantifiers of the predicate logic, as well as the identity
sign--play no referential role.
sort of thing.

Unlike names they do not refer to any

Elsewhere in the Tractatus he would state the point by

saying "that -t;here are no logical objects" (1922b, 5.4).
Concern over the status of the logical constants occurs very early
in Wittgenstein's career.

Its earliest expression, and indeed the first

statement of the Grundgedanke, is found in a 22 June 1912 letter to
Russell:
Logic is still in the melting pot but one thing gets more
and more obvious to me: The propositions of Logic contain
ONLY apparent variables and whatever may turn out to be the
proper explanation of apparent variables, its consequences
must be that there are NO logical constants.
Logic must turn out to be a totally different kind than
any other science (1912, p. 120).
Here we see Wittgenstein's concern with the variables of the predicate
logic.

His concern with the sentence-forming operators of the proposi-

tional logic would remain primarily (though not always 10") focused upon
the negation sign.

We have already seen that the problem of negation

(and related problems) forced Wittgenstein to reject Moore's relational
theory of judgment.

A 25 November 1914 entry in the Notebooks states:

It is the dualism, positive and negative facts, that
gives me no peace. For such a dualism can't exist. But how
to get away from it?
All this would get solved of itself if we understood the
105 A letter to Russell, dated some time during 1912, mentions the
disjunction sign and the predicate logic variables together (1912, p.
121).
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nature of the proposition (1914b, p. 33).
The identity sign would also be acknowledged early on as problematic:
Identity is the very Devil and immensely important~ very
much more so than I thought. It hangs--like everything
else--directly together with the most fundamental questions,
especially with the questions concerning the occurrence of
the same argument in different places of a function (1912,
P.123).
we have already introduced the principal considerations bearing
upon the status of both the quantifiers and the identity sign, and for
that reason they shall only receive cursory treatment here.

Reasons for

thinking (1) that quantified expressions contribute to the sense of a
propositional sign only by virtue of being abbreviations for logical
products and logical sums in which singular terms occur, and (2) that
the identity sign does not contribute to the sense of a propositional
sign at all were evinced in the course of the argument for logical atomism.

If I am correct, the final component of the Grundgedanke--namely,

(3) that the sentence-forming operators of the propositional or sentential logic are not referring expressions--is a claim crucial to establishing Wittgenstein's particular brand of atomism.

To be sure, the 4's

of the Tractatus do initiate a lengthy discussion of possible counterexamples to the Picture Theory that include molecular propositions, scientific laws, normative claims and propositional attitude ascriptions.
However important it is to establish that molecular propositions do not
constitute a counter-example to the Picture Theory, the greater importance of the third clause of the Grundgedanke consists in its role in
establishing a metaphysical distinction between facts (Tatsachen) and
states of affairs (Sachverhalten).
2.

Problems with Molecular Propositions.
It should be fairly clear why molecular propositions pose a prob-

lem for the Picture Theory.

The presence of sentence-forming operators

222

within a propositional sign poses a dilemma:

either there are more ele-

ments within the propositional sign than there are objects to be depicted, in which case we have a failure of isomorphism, or isomorphism does
obtain, in which case negative, disjunctive, conjunctive, and conditional facts must be admitted into the ontology.
dilemma by passing through its horns:

Wittgenstein resolves the

he denies that a propositional

sign containing sentence-forming operators possesses more referring expressions than there are objects to be depicted, and he denies that
there are negative and other kinds of molecular facts and offers instead
an ontology o~ Tatsachen and Sachverhalten.

The operators, in turn, ex-

press various attitudes towards propositional signs.

Affirmation and

denial are two such attitudes~ and, though not discussed by Wittgenstein
in the Tractatus, analogous attitudes are expressed by disjunction, conjunction and material implication signs.

Rather than having to intro-

duce negative, disjunctive (etc.) facts to account for the semantic
properties of these symbols, truth tables may be used to define them
functionally.

Thus the truth-values of molecular propositions may be

represented as truth-functions of elementary propositions.

For example,

sentences with the same structure as "Either Carnap wrote the Aufbau, or
Wittgenstein did, but not both" could be represented by the final column
in the following chart:

p Q

p V Q

T T
T F
F T

T

F

F

T
T

T

F F

F

T
T
T

-(P & Q)

(P V Q) & -(P & Q)

T

~"

The column represents the sense of the proposition, i.e., its possibili-

1~
Wittgenstein does not employ the standard table used here. Be
typically employs rows where today we use columns. Thus, (FTTF) (P,Q)
would represent the final column in the table above (1922b, 5.101). At
places he also employs his ab-notation (1922b, 6.1203).
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ties for truth or falsehood under different conditions; the row that
corresponds to what is actually the case with respect to P and
sents the meaning of the proposition. 101

Q

repre-

Nothing contributes to the

truth-value of the molecular proposition other than that which contributes to the truth-values of the elementary propositions.
The question we now face is:

what argument can be given in sup-

port of the Grundgedanke for sentence-forming operators?

We today have

become so accustomed to the truth table definitions for connectives that
the matter hardly seems one for which an argument is even necessary.
This dogmatic attitude is not justified.

It is hardly a self-evident

truth that negation, disjunction, and the rest are, as it were, contributed by the subject who judges or speaks rather than a part of the
objective content of the judgment.

Sartre (1975), for example, argues

that in a certain respect negativity is objective.

His most famous ex-

ample consists of a description of what one experiences when one discovers the absence of a friend from a particular setting:

one expects

to meet Pierre at the cafe, but instead one finds he is not there.
According to Sartre, one is encountering the negative fact (negatite)
that Pierre is not in the cafe.

"It is an objective fact at present

that I have discovered this absence, and it presents itself as a synthetic relation between Pierre and the setting in which I am looking for
him" (1975, p. 42).

The point is that phenomenologically at least it

seems as if the negativity belongs to the content of the judgment--i.e.,
101 One interesting consequence of Wittgenstein's view is that propositions that differ in terms of sense may have the very same meaning.
This is a harmless consequence, given what Wittgenstein means by usense"
and "meaning". Notice that the same may be said for Fregean semantics.
Sentences with very diverse senses (such as "Snow is white" and uGrass
is green") may both mean (bedeuten) the very same thing, namely, the
True. This is a very undesirable consequence for Frege if that philosopher is understood as advancing metaphysical distinctions in distinguishing between the Bedeutung of a name and that of a concept-word.
The previous chapter argues for a more charitable interpretation of
Frege's work.
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to what one believes, not to how one believes it.

Sartre, it should be

noted, is well aware of, and argues against, the obvious criticism that
what one is encountering is a positive fact other than the fact one expected to encounter and that the negativity seemingly encountered is to
be explained by the fact that one's expectations were denied.

Other

persons who do not share one's expectations would not encounter the negative fact at all; and that shows that what one is experiencing is not
objective in nature.

But against this Sartre maintains that the very

possibility of forming expectations (or of asking questions or engaging
in projects) presupposes what he refers to as "a prejudicative comprehension of non-being" (1975, p. 39).

Before one even forms the judgment

that Pierre is not in the cafe one may be aware of the possibility of
Pierre not being in the cafe.

Hence, "non-being does not come to things

by a negative judgment; it is the negative judgment, on the contrary,
which is conditioned and supported by non-being" ( 1975, p. 42) • 101
Quite apart from phenomenological considerations, other reasons
can be advanced in support of negative facts.

Interestingly, Russell

(1918) was willing to countenance such facts precisely at the time in
his career when he was perhaps most influenced by Wittgenstein.

That

Russell would hold this view as late as he did is particularly surprising in light of what he says concerning disjunction:
There are, of course, two propositions corresponding to
every fact, one true and one false. There are no false
facts, so you cannot get one fact for every proposition but
only for every pair of propositions. All that applies to
atomic propositions. But when you take such a proposition a
'P or g', 'Socrates is mortal or Socrates is living still',
,~ Sartre's views are considerably more complicated than this, especially given his willingness to say that there is a certain respect in
which negativity is conferred upon states of affairs by consciousness.
Negativity is "made to be" by a consciousness that always transcends itself and takes as its object something other than itself. As he puts
it, " ••• transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness;
that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not
itself" (1975, p. 23). A fuller discussion of Sartre's so-called ontological argument may be found in Levvis (1980).
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there you will have two different facts involved in the
truth or falsehood of your proposition 'P or g'. I do not
suppose there is in the world a single disjunctive fact corresponding to 'P or g'. It does not look plausible that in
the actual objective world there are facts going about which
you could describe as 'P or g' ••• You must not look for an
object you can call 'or', and say 'Now, look at this. This
is "or"'(1918, pp. 71-72).
Here Russell is in full agreement with Wittgenstein:

the truth-value of

the disjunction is wholly determined by the truth-values of its disjuncts, there are no disjunctive facts, and there is no object corresponding to the word "or" which may be the constituent of any fact.
Even the claim that two propositions correspond to each fact is one with
which Wittgenstein would agree, provided "proposition" is interpreted as
synonymous with "propositional sign. " 100
Russell does not provide an argument for his view, so it is hard
to tell how far he is willing to travel with Wittgenstein in these matters.

He does say that one will "get into trouble" (1918, p. 72), if

one attempts to analyze "P or Q" in any way other than that described
here.

It is quite likely that troubles that would arise for the theory

of inference weigh upon Russell.

If one thinks "P or Q" is made true by

something other than what makes P true, or by what makes

Q

true, or (as-

suming inclusivity) both by what makes P true and by what makes

Q

true,

then one is committed to the thesis that:

(A) It is possible that P or
is not true.

Q

is true, but that "P or Q"

109 For Wittgenstein tokens of the propositional signs P and -P have
the same sense as well as the same meaning, even though--in a sense to
be described below--they are used to express or assert different propositions. This will become clearer below when we consider Wittgenstein's
definition of a proposition as a propositional sign in its projective
relation to the world. In an important respect there may be, for
Wittgenstein, innumerable propositions "corresponding" to a given fact,
depending upon the type of projective relation or propositional attitude
tokened in a particular thought or utterance. Wittgenstein's attempt to
find the sole logical constant is part of a strategy to whittle down the
number of necessary projective relations. That strategy rests upon
questionable assumptions concerning the relation between parsimony and
ontology.
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This already sounds somewhat paradoxical; however, acceptance of (A) requires the truth predicate within the noun clause in the first disjunct
to be taken distributively; consequently, one cannot generate a paradox
simply by placing "P or Q" in that conjunct in the formal mode.

It

would only be permissible to restate (A) as:
(B)

It is possible that Pis true or Q is true, but that "P
or Q" is not true.

The point is that the truth of P or of Q (or even of both Pas well as
Q) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the truth of "P or
Q."

Obviously, if this is so, then distributive laws in mathematics and

logic must be regarded as illegitimate; that alone would suffice to
bring despair to the author of Principia Mathematica.
too, the consequences of taking (B) seriously.

But consider,

Assume to be actual what

(B) maintains is possible, namely:
(C)

Pis true or Q is true, but "P or Q" is not true.

What makes the second conjunct of (C) true?

One wants to say that it is

made true by neither P nor Q being the case, however it follows from the
fact that P's and Q's truth is necessary but not sufficient for the
truth of "P or Q" that their falsehood may be sufficient yet not necessary for the falsehood of "P or Q."

It is not necessary for P to be

false or for Q to be false or even for both to be false in order for "P
or

Q"

to be false. 110

Russell's (and Wittgenstein's) adversary is there-

by committed to the thesis that:
(D)

It is possible both that Pis true and
that "P or Q" is not true.

Q

is true, and

How this is possible need not detain us; presumably it requires P and

Q

somehow to be true in the "absence" of the object designated by "or."

Here what is interesting is that since it is not necessary for P or for

,,o I am assuming bivalence throughout this discussion, so that "is
not true" and "is false" are synonymous. This is a safe assumption so
long as we are dealing with Russell's views on the subject.
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Q

to be false in order for

11

P or on to be false, one cannot infer from

the second (embedded) conjunct of (D)--via one of De Morgan's Laws--both
that Pis false and Q is false, thereby achieving a contradiction in
conjunction with the first (embedded) conjunct of (D). 111

The commit-

ments of Russell's adversary (for example, to (A)) appear on the surface
to be paradoxical.

But then upon examination we find they are not even

that, because they undermine the forms of inference necessary for demonstrating their paradoxical nature.

This bears further explanation.

The above considerations suffice to show that, according, to the
view which rei~ies disjunction, none of the following sequents would be
valid:

P ]- (P v Q); Q ]- (P v Q); (P

-Q); -(P v Q) ]- (-P v -Q).

&

0) ]- (P v Q); -(P v Q) ]- (-P

&

Proponents of that view must hold that it

is possible for the formulae corresponding to all five of five sequents
to be simultaneously false (or that their negations form a consistent
set).

Yet, using a standard truth table, the conjunction of their nega-

tions can be shown to be inconsistent; and by using fairly standard
rules of inference that very formula can be shown to produce a contradiction.

112

Needless to say, such procedures (employing a standard

truth table or engendering a reductio via rules like modus ponens or
modus tollens) would be regarded as wholly question-begging, since on
the view under consideration operations upon formulae do not preserve
the propositions expressed by the formulae upon which such operations
(or transformations) are performed.

That is to say, the view under con-

sideration has it that propositions are individuated purely in terms of
De Morgan's Law applied to the second conjunct--i.e., -(P v Q)-would yield -P & -Q. Using the first conjunct of (D) we may derive:
◊[(P & Q) & (-P & -Q)] and consequently ◊(P & -P) and ◊(0 & -Q).
Here
the claim is not that P and Qare bivalent, but that each and its contradictory can be true simultaneously. These contradictions cannot be
derived, if it is not necessary for P or Q to be false for "P or Q" to
be false.
112 In fact,
a standard truth table will show that the negations of
any of the formulae corresponding to these sequents are contradictions
(if material implication is used in place of the derivation sign).
111
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the formal features of formulae used to express them. 113

So, for exam-

ple, the conjunction of the five conditionals (corresponding to thesequents referred to above) into a single formula would result in a string
that contains more content than that contained in the list of non-conjoined sequents.

The conjunction sign, in this instance, introduces ad-

ditional reference than that contained merely in the list.
The fact is that if one holds that the disjunction sign is a referring term but retains the (now) standard conception of the other operators, then the view in question leads to contradiction and paradox.
If, on the oth~r hand, one treats all operators as referring terms, then
the view being considered becomes immune to such criticism, but only because that view then entails that inference itself is impossible, since
no operations upon (or transformations of) formulae could lay claim to
being truth-preserving.

Taxonomies of propositions in purely formal

terms appear to be too fine-grained to support what seem quite naturally
to be valid inferences.

If one is inclined to think there are such

things as valid inferences, then one is likely to see in the above considerations grounds for drawing a semantically relevant distinction between sentences and formulae and the statements made by them.

And if

one is inclined to make that distinction, one is likely to regard any
thesis that runs so far in the opposite direction--such as the thesis
that the disjunction sign is a referring term--as having received its
113

This view has had its defenders even outside what is traditionally regarded as the formalist camp. We saw in an earlier chapter that
even Frege at one point was willing to say that the difference in order
between formulae such as P v Q and Q v P sufficed for them to have different senses. More recently the view has found expression in Fodor's
(1980) formality condition, according to which differences in content
correspond to structural differences among tokens within a language of
thought. The structures of these tokens should not be confused with the
surface structures of natural language strings; there are, if anything,
to be identified with something akin to a Chomskian deep structure.
(However, see arguments by Barman (1973) in support of the claim that
structures in a language of thought must be isomorphic to those within
natural language.) Fodor (1994) has tempered his view by abandoning the
methodological solipsism central to his computational semantics.
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due reductio.

But it is perfectly possible for the would-be opponent to

bite the bullet here, and to say there is indeed no such thing as valid
inference.

There is nothing that precludes wedding the referential ac-

count of operators to a conventionalist account of inference.
not stop to consider the prospects of such a marriage here.

We need
That valid-

ity and invalidity might be a matter of convention would have been an
idea repugnant to Russell, but it is not a view that is unintelligible.
What is surprising is that Russell would discharge the idea that
the disjunction sign refers, but accept (albeit with hesitation) that
the negation sign is a referring term.

surely Russell was aware of the

problems this view holds for the theory of inference.

These very con-

cerns had led Wittgenstein to insist upon the bipolarity of the proposition and a distinction between showing and saying.

Russell resisted

these moves preferring instead to bolster his relational theory of
judgment.
In the lectures published as The Philosophy of Logical Atomism
Russell considers the opinion of a student, Demos, who holds that "when
we

assert 'not-p' we are really asserting that there is some proposition

g which is true and is incompatible with p ••• "(1918, p. 76).

So, for

example, the sentence "This chalk is not red" is used to assert that
there is some proposition (namely, "This chalk is white") with which it
is inconsistent and which happens to be true.

One uses the negative

form, because one is ignorant of the actual proposition that is true, or
because one is interested in the falsehood of a given proposition (1918,
p. 76).

Russell's objection is that "it makes incompatibility [a) fundamental and objective fact, which is not so much simpler than allowing
negative facts" (1918, p. 76).

Russell provides two arguments.

First,

to analyze negative propositions in this way simply reintroduces molecular propositions.

To say "This chalk is not red" is just to say "There
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is some proposition which is true and is incompatible with 'This chalk
is red"' (1918, p. 76).

The result is a conjunctive fact, and presum-

ably conjunctive facts are as problematic as disjunctive ones. 114
Second, incompatibility cannot be a fundamental and objective
fact, as the theory appears to entail, since incompatibility is a relation that holds between propositions not facts.
two facts are incompatiblew (1918, p. 77).

"It is clear that no

And, thus, Russell resigns

himself to the existence of negative facts.
Wittgenstein would not have found these arguments convincing.
Concerning the second argument:

Russell may be right that no two facts

are incompatible: however, the same cannot be said of possible facts.
Russell's own contention is a bit like comparing apples and oranges.

If

it is a fact that a given ball is round and it is fact that it is red,
then those two facts cannot be incompatible, since they cannot both
occur.

However the occurrence of some possible facts precludes the oc-

currence of other possible facts.
cludes its being green.

So the fact that a ball is red pre-

It is to the objectivity of mutually exclusive

possibilities that one becomes committed upon accepting Wittgenstein's
distinction between sense and meaning.

The sense of "The ball is red"

consists of a set of possible facts differing in terms of the coloration
of the ball.

The sentence "The ball is red" means that the ball is red

(provided it is true) or that it is some other color (if it is false).
If we bear in mind that for Wittgenstein meanings are actual facts and
states of affairs, we can see that Russell fails do justice to the sense
side of the sense/meaning distinction.

Why he would do so is not clear,

especially since his willingness to countenance abstract and potentially
uninstantiated entities like properties counts against an over-concern
with postulating intensional entities.

Here though the possibilities

114 For example,
sentences taking the form, respectively, of P and P &
P would have to treated as having different truth-conditions, as not entailing one another, etc.
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belong to actual existent objects; we are not discussing "free floating"
real but non-existent objects.

Possible facts are not, for example,

Platonic entities of any sort.

Anyhow, if Russell's second argument is

intended as a reductio, it fails, since it is not absurd to countenance
there being objective incompatibilities in this sense.
Regarding the first argument:

Russell maintains that positing ob-

jective incompatibilities leaves one with molecular facts; however if
the sense/meaning distinction is born in mind, then at most one is committed to the objectivity of possibility (i.e., to objects that actually
exist possessing possibilities for combination).m

Possible facts and

states of affairs are objective in that they are not mind-dependent,
however that does not in any way entail that what is merely possible is
actual or existent.

Russell seems to elevate what is merely possible to

the same level as what is possible and actual.

By collapsing the dis-

tinctions between sense and meaning, on the one hand, and between what
is merely possible and what is actual, on the other hand, Russell is
left in the sort of quandary that left Moore positing entities with
being but not existence.

Like Moore, he is left asserting there is both

what is and what is not.

The truth however is that the affirmative and

negative propositional signs share the same sense and (following the
Notebooks use of the word) the same meaning, and it is their meaning
(i.e., what actually occurs) that determines their truth-value.
Wittgensteinian semantics thus offers an alternative to this morass.
115 One point of interest is the inconsistency of Russell's two arguments. If the second argument were to be sound, then the conjunctive
fact to which we referred in the first argument would be a fact whose
constituents are propositions. Recall that the conjunctive fact was
represented by "There is some proposition which is true and [it] is incompatible with 'This chalk is red'" (1918, p. 76). But for Russell
propositions cannot be facts (1918, p. 77); a fortiori there cannot be
conjunctive facts. Russell would have done better to unpack the word
"incompatible" in modal terms--perhaps as " ••• and it is necessarily not
'This chalk is red'". This would have permitted him to show that the
negation had not been eliminated at all.

232

we have considered some of the arguments that might be offered in
support of negative facts and have noted both the difficulties of the
view as well as the reasons why Wittgenstein would have thought positing
negative facts unnecessary.

we have yet to see any sort of positive ar-

gument in support of the thesis that the sentence-forming operators do
not function as referring terms.

We have also yet to see any positive

characterization of their semantic role.
Commentary on the argument for the Grundgedanke is varied.
McDonough (1986) devotes an entire chapter to the subject, but nowhere
is the Grundgedanke presented as anything other than a basic
assumption. 110
damental idea.

Black (1964) suggests two sources for Wittgenstein's funOne is his view on the interdefinability of logical con-

nectives; the other, deeper, source is related to uthe impossibility of
116 See McDonough ( 1986) pp.
35 and 39. McDonough presents the
Grundgedanke for sentence-forming operators as a premise in an argument
designed to show that P and -P have the same sense. Given the greater
generality of the Grundgedanke, such an argument would beg the question.
The historical evidence cited in Chapter One suggests that Wittgenstein
worked out his answer to the problem of negation (i.e., the bipolarity
of the proposition) prior to the Grundgedanke. Indeed, we have demonstrated that conclusions concerning the sense and meaning of P and -P
can be reached without using the Grundgedanke as a premise. McDonough's
views will not receive much attention in this work, as they fail to accommodate the sense/meaning distinction so important to Wittgenstein.
Instead McDonough draws a distinction between what he refers to as the
sense 1 and sense 2 of a proposition. The former he defines as a proposition's "projection, or representation of that which is relevant to its
truth value" (1986, p. 39). Obviously this is vague enough to refer to
either the sense or the meaning of a propositional sign. (His use of

"projection" is questionable too, as will become clearer in the next

section.) The "sense 2 " of a proposition he defines as an attitude toward a proposition (1986, p. 28), so that P and -P have identical
sense 1 •s but opposite sense 2 •s. There is little evidence in the text to
support such a reading of usense," except when Wittgenstein speaks of
the negation sign as reversing the sense of a propositional sign (1922b,
5.2341). That and the surrounding passages of the text, however, are
concerned with the nature of logical operations generally, and in that
context it is clear that reversing the sense of a proposition means
something like adopting a different attitude towards a given subset of
possible facts or states of affairs; specifically it involves: taking
a given member of the subset of the complement of P to be true.
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depicting the form of representation" (1964, p. 174).

McGuiness (1974)

traces the Grundgedanke historically back to Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the bipolarity of the proposition and to the need for genuine
propositions to make a discrimination among facts. 111

There is much

truth to Black's and McGuiness's suggestions, but the treatment each
gives the subject is largely incomplete.

What is the relationship be-

tween interdefinability, the impossibility of representing logical form,
and bipolarity?
we will begin with what seems to be the most explicit argument for
something like the Grundgedanke (for sentence-forming operators) occurring within the Tractatus.

The argument occurs in the series of com-

ments following Tractatus 4.06, and it appears primarily to be concerned
with the negation sign:
A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of
being a picture of reality.
It must not be overlooked that a proposition has a sense
that is independent of the facts: otherwise one can easily
suppose that true and false are relations of equal status
between signs and what they signify.
In that case one could say, for example, that 'P' signified in a true way what '-p' signified in a false way, etc.
Can we not make ourselves understood with false propositions just as we have done up to now with true ones?--So
long as it is known that they are meant to be false.--Nol
For a proposition is true if we use it to say that things
stand in a certain way, and they do; and if by 'P' we mean
-p and things stand as we mean that they do, then, construed
in the new way, 'P' is true and not false.
But it is important that the signs 'P' and •-p' can say
the same thing. For it shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign'-' (1922b, 4.06-4.0621).
First note that 4.06 (the first paragraph) is a remark about the
nature of truth.

A proposition is true if it pictures or depicts or

shares a structure isomorphic to actual facts or states of affairs.
111

See also McGuiness ( 1988), pp. 307ff.
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The

point is reiterated in 4.062 (the fourth paragraph), in which Wittgenstein says, "a proposition is true if we use it to say that things stand
in a certain way, and they don (1922b, 4.062).

In 4.061 (the second

paragraph) we hear Wittgenstein's rejection of of the sort of relational
theory of judgment attributed earlier to Moore.

To usuppose that true

and false are relations of equal status between signs and what they signify" involves the countenancing of false facts.

To eliminate the need

to do so Wittgenstein draws a distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung,
and it is to this that he is referring in the first sentence of that
paragraph.

"[A] proposition has a sense that is independent of the

facts" (1922b, 4.061) just means that the sense of a proposition consists in a set of possible facts not all of which can be actual.

It

does not mean that senses are to be identified with Platonic entities or
mental contents.
Corresponding to the sense/meaning and form/structure distinctions, there is, needless to say, the distinction between showing and
saying.

All this provides the backdrop to the remainder of 4.062 which

supposedly provides grounds for believing that "nothing in reality corresponds to the sign'-'" (1922b, 4.0621).

Purportedly 4.062 does this

by demonstrating that "the signs 'P' and '-p' can say the same thing"
(1922b, 4.0621).

Whether it does establish that the two signs can say

the same thing, and whether that entails that the negation sign does not
function as a referring term remains to be seen.
In 4.062 the question arises whether it is possible to "make ourselves understood with false propositions just as we have done up till
now with true ones ••• [s]o long as it is understood that they are meant
to be false" (1922b, 4.062).

This question Wittgenstein assimilates to

that of whether it would be possible for information to be conveyed
using the negative propositional sign in much the same way as it is conveyed when the positive one is used.

Wittgenstein's view is that since
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the negative propositional sign can function to convey truth, the very
idea of -P representing in a false way (or of it representing false
facts) is to be rejected.

Although Wittgenstein does not expressly say

so, it is likely he would view the negation sign under these circumstances as analogous to Frege's assertion sign (a sign for which
Wittgenstein could see no use; cf. 1922b, 4.442).

The absence of the

"-" symbol would then be what indicates negation.

The sort of case

Wittgenstein asks us to imagine is comparable to the sort of thing that
occurs on April Fool's Day in the United States:

on that day it is the

custom to treat sentences like "Your shoe is untied" as meaning nothing
other than what "Your shoe is tied" means on the other days of the year.
(Sarcastic remarks provide another example; consider a parent's remark
to a teenager:
Break ••• ". 118

" ••• so, you're going to drive the Mercedes to Spring

That the very same state of affairs can be represented by

the negation sign or its absence suffices, according to Wittgenstein, to
show that the semantic role of the negation sign is determined solely by
the use or interpretation given to it by language-users.

If it were an

element containing reference, then its presence or absence would make a
difference.
The argument is not convincing.

First, convention is always in-

volved in the selection of names for objects; that I can call John "Jim"
does not mean "John" has no referent.
issue entirely.

The argument sidesteps the real

The question, it seems, would simply become one of

whether the absence of"-" from a propositional sign--now interpreted as
the operation of negation--is to be interpreted as a referring term.

If

the sarcastic tone or silence of a parent can be used to express negation, why cannot such silence or sarcasm be interpreted as pertaining to
the fact that the teenager is not to take the Mercedes to Spring Break?
(In a similar vein Pierre's absence from a cafe might be depicted by
118

These two examples were suggested to me by Margaret Ayotte Levvis.
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leaving a blank space in the shape of Pierre's silhouette somewhere
within a painting of the cafe.)

It almost seems as if Wittgenstein is

leaning too heavily upon the narrower notion of pictorial structure as
opposed to the broader notion of logical structure, so that sameness of
content in spite of difference of structure counts as evidence of the
sort needed.

It is as though an actual physical element were needed.

But clearly the absence of
sence of any symbol:

u_u

does not necessarily constitute an ab-

blank spaces on a page or canvas, moments of si-

lence, etc. can function as symbols.
Second, the whole idea that the negative proposition can replace
the affirmative one without loss of function stems from the claim that
any attempt to communicate by means of false propositions results in
true ones.

The false proposition is then assimilated to the negative

one receiving an alternate interpretation.

However it is quite ques-

tionable whether one could communicate the very same thing by means of
false or negative propositions, even if they are reinterpreted.
Typically there are many ways a proposition may be false, but only one
way that it may be true.

Consequently, the reinterpreted false or nega-

tive proposition would suffer from what might best be called an under-

determination of content.

For example, uMy desk is made entirely of ma-

hogany" is made true by only one thing, namely, the fact that my desk

is made entirely of mahogany.
things:

But it can be made false by any number of

by its being made (partially or entirely) of oak, or cherry, or

pine, etc.

Suppose now that one belongs to a linguistic community that

treats all utterances as false.

If someone were to utter uMy desk is

made of oak," the listener would understand by that what English speakers understand by "It is false that my desk is oak.n
would not know what material the desk is made of.

But the listener

The target meaning

remains undetermined.
This problem cannot be overcome by constructing an elaborate con-
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junction such as uMy desk is made of oak, and it is made of cherry, and
it is made of pine, ••• ".
be?

What would the final conjunct of this sentence

There are two possibilities.

First, after listing all the possible

materials out of which a desk may be constructed, one might add the
clause " ••• and those are all the possible materials out of which desks
are made."

But if this is true, then it will not be interpreted as such

by the members of our imaginary linguistic community.

They will not be

in a position to infer by a process of elimination that the speaker
means what English speakers mean when they utter uMy desk is made entirely of mahogany. " 110

A second possibility would be to add the clause

" ••• and those are not all the possible materials out of which desks are
made."

This appears at first sight to be a better suggestion, since it

would be interpreted as false, yielding what English speakers express by
" ••• it is false that those are not all the possible materials out of
which desks are made."

The problem is that negation is expressed in our

hypothetical language by the absence of a negation sign.

Consequently,

the presence of "not" in " ••• and those are not all the possible materials out of which desks are made" cannot negate that from which the negation sign is absent.

If Pin the hypothetical language is equivalent to

-Pin English, then-Pin the hypothetical language is equivalent to -P
in English as well.

As Black (1964) points out, "repeated applications

of [negation in the hypothetical language] reduce to a single application of it (1964, p. 180).

So, the second attempt to complete the elab-

The sort of practice described hear is actually customary among
speakers of Malagasy in Madagascar. Speakers typically provide less information than is requested of them. For example, it would be typical
for someone wanting to know whether there are fresh mangoes at the market to be told "If you go to the market, you won't find bananas." The
relevant sociolinguistic research may be found in Keenan (1977); a discussion of its philosophical relevance is to be found in Levvis (1987).
Malagasy provides numerous counter-examples to the sort of view of conversational implicature advanced by Grice (1975). Such counter-examples
are relevant to semantic theory, because a purely formal semantics (such
as Frege's or Davidson's) must be supplemented by a Gricean account of
implicature.
119
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orate conjunction fares no better than the first. 120

It follows that the

principal assumption underlying Wittgenstein's argument is false.
The two lines of criticism introduced above pose a dilemma for
Wittgenstein.

Either the absence of the negation sign serves as a sym-

bol (as we might treat a blank space on a page), or it does not.

If it

does serve as a symbol, then the fact that as a matter of convention
negation can be expressed in that manner does not permit us to conclude
that the negation sign fails to refer (rendering the argument invalid).
If it does not serve as a symbol (if it really is the absence of any
symbol), then it is false that the same content may be communicated by a
language that is entirely affirmative as opposed to one that is both affirmative and negative (thus rendering the argument unsound).
In spite of its shortcomings, the argument of Tractatus 4.0621 is
driven by an assumption that may well be relevant to the semantics of
molecular propositions.

And it is this assumption that plays a crucial

role in a second and stronger argument for the Grundgedanke.

If the

number of constants could be viewed as variable without loss of content,

given the way determinancy of sense requires element/object isomorphism,
it would follow that their presence or absence neither adds to nor detracts from the empirical content of a sentence.

The problem with the

argument at 4.0621 is that it attempts to eliminate a single connective.
The argument from the interdefinability of the connectives, however,
seeks not to eliminate single connectives but a whole group of connectives at once.

It is quite evident that this can be done.

The first

two columns of the following table represents the possible combinations
of truth and falsehood with respect to two propositions P and Q.

The

sixteen columns represented in Table I show the possible values that may
be assigned to molecular propositions containing P and Q.

Matters go unchanged if a distinct symbol is introduced rather
than the absence of a symbol; cf. Black (1964), pp. 179-180.
120
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Table I
Column b, for example, represents the semantic properties of inclusive
disjunction.

Column e represents those of material implication when P

is the antecendent and
of conjunction.

Q

is the consequent.

Column h represents those

Columns a and p, respectively, represent molecular

propositions that are tautologous and contradictory. 121
Now it so happens that each of the columns can be expressed by
formulae containing only the connectives"-" and,,_,, (thereby eliminating disjunction and conjunction), or the connectives ,,_,, and "v" ( eliminating material implication and conjunction), or"-" and"&" (eliminating material implication and disjunction).

For example, using just"-"

and,,_,, column b (the column for disjunction) may be expressed by -P Q.

One could use this formula to assert the very same thing as is as-

serted by P v Q.
"-"and"&":

Similarly, that column could be expressed using only

- (-P & - Q).

The point is that at least certain logical

connectives may be defined in terms of other logical connectives.
The second of Wittgenstein's arguments, which begins at Tractatus
5.4, exploits this fact about the sentence-forming operators.

There he

says,
At this point it becomes manifest that there are no 'logical objects' or 'logical constants' (in Frege's or
Russell's sense).
The reason is that the results of truth-operations on
truth-functions are always identical whenever they are one
and the same truth-function of elementary propositions.
121 Wittgenstein's table appears in slightly different form at
Tractatus 5.101. The table I have used is closer to that used by
Lemmon (1965), p. 70 and Haack (1978), p. 28.
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It is self-evident that v, - are not relations in the
sense that right and left etc. are relations.
The interdefinability of Frege's and Russell's 'primitive
signs' of logic is enough to show that they are not primitive signs, still less signs for relations.
And it is obvious that the•-• defined by means of '-'
and 'v' is identical with the one that figures with'-' in
the definition of 'v'i and the second 'v' is identical with
the first one1 and so on.
Even at first sight it seems scarcely credible that there
should follow from one fact p infinitely many others, namely
--p, ----p, etc. And it is no less remarkable that the infinite number of propositions of logic (mathematics) follow
from a half dozen 'primitive propositions'.
But in fact all the propositions of logic say the same
t~ing, to wit nothing (1922b, 5.4-5.43).
The key remark here is that "[t]he interdefinability of ••• 'primitive
signs' of logic is enough to show that they are not primitive signs,
still less signs for relations" (1922b, 5.42).

The reason the question

concerning indefinables (or primitive signs) is important is that, as
indicated earlier, ineliminability is taken to be a criterion of ontological commitment.
ment.

That assumption is clearly at play within the argu-

On Wittgenstein's view, it is purely an arbitrary or pragmatic

matter which operations are treated as basic:
The number of fundamental operations that are necessary
depends solely on our notation.
All that is required is that we should construct a system
of signs with a particular number of dimensions--with a particular mathematical multiplicity (1922b, 5.474-5.475).
And it is the interdefinability of the connectives--i.e., their potential for elimination--that demonstrates their arbitrary or pragmatic nature.

Indeed, Wittgenstein believes it is possible to derive all opera-

tions from a single logical operation.

At 5.5 he introduces this opera-

tion saying,
Every truth-function is a result of successive applications to elementary propositions of the operation
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'(---T) (~, ••• )'.

This operation negates all the propositions in the righthand pair of brackets, and I call it the negation of those
propositions (1922b, 5.5).
Here the contents of the left-hand set of brackets corresponds to a column within a truth table; the blank spaces correspond to F's.
Specifically, it corresponds to column o of the the table provided
above.

The brackets to the right contain a set of propositional signs.

The operation in question involves the simultaneous negation of all the
members of that set.

so if the set consists of P and O, then the matrix

represents what in English is expressed by uNeither P, nor

o."

Thus the

operation corresponds to what is usually referred to as the Sheffer
stroke: P•O. 122

This formula, one can quickly see by using a truth

table, is logically equivalent to -P

&

-0, -(P v 0), or -(-P - 0).

That Pio is logically equivalent to formulae containing the other operators does not suffice to show, however, that the other operations may be
defined in terms of it.

To do that it is necessary to show that the ma-

trices corresponding to each of the connectives may be generated by repeated applications of

11

i alone.
11

In other words, it is necessary to

show logical equivalences hold between those matrices and formulae conWittgenstein introduces a variant symbolism almost immediately at
5.502. That symbolism facilitates his introduction of the general form
of proposition at Tractatus 6 and his discussion of numbers in paragraphs 6.01-6.03. For the sake of simplicity the discussion here shall
be formulated in terms of the stroke notation.
On a historical note, Wittgenstein's selection of the stroke notation
occurs as early as the 1913 Notes on Logic where he maintains "[t]he
function pig is merely a mechanical instrument for constructing all possible symbols of ab-functions" (1913b, p. 103). Although the search for
the sole logical constant is largely motivated by Wittgenstein's concern
with what he regarded as Russell's and Whitehead's piecemeal introduction of the constants in Principia Mathematica, the fact that the stroke
notation is explicitly linked to the ab-functions and, so, to concerns
over bipolarity helps shed considerable light upon the argument for the
Grundgedanke. What I intend to show below is that the Grundgedanke for
sentence-forming operators follows from the thesis that all propositions
are contingent. It is only in that context that the role of the sole
logical constant can truly be appreciated.
122
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taining only propositional variables and the symbol for joint negation.
This can be done.
to P v Q.

PlP is equivalent to -P.

(PlO)l(PlO) is equivalent

(PlP)l (OlO) is the logical equivalent of P

Q.

&

for material implication is shared by [(PlP)lOll[(PlP)lQ].

The matrix
Finally, the

formula corresponding to the matrix, found in column g, for logical
equivalence or biconditionality may be treated in the following way.
Bear in mind that that matrix is equivalent to (P - Q)
first conjunct of this formula is [(PlP)lOll[(PlP)lQ].
junct is [(OlO)lP]l[(OlO)lP].

&

(0 - P).

The

The second con-

Now we have noted above that (PlP)l (OlO)

represents the conjunction of P and Q.

Treating the conjuncts of the

biconditional as substitution instances of P and
{{I (P+P) +QJH (P+P) +QI} HI (P~P) +QJH (P+P) +QI}}

Q

yields:

'HI (Q+Q) +PJ H (Q+Q) tPI} HI (Q ♦Q) +PJ H (Q ♦Q) +Pl}}

which requires twenty-three operations using the stroke notation to produce that particular matrix.

(The same matrix can be reached using

thirty-four operations, if one translates the logically equivalent -[(P
- Q) -

-(Q - P)] from which the conjunction sign has been eliminated.)
We do not have to accept Wittgenstein's (and Russell's and

Quine's) assumption that primitive terms convey ontological commitment
in order to reach the desired conclusion.

In fact, at this point in the

argument it is no longer clear that Wittgenstein does accept this criterion, since, if consistently applied, "l" would have to be treated as a
referring term; but certainly Wittgenstein does not regard it as that.
The assumption that should--and apparently does--operate within the argument is that which hails from the Picture Theory's thesis that determinancy of sense is to be guaranteed by the isomorphism between the elements (or referring terms) within a propositional sign and the objects
that are the referents of the propositional sign.

Clearly, if the num-

ber of operators can be varied, even though the number of referring
terms must remain invariant, then it follows that the operators are not
referring terms.
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This argument is much stronger than the first one.

To begin with,

its conclusion is the Grundgedanke for logical operators, not the more
specific claim concerning negation alone.
be deduced from this one.

Obviously that conclusion can

Next, the argument is valid:

if all of a

language's referring terms must be invariable, but none of a language's
connectives are invariable, then none of a language's connectives are
r~ferring terms.
The problem with this argument is that it is a petitio principii.
The argument is designed to show that the logical operators are not referring terms.

That task is not so different from determining the for-

mal interpretation--i.e., the matrix corresponding to--each operator.
Yet the argument presupposes the very matrices that stand in need of
justification.

For the simplest example of how this occurs consider the

fact that every stroke operation subsequent to the first involves (at
the very least) the operation of double negation.
that (P~P)~ (Q~Q) is logically equivalent to P
(Q~Q) may be translated:

&

For example, we said

Q Informally (P~P)~

ult is not the case not-P and not-P, and it is

not the case not-Q and not-0" (or uNeither neither P nor P, nor neither
Q nor Q").

To regard the formula involving the stroke notation as

equivalent to P

&

Q, it is necessary to do two things:

(a) the two

negations in each of the subordinate clauses (not-P and not-P and not-Q
and

not-Q) must be regarded as redundant, i.e., so that the conjunctions

in which they occur are interpreted as equivalent to -P and -Q respectively, and (b) the stroke with the widest scope must be regarded as
negating both -P and -Q, and the negations of these (--P and --Q) must
be regarded as equivalent to P and Q.
ways.

This begs the question in two

In (a) treating the two negations as redundant requires that the

conjunction sign already be regarded as adding nothing to the referential conditions of the subordinate clause(s) as a whole.
that -P

&

The assumption

-Pis made true by the very same thing as makes -P true (or
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that P

&

Pis made true by the very same thing makes P true) is an as-

sumption Wittgenstein's opponent would reject.

The formulae containing

the conjunction sign do not share the same referential conditions, let
alone the same truth conditions, with the formulae from which the conjunction sign is absent.
-P

&

It would be false, on this account, to regard

-P (etc.) as having the same matrix as -P (etc.).
Next, in (b) the negations of --P and --Qare held to be equiva-

lent to P and Q.

In each case the negation sign with the widest scope

reverses the truth-value of the formula it negates~ consequently, the
two negation signs doubly negate, canceling one another out.

But

Wittgenstein's adversary would hardly treat --P and Pas equivalent,
since if the sign"-" refers, then --P would contain (at least) one more
referent than P.

Again, formulae (or sentences) that differ in referen-

tial conditions must differ in truth conditions.

So, again the question

is begged by treating the matrices for P and --P and Q and --Q, respectively, as equivalent.
There are, no doubt, many ways to draw the petitio, given the various equivalences that are deemed possible.
citing, however.

One in particular is worth

On Wittgenstein's view the matrices for P and -P con-

tradict one another.

But if one regards the negation symbol as having

reference, then it is possible to regard, as Moore once did, Pas a constituent of -P.
truth of P.

In that case, the truth of -P would not preclude the

Here again the question is begged, since the matrices for P
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and -P would not be deemed contradictory. 121
There must be a better argument against this sort of view!
Regardless of what one thinks of the semantic theory of the Tractatus,
it cannot be that it hangs on such terrible arguments.

(As I suggested

at the end of the previous section, even the semantics for atomic propositions rests upon the account that can be given for those propositions
that are molecular, so there is considerably more at stake here than the
the semantic theory for logical operators.)

It is frustrating that a

view so bad cannot be knocked down straightaway.
as foil is bad:

And the view serving

one does not want to sanction inferences from -P to P,

nor does one want objects designated by "v" "running around" as Russell
puts it.

(Imagine the grant applicant:

"But I'm studying the Morning

This circularity has not gone unnoticed. Although he does not explicate it quite as I have above, Black alludes to it and maintains that
if Wittgenstein's "metaphysical preconceptions forced this view of language upon him, so much the worse ••• for the metaphysics" (1964), p. 17.
Black thinks that the necessary but apparently impossible elimination of
the connectives is a reductio of certain metaphysical assumptions. If
anything, the present chapter of this dissertation attempts to show that
the metaphysical claims of the Tractatus are derived as conclusions of
arguments. The argument runs from semantic premises (re the bipolarity
of the proposition, the distinction between showing and saying, the
Picture Theory) to metaphysical conclusions (re modality, simple objects, a distinction between Tatsache and Sachverhalten, logical objects, etc.), and from these to further semantic conclusions concerning
the analysis of statements of scientific laws, propositional attitude
ascriptions and statements with normative or evaluative content.
Others, working within Idealist and phenomenological traditions have
cited such circularity as evidence to the effect that the use of operators carries ontological import and are expressive of the contents of
experience (cf. Price (1953), p. 124, Dufrenne (1963), pp. 37ff, and
Kaminsky (1969), p. 142ff). Since a non-circular argument for the
Grundgedanke is to be discussed below, these philosophers' objections
will be side-stepped here. Since the evidence for the opposing view is
largely phenomenological (as we saw earlier in discussing Sartre's
views), it is not surprising to find that most of its advocates hail
from those traditions. My impression of these philosophers' views
(aside from the fact that they seem unaware of his non-circular and
strongest argument, to be discussed below) is that they do not do justice to Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying, and thus
to the extent to which Wittgenstein can account for how experience can
be about negativity, conditionality, etc. What is shown can be considered as a component of experience. This will become clearer below.
123
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Star and the Evening Star; surely the study of such relations warrants
more funding.")

we should remember that the best Russell could offer

against the view is that it is counter-intuitive.

Against Russell's in-

tuitions, however, there is poised the sort of phenomenological data
cited earlier:

one may very well want to describe the content of one's

awareness as consisting in, for example, Pierre's not being in the cafe.
Similarly the semantic content of sentences such as NYou will practice,
and you will practice!" and "You will practice!" may seem to differ even
though the former is logically equivalent to the latter.

It is tempting

to try to min~mize the ontological import of the phenomenological data
by assigning de dicto interpretations to the sentences in terms of which
it is expressed.

That is to say, one wants to treat such sentences as

expressions of a subject's internal representation of mind-independent
facts.

Thus two persons--one expecting to find Pierre at the cafe and

the other not--have before them the same object or fact (namely, the
cafe), but their internal representations of that object differ.

But

even if one were then able to go on and explicate the relevant differences in internal representations, Wittgenstein would be left with an
insurmountable problem.

Any dichotomy between de re and de dicto that

adds the sorts of elements that are traditionally treated under the
headings of force or connotation to what the mental representation is
about will be incompatible with the Picture Theory's requirement of isomorphism.

The structure or content of the propositional sign or mental

representation cannot differ in any way other than that required to account for the possibility of false judgments.

To introduce some matter

of force (e.g., by treating "You will practice and you will practice!"
as synonymous with "It is (doubly) asserted that you will practice" or
"I assert (twice} that you will practice") certainly goes beyond this.
The same is true of connotation (e.g., by treating it as synonymous with
"You will practice--that is, do something I find desirable.").
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Introducing any subjective element will have the same consequences.
After all, whether one practices and practices is made true (or false)
by factors quite independent of whether a particular speaker happens to
assert that or find valuable that one should practice.
Wittgenstein needs a better argument, and he has one.

As Black

(1964, p. 174) points out, the deeper grounds for the Grundgedanke lie
with the impossibility of depicting the form of representation. 124
should take care to remember precisely what this means.

We

The form of a

picture or propositional sign must not be confused with its structure.
It is not that which numerous philosophers have sought to demonstrate as
formalizable in terms of a metalanguage (e.g., Carnap (1937), Tarski
(1937)), sometimes in what they mistakenly believe to be direct opposition to Wittgenstein's view.

The form of a propositional sign (as op-

posed to its structure) is what conveys its sense (rather than its meaning).

The relevant passages follow Tractatus 4.12:
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they
cannot represent what they must have in common with reality
in order to be able to represent it--logical form [logische
Form].
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should
have to be able to station ourselves with propositions some
where outside logic, that is to say outside the world.

Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mir
rored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot
represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by
means of language.
124 Although Black asserts this to be the basis of the Grundgedanke,
and even though he does discuss the impossibility of depicting the form
of representation, he does not demonstrate how the one is a premise in
an argument for the other. (As noted earlier, Black is willing to say
the whole metaphysics of the Tractatus founders on the problem of circularity.) The fact is that I have not run across any commentaries that
have demonstrated this, even though a link between the two subjects is
often hinted. Most commentators treat the Grundgedanke as justified on
the basis of the economy with which it dispatches ontological worries.
This is certainly question-begging in a show-down between non-Idealistic
realists, like Russell and Wittgenstein, on the one hand and Idealists
and phenomenalists on the other.
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Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it (1922b, 4.12-4.121).
The form of an elementary proposition, we saw earlier, consists in the
combinatorial possibilities of its components.

This set of possible

configurations corresponds to the set of possible relations that may obtain among the objects so depicted.
the propositional sign.

This set constitutes the sense of

The relation between form and sense is ex-

pressed by Wittgenstein at 4.12 by saying language and reality share a
common logical form. 120

We have already seen why the sense or form of a

non-molecular propositional sign cannot be depicted:

in order for P to

assert P, it cannot simultaneously assert the various conditions that
would make P false (conditions which belong to its sense).
We saw earlier that the set of formulae constituting the form of a
non-molecular proposition is determined by the number of elements it
possesses as well as the formation rules governing those elements.
Recall our earlier discussion of how the sign 11 ¥ 6 possesses a form
consisting of the set of possible configurations:

¥ 611, 6 ¥ 11, 611 ¥}.

{11¥6, 116¥, ¥116,

These configurations represent the possible states

of affairs that constitute the sign's sense.

Now when we turn to a

molecular proposition, we find that the possible states of affairs comprising its sense grows exponentially.

Ignoring the sub-sentential ele-

ments momentarily, the possible combinations of states of affairs equals
2n

(n = the number of atomic formulae within the molecular proposition).

In the case of Table I, for example, the fact that there are only two
such formulae is reflected in there being four rows in the table.

We

say that the possible states of affairs comprising the sense of a molecular proposition grows at least exponentially, because in each case the

125 As mentioned earlier, the extension of the word uform" to refer to
the sense of a sentence seems harmless; if anything, it underscores the
isomorphism of the Picture Theory.
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propositional variables have as their substituends atomic formulae with
compositional complexity.

Each of the F's in Table I represents a vari-

ety of possible states of affairs.

If the propositional variable Prep-

resents Q¥A, then P's being false may consist in any of the following:
{QA¥, ¥QA, ¥An, A¥Q, AQ¥}.

Consequently, each row containing an F

could be expanded; for example, the entries in the first two columns of
the fourth row in Table I, which correspond to P and

Q

both being false,

are an abbreviation for Table II
p

Q

QA¥
¥QA
¥AQ
A¥Q
AQ¥

F
F
F
F
F

Table II
In order for a table to perspicuously represent the sense of a propositional sign, it would need to contain lines for each of the proposition's falsifying conditions.

So, in order to perspicuously represent

the sense of a molecular proposition containing P and Q, it would be
necessary to replace each row in Table II with a series of rows representing the falsifying conditions of Q.

Suppose Q is made false by any

states of affairs represented by the propositional signs in the following set: {<l>rH, <l>lll', r<1>H, rH<I>, Hr<I>}.

It would take five rows to repre-

sent what appears in an abbreviated form on the first line of Table II.
Table III represents the greater multiplicity.
p

Q

QA¥
QA¥
QA¥
QA¥
QA¥

<1>rn
<l>Hr
r<l>H
rH<I>
Hr<I>

Table III
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Thus for any molecular proposition containing n atomic formulae (P, 0,
R, etc.) for which there exist a number of falsifying conditions (pf 1 ,
pf 2 , pf 3 , ••• , pfn; qf 1 , qf 2 , qf 3 , ••• , qfn; etc.), a table containing
[2n x (Pfn

x qfn, etc.)] would be needed to display the sense of the

proposition. 12 •

Let us call this the minimal truth table, since it con-

tains the fewest number of coordinates capable of expressing the combinatorial possibilities of atomic propositions.

If such a table were to

contain a column for each atomic proposition, then each line would constitute a complete description of a possible world (1922b, 4.26).

The

lines of a minimal truth table for a finite set of atomic propositions
will provide a complete description of the possible facts (Tatsachen)
for which the atomic states of affairs (Sachverhalten) are constituents.
Let me be quite clear about the fact that Wittgenstein nowhere
uses the phrase "minimal truth table" within the text, and in fact
nowhere does he employ truth tables that exhibit the components of elementary propositional signs.
ty of doing so at 5.55:

He seems to explicitly deny the possibili-

"Elementary propositions consist of names.

Since, however, we are unable to give the number of names with different
meanings, we are also unable to give the composition of elementary
propositions" (1922b, 5.55; cf. 5.555).

I interpret this and subsequent

remarks (cf. 5.551) as expressing Wittgenstein's belief that the discovery of simple objects and the determination of elementary forms is an
empirical matter, whereas his own concerns are with matters a priori.
His comments should not be taken to mean that it is impossible in principle to come up with elementary forms.

In the 1929 "Remarks on Logical

Form" he goes so far as to say:
This should not be taken to mean that Wittgenstein thinks one can
say or depict what is shown by the truth table. Saying or depicting always involves a discrimination within reality, but outside of a truth
table containing variables for each atomic proposition there is nothing. It is presumably for this reason that Wittgenstein does not avail
himself of a metalanguage containing modal operators.
1~
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[W)e can only substitute a clear symbolism for (an) unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena we want to describe,
thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity. That
is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what
might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena
themselves, i.e. in a certain sense a posteriori, and not by
conjecturing about a priori possibilities (1929a, p. 32).
My reason for introducing the minimal truth table is that it alone
is capable of exhibiting the structure/form distinction to which elementary propositions owe their bipolarity, and it is the thesis of bipolarity, as I shall explain shortly, that serves as the major premise in
Wittgenstein's argument for the Grundgedanke.
The question now becomes one of how the columns following the
original atomic propositions or propositional variables are to be interpreted.

Wittgenstein's view, now the standard view, is that a subset of

the columns express the manner in which certain connectives are to be
understood~ column bin Table I, for example, is taken to express disjunction thereby defining the truth-functionality of "v" within the
propositional calculus.

If one were not concerned with how the columns

of the table are to be interpreted vis a vis natural language (e.g., "v"
as the inclusive "or" of English), then one could simply stipulate, for
example, that column b shall be labeled "v" and that "P v Q" constitutes
a well-formed formula that simply has the semantic properties exhibited
by that column.

Since the column is determined solely by the "truth

possibilities" (1922b, 4.28) of elementary propositions, and by nothing
more, it follows that the stipulated operator in no way affects the
truth conditions of the formula in which it is contained--something it
presumably would do, if it were to have reference.
The only question the argument leaves unanswered pertains to the
relationship between the stipulated operators and the connectives of
natural language.

There is a problem here.

If one simply stipulates

that the semantic properties of P and Qin column b shall be designated
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by "v" or that those of column m and k (the negations of P and O respectively) shall be designated by ,,_,, , then certainly nothing other than
P's and Q's own truth possibilities determine the function of "v", "-",
etc.

But it is open to the opponent to claim that these symbols have

nothing whatsoever to do with the expressions of natural language that
supposedly are their analogs.

The reason why this is important at all,

the objector might argue, is that it is in natural language that one expresses the contents of one's experience, and the contents of one's experience is of Pierre's not being in the cafe, of practicing and practicing, of being either a knight of faith or a knight of infinite resignation, etc.

The objection, then, is that the words which we use to ex-

press what we experience are not the cauterized connectives of a logical
calculus.
It is an interesting fact that Wittgenstein does not discuss this
objection anywhere.

we would expect Wittgenstein to dismiss this issue

if his attitude toward natural language were that of a Frege or a
Tarski, both of whom believed natural language to be inferior to a logical calculus with a formal semantics.
different.

But Wittgenstein's attitude is

As we saw in an earlier chapter, his view is that natural

languages are in perfect logical order:

they contain propositions that

have a determinate sense, they preserve truth through valid inferences,
etc.

The purpose of logical analysis is to reveal the deep logical

structure of most ordinary language. 121

The objector wants to drive a

wedge between natural language and that for which the Tractatus offers a
semantic theory~ but no such wedge can be admissible for Wittgenstein,
since, for him, Tractarian semantics is supposed to be applicable to any
language--any representational system--at all.

Or, to qualify this somewhat, it reveals the deep logical structure of sentences whose currency is not counterfeit due to the presence
of philosophical--that is, metaphysical--nonsense (e.g., sentences like
"Everything must have being").
121
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Although Wittgenstein does not pursue the matter explicitly, the
Tractatus does have the resources needed to handle the problem.

These

resources consist in the sole logical constant (described above) and
what he would eventually refer to as the general form of the proposi-

tion.

The strategy involves using the sole logical constant to show

that all propositions with a sense share this general form: if this can
be done, then the Grundgedanke must be true.
What is the general form of the proposition?

Wittgenstein intro-

duces the notion at Tractatus 4.5, it is pursued in the remarks following 5.46, and.we get an impression of the importance Wittgenstein assigns to it when it reappears at Tractatus 6 (one of the seven central
passages that form the spine of that work).

Tractatus 4.5 runs:

It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoever in such a way that
every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying
the description, and every symbol satisfying the description
can express a sense, provided the meanings of the names are
suitably chosen.
It is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be included in its description-for otherwise it would not be the most general form.
The existence of a general propositional form is proved
by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form
could not have been foreseen (i.e., constructed). The general form of the proposition is: This is how things stand
(1922b, 4.5). 121
To say that the general propositional form consists in a proposition's
ability to say how things stand is not particularly enlightening.

If

the general propositional form is supposed to supply us with an account
of the essence of a proposition (as the second paragraph above suggests:
cf. also 1922b, 5.471), but all we are told about it is that propositions tell us how things are, then we are no further than we would be

128 "Es verhalt sich so und so"--C. K. Ogden translates this "Such and
such is the case" (1922a, 4.5).
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were we to be told simply that propositions state what is true. 12 '
Wittgenstein himself would be critical of the passage later:

H[a]t bot-

tom, giving 'This is how things are' as the general form of propositions
is the same as giving the definition:
true or false" (1958, 136). 130

a proposition is whatever can be

Wittgenstein's case is not helped, be-

cause this is not a point of contention in the debate over the
Grundgedanke; someone who holds that the constants do refer would main-

tain that sentences in which they are contained are made true by something.
Tractatus 4.5 does, however, point the way beyond. In the last
paragraph we are told that "there cannot be a proposition whose form
could not have been foreseen" (1922b, 4.5).

Tractatus 4.51-4.53 pro-

vides us with somewhat further explication of the point:
Suppose I am given all elementary propositions: then I
can simply ask as what propositions I can construct out of
them. And there I have all propositions, and that fixes
their limits.
Propositions comprise all that follows from the totality
of all elementary propositions (and, of course, from its
being the totality of them all). (Thus, in a certain sense,
it could be said that all were generalizations of elementary
propositions.)
The general propositional form is a variable (1922b,
4.51-4.53).
What is crucial here is the idea that what can be expressed by a language is determined wholly by its elementary propositions--that somehow
the full expressive powers of a language are contained in sentences free
of any operators.

All propositions with a sense can be #constructed"

129 To be accurate Wittgenstein should have said that propositions
state what could be true.
130 The later Wittgenstein is concerned with more than the fact that
it is uninformative to proclaim "This is how things are" as the general
propositional form. The crux of his criticism is that even this is a
sentence of ordinary language, and it gets its meaning from its use in
ordinary contexts; cf. (1958, 134-137).
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out of elementary propositions.

Now how is this made possible?

are to be had in an earlier portion of the Tractatus.

Clues

The passages im-

mediately proceeding Tractatus 4 seem to have a direct bearing upon
those immediately proceeding Tractatus 5 (i.e., 4.5-4.53, quoted above);
3.4-3.42 tell us:
A proposition determines a place in logical space. The
existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere
existence of the constituents--by the existence of a proposition with a sense.
The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates--that is
the logical place.
In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility:
something can exist in it.
A proposition can determine only one place in logical
space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given by it.
(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.,
would introduce more and more new elements--in coordination
(1922b, 3.4-3.42; emphasis added)).
Here we are told that there is a relation between the fact that the subsentential elements of an atomic proposition determine its sense (4.5,
the first paragraph) and the fact that "negation, logical sum, logical
product, etc." do not introduce new elements (i.e., referring terms)
into the propositional signs in which they figure.

When Wittgenstein

says that a proposition determines a place in logical space, he means
that it corresponds to a particular set of possible states of affairs.
That set of possible states of affairs is the propositional sign's
sense.

But now what does it mean to say that although a proposition de-

termines only one place in logical space, it "nevertheless the whole of
logical space must already be given by it" (1922b, 3.42)?

The whole of

logical space would be what is represented by the minimal truth table
introduced above!
Every elementary proposition belongs to the minimal truth table.
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Thus the truth-possibilities expressed by it are something all elementary propositions share in common.

Thus the matrices are inherent in

the elementary propositions themselves by virtue of their mathematical
multiplicity.

we might say that it belongs to the very nature of a

given elementary proposition that it be capable of occurring within compound propositions that are correlated with the various matrices.

Thus

we may speak not only of the forms of elementary propositions per se
(with reference to the possible combinations among the sub-sentential
elements), but of the general form of all elementary propositions, that
is, of their potential to be elements within compound propositions.

The

minimal truth table, therefore, is an expression of the general propositional form.

On the ontological side, just as the form of an elementary

proposition per se corresponds to a set of possible states of affairs
that constitute the proposition's sense, there corresponds to the general form of the proposition the set of all possible combinations of
states of affairs or what Wittgenstein often refers to as the limits of
the world (1922b, 5.6-5.61).
One way to construe the debate over the logical constants is by
considering whether the minimal truth table is complete.

Do the matri-

ces presented there contain all of the possible truth possibilities for
elementary propositions.

Wittgenstein's opponent would have to deny

that this is the case, maintaining instead that the minimal truth table
does not suffice in terms of the requisite multiplicity.

To achieve the

requisite multiplicity it would be necessary to introduce additional matrices for what are presumed to be additional elements.

In effect, the

opponent would object that the expansion of Table I that results in the
minimal truth table fails to provide for the constants at all.

The

problem, the objector might argue, can be traced down to treating-Pas
a sign that merely goes proxy for some yet to be determined affirmation~
if Pis identical to Q¥~, then-Pis not identical to some member of
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{OA¥, ¥0A, ¥AO, A¥0, AO¥}, but rather to O¥A-.
is represented as an element among elements.

1' 1

Here negation

Since none of the matrices

of the minimal truth table are based upon signs containing the requisite
number of elements, the minimal truth table must be dubbed incomplete.
It will not do for Wittgenstein to simply rehearse the arguments
directed against Moore's relational theory of judgment that were cited
earlier, even though the view described here bears considerable similarity to it.

For one thing, the current problem is a larger one than sim-

ply the problem of negation, since all types of molecular proposition
are at issue. 1 ."

Nevertheless, if Wittgenstein's argument against this

view is to be understood properly, the conclusion of his argument
against Moore--namely, the thesis of the bipolarity of the proposition
which entails that a proposition must effect a discrimination within reality--must be taken as a basic premise in the argument for the
Grundgedanke.

We must assume that all propositions are contingent, that

is, that any proposition with a sense is possibly true and possibly
false.

Now one necessary condition for a truth table being complete is

that it, as symbols go, is senseless.
form of criticism.

This should not be regarded as a

A complete table is senseless, because it does not

effect a discrimination within reality, due to the fact that such a
table contains matrices for all possible truth-functional compounds,
leaving no proposition with sense outside of it

In order for the argu-

How 0¥A- is to be interpreted is unclear. Phenomenologically it
seems, at least to this writer, that negation affects the entire proposition and that it does not "interact" merely with the elements of the
proposition. The opposing position seems to be committed to the idea
that negation "bears upon" objects in some way. What remains vague is
how - is related to the other elements in 0¥A-. The reader is invited
to make up his or her own mind as to the syntactical rules governing the
new formula.
132 Of course, the problem of what makes molecular propositions false
is not unrelated to the problem of negation, since one wants to express
the falsifying conditions for molecular propositions by using the negation sign. One part of the criticism presented below is that Wittgenstein's foil simply cannot have it this way.
131
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ment for the Grundgedanke to go through, it will suffice to show that
Wittgenstein's truth table is complete, but that his opponent's fails to
satisfy this necessary condition.
That the opponent's view cannot generate a complete truth table
results from the fact that the introduction of subsequent operations,
like negation, introduces ever more elements (1922b, 5.44).

In order

for a propositional sign to effect a discrimination within reality, it
must be possible to say what has the potential to falsify it as well as
what has the potential to make it true.

If new elements are introduced

for each operation, then this condition cannot be satisfied.
what makes P false:

Consider

presumably something expressed by means of -P.

this cannot be so, since -P contains P.

What makes -P false?

But

It cannot

be what makes --P true, since (again) the former is contained in the
latter.

Nor can it be whatever makes P true; since P, on the contrary,

is a necessary condition for the truth of -P (since, on this view, P is
contained in -

P) • 133

If P is consistent with both --P and -P, then some

further account of what makes -P false is needed. But surely
Wittgenstein's opponents are hanged by their own ropes if they attempt
to do so by means of what seems to be the one remaining possibility,
namely by saying it is made false by P but not - being the case. 134
or, consider the disjunction P v Q.

What makes it false?

Presumably, it is made false by what makes -(P v

Q)

true.

But this can-

not be so, since the truth of the former is contained in that of the
That these criticisms do not constitute any sort of attack upon a
straw man can be appreciated on the basis of the phenomenological data.
Wittgenstein's opponent could not say, for example, that "Pierre is not
absent from the cafe" and "Pierre is in the cafe" express the same content.
134 Technically speaking, the foregoing discussion contains a mistake.
If we grant Wittgenstein's tenet that different objects are to be symbolized by different names (the strategy that allows him to dispense
with quantifiers in favor of logical products and sums), then the formula --P would have to be considered ill-formed. If the negation sign
furthest to the left introduces a new object, then some alternative symbolism--e.g., ~-P--would need to be used.
133
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latter.

What makes -(P v O) false?

As above, it cannot be what makes

--(P v O) true, since --(P v O) contains the truth of -(P v Q).
be whatever makes P v O true?

Can it

Again, P v O is as much a component of

the formula -(P v Q) as it is of the formula --(P v Q), so some further
account of its falsehood is necessary.

To say it is made false by P v

O but not - simply generates more problems.
The problem should now be quite apparent:

any attempt to specify

falsifying conditions requires introducing new elements and, so, new elementary propositions whose own falsifying conditions are not specifiable in any vocabulary thus far introduced.

It is not at all clear how

falsifying conditions could ever be stated given such a view; however
if it were possible to provide the falsifying conditions by introducing

a formula containing a new element, then an infinite regress would result.

That would suffice to render the table incomplete, since there

would always be some formula that presumably has sense but is incapable
of being presented on the table.
culty.

This is not simply a pragmatic diffi-

For Wittgenstein's adversary a table containing n elements will

always need n + 1 elements to be complete. 135
Lest it be maintained that the argument applies solely to the
negation sign, so that its referential nature might be renounced while
that of the other connectives be retained, it should be born in mind
that similar arguments pertain to all the connectives.

If one accepts

the interdefinability of the logical constants, it follows straightaway
that what holds for negation will hold for the other connectives.

One

need only translate the formulae into the necessary vocabulary.
However, as noted earlier, such a strategy would be regarded as queswe can now see just how much truth there is in Black's (1964, p.
180) criticism mentioned earlier. The problem is not simply that every
operation of negation subsequent to the first is simply redundant (although that is an appropriate remark to make within the context in which
it was introduced earlier. The problem here is that there is no possibility of redundancy whatsoever: Neither ---P nor --P can be synonymous
to -P, since both introduces additional elements.
135
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tion-begging by Wittgenstein's opponent.

Nevertheless it is still pos-

sible to introduce problematic examples.

What makes (P v O) false? 136

Presumably it is made false by whatever makes -P
view being considered, that fact contains P and

&

Q

-O true.

But, on the

as constituents, and

they are necessary (if not sufficient) conditions for the truth
Q.

of P v

or, suppose it is maintained that what makes P v O false is that P

obtains and

Q

obtains but v does not.

This desperate move can hardly

be considered a solution, since it introduces additional entities (corresponding to and, but, and not), and it fails to eliminate the apparent
reference to v.

Any attempt to state falsifying conditions simply pro-

duces another sentence or formula consistent with the original.
These considerations allow us to dispense with any need to accommodate additional matrices that would arise from treating the constants
as referring terms.

Such a table will fail to be complete due to its

inability to represent the senses of propositions.
table, as envisioned by Wittgenstein, complete?
pressing all sense.

But is the truth

Is it capable of ex-

To see Wittgenstein's reason for thinking that it

does, we must come to terms with his claim that u[a) proposition can determine only one place in logical space:

nevertheless the whole of log-

ical space must already be given by it" (1922b, 3.42).
Here is where the earlier discussion of Wittgenstein's concerns
with the sole logical constant become relevant.

The key to

Wittgenstein's remark concerning the whole of logical space being "given
by" individual propositions lies in his belief that "[a)n elementary
proposition really contains all logical operations in itself" (1922b,
5.47).

This remark, and a related remark to the effect that "[a) posi-

1~
As with the case of negation, using the disjunction sign more than
once is misleading. If we accept Wittgenstein's claim that different
objects are to be represented by different names, then a different symbol will need to be introduced for subsequent uses of what corresponds
to disjunction. I take it that Wittgenstein's opponent has no answer to
the question of what makes an individual v a member of the class of

V'S.
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tive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative

proposition and vice versa" (1922b, 5.5151), are most fruitfully interpreted in light of the thesis of bipolarity and the distinction between
sense and meaning consequent upon it.

What we know from our earlier

discussions of bipolarity is that for something to count as a propositional sign at all, it must hold within it the possibility of being
negated: and what we have just seen is that propositional signs must be
capable of being negated in such a way as to make it possible for both a
proposition and its denial to effect a discrimination within reality.
The latter possibility is secured by the fact that an elementary proposition has both structure and form, meaning and sense.

Consider, then,

a set of atomic propositions containing just two members, P and Q.
must be possible to negate both members of this set.

It

But this is none

other than the operation performed by the Sheffer stroke.

As we have

already seen that its application suffices to produce each of the matrices in Table I associated with the usual connectives, and it can be
proven that its application to various sets of formulae can produce each
of the matrices making up the table. 137
generating the minimal truth table.

Consequently, it is capable of

This is what Wittgenstein has in

mind when he tells us that "(a]n elementary proposition really contains
all logical operations in itself" (1922b, 5.47).

As one commentator

aptly puts it, "it is implicit in the affirmative proposition 'P' that
'P' can be negated, conjoined with others and so on" (McDonough, 1986,
p. 76). 138

Bipolarity is essential to proposition, and so it is in the

essence of the proposition itself that the minimal truth table is
grounded.
The reader will be spared this.
McDonough's (1986) exposition of the Tractatus contends that the
Grundgedanke is a premise in an argument designed to show that all genuine propositions are contingent. Here is another point at which we are
at odds: if anything, we have demonstrated that matters are the other
way around.
137

m
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So what would suffice to show that the minimal truth table is complete?

What would suffice, for example, to show that a table with six-

teen matrices exhausts the truth possibilities of two elementary propositions?

In the case of the competing view incompleteness was hailed by

the inconsistencies arising from the attempt to state falsifying conditions for propositions.

we saw that the attempt to provide falsifying

conditions for -P produces the undesirable consequence of P being consistent with both -P and --P.

Inconsistency is a mark of incomplete-

ness, because it leaves us unable to provide a definite matrix for a
given formula:

we just do not know under these circumstances when to

say a proposition is true or false.

consequently, any propositional

sign that might occur within such a table will lack a determinate sense.
For this reason the table countenanced by Wittgenstein's would-be opponent is incapable of expressing the senses of the formulae it contains;
a fortiori, it is incapable of expressing all senses of propositions.
I understand Wittgenstein to be arguing that the fact that determinate matrices can be produced by the application of the Sheffer stroke
(the use of which is sanctioned by the very nature of propositions) to
sets of elementary propositions demonstrates (somehow) that his table is
complete.

However, it does not follow from the fact that if a table is

inconsistent (or incapable of providing determinate matrices), then it
is incomplete that if a table is consistent (or capable of providing
determinate matrices), then it is complete. 13 •

Yet Wittgenstein seems

to think that it follows straightaway--a priori (1922b, 5.47 and 5.551)-from the fact that determinate matrices can be generated in this way,
that what is expressed by the general form of the proposition (i.e.,
1~ Bear in mind that the canons of argumentation employed in this
dissertation are precisely what are at issue here. That these are cannons is due largely to the acceptance of Wittgenstein's views in the
philosophy of logic. Bence, the fact that the above inference is invalid by Wittgenstein's own lights is significant. No questions are
begged above; rather the consistency of Wittgenstein's own view is the
issue.
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what we have identified with the general form of the proposition) is
complete.
Wittgenstein's argument is invalid, but it is nevertheless a

strong argument.
ing.

In the interest of charity I would suggest the follow-

In spite of Wittgenstein's claim that the whole of logic (which he

assimilates to the whole of the philosophy of logic" 0 ) is a priori, his
argument should be considered an abductive one and should be evaluated
accordingly.
The word "abductive" was originally coined by Peirce (1931), of
course, to denote a form of non-deductive inference common to arguments
offered in science in favor of theoretical claims, that is, claims that
appear to refer to unobservable entities to which one must advert in
order to explain observable phenomena.

A good abductive argument takes

the form of affirming the consequent (which is deductively invalid).
But it is sanctioned nonetheless by the fact that the consequent affirmed constitutes good probabilistic grounds in support of the theory.
Rather than dismissing Wittgenstein's argument as an invalid deductive
argument, let us consider the possibility of it being a strong abductive
argument of the form:
(1) If the minimal truth table is complete, then it will exhibit consistency in such a way as to make the construction
of determinate matrices possible.
(2) The minimal truth table does exhibit consistency in
such a way as to make the construction of determinate matrices posible.
therefore,
(3)

The minimal truth table is complete.

Whether the argument is strong or not depends on whether the evi-

140 This assimilation is forced upon him by his treatment of Russell's
Paradox. Recall his criticism that Russell and Whitehead (1910) use expressions of natural language. There is the root of Wittgenstein's conception of incompleteness.
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dence appealed to in the consequent of (1) makes probable what is expressed in the antecedent of (l) and makes improbable whatever theories
compete with the antecedent of (1).

our sample of competing theories

consists only so far in one theory for which internal consistency is
problematic.

Yet we are considering this strategy only because

Wittgenstein's view and that of his would-be opponent are not being assumed to be jointly exhaustive.

(If they are jointly exhaustive--a

claim I am not sure how to defend--then Wittgenstein's conclusion would
follow on deductive grounds.)

Since it is hard to imagine competing

theories, the.sample size should not be considered particularly problematic.

That consistency is a property of Wittgenstein's table but not a

property of his opponent's does seem relevant.

It seems to this writer

that the burden falls upon Wittgenstein's critics to come up with alternative accounts for which we would not find inconsistency surprising.
If we grant Wittgenstein his assumption that sense must be determinate,
this does not seem likely.
If we combine the conclusions of the two legs of the argument, we
have, I believe, Wittgenstein's argument for the Grundgedanke.

The con-

clusion of the first half is that if the logical operators are referring terms, then any truth table in which they figure will be incomplete.

The conclusion of the second half just is that if the logical

operators are not referring terms, then the resultant truth table
(i.e., the minimal truth table) is complete.

Because an incomplete

truth table is one in which formulae or sentences lack sense, the matter
of completeness speaks to the very essence of the proposition.

Thus it

stems from the very nature of representation itself that "there are no
'logical objects'" (1922b, 4.441 and 5.4).
I should like to conclude this discussion of the Grundgedanke by
touching upon three issues.

The first concerns a possible objection

that might be raised against the account provided above.
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The second

concerns the semantic status of tautologies and contradictions: and the
third pertains to the ontological problem raised at the end of the previous section over the relationship between Sachverhalten and
Tatsachen.
To begin with an objection might be introduced that the account
provided here of the general propositional form in terms of the minimal
truth table is not consistent with Tractatus 6.

There we are told:

The general form of a truth-function is [p,~N(~)J.
This is the general form of a proposition (1922b, 6). 141
This passage initiates a discussion of the thesis that all propositions,
of whatever complexity, are truth-functions of repeated applications of
the basic logical function (the Sheffer stroke) to sets of elementary
propositions.

The symbol in Tractatus 6 is to be understood, as Russell

indicates, as representing "whatever can be obtained by taking any selection of atomic propositions, negating them all, then taking any selection of the set ••• now obtained, together with the originals--and so
on indefinitely (1922, p. xv).

So it sounds as if the general form of a

proposition is to be identified with this function or with the totality
of its values (which would be identical to the totality of propositions).

In either event it would not seem to be identical to the mini-

mal truth table.

If we think of the general form of the proposition in

terms of the latter, then the minimal truth table expresses but a subset
of the general form. 142
,., I have deleted the bars Wittgenstein places above the variables,
due to the technical problems in replicating them.
1 • 2 Determining what is and is not consistent with Wittgenstein's view
is not facilitated by the different things he happens to say about the
general propositional form. Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the
interpreter is the fact that he refers to the general form in one place
as a variable (1922b, 4.53), elsewhere as a constant (1922b, 5.47), and
finally as function (1922b, 6): and Russell all but says the general
form consists in the values yielded by the expression at Tractatus 6 (a
point consistent with Tractatus 3.312ff.). one senses in the difficulty
Wittgenstein has in articulating the nature of the general form that his
thoughts on the subject were incomplete.
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I do not think this objection is problematic.

First, it should be

remembered that the formulae that we associate with the matrices, with
the exception of those associated with an atomic proposition's negation,
require for their production numerous applications of the fundamental
operation.

The production of formulae corresponding to the matrices

requires a procedure such as that described here.

Second, it is a mis-

take to think that operations beyond those necessary for producing the
minimal table produce new truths.

What they produce are new formulae or

sentences whose matrices match one or another of the original sixteen
that make up the minimal table.

The continued use of the fundamental

operation beyond the number required to produce formulae whose truth
possibilities are reflected by the minimal truth table does not introduce additional semantic distinctions, only additional syntactic ones.
This fact is largely born out by the treatment given to the logical
propositions.
One of the major implications of Wittgenstein's view is that tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

That they are senseless (sinn-

los) stems from their lack of contingency.

Lacking contingency, they

are incapable of effecting the discrimination requisite of any picture
(Bild) of reality:
A tautology leaves open to reality the whole--the infinite whole--of logical space: a contradiction fills the
whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality.
Thus neither of them can determine reality in any way

(1922b, 4.463).

Thus,
Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations
(1922b, 4.462).

That there are such sentences is unavoidable:
matrices produced by the fundamental operation.
belongs to the very nature of the proposition.
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they are two of the

That they exist thus
Since they are a part of

language (1922b, 4.4611), but because they lack sense (1922b, 4.461), it
is necessary provide some sort of account of their nature.

In an earli-

er chapter we briefly considered Wittgenstein's account of them in terms
of prototypes which function to show how particular expressions are
used.

we can now see how this new conception of showing is forced upon

Wittgenstein.

This is an important extension of the semantics of the

Tractatus, and it is easily misunderstood.

It is tempting, for example,

to assimilate it to the other forms of showing referred to in the
Tractatus; as a consequence one is left with the impression that the nature of showing is entirely vague.

However, as I mentioned earlier,

there are three quite distinct, concepts of showing at work in the
Tractatus.

Because they share certain features in common, they are eas-

ily confused.
The first concept of showing was introduced to explain how a
propositional sign conveys its sense.

In this instance what is shown is

dependent upon the relations among the sub-sentential components of the
propositional sign.

This new concept of showing, which arises in con-

sideration of the role of the logical propositions, pertains more to
inter-sentential relations.

That P

&

-Pis always false shows that both

conjuncts cannot be asserted at the same time so as to produce any
proposition with sense.

That P v -Pis always true shows that either

disjunctcan be asserted at any time so as to produce a proposition with
sense.

More importantly for the theory of inference, the fact that a

tautology is achieved by such conditionals as, for example, -(P

& Q)

-

(-P v -Q) shows that if the antecedent is true, then the assertion of
the consequent is sanctioned--indeed that what is contained in the consequent is implied by what is contained in the antecedent.
that (-P v -Q) -

-(P

&

The fact

Q) is tautologous too, making the two formulae

interderivable, shows that either or both may be asserted at the same
time without loss of truth; the conjunction of the two formulae is nei-
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ther a contradiction, nor a tautology.

Although important questions re-

main to be considered, the significance of this treatment of logical
rules and logical laws is significant. 143
Commentators (Coffa, 1993, pp 160-167~ McDonough, 1986, pp. 89-95)
have been quick to point out that this treatment of rules and laws undermines Carroll's (1896) Paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise.

The

paradox consists in the fact that if one wants to infer via, say, modus

ponens, one must tacitly assume {[P

&

is entitled to infer

-a.

to assume {{ [P

infinitum.

&

(P -

Q

from P and P
Q)] -

Q} &

{[P

(P -

&

Q)] -

Q}

is true before one

But then one would also have

(P -

Q)]}} -

Q,

and so on ad

Those who take the paradox seriously hold that the rules and

laws of logic stand in need of epistemological justification.

Against

this view Wittgenstein maintains "[l]ogic must look after itself"
(1922b, 5.473) ."•

This should not be taken to mean Wittgenstein advo-

cated Russell's (1912, pp. 70-73) view that logic provides us with

self-evident truths.

To the contrary, Wittgenstein says,

Self-evidence, which Russell talked about so much, can
become dispensable in logic, only because language itself
prevents every logical mistake.--What makes logic a priori
is the impossibility of illogical thought (1922b, 5.4731).
The rules and laws of logic neither need justification, nor need to be
regarded as self-evident (to intuition or acquaintance), because they
are implicit within the very nature of propositions themselves.
we had a chance to consider Wittgenstein's claim that an illogical

143 A point concerning terminology:
a logical rule is a tautologous
formula whose main operator is the material implication sign~ a logical
law is a tautologous formula whose main operator is the biconditional
sign. Modus ponens, { [P & (P - Q)] - Q}, is an example of the former~
the particular DeMorgan's Law cited above, -(P & Q) (-P v -Q), is an
example of the latter.
144 To give you some idea how early this idea occurred to him,
this
comment is the very first to occur in the world war I Notebooks (1914b,
p. 2). At this point in time the Grundgedanke had occurred to him but
needed working out. The 1914 "Notes Dictated to Moore in Norway" begin
with a consideration of the the same topic
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language is an impossibility earlier in connection with his rejection of
Russell's Paradox.
distinct theses:

We now know that that claim actually involves two
(1) a function cannot be its own argument, and (2)

logical rules and laws are implicit within the nature of propositions
themselves.

(If one were not prepared to distinguish these claims, the

overall argument described in this dissertation would appear guestionbegging.)

But, by way of criticism, it seems quite ludicrous to assert

that valid inferences are ours merely by virtue of the language we
speakl

As desirable as it might be to think that there are a priori

grounds for not testing students or holding dissertation defenses, no
one can deny that invalid inferences do occur.

Lucky is the logic

teacher who never has a student for whom modus ponens or modus tollens
seems unnatural.

If Wittgenstein's view entails that logical mistakes

are impossible, then in the end it fares no better than Moore's theory
of judgment.

And even if his view implies that the only good argumenta-

tion is deductive argumentation (that is, that there are not good forms
of non-deductive reasoning), it is faced with difficulties, since such a
claim does not ring true.

Clearly there are good non-deductive forms of

inference; witness the various inductive and abductive forms of inference that contribute to the success of science.
The objection we have been considering, however, is an attack upon
a straw man, as it misconstrues the role the logical propositions play
within the context of inferences.
valid inferences are impossible. 145

Wittgenstein's view is not that inSurely his view comes to this:

tau-

tologies are no more nor less a possibility of our language than contraHe does, however, seem to suggest that the theory of probability
is founded upon the possibility of deduction (cf. 1922b, 5.15-5.156).
As this is not a claim to the effect that non-deductive reasoning does
not occur, but is rather a claim about the relation between deductive
and non-deductive forms of reasoning, it need not be considered objectionable here. Whether contentious or not, the claim that the probability calculus is founded upon the propositional calculus plays a role in
numerous texts (for example, Skyrms, 1975, pp. 130 ff.).
145
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dictions or sentences subsumable under the other matrices.

Valid rea-

soning is no more nor less a possibility for language users than invalid
reasoning.

These possibilities are what are implicit in language.

Language does not provide us with the impossibility of error but with
the possibility of proving that an error has occurred (if one has occurred) by means of a mechanical test--namely, by constructing a truth
table (1922b, 6.126-6.1265).

Wittgenstein does not make the point abun-

dantly clear, nor is his contention that an illogical language is impossible free of ambiguity.

But, I believe, his principal point is that

even if one were to utter something tautologous or contradictory (or
were to perform an invalid inference), the possibility of one doing so
arises from the fact that such sentences are related essentially to
other sentences for which sense is determinate.

The very language one

speaks exposes the contradiction as contradiction.

In the Tractatus a

counterweight to the logical atomism may be found in a certain holism of
sense that is expressed by means of the minimal truth table.
At bottom, the idea that logical laws and rules are statements for
which evidence should be provided rests upon a misconception of their
subject matter.

To think they require evidence involves assimilating

their subject matter to that of factual (hence contingent) propositions,
because it involves countenancing the possibility of their falsehood.
But it is misleading to say that, for Wittgenstein, these sentences or
formulae express necessary truths.

Strictly speaking, their 'assertion'

cannot be regarded as the assertion of a proposition or statement at
all, since all statements or propositions must be contingent, and these
are clearly not that.

This much is demonstrated by the truth table.

What then are they?

Wittgenstein's conception of the logical

propositions bears at least a cursory resemblance to the type of analysis later offered by positivist writers.

Hahn, for example, contrasts

"[t]he old conception of logic" according to which "logic is the account
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of the most universal properties of things, the account of those properties which are common to all things" (1933, p. 45) with the newer conception of logic according to which:
logic does not by any means treat of the totality of
things, it does not treat of objects at all but only of our
way of speaking about objects~ logic is first generated by
language. The certainty and universal validity, or better,
the irrefutability of a proposition of logic derives just
from the fact that it says nothing about objects of any kind
(1933, PP• 45-46). 149
While Wittgenstein would agree with the claim that tautologous and contradictory propositions do not "treat of objects," as well as with
Hahn's and other positivists' construal of logical propositions as being
about (in at least some respect) "our way of speaking of objects," he
would disagree that it is possible to speak about language--or at least
about what is essential to language--in the same way as it is possible
to speak of extra-linguistic objects and states of affairs.

we will

postpone a discussion of Wittgenstein's reasons for rejecting the possibility of a meta-language such as proposed by Carnap (1936) and Tarski
(1936) until the next chapter where we will be in a position to describe
his distinction between senselessness and nonsense and his view concerning statements about the essence of propositions.

Let it suffice for

now to say that senseless sentences have a use (though that use is not
assertion), but nonsensical sentences do not.

Tautologies and contra-

dictions (or rather utterances and inscriptions of them) fare better
than sentences that are nonsensical, inasmuch as they show (1922b, 6.12)
or demonstrate (1922b, 6.121) how expressions may be used.

In particu-

lar, they show which propositional signs may be used to assert the truth
given that certain other propositional signs may be used to assert the
truth.

So, for example, the fact that the matrix for P -

Pis tautolo-

gous shows that if one is entitled to assert Pat t 1 , then (other things

,,e The same view is expressed almost verbatim by Carnap ( 1930, p.
143) and Ayer (1936, p. 79).
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being equal1"), one is entitled to assert P at t 1 •
What distinguishes Wittgenstein's view from that of the positivists is that his view of the logical propositions (and the rules and
laws that are formulated in terms of them) is much less rationalistic-much less cognitivistic--than theirs.

One does not find in Wittgenstein

any of the adoration typically assigned to the so-called truths of logic
and mathematics.

Rather than pronouncing analyticity (and the a priori

in general) as the domain of pure knowledge, we find even the early
Wittgenstein laying great stress upon the practical use of sentences.
It is worth recalling some of the passages cited earlier that found
their way into the Tractatus:
[I]n, real life a mathematical proposition is never what
we want. Rather, we make use of mathematical propositions
only in inferences from propositions that do not belong to
mathematics to others that do not belong to mathematics.
(In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use
this word or proposition for?' repeatedly leads to valuable
insights) (1922b, 6.211).
In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense (1922b, 3.326).
A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is
taken together with its logic-syntactical employment (1922b,
3.327).
If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the
point of Occam's maxim.
(If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it
does have meaning (1922b, 3.328)).
These passages do not equate meaning and use, but it is clear that
Wittgenstein wants to place great stress upon the use or employment of
signs.

As we will see in the next section, only when we understand what

is made manifest in the employment of signs--namely, the way the will
effects a projective relation between signs and world--do we have an understanding of the essence of the proposition.
147 Obviously P cannot contain indexical elements that make the time
of the utterance relevant to its truth value.
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Although the tautologies and contradictions are incapable of establishing any projective relation (due to their inability to effect a
discrimination among facts), they do have a use:

they provide a device

that determines when other (sensical) propositional signs can be used.
Construed as devices or instruments the logical propositions need not be
viewed as expressing abstract propositional knowledge.

They are tools.

As with tools generally, one need not think about the tool one is using
in order to use it.

An understanding of the logical propositions and

the rules and laws stemming from them is implicit in the use of propositions that do have sense.

Against the idea that the logical proposi-

tions provide any sort of pure or abstract knowledge, there stands
Wittgenstein's view that it is not even necessary for the rules of syntax or grammar to ever be explicitly stated or consciously entertained
by language users (1922b, 3.334 and 6.122). 141

As one commentator aptly

puts it, "what is gained here is a kind of practical knowledge, the
knowledge of how to do something ••• knowledge of how to operate with certain symbols" (Edwards, 1985, p. 55) ."'

Rather than calling tautologies

and contradictions propositions at all, it would have been more accurate
for Wittgenstein to say that utterances of them give expression to a
certain ability one has with respect to signs.

To understand that a

given combination of signs is a tautology or a contradiction is to possess a kind of know-how rather than any form of propositional knowledge
(i.e., knowledge that such-and-such is the case).
As mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein's discussion of these matters
is not always consistent.

The very reference to tautologies and contra-

dictions as propositions, and the ascription to them of truth and
,~ A logically perspicuous language is supposed to facilitate this.
At Tractatus 6.122 we are told "we can actually do without logical
propositions; for in a suitable notation we can in fact recognize the
formal properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions
themselves."
149 This claim is supported by Tractatus 6 .12.

274

falsehood, is misleading.

To speak of them as prototypes (Urbilder)

(1922b, 3.315, 5.5351) involves viewing them as salient examples or exemplars of the use of expressions.

The appeal to prototypes or exem-

plars is implicit in (and explains) Wittgenstein's otherwise obscure remark at Tractatus 5.454 that u[i]n logic there can be no distinction between the general and the specific."

variables, typically held (as in

Russell's case) to be very general terms, are dummy or proxy terms whose
usage is to be imitated.

The utterance of a tautology constitutes the

setting up of a certain sort of convention for the use of signs.
Upon returning to philosophy in 1929 Wittgenstein struggled to articulate his thoughts on this subject.

According to Lee (1982),

Wittgenstein asserted during his 1931 lectures at Cambridge that a tautology
••• is a rule of grammar dealing with symbols alone, it is
a rule of a game. Its importance lies in its application;
we use it in our language. When we talk about propositions
following from each other we are talking of a game.
Propositions do not follow from one another as such; they
simply are what they are. We can only prepare language for
its usage; we can only describe it as long as we do not
regard it as language. The rules prepare for the game which
may afterwards be used as a language. Only when the rules
are fixed can I use the game as a language.
To a necessity in the world there corresponds an arbitrary rule in language (1982, p. 57).
This passage provides a crucial insight into the relation between the
philosophies of the early and later Wittgenstein.

It might reasonably

have occurred either within the Tractatus or in the Philosophical
Investigations.

Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures from 1930 through

1932 aimed primarily at explicating, with slight modification, the principal tenets of the Tractatus.,..

That he would employ the game

metaphor in doing so gives some indication of the continuity between his

150 This particular passage from the lectures seeks to clarify
Tractatus 5.557 where Wittgenstein vacillates on the relation between
logic and its application.
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earlier and later philosophy:

eventually the rule-like function of tau-

tologies and contradictions in the early philosophy would be supplanted
by that of the grammatical propositions of the later philosophy.

In

both the early and later philosophy rules are conceived of as being
something other than bits of information or as parts of a rational system of propositions.

The chief difference between the early and later

philosophy consists in the fact that the former construes the tautologies and contradictions as rules for a rational system of propositional
signs whose use answers to the form of objects and states of affairs in
the world; the grammatical propositions of the later philosophy provide
the rules for language games, and if they answer to anything, it is to
what Wittgenstein later calls a form of life.
This final point about the Tractatus conception of logical propositions bears emphasis.

It is not being claimed that the rules and laws

that stem from them are mere conventions one may or may not adopt.
Certainly the particular symbolism used (i.e., the vocabulary) is largely an arbitrary or pragmatic matter.

But which inferences one is enti-

tled to draw depends upon the relations that exist among the senses of
propositional signs (1922b, 5.122), which means that it depends upon the
relations that obtain among possible states of affairs in the world
(1922b, 6.12).

If one is to represent the world in thought or speech,

how one thinks or speaks is constrained by the world itself.
we are now in a position to return to the metaphysical issue with
which we closed the previous section.

Earlier I suggested that the very

intelligibility of Wittgenstein's logical atomism depends upon finding
an answer to the question of how something composite may be related to
something non-composite.

The relevance of the question resides in the

necessity to square an ontology of simple objects with the common sense
and Newtonian conception of objects as infinitely divisible that appears
to find expression in ordinary language.
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we noted earlier that unless

this question could be answered, Wittgenstein's claim that ordinary language is in perfect logical order would have to be abandoned.

The most

important consequence of this would be that Tractarian semantics could
in no way be considered the semantics of ordinary language.

While that

consequence would not be disagreeable to someone like Frege or Tarski,
it would be regarded as unfortunate by Wittgenstein, since he saw his
task as one of explaining how representation in general is possible.
The solution resides in the ontological distinction between molecular facts (Tatsachen) and atomic facts or states of affairs

(Sachverhalten), and the fact that the former are not reducible to the
latter.

Our talk about complex objects, on Wittgenstein's view, may be

analyzed into sets of statements about Tatsachen, because the existence
of a complex object just is the occurrence of a certain kind of fact.
The first stage of analysis, we saw earlier, deploys Russell's Theory of
Descriptions at precisely this juncture.

If the facts adverted to at

this stage contain objects that are complex, the assumption is they too
shall be analyzed in an analogous fashion.

This process continues until

one adverts only to simple objects by means of elementary propositions.
If we imagine a pyramid (as we are given, for example, at Tractatus
4.1252 and 4.1273 151 ) with a complex object's name at the top (e.g.,
"Scott"), then the bottom of such a pyramid would consist of numerous
(perhaps infinitely long) sets of atomic propositions in conjunction.
Since elementary propositions are contingent, presumably their truth

Wittgenstein uses the image of a pyramid to express what he refers
to as the internal relations that exist among a series of forms (1922b,
5.125-5.1252). That passage provides at least a partial clue as to how
analysis is to be conducted. I do not believe Wittgenstein's thoughts
on this were complete. Certainly my own use of the pyramid analogy in
the paragraph above goes beyond what he says (though not beyond what he
would say).
151
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would be indexed to times. m
The problem can be understood, then, as one of how Tatsachen can
consist of Sachverhalten, without the latter consisting of further
sachverhalten.

The answer lies in the fact that the spatio-temporal

properties of Sachverhalten are emergent, as contemporary physics suggests, and the relation obtaining between them and the Tatsachen from
which they are emergent is logical rather than spatio-temporal in character.

This could not be the case if there were logical uobjectsn cor-

responding to the sentence forming operators or the identity sign.
P, Q, and R represent Sachverhalten.

Let

The truth of their conjunction im-

plies the truth of s which represents a given Tatsache.

If one views

the constants as referring terms, it is likely one views the conjoining
of P, Q, and Rand the implying of s by them as processes culminating in

s.

(Notice the equivocation this requires:

conjunction and implica-

tion are treated both as relations among propositions as well as facts.)
If this were the case, it would imply spatio-temporal continuity between
P, Q, R, ands.

Under these conditions, conceiving of the constituents

of P, Q, and Ras having, for example, extension in space appears inevitable.

But if the Grundgedanke is true, the temptation to proceed

along this line of thinking is removed.

If one is also willing to find

at least the possibility of truth in the basic tenets of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, one should not find Wittgenstein's appeal to
simple, unanalyzable objects unintelligible.

Thus the Grundgedanke, not

only is central to the analysis of molecular propositions, but rescues
the account of elementary propositions from the criticism raised earlier.
Although the logical atomism of the Tractatus is shielded from
,~ This makes the translation of Sachverhalten as states of affairs
particularly appropriate. That a Sachverhalt is the obtaining of a situation underscores the fact that it is one of a set of possible states
of affairs.
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what seems to be a major criticism, a new criticism arises that might
make one wonder whether the cure is worse than the illness.

The logical

relation that holds between different levels of analysis would seem to
be that of strict implication:

[(P & Q & R) ... s).

This is because P,

Q, and Rare in some sense constituents of s (individually necessary

and jointly sufficient for S).

In effect the above formula expresses

an identity statement or what is sometimes referred to as a bridge law.
However if it is necessarily the case that (P

& Q &

R) imply s, then the

sentence or formula that expresses such cannot be contingent and thus
must be considered without sense.

They must be treated as Mmere repre-

sentational devices" (1922b, 4.242).

But in fact such statements do

seem to express important--necessary--empirical truths.

What

Wittgenstein calls the logical form of the world appears to contain, not
only the possible combinations of objects into states of affairs and the

possible consistencies among Tatsachen that make Sachverhalten possible,
but necessary relations between Tatsachen and Sachverhalten.

The meta-

physics of the Tractatus has a modal structure through and through!
Here we have the germ of the positivist rejection of metaphysics.
Our concern is not so much with that, though, as with the possibility of
a vicious inconsistency entering into Wittgenstein's semantic theory.
That there are statements about the world that are necessarily true--indeed, that there are statements about the facts that make language (and
representation generally) possible that are necessarily true (i.e.,
those that make up the Tractatus itself)--is inconsistent with the principal semantic theses considered of the Tractatus considered thus far.
Russell notes this apparent inconsistency in his "Introduction" to the

Tractatus saying, "Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about
what cannot be said" (1922, xxi).

Wittgenstein's solution consists in

introducing a further semantic category over and above what has sense
(contingent empirical propositions) and what is senseless (tautologies
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and contradictions).

This further category consists in what is nonsen-

sical (but not nonsensical in the way that strings failing to meet arbi-

trary syntactical rules are nonsensical).
below.

This topic will be dealt with

Although the Tractarian account of sense is assisted by the ac-

count of senselessness, it does not seem to be the case that the weakness in the account of senselessness can be reconciled by an appeal to
what is nonsensical.
Tractarian semantics.

This, I believe, exposes the central flaw of
The stumbling point turns out to be none other

than its most important feature:

the essence of the proposition as con-

sisting in a propositional sign's projective relation to the world.
What points the way beyond Tractarian semantics is the inadequacy of the
account of this projective relation and the problem this inadequacy
poses for the semantic interpretation of propositional attitude ascriptions.
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CHAPTER V
PROJECTIVE RELATIONS AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS
1.

Introductory Remarks.
Up until this point we have been concerned with the semantics for

sentences that either have sense or are senseless.

Chapter III allowed

us to bring to a close our consideration of the nature of sense by seeing how the Picture Theory must be expanded so as to include logical
atomism.

That chapter concluded by noting that atomism can be made in-

telligible only if we can make sense out of the idea that composite objects may consist of non-composite elements.

That possibility is se-

cured by a metaphysical distinction between Sachverhalten and Tatsachen.
Such a distinction can only be drawn if the Grundgedanke
Tractatus is true.

of the

Thus we saw that the Tractarian account of elemen-

tary propositions depends largely on the analysis that can be given of
molecular and negative propositions.
ment for the Grundgedanke.

In Chapter IV we studied the argu-

Since the logical atomism depends on the

Grundgedanke, and the Grundgedanke entails that there must be matrices
for tautologies and contradictions which lack bipolarity, the account of
sense must make room for what is senseless but no less a part of language.

In this chapter we turn our attention to nonsense.

The need to

expand the semantics of the Tractatus arises once the essence of the
proposition is laid bear.

The essence of the proposition consists in

the projective relation between propositional sign and the world that is
effected by the will.

In Section Two we attempt to clarify

Wittgenstein's position concerning this topic.

In Section Three our

findings are applied to the analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions.

There we see the sharp contrast that exists between

Wittgenstein's view and Russell's theory of judgment.
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Once this has

been done we will be in a position in Section Four to explain
Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism.

I had said in an earlier chapter

that those remarks pose a significant challenge to the realist interpretation of the Tractatus throughout this dissertation.

This problem dis-

sipates once the semantic theory of the Tractatus is seen to quantify
over assertions and other linguistic tokens.

The remarks on solipsism,

I shall argue, are but expression of what today we might call semantic
individualism.

In Section Five we turn to the real problems with

Tractarian semantics.

The usual criticism of the Tractatus centering

around the Color Exclusion Problem is dismissed on the grounds that it
fails to do justice to Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and
meaning.

More important criticisms await us concerning the Tractarian

account of propositional attitude ascriptions and the nature of nonsense.
2.

Projective Relations.
Tractatus 3.1-3.12 reads as follows:
In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can
be perceived by the senses.
we use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or
written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.
The method of projection is to think of the sense of the
proposition.
I call a sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.--And a proposition is a propositional sign in
its projective relation to the world (1922b, 3.1-3.12).

Just what is this projective relation, and how does it come about?

Is

the same or a different relation involved in both elementary and molecular propositions?
The principal clue we are offered is the claim at 3.11 that the
method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.

If

one regards sense as some sort of abstract or Platonic entity, one will
completely misunderstand the way in which the projective relation aris-
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es.

Let us begin by considering the case of elementary propositions.
The sense of an elementary proposition consists in a set of possi-

ble states of affairs.

Somehow this range of possibilities must become

the object of one's thought.

But this immediately seems to be problem-

atic, since one can only say ( and so presumably think1" ) that one member of this set is true.

To return to the symbolism employed in

Chapters II I and IV, let the sense of ll ¥ A consist in the set:
DA¥, ¥DA, ¥All, A¥1l, All¥}.

{ll ¥A,

One does not, in saying or thinking

ll¥A, say or think that all the members of this set are possible.

Their possibility is rather exhibited by one's employment of the syntactical rules governing the construction of ll¥A; or, more accurately,
the employment of those rules shows or exhibits the form of ll¥A, and
it is this form that corresponds to the sense of the proposition.

We

said in an earlier chapter that the form/structure distinction allows
Wittgenstein to hold a position according to which a sentence may be regarded as about more than what is actual.

We now need to retrieve that

idea in order to explain what is involved in thinking about the sense of
a sentence.

we know that it does not consist in forming an explicit

idea of it; the attempt to think explicitly about the full array of possibilities results in a disjunction with a different sense (corresponding to its form).

That which is explicitly thought about (thought about

thematically, to borrow a word from Heidegger, 1926, pp. 414-415) is

that which is expressed by the structure of the propositional sign,
i.e., what Wittgenstein sometimes refers to as a sign's content.
Thinking about the sense of a sentence cannot be that sort of thing.
The question boils down to the way subjects are aware of what is
153 Wittgenstein draws no distinction between the way language and
thought represent. In the Notebooks he maintains, "Thinking is a kind
of language. For a thought to is, of course, a logical picture ••• and
therefore it just is a kind of proposition (1914b, p. 82). A similar
point is made in a 19 August 1929 letter written to Russell while a
prisoner of war in Cassino, Italy; cf. Wittgenstein (1912), p. 131.
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shown by a proposition possessing sense.

Whatever kind of awareness it

is, it presumably arises at the same time as the more or less self-conscious awareness one possesses of what one is saying (or of what one is
having an occurent thought).
curs at that moment.

Perhaps the explanation lies in what oc-

What occurs is the construction of a structure

according to the rules of syntax.

Applying the rules of syntax is some-

thing we do: it is a form of action.

To be sure, the active nature of

the representation process is stressed a various points in the
Tractatus.

Thus:
we make to ourselves pictures of facts (1922a, 2.1, em
phas is added) •
"A state of affairs is thinkable": what this means is
that we can make for ourselves a picture of it (my translation of the German in 1922a, 3.001) • 1 '•

So perhaps the type of account to be given is akin to the sort of account appropriate to explaining the kind of awareness one has of one's
own actions. m

It is beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, to

give any sort of thorough phenomenological analysis of action--specifically, of linguistic action.

That task has been shared by members of

the analytic tradition (e.g., by the so-called speech act philosophers:
Austin (1962), Searle (1969), etc.) as well as the phenomenologicalI have reverted to the Ogden translation for Tractatus 2 .1: the
Pears and McGuiness translation runs "We picture facts to ourselves."
This loses sight of the active nature of picturing made evident in the
German by the verb "machen." Neither translation does justice to it in
3.001. Ogden translates the phrase after the colon ("Wir konnen uns
ein Bild von ihm machen") merely as "we can imagine it." This hardly
does justice to the fact that this activity brings about a relation to
reality.
155 And, one might add,
" ••• appropriate to the specific action of applying the rules of syntax." However, doing so invites one to misplace
what is important: one looks to the rules rather than to the action. I
would suggest this is precisely what happened to Moore when the topic
came up in Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures between 1930 and 1933.
After asking "is not 'projecting with the common method of projection'
merely a metaphorical way of saying 'using in accordance with standard
rules of grammar'?" (1954, p 247), Moore dismisses the issue as at heart
one of knowing how to interpret a rule, a very cognitive affair.
154
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hermeneutic tradition (cf. Gier (1981) for a list of references to the
works of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Schutz and others).

And,

indeed, a great deal of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is
devoted to the subject.

The early Wittgenstein appears to devote very

little time to the subject.

The most extensive passages, which we shall

examine momentarily, dealing with the nature of action are contained in
the world war I Notebooks where the topic quickly gives way to a discussion of the will and of the subject who wills.

The notes taken by Moore

(1954), and Lee (1982) show little indication of this topic being taken
up.

The one exception is where Moore records Wittgenstein's comments

that the method of projection can be likened to being guided in one's
playing of an instrument by a musical score (1958, pp. 242-243).
(Interestingly, the experience of being guided is given considerable attention in the Philosophical Investigations (170-177) where it is revealed as a number of related phenomena and as not always characteristic
of language use.)

What is interesting about the occurrence of any ref-

erence to being guided in the Cambridge lectures of 193-1933 is that it
betrays an attitude toward language use (shared by the Notebooks and the
Tractatus, but abandoned by the time of The Blue and Brown Books), name-

ly, that using language is a form of compliance to what must be the case
if representation is to occur in thought or language at all.

The very

acts of thinking and speaking, so essential to our nature, are forms of
compliance.

We have already seen that Wittgenstein thinks an illogical

language is impossible; his comment at 3.031, cited earlier, can now be
understood fully:
It used to be said that God could create anything except
what would be contrary to the laws of logic.--The truth is
that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look
like (1922b, 3.031).
One is powerless to say what an illogical world would be like precisely
because saying requires what is said to share with the world a common
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logical form (1922b 4.12).

It is the logical form imposed upon language

by reality which constrains in every event what one may say.

It is no

wonder that the Notebooks enters into lengthy soliloquy over the effectiveness of the will and its relation to reality.

On the one hand, the

subject who acts seems to accomplish representation by means of a propositional sign that has both a structure and form~ on the other hand,
things could not be otherwise, since the forms of our sentences are determined by their senses, i.e, from the possible facts and states of affairs of which reality itself consists.
Unfortunately for our purposes the discussion of the nature of the
will in the Notebooks pertains to the senses of propositions in toto.
That is to say, it is concerned with how the will affects and is affected by the the senses of the class of all possible propositions (what we
described as expressed by the minimal truth table), what Wittgenstein
refers to as the limits of the world.

It is in this context that the

willing of the subject (or, rather, the good or bad willing of the subject (1922b, 6.43)) is identified as "a condition of the world, like
logic" (1914b, p. 77).

Some of these considerations will become impor-

tant in Section Four, below, where we consider the remarks on solipsism.
On the face of things, it does not seem they bear directly upon the
question of the manner in which we are said to be able to think of the
sense of a particular sentence.

Indeed, the sort of compliance imposed

upon one by the logical form of the world--the sort of compliance that
has led some scholars to say such things as that "[i)n the Tractatus
language is conceived from the perspective of a spectator, not that of
an agent" (Edwards, 1985, p. 79) • 150 --seems out of place when considering
what is done with individual propositions.

For surely at the level of

,~ Edwards (1985, Chapter III) is concerned to show that
Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Ethics" (1929b) moves away from such a passive account of human language and thought. Clearly the active role of
the language user looms large in the writings and lecture notes from
1929 onwards.
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the individual proposition choices do occur as to what to assert or not
assert.

A propositional sign has a form and a structure, and the struc-

ture one selects to utter indicates what one thinks is actually true.
One does not--cannot--assert all of the structures of a given form simultaneously.
There is of course the holism of sense that was outlined in the
previous chapter.

The set of all elementary propositions contains with-

in it the possibility of all propositions whatsoever, including presumably the propositions of ordinary language.

When one utters a sentence

with a given structure (here let it be noted that we are speaking of
sentences of ordinary language far removed from the elementary propositions into which they are analyzed) one is uttering a sentence that has
a sense internally related the senses of the sentences into which it decomposes (by analysis) as well as the senses of those sentences into
which it may figure compositionally (by operations).

As we noted in the

last chapter, we can speak of the sense of the sentence per se, but the
array of possible facts or states of affairs of which this sense consists belongs to a wider array of possibilities which Wittgenstein
refers to as reality itself (1922b, 2.06).
Is there anything in this that might help us?

Perhaps so.

What

constrains what one may say is the sum total of possible (realized and
unrealized) facts and states of affairs.

Whereas the realization of any

particular fact or state of affairs is a contingent matter, the full
array of possibilities is not.

They determine the totality of linguis-

tic forms, which in turn determine the set of all possible utterances.
According to Wittgenstein, since one cannot affirm or deny what is not
contingent, the appropriate attitude to take toward reality as a whole
is one of amazement or awe before the fact that it is.

Thus the 6's of

the Tractatus arrive at the dramatic conclusion:
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical,
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but that it exists (1922b, 6.44).
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a
whole--a limited whole.
Feeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is
mystical (1922b, 6.45).
He had made the point earlier in more mundane terms:
The 'experience' we need in order to understand logic is
not that something or other is the state of things, but that
something is: that, however, is not an experience.
Logic is prior to every experience--that something is
so.
It is prior to the question 'Bow?', not prior to the
question 'What?' (1922b, 5.552). 157
While I do not want completely to discuss what is involved in viewing
the world sub specie aeterni here, this much is relevant to our present
concerns:

it involves seeing oneself as importantly free from the con-

tingencies of empirical reality.

(We will examine Wittgenstein's reason

for believing this to be so in the next two sections.)

This is the idea

behind his claim that:
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I
should have to include a report on my body, and should have
to say which parts are subordinate to my will, and which
were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there
is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that
book (1922b, 5.631).
The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a
limit of the world (1922b, 5.632).
These passages, written at the peak of some of the worst fighting of
world war I, express Wittgenstein's indifference to how things are in
the world.

Like many persons who undergo severe suffering, Wittgenstein

coped with the experiences he underwent while manning a spotlight amidst
heavy artillery shelling by psychologically 'removing' himself from the
situation.

(of course this bit of biographical information is not in-

Presumably the "How" of the last line is equivalent to the question of how things are among what is contingent; the "What" pertains to
what is possible.
157
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tended to replace an argument for a 'metaphysical' subject, something we
will consider later.)

Being able to stare into the face of death fear-

lessly (which Monk, 1990, p. 138 describes as being of the utmost importance to him) could not have been accomplished without the world being
viewed as having limitations, i.e., as not being able to exercise power
over one's self or soul.
This attitude towards possible facts is correlated with an attitude towards propositional signs.
sitions are of equal value."

Tractatus 6.4 asserts, u(a]ll propo-

Just as one may be indifferent to which

facts obtain, so may one be indifferent to which propositions are true.
This possibility does not in any way preclude entertaining various attitudes towards propositions.

One could continue to believe, remember,

expect, etc., the truth of given propositions.

What one could not do is

entertain such attitudes as hoping, desiring, wishing, craving, disliking, etc., that a given proposition is true.

(These are the so-called

pro-attitudes that confer or express value.)

When one subtracts the

pro-attitudes from the propositional attitudes generally, one is left
with a set of attitudes that are, we might say, topic-neutral with respect to their contents.

They simply view one or another propositional

sign as true or false (in the past, present or future).

They come as

close as possible to being states in which a propositional sign is considered simply as a propositional sign with a potential tor truth and
falsehood.

That is to say, they come as close as anything can to being

states in which one is aware that something or other is a proposition-that the structure asserted or believed is but one among a range of possible structures comprising the same form.
I suggest that to "think of the sense" of a propositional sign involves viewing the structure one is using as one possibility among many.
It is to be aware that it is but a member of a class to which it is internally related.

(This idea that the members of the set are internally
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related appears to run contrary to what is deemed the Color Exclusion
Problem, but really it does not, since each possible state of affairs is
a possibility of the simple objects that are their constituents~ Section
Five, below, deals with this more explicitly.)

Here the point is that

the use of one structure in accordance with rules of syntax involves an
awareness, no matter how marginal, that other structures subject to the
same rules are possible.

Of course one does use one of the structures

of the set, since it corresponds to what one presumes is true, but it is
the fact that its use occurs against the backdrop of these other possibities that accounts for its potential to draw a distinction between
what is (presumed) actual and what is (presumed) possible but not actual.

This may seem like a small point, but in fact what we have been de-

scribing just is how the discrimination within reality, of which we have
spoken, is accomplished.

Here it is useful to retrieve Wittgenstein's

earlier metaphor: a proposition is like an arrow (1922b, 3.144), they
divide the landscape of possibility.

But because one actually uses one

structure among the many, one's utterance has a certain direction:

it

points to this side of the landscape as being (what is presumed to be)
actua1.~•
The projective relation thus involves action within constraint.
The application of the rules of syntax are constrained by the logical
possibilities being what they are (possibilities at which one can but
marvel, since over them one has no control), but these logical possibil,~ Wittgenstein's metaphor at 3.144 has caused a great deal of confusion among commentators, especially when the commentator is tempted to
unpack the metaphor in terms of what is usually called Wittgenstein's
directionality thesis (1922b, 5.2341). One is tempted to unpack it by
thinking of the arrow as moving toward what the speaker thinks is true.
That is not correct~ rather what the speaker thinks is true would have
to be represented by an arrow that intersects the arrow of 3.144 responsible for effecting the discrimination within reality. For all the
criticism directed against Carruthers (1989) in an earlier chapter concerning his quasi-Fregean conception of Wittgenstein's senses, he is
correct on this point (cf. 1989, p. 31).
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ities afford one the possibility of action, i.e., of uttering (for whatever purpose) a structure of a certain sort.
To counsel despair over the passivity and impotence of the will,
when the will is afforded the possibility of action by the logical form
of language and world, is unjustifiable. 151

So is the other extreme po-

sition which sees all logical possibility as stemming from an activity
of the will (more will be said concerning this when be discuss the remarks on solipsism).
point.

Surely either extreme misinterprets Wittgenstein's

If anything, Wittgenstein's view bears a cursory similarity to

the view of Heidegger (1927) where Dasein's being-in-the-world is characterized as a "thrown-thrownness" or a "projected projection." 110
(Sartre (1943) would latter use the terms "facticity" and "transcendence" in a similar vein.)

Here the idea is that human action is always

situated within a concrete context which affords the possibility of action.

For example, in a discussion concerning the nature of signs (in-

cluding signs in nature, e.g., that a storm is coming) Heidegger says,
The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment,
but in its readiness-to-hand the environment becomes in each
case explicitly accessible for circumspection. A sign is
something ontically ready-to hand, which functions both as
this definite equipment and as something indicative of the
ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential
totalities, and of worldhood (1926, pp. 113-114, emphasis
contained in the original text).
What Wittgenstein refers to as the structure of a propositional sign
would certainly be regarded by Heidegger as something ready-to-hand,
that is as something which has a use.

on this Wittgenstein would agree

(recall Tractatus 3.326-3.328 and related passages).

What Heidegger

refers to as the ontological structure of the ready-to-hand is consti-

As Ryle would later say, "we feel no inclination to lament that
Gibbon's pen ran a fatal groove" (1949, p. 79).
,~ we know that Wittgenstein expressed considerable approval of this
work in his conversations with members of the Vienna Circle. Just how
much of it he read, and precisely what he agreed with we do not know.
159
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tuted by a series of relations that holds between a tool in use and
other entities--specifically, the relations between a tool in use and
that out of which the tool is made (its constituents), that towards
which its use is directed (its purpose), and that for the sake of which
it is used (the person or creature for whom the purpose serves a purpose).

The point is that the use of a tool takes place against a hori-

zon in which other entities become Naccessible for circumspection."
Ultimately, for Heidegger, this system of significations includes what
he here refers to as referential totalities and the worldhood [of the
world], i.e., the fact that there is a world at all.

For Heidegger the

same very much holds true for linguistic signs that function essentially
as tools.

Linguistic expressions signify referential totalities and the

world, but they do so not because a particular sign contains all this as
part of its content; rather it does so by virtue of its application as
something ready-to-hand.

One suspects Heidegger would find little to

disagree with in Wittgenstein's contention that "[w)hat signs fail to
express their application shows" (1922b, 3.262).

It is the application

of the sign that relates the sign's structure to a context that includes
its sense.
I believe we have put the nature of projection in the proper
light.

It involves discriminating within reality between what one

thinks is actual and what one thinks is possible but not actual.

This

is accomplished by means of a concrete (hence uttered or inscribed or
imagined) propositional sign that serves as a model (Bild) of a possible
fact that is presumed actual by the speaker.

The mechanics involved in

letting a sign serve as a model are, as we know, two-fold:

(i) names

must go proxy for objects, and (ii) syntactic rules for combining names
(in ways that reflect the possible relations among objects) must be devised or (since an illogical language is impossible) simply learned.

It

is important to stress here that the structure of the model serves as a
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tool (its components being mechanisms" 1 ) by means of which reference and
truth is accomplished.

Otherwise, one is tempted to attribute to

Wittgenstein the view that the structure or content of thought is an
immediate object of awareness while the fact or state of affairs of
which that structure is true or false (its Bedeutung) serves as a sort
of transcendent object of awareness.

This mistake is presumably what

lies at the heart of Carruthers' (1989) misconstrual of Wittgensteinian
Sinne as guasi-Fregean entities.

Such an interpretation fails to do

justice to the realist influence of Moore and Russell upon Wittgenstein,
and in effect would render the Tractatus susceptible to the sorts of
epistemological worries Moore directed against Bradley.

For

Wittgenstein, though, the structure--whether uttered or thought--has no
sense or meaning in itself, but only as it is used by some subject.

The

structure is a stepping-stone to the world:
The fact that the elements of a picture are related to
one another in a determinate way represents that things are
related to one another in the same way.
Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure
of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this
structure the pictorial form of the picture (1922b, 2.15).
That is how a picture is attached to reality~ it reaches
right out to it (1922b, 2.1511, emphasis added).
It is laid against reality like a measure (1922b,
2.1512).
Although the structure of the propositional sign is in itself a fact, it
is not that which one's awareness or discourse is about, as one would
expect, given Wittgenstein's views concerning a theory of types:

be-

cause a structure cannot contain itself (that being a physical impossiIn his Lent Term lecture of 19 30 he is recorded as saying, uthe
proposition, having multiplicity, is therefore a complex. Its constituents are words. Have words meaning apart from their occurrence in
propositions? words function only in propositions, like the levers of a
machine. Apart from propositions they have no function, no meaning"
(Lee, 1982, p. 2). The passage is transitional, given its last sentence, but clearly the rest of is consistent with the way Frege's context principle reemerges in the Tractatus.
161
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bility), a propositional sign cannot be about itself. 162 Because the
structure serves as a mechanism only, it must be sharply contrasted with
views which countenance the sort of mental content under attack by
Moore.

Bradley's ideas (1883), Frege's Sinne (1892a, 1918) (on either

interpretation), Husserl's noema (1913) (if I understand that term correctly~ cf. Aguila (1977, p. 115), while all playing a similar rOle,
must be distinguished from Wittgenstein's thought-structures by virtue
of the latter's not being some sort of intentional object.
Let us turn to the question of whether the projective relation is
essentially the same for both atomic and molecular propositions.
respect it would have to be.

In one

In the preceding paragraphs we basically

treated the unanalyzed sentences of ordinary language as analogous to
elementary propositions.

(The fact that the nature of elementary propo-

sitions is usually explicated by commentators by means of ordinary sentences like "The cat is on the mat" is the flip side of the coin.)

Our

comments really pertained to any sentences subject to syntactic rules
whatsoever.

Let us just assume that the foregoing discussion holds for

all linguistic tokens, whether elementary or ordinary and unanalyzed)
that contain no sentence forming operators.
containing operators?

But now what of sentences

The fact is that these sentences pose less diffi-

culty than those from which operators are absent, since they even more
obviously possess the holism of sense expressed by the minimal truth
table.

This just means that in the case of sentences containing opera-

tors it is not neccessary to prove that the component sentences--which
in the elementary proposition's case is the elementary propositional
sign itself (1922b, 5)--contain the potential of having all operations
performed upon them.

The existence of molecular propositions, on the

This is undoubtedly what Wittgenstein is trying to express, somewhat unclearly, at 3.13 when he says, "(a] proposition includes all that
the projection includes, but not what is projected ••• " It would have
been clearer to say that the structure by means of which representation
occurs cannot be what is represented.
182
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other hand, presupposes the possibility of operations and their continual application.
For molecular propositions the sense per se is represented by the
entire column containing the matrix for the operator with the widest
scope.

Since all propositions with sense are contingent, this column

will contain both T's and F's.
is TFFF.
Q

For example, the matrix for conjunction

When one asserts P & Q, however, one is not asserting that P &

is false under those conditions where one or more of the conjuncts is

false; obviously, one is asserting that P

& Q

is true.

The right thing

to say is that one is asserting something that would be false under
those conditions.

These conditions belong to the sense of the proposi-

tional sign and not to what the speaker believes or asserts as being the
Bedeutung.w

facts.

Anyhow, there corresponds to any matrix a modeling of the

The particular connective (hence structure) one employs express-

es, not only what one holds true, but the other logical possibilities
one must countenance if one understands what one is saying. 104
that one asserts P

& Q

rather than, say, P v

Q

The fact

shows that one counte-

nances one range of possibilities (TFFF) rather than another (TTTF).
Consequently, not only does the choice of structure effect a discrimination within reality (as reflected within the matrix), it brings about
one modeling of the facts among many (as reflected by its being one matrix among many).

In this direction lies the holism of sense exhibited

Needless to say, should P & Q turn out false, whatever the
Bedeutung is will be represented by whichever F corresponds to the
facts. we need to remember that the meaning of a propositional sign is
independent of a speaker's intentions. The speaker's intentions to assert a particular fact is reflected in the structure she chooses.
Strictly speaking, the view of the Tractatus is that what one means and
what one intends to mean need not coincide. This is not paradoxical so
long as we do not interpret Bedeutung psychologistically.
184 This account of what is involved in thinking about the sense of a
propositional sign is indistinguishable from an account of what it is to
understand a sign and serves as an explication of the primacy of understanding over knowledge (introduced in the argument for the bipolarity
of the proposition).
183
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by the minimal truth table.

The sole logical constant and the inter-de-

finability of logical operations secures this status for the matrix.
Thus, if anything, the u•experience' we need in order to understand
logic" (1922b, 5.552) becomes more prominent in the case of molecular
propositions.

The fact that the selection of structure constitutes a

selection of one model among many will become important below in our
consideration of the remarks on solipsism.
The essence of the proposition, then, consists in the propositional sign taken together with its projective relation to the world (i.e.,
to reality in the wide sense).

The projective relation is something

accomplished by thinking of the sense of a sentence.

That requires see-

ing the structure of one's utterance (or thought) as one structure among
many.

Thus a discrimination within reality is effected between what the

speaker believes is actual and what she thinks is not actual but merely
possible.

No significant difference exists between atomic and molecular

propositions on this count.

At bottom, we have an account of the

essence of the proposition that assigns a great role to human volition-to the selection of structures and models.

This is something it shares

with the anti-empiricism of the earlier relational theories of judgment.
Unlike those relational theories, however, it countenances a representational medium.

Yet, in contrast to other theories that countenance men-

tal 'contents,' this medium cannot be said to be the immediate object of
awareness or judgment.

Furthermore, unlike the the earlier relational

theories, what one can think or say is constrained

by

the logical possi-

bilities, i.e., the logical form shared by language, thought, and world.
Here we are as far as possible from Meinong's jungle and Moore's entities that have Being but not existence.
With the essence of the proposition on the table, a new difficulty
arises for the semantics of the Tractatus.

What is to be made of the

sentences that comprise the theory itself?

(This is the topic that ani-
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mated the Vienna Circle discussions in 1930-1931, up until the presentation of Godel's paper in 1931.)

The theory purports to provide an ac-

count of the very essence of the proposition.

The properties attributed

to propositions (bipolarity, meaning and sense, the projective relation)
are necessary properties, and the statements used to describe them would
need to be regarded as necessarily true.

Consider the sentence uAll

propositions consist in a propositional sign along with its projective
relation to the world" which states the essence of the proposition.
us call this P*.

Let

P* cannot be considered contingently true, since it

seems to follow from the very nature of language itself.
utter P* (as Wittgenstein has) P* must be true.

If one can

This fact is behind

Wittgenstein's contention that "[l]ogic is transcendental" (1922b, 6.13)
and unlike any of the natural sciences ( 1922b, 4 .111) • 1 ••

But this puts

the propositions of the Tractatus in a dubious light, since only propositions that are contingent have sense.

And while there are senseless

tautologies and contradictions within our language, P* cannot be regarded as one of them.

P* simply lacks the structure of a tautology or con-

tradiction, and presumably it cannot be analyzed into a string that is
tautologous or contradictory. 166
Yet statements like P* convey important truths.

To accommodate

this fact, Wittgenstein's semantics are expanded so as to include nonsensical (unsinnig) sentences.

The sort of nonsense of which the

Tractatus consists should not be confused that with the kind of nonsense
that consists, say, of a jumble of words:

"Blue John taller smelly if."

185 Here too we have the source of his claim that u [ i] n philosophy
there are no deductions: it is purely descriptive" (1913b, 106). It
cannot contain deductions, because deduction occurs among sentences that
have sense.
188 Baker ( 1987) attempts to show that using a sentence to deny sentences have certain essential semantic properties amounts to uttering
something that is pragmatically incoherent. If the Picture Theory were
true, affirming P*, on her view, would come close to being an empty tautology. For criticism of her view from the perspective of the later
Wittgenstein, see Levvis (1992).

297

They are, he tells us, rungs of a ladder one must throw away after it
has been climbed (1922b, 6.54).
In order to arrive at a greater understanding of Wittgenstein's
conception of nonsense, we should look more closely at what he says
about other kinds of statements (besides those found in the Traatatus)
that purport to be necessarily true.

It seems strange on the one hand

that the Tractatus would contain an account of necessity in terms of the
logical necessity contained in tautologies and contradictions, while on
the other hand characterize its own statements as in some sense necessary or a priori.

we need to unpack what this sense is.

The other

major 'non-contingent' forms of statement that he considers are statements of scientific laws and moral maxims.

Both turn out to be nonsen-

sical too.
Moral maxims, taking the form of categorical imperatives, he dismisses out of hand.

As he puts it, "[w]hen an ethical law of the form,

'Thou shalt •.• ', is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do
not do it?"' (1922b, 6.422).

There is a great deal that could be said

about the meta-ethics of the Tractatus and Notebooks, indeed the bulk of
the passage just cited has to do with the concepts of punishment and reward (which he claims cannot be consequences of an action but must somehow reside in the action itself) • 1 • 1

Here let it suffice to say that it

appears he dismisses the possibility of such maxims on the grounds that
such 'laws' are incompatible with existence of human freedom, that is,
with the exercise of the will.

Readers familiar with Kant's

Foundations (1784) will no doubt be suspicious of this claim, and will
want to argue that Wittgenstein conflates two different types of statement that might be expressed by "S must do x."

The claim can be inter-

preted as descriptive (that is, one that expresses a psychological law

167 My opinions concerning the meta-ethics in these two works is contained in Levvis (1994).

298

pertaining to the production of human behavior), or as prescriptive
(i.e., one that states how one ought to act when faced with a choice of
actions).

Clearly, if it is a statement about how one will act, it is

contingent and susceptible to counter-example, but what if it is a prescriptive claim?

A lengthy discussion of Wittgenstein's ethics (indis-

tinguishable from his views on religion, art and culture) is out of the
question here.

Suffice it to say that for Wittgenstein even if

us

must

do x" is a prescriptive claim, it is in some way contingent.

Ifs must

do x, then doing x must, he says, carry some kind of reward.

But given

his view that the subject of the will is not a part of empirical reality, "ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual
sense of the terms" (1922b, 6.422).

Reward and punishment, happiness

and unhappiness, cannot be events that occur in the world; they must
"reside in the action itself" (1922b, 6.422). 168

Wittgenstein goes even

further to say that goodness and badness cannot reside in the physical
action itself but in the good or bad exercise of the will (1914b, p.
87).

(Basically he argues that to will is to act; 1914b, p. 87).

The

will, which we have already seen is the source of projection, is not a
part of the world but a necessary condition for talking or thinking
about it.

What is good or bad in the world, the hardness of the "must"

in "S must do x" depends on the will.

And whether the exercise of the

will is good or bad depends--on the will.

Wittgenstein's account of

moral statements assimilates them either to (i} statements of psychological law, in which case they are either (a) subject to counter-example
or (b) if truly law-like, subject to the criticism directed against scientific laws (that we are about to consider), or (ii) statements concerning the will from which the contingency of the good and bad flows.
Clearly it is the second of these alternatives that Wittgenstein takes
Wittgenstein is like a deontologist who tries to describe his view
in consequentialist terms, while at the same time renouncing ethical rationalism.
188
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most seriously (1922b, 6.423).

Given the status of the will, this just

means "[i]t is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the
subject of ethical attributes (1922b, 6.423, emphasis added).
Wittgenstein's views regarding what appear to be scientific laws
are found primarily in Tractatus 6.3-6.372.

That set of passages ends

with the remarkable claim that:
[t]he whole modern conception of the world is founded on
the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomea (1022b, 6.371).
For Wittgenstein there can be no scientific laws--no categorical statements about facts or events in the physical world that are exceptionless--because "outside logic everything is accidental" (1922b, 6.3). All
the facts that occur in the world are accidental (1922b, 6.41).

The

generality attributable to categorical statements "means no more than to
be accidentally valid for all things" (1922b, 6.231).
Believing this to be the case, some sort of account of the nature
of sentences like "Water boils at lOOc" must be given.

Without going

into arguments concerning essentialism, rigid designation or matters
concerning trans-world identity, let us assume this is a candidate for a
scientific law and that it (might) express a necessary a posteriori
truth.

What sort of account of it would Wittgenstein give?

out, in these matters Wittgenstein is a disciple of Hertz.

As it turns
(It is from

Hertz's conception of a dynamical model in Principles of Mechanics
(1899) that Wittgenstein draws his thesis concerning the need for there
to be an isomorphism between pictorial elements and objects represented:
cf. Tractatus 4.04.)

With respect to scientific laws, Wittgenstein de-

rives from Hertz the idea that statements of such laws function primarily as either formation rules for other statements that are about particular objects, or as statements about the forming of such rules.

In one

of the most sustained discussions concerning any single topic in the
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Tractatus, he says,
••• Newtonian mechanics ••• imposes a unified form on the
description of the world. Let us imagine a white surface
with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever
kind of picture these make, I can always approximate as
closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the
surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this
way I shall have imposed a unified form on the description
of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have
achieved the same result using a net with a triangular or
hexagonal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would
have made the description simpler: that is to say, it might
be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a
coarse triangular mesh than with a fine square mesh (or conversely), and so on. The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that
all propositions used in the description of the world must
be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositionsthe axioms of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks for
building the edifice of science, and it says, nAny building
that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be
constructed with these bricks, and with these alone (1922b,
6.341).

Interpreting Wittgenstein's passage is not easy.

The claim that

the axioms of mechanics introduce a form of description that is in some
way optional might strike a chord with our earlier discussion of molecular propositions as providing one model among many.

It is tempting,

using Quinean hindsight, to say that theories are groups of molecular
sentences, and that there is nothing except the size of the linguistic
unit that distinguishes our earlier considerations from the present one.
Just as the smaller unit might effect a discrimination within reality,
so might the larger unit.

That, however, is not Wittgenstein's view.

His is that a theory--specifically, the statement of a law--has the same
sort of standing as the arbitrary conventions underlying language use.
Since syntactic conventions reflect nothing more than speakers' choices
(preferences, tastes, etc.), they are appropriately thought of as expressions of the will~ consequently they fall within the domain of the
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nonsensica1. 1 ••

In criticism, it can be argued that it is difficult to

see how Wittgenstein can sustain this claim, since surely the structure
of any proposition whatsoever reflects a choice on the part of the
speaker, and these are not nonsensical.
Furthermore, how could "Water boils at l00c" be the mere expression of an arbitrary convention?

Surely we could change our conven-

tions, and the facts would stay the same.
a people who only count to 90.

Suppose, for example, we are

we do not measure lengths over 90 me-

ters, weights over 90 grams, temperatures over 90c, etc.

The word

"boiling" is npwhere in our vocabulary; instead we have a word "choiling" which denotes--for people who use "boiling"--almost boiling.

This

difference in the 'mesh' clearly cannot entail there is no such thing as
water boiling at 100c; that cannot be the result of an arbitrary convention.

So, on the face of it, Wittgenstein's view seems highly implausi-

ble.
Matters seem to worsen when we consider that Wittgenstein admits
he regards these different possible frameworks as referring to real objects in the world.

This is why he says, "[t]he laws of physics, with

all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, about objects of the world" (1922b, 6.3431).

Objects in the world contain vari-

ous possibilities for combination, and a diverse number of facts (including such facts as being water or being hot) are produced by their
Janik and Toulmin ( 197 3) provide an excellent discussion of
Wittgenstein's concerns with style, taste, and culture. Wittgenstein's
own aesthetic sensibilities moved in the direction of austerity and lack
of unnecessary adornment, a fact not unrelated to his distinction between showing and saying. In a 4 September 1917 letter to Paul
Engelmann concerning a poem by Uhland of which he approved, he had written: "And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is
unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be--unutterably--contained in what has been uttered" (quoted in Monk, 1990, p.
151).
Many of Wittgenstein's comments, ranging from 1914 to 1951, concerning style and culture have been collected under the title Culture and
Value ( 1984).
189
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combinations.

What the net allows, if the metaphor may be pursued, is

for some rather than other facts to be caught in its mesh.

The proper

way to state Wittgenstein's view would be by saying the conventions one
adopts allow one to speak about certain aspects of the world as opposed
Consequently, it would not be appropriate to ascribe to him

to others.

some sort of radical Idealist position according to which the contents
of a theory are wholly conventional.

That being so, how are we to make

sense out of Wittgenstein's thesis that scientific laws are a kind of
Let us try to unpack the imagery of 6.341 a bit.

nonsense?

Let us refer to the different 'meshes' or schemata in the following way.

The schema employing a fine square mesh will be schemas,

whereas that employing a triangular mesh will be schema T.

Schema S

will employ a grid containing two axes whose coordinates are a 1 ••• an and
b 1 ••• bn.

The language of schema S users will contain the predicates "is

black" and "is white."
forth.

One may then say, "{a 1 , b 1 } is black" and so

(I do not think Wittgenstein's example is very well constructed,

since it allows for the possibility of indeterminacy in those case where
a square is only partly black.

Perhaps the difficulty could be avoided

by replacing the predicates with "contains some blackness" and "contains
some whiteness.")

Schema Twill less fine grained.

Where there are

four distinguishable units within schema S's {a 1-a 2 , b 1 -b2 }, Schema T
will contain only two.
of S: w, x, y, and z.

Let us name each of the squares in this quadrant
The language of Swill then allow one to assert

(deny, conjoin, disjoin, etc.) such sentences as "w is (or contains)
black(ness)."

The language of T, on the other hand, will contain fewer

possible sentences, because it will employ only two names wheres employs four.
We can now raise the problem anew.

Why is it not possible to

treat scientific laws as ranging over sets of entities, such that sentences like "w is (or contains) black(ness)" are contingently true?
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Unless evidence to the contrary can be evinced, it would seem
Wittgenstein's thesis that scientific laws do not have sense should be
rejected.

That would leave us in a precarious position in trying to

make intelligible his conception of nonsense.
It seems to me that Wittgenstein would argue that there is something misleading about the way the example unfolded above.

The 'conjur-

ing trick' (as he might later say) occurs at the stage at which we supposedly name the different quadrants w, x, y, and z.
these are not names of objects.

The fact is that

we can see that this is the case, if we

consider what _the real objects are that are referred to by the sentences
of sand T.

The real objects are the black spots on the white surface.

If anything, reference to them is contained in the predicates of sentences like "w is (or contains) black(ness)."

(Of course the predicate,

which refers to the fact or property of being black, would have to be
analyzed in some fashion to arrive at singular terms referring to objects.)

we might say that a sentence like "w is (or contains)

black(ness)" is systematically misleading, inasmuch as the grammatical
subject appears to refer to some kind of object, but in fact no such object exists.

The terms w, x, y, and z are really a part of the coordi-

nate system. If they refer to anything, they refer to quadrants of the
grid itself.

But the quadrants of the grid are not the objects to which

we are allowed to refer by means of the grid.
This account helps us to make sense out of Wittgenstein's imagery.
Applying his view to actual statements of (purported) scientific laws is
not so easy however.

The grammatical subject of "Water boils at 100c"

does not appear to be comparable to the terms w, x, y, and z.
something.

Water is

If Wittgenstein's view is defensible, it will have to bear-

gued that sentences like the above are somehow equivalent to sentences
that express syntactic rules or that they attempt to state something
about the setting up of these rules (that is, about the projective rela-
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tion) that makes the modeling of facts by means of structures possible.
This is possible.

Perhaps anticipating an objection, Wittgenstein

reminds his readers "that any description of the world by means of mechanics will be of the completely general kind.
never mention particular point-masses:

point-masses whatsoever (1922b, 6.3432).

For example, it will

it will only talk about any
we will not be able to see why

this is relevant without a better example of a scientific law than
"Water boils at lOOc."
law at all.

Strictly speaking, this is not a statement of a

we see this if we translate it into the predicate logic.

Allowing w to _denote "is water" and B to denote "boils at lOOc," it may
be translated as (x) (Wx==> Bx).

Here the strict implication symbol is

used to capture the idea implicit in regarding the original sentence as
a law that being water necessarily implies being able to boil at 100c.
If being water does necessarily imply being able to boil at 100c (which
we will assume for the sake of argument), then for Wittgenstei~ it must
be possible to define water in terms of the later property or in terms
of combinations of objects (e.g., e 2o) that make such a property possible.

The strict implication disappears upon analysis, as it must since

the relations among the objects referred to in the analysis must be
purely contingent.
What is missing from "Water boils at 100c" is any reference to the
forces acting upon water in virtue of which it boils at 100c.
Scientific laws relate one series of facts or events to another series
of facts or events; they do not simply consist of definitions.

While

still overly simplistic (though not too simplistic for our purposes), a
better example would be "If a 2o molecules are subjected to k force,
their molecular bonds will break."

This sentence has the requisite

qualities of being general, predictive and it ranges over fact or events
that are not identical to one another:

being an a 2o molecule is not the

same fact that being kinetic energy happens to be.

305

If we allow H to de-

note "is e 2o," K to denote "is subjected to k force," M to denote "is a
molecular bond of," and B to denote "will break," then our law can be
translated:

(x) (y) {[(Bx & Kx) & Mxy)

~

By}.

As with our earlier

sentence, reference to water is made in the antecedent and the consequent since y presumably is a constituent of x~ and, as with the original, the consequent makes reference to boiling, i.e., the breaking of
molecular bonds.

However a more explicit definition of K would reveal

that the antecedent refers to objects that the consequent does not.
(Here it is helpful to remember that the ontology was carried by the
predicate "is _black" in the original example.)

To be subjected to k

force is to be acted upon by some 'entity• that exerts such force.

(For

our purpose we do not need to consider the nature of this entity~ doing
so would require going into detail concerning the phenomena that define
mean kinetic energy.)

we may say that K ranges over objects k 1 , k 2 ,

k 3 , ••• , kn, and that none of these are values of x.

The problem with which Wittgenstein is concerned now begins to
emerge. 170

The scientific law asserts a necessary connection between two

types of facts (or events or objects):

the objects that are K necessar-

ily affect the objects that are Hin a certain way.

Indeed, they affect

them in such a way that the existence of objects that are H depend upon
those that are K, since once its molecular bond is broken an object that
is H will cease to exist.

This is problematic, because different types

of facts (Tatsachen containing non-coextensive sets of objects as constituents) must be contingent for their existence upon nothing other
than the contingent relations that obtain among their constituents.
This situation would be reflected in language by the fact that the truth
of a proposition about one type of fact would cease to be independent of
the truth of a proposition about the other kind of fact.

But since ele-

110 The reader is asked to remember that the following comments are
part of an attempt to explicate, not defend, Wittgenstein's view.
Criticism will be offered in Section Five below.
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mentary propositions must be logically independent of one another, so
must the molecular propositions which decompose into them.
Now the question concerning how the imagery of Tractatus 6.341 is
to be applied to genuine statements of scientific law can be posed by
asking what in the scientific law corresponds to the terms that refer to
the quadrants of the grid in Wittgenstein's passage.

Our job might be

facilitated by formulating a sentence with the structure of a law using
that imagery.

Following the same general pattern, we know that to the

left of the strict implication symbol there must be reference both to
the schema anq to the objects to which the schema refers, while to the
right of it there must be reference to the the objects themselves or to
parts of the objects themselves.

As a rough approximation, we might say

"Given any white surface with black spots (objects) and schemas, then
necessarily a certain quantity of blackness (0%-100%) will be found in

w, x, y, z, etc."

The point, I think, is that the schema determines the

kind of property ascribed tow and the other quadrants.

Having an ex-

panse of blackness of a certain percentage is determined by the size and
shape of the quadrant (which admittedly belongs to the schema itself).
The predicate "is 80% black" is (partly at least) a reflection of the
schema that is employed in describing the surface.

The qualification

here concerns the fact that "black" within the predicate does pick out
an object or an aspect of an object.

The system that permits predic-

tion, however, employs predicates of a more specific nature (as "is 80%
black" is more specific than "is black").

As I understand Wittgenstein,

he may be regarded as a kind of instrumentalist with respect to these
predicates:

they make calculation and prediction (concerning some do-

main of objects), but they do not in themselves carry any ontological
commitment.

Such a view does not seem implausible; predicates inter-

pretable along instrumentalist lines are a working part of the natural
sciences (Friedman, 1981).

And Wittgenstein's version of it is vague
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enough to escape specific criticisms directed against more worked out
forms of instrumentalism (for example, against Reichenbach's (1938)
views on the relation between abstracta and concreta).
cisms will be saved until Section Five below.

Our own criti-

Even though we have tried

to cast Wittgenstein's views in as favorable light as possible, there is
considerable confusion contained within them to which we shall turn
later.
we are now in a position to explain the nature of nonsense.

The

nature of nonsense can be elusive, because in order to figure out what
it is we need to rely upon Wittgenstein's analysis of sentences that
state scientific laws, yet on countless occasions he asserts the utter
dissimilarity of science and philosophy.

As we will see, a certain

asymmetry does exist in the way each contains nonsense, but it is negligible.
Nonsense arises when one attempts to say the unsayable.
Specifically, it arises when one attempts to convey a necessary truth
that is not tautologous.

More specifically yet, it results from an at-

tempt to express in an inappropriate way the necessary conditions for
language use and for thinking.

While the Tractatus consists from start

to finish of nonsensical sentences, the central most important is perhaps that which occurs at 3.12 where the essence of the proposition is
given as a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.
When we unpack the concept of projection, we find at the heart of language and thought the willing subject.

We find choices concerning which

structure among a proposition's form is to be uttered.

Such choices

must be made, inasmuch as representation requires a concrete structure.
The production of utterances, inscriptions, thoughts and other propositional signs is not merely a part of the phonetic, syntactic or pragmatic features of language; rather it belongs to the very essence of language, to the very possibility of representation.
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A child incapable of

using some structured medium for the purpose of representation is not

otherwise able to represent to itself the facts or states of affairs of
this world.

(This is a fact that will become even more relevant below

when we consider Wittgenstein's remarks on solipsism.)

Representation

presupposes the human will. 171
If we were to conjoin all the theses that constitute Tractarian
semantics and represent the theory as a whole by

w,

we might say that

the occurrence of any propositional sign with sense necessarily implies

W; hence, to maintain the correctness of Tractarian semantics is to hold
true:

(P) (P

.=>

W).

Here P ranges over propositional signs (i.e., lin-

guistic tokens) that possess sense.

w contains

all that must be true,

particularly those claims about the role of the will, if a given proposition is to have a sense.

Of course, this formula is itself nonsensi-

cal (which corresponds to the fact that the Tractatus not only contains
nonsense but also nonsensical sentences about nonsense, e.g., 4.124),
and is thus contained in

w.

posed to Russell's) Paradox.

We might call this Wittgenstein's (as opIf the sentences of the Tractatus say any-

thing at all, they say (of themselves) that they are nonsensical.
they are nonsensical, they do not say anything at all.

If

Hence, if the

sentences of the Tractatus say anything at all, they do not say anything
at all.

The self-referential nature of

logical use of language.

w precludes its inclusion in the

This is why Wittgenstein says u[a] philosophi-

cal work consists essentially of elucidations (Erlauterungen)" (1922b,
4.112), and it goes a long way toward explaining the non-argumentative
style of the book.

Since inferences can only hold among sentences with

a sense, it would be misleading at best to argue for Tractarian semantics.

we will have an opportunity to consider the implications of all

171 Of historical significance is the influence upon Wittgenstein of
Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason and on the Will in Nature (1881). See Janik and Toulmin (1973),
pp. 120ff for discussion.
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this in Section Five.
We may now ask, just what distinguishes the nonsensical expressions of the Tractatus from such nonsense strings as "red up down white
only only?n

The nonsensical expressions of the Tractatus are about

something; indeed, they are about something very important.

Like the

nonsense string written here, though, they have no use within the domain
of rational discourse.

This distinguishes them from sentences that ei-

ther have a sense or are senseless.

Yet unlike the gibberish above,

which we might term bad nonsense, the possibility of good nonsense resides in the nature of language itself. 112

If Tractarian semantics is

true, the attempt to put the necessary conditions for the possibility of
any representation whatsoever into words will inevitably produce something that has neither sense, nor is senseless, nor is bad nonsense like
that mentioned above.

Such utterances are, quite literally, expres-

sions--they spring from one's desire or (better) willingness to say what
cannot be said.

To the extent that these utterances look like ordinary

sentences that do have sense, they are misleading.

we saw this from the

very beginning when we were examining the imagery found in Tractatus
6.341.

Recall how the description of the white surface with black spots

incorporated what appear to be singular terms (w, x, y, and z); later it
was determined that these are not genuine referring expressions at all.
Similarly, in the case of actual scientific laws we find predicates
This sort of distinction is commonplace among Wittgenstein's commentators. Hacker divides the pie even further, distinguishing overt
(bad) from covert (good) nonsense and then subdividing the latter into
misleading and illuminating nonsense (1972, p. 18). As Hacker puts it,
"[i]lluminating nonsense will guide the attentive hearer or reader to
apprehend what is shown by other propositions which do not purport to be
philosophical; moreover it will intimate, to those who grasp what is
meant, its own illegitimacy" (1972, p. 18). This is what distinguishes
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (with its own ontology) from the great metaphysical works of philosophers such as Hegel. Viewed in this light we
might say--in contradistinction to Whitehead's famous claim about Plato-that all of western metaphysics is but a preliminary note to Wittgenstein.
172
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which must be interpreted instrumentally.

These expressions cannot be

analyzed out by means of Russell's Theory of Descriptions or by any
other technique, for at bottom there is nothing contingent into which
they may be analyzed.

To the extent that these expressions are about

anything whatsoever, they are about the activity of the willing subject.
That is to say, they are about the projective relation itself.
3.

Ascriptions of Propositional Attitudes.

One of the most intriguing passages in the Tractatus is that
occurring at 5.542:
It is clear ••• that 'A believes p', 'A
arid 'A says p' are of the form "' p" says
not involve a correlation of a fact with
rather the correlation of facts by means
of their objects (1922b, 5.542).

has the thought p',
p' : and this does
an object, but
of the correlation

The most striking feature of this passage is the way any reference to
the subject who thinks, believes or says Pis removed.

Given all we

have said about the role played by will in establishing a projective relation between propositional sign and world, the removal of any reference to the subject is rather startling.

The passage does not become

any less puzzling in light of what now seems to be its standard interpretation by commentators.

Typical is the following:

[T)o say that a person believes that pis to say (or,
rather, to show) that the propositional sign 'P' (which is a
fact) represents or mirrors the fact that p (see 5.542).
The original form of words which prima facie is about the
person A in this way turns out to be about a proposition
which is somehow connected with A. This proposition is
taken by Wittgenstein to be a part of the "subjectn
A••• (Hintikka, 1958, p. 159).
The usual response to Tractatus 5.542 is to treat it as expressing a
view similar to a Humean bundle or cluster theory of the self.

It is

interpreted as similar in spirit to the view expressed by Russell and
Whitehead (1910), according to which the uttering of a sentence is
" ••• part of the series of events that constitutes the person" (1910, p.
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661; as quoted in Copi, 1958, p. 164).
sign

But of course a propositional

by itself is not a proposition; so even if the uttered sign is a

constituent of the language user, it is hardly possible to reduce our
talk about propositions and propositional attitude ascriptions to talk
about propositional signs.

Even if the cluster theory is correct, there

must be some story to tell in answer to the question, uTo whom are
propositional attitudes ascribed?"

We would want some kind of account

of how the utterance-producing portion of a person is related to the
other cognitive and conative portions of a person. 173

So it would seem

to be necessary to refer to a subject A in some manner or other, even if
we replace talk of A as a unity with talk of A-parts.

Is it not the

case that it is simply false that the sign P says P, but rather that a
speaker

says P by means of P?

Let us get clear on precisely what sort of view Wittgenstein is
attacking.

The context of the passage makes clear that he is attacking

the kind of theory of judgment advocated by Moore and Russell (see
1922b, 5.541).

These are relational theories of judgment.

amined Moore's theory at some length in Chapter I.
come up on numerous occasions.

we have ex-

Russell's views have

Some further description of his theory

of judgment is in order here, as it is primarily Russell (1912) with
whom Wittgenstein arguing.
Like Moore (1899), Russell believes that there can be an unmediated relation to the objects of awareness and judgment; this is accomplished by way of the special psychological relation of acquaintance
which we described back in Chapter III.

On this view the propositional

attitude ascription uothello believes Desdemona loves Cassio" is to be
analyzed as asserting a relation (believing) with four terms (Othello,
173 This challenge is readily acknowledged by Fodor ( 1983) who, by
virtue of the mental sententialism he has so adamantly defended, deserves to be regarded as the foremost proponent of Tractatus-like semantics. His and Lepore's (1992) recent defense of atomism (or, rather,
attack on the arguments for holism) confirms this.
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Desdemona, the loving of ••• by ••• , and Cassio.

Othello is related by the

believing relation to these three other things.,,.

Russell's view can be

contrasted with Moore's in that several objects, rather than a unitary
proposition (fact) serve as the object of belief.

This permits Russell

to account for falsehood without recourse to "objective falsehoods"
(1912, p. 125).
Believing that Desdemona loves Cassio cannot merely consist in a
series of relations to Desdemona, Cassio and the relation of loving,
since those are related in a certain kind of way.

The sentence ucassio

loves Desdemona" contains the same three constituents, but fails to express what it is that Othello believes.

How are the constituents of

what is to believed to be related (by Othello) in the proper sort of
way?

And how are they related so as to distinguish what Othello be-

lieves from what is contained in such gibberish (bad nonsense) as "loves
Cassio Desdemona?"
The Russell of 1912 maintains (somewhat metaphorically) that the
objects of Othello's belief (and objects of our belief about Othello's
belief) are "knit together" in the appropriate way by the subject who
judges (1912, p, 126).

Any judgment involving a two (or more) place

predicate requires an ordering of the terms by the judging subject.
Thus, for Othello, Desdemona stands in the loving relation to Cassio,
and not vice versa.

Othello orders the terms of his belief thus:

Ldc

This permits Russell to accommodate falsehood by positing contingent relations among objects that really exist.

(Apparent references to unreal

objects are, as mentioned earlier, analyzed away using the Theory of
Descriptions.)

So if Othello's belief is false, there is no need to

Actually these are not all known by
Cassio are not objects of acquaintance at
are to be analyzed as involving knowledge
plicity's sake this will be ignored since
pens upon knowledge by acquaintance. Our
Othello to Desdemona and Cassio should be
174
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acquaintance, as Desdemona and
all. References to persons
by description, but for simknowledge by description dereference to the relation of
understood in this way.

construe his belief as involving a relation to the objective falsehood
or false fact of Desdemona loving Cassio (which on Moore's account would
have Being but not existence).
Similarly, our judgment of Othello as believing that Desdemona
loves Cassio involves the ordering of four terms.

we affirm of Othello

(o) that he stands in the believing relation (B) to Desdemona (d) loving
(L) and Cassio (c) ~ hence:

B(oLdc) • 175

The analysis stands in stark

contrast to Wittgenstein's view, since it includes reference to the subject of belief (Othello) •
As is well known, Russell was working diligently on the unpublished manuscript Theory of Knowledge in 1913.

Over a period of weeks

he had sustained an average of twelve pages per day.

The work was in-

tended to develop the principal lines of The Problems of Philosophy.
Wittgenstein was extremely critical of Problems (which he denounced as a
shilling-shocker, i.e., something designed merely to line Russell's
pockets).

Of the new work Wittgenstein was no less critical.

In June

of 1913 Russell had received a letter from him outlining a criticism
which Russell later remarked in a letter to Ottoline Morell as being "an
event of first-rate importance in my life" (as quoted in Eames, 1984, p.
xvi).

It was, in fact, to cripple Russell's work.

It had such an ef-

fect that "I saw that I could not hope ever again to do fundamental work
in philosophy.

My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces

against a breakwater" (Eames, p. xxvi). 176

While we do not have a full

account of the exchanges between Russell and Wittgenstein, we do have a
letter postmarked to Russell in June of 1913 in which Wittgenstein asThe power of this view comes into focus when quantification is introduced, since the scope of the quantifiers enables Russell to accommodate some of our true ascriptions of false beliefs to others (something
Moore was unable to do). Since we are dealing with ascriptions where it
is assumed all the terms exist, we need not pursue the matter here. As
we will see, though, Russell cannot account for true ascriptions of
false beliefs in which all the terms do exist.
176 This letter is dated 4 March 1914.
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serts
••• I can now express my objection to your theory of judgment exactly: I believe it is obvious that, from the
proposition uA judges that (say) a is in relation R to
b", if correctly analyzed, the proposition "a R b.v.
-a Rb" must follow directly without the use of any
other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by
your the~ry (in 1912, p. 122).
Since the letter is dated two months after Russell's letter to Ottoline
Morrell, we can infer that this is not quite the way Wittgenstein had
expressed his criticism originally.

Russell must not have expressed to

Wittgenstein how significant he felt the latter's criticism to be until
later.

A

22 July 1913 letter from Wittgenstein to Russell responds to

the news:
••• I am very sorry to hear that my objection to your theory of judgment paralyses you. I think it can only be removed by a correct theory of propositions (in 1912, p. 122,
emphasis added).

What was the original objection?

Most of what we know about what tran-

spired between Wittgenstein and Russell during this time can be garnered
from Wittgenstein's (1913b) "Notes on Logic."

These "Notes" are actual-

ly a series of manuscripts, prepared by Russell, based upon conversations with Wittgenstein.

(Russell had intended to use them as an aide

in conveying Wittgenstein's ideas to audiences at Harvard during his
Lowell Lectures.)

One significant passage stands out:

Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible
for me to judge that this table penholders the book.
Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition (1913b, p.
103).
The passage would eventually evolve into Tractatus:

5.5422:

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition,
"A makes the judgement p", must show that it is impossible
for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's
theory does not satisfy this requirement (1922b, 5.5422).
Together these passages give us a pretty clear picture of the na-
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ture of Wittgenstein's objections

Wittgenstein believes that whatever

can be said, thought, believed, etc. must be capable of having a sense.
That is the import of the original comment in his letter to Russell that
"from the proposition "A judges that (say) a is in relation R to b", if
correctly analyzed, the proposition ua R b.v.-a Rb" must follow directly without the use of any other premiss" (1912, p. 122).

While the tau-

tology does not say anything, it does express (in an abbreviated fashion) the sense of the proposition~

The point is that the bipolarity of

the proposition must be a precondition that must be met by anything that
is a candidat~ for judgment.

In order to demarcate what is and what is

not a propositional attitude ascription, it is therefore necessary to
have "a correct theory of propositions"

(1912, p. 122).

Russell's the-

ory is inadequate precisely because it allows nonsense to be judged, asserted, and so forth.
Now in what manner of speaking does Russell's theory permit judgments regarding nonsense?
nonsense?

Is Wittgenstein talking about good or bad

The answer, it seems to me, is that Wittgenstein's view in

this matter evolved.

In the early goings he seems to be concerned with

bad nonsense, that is, with strings that may be considered bits of gib-

berish.

Such, for example, is "this table penholders the book" (1913b,

p. 103).

we see this to be the case, if we examine the way in which
"Othello believes Desdemona loves Cassio" is formalized, viz., as
B(oLdc).

We said earlier that what Othello believes involves an order-

ing of terms thus:

Ldc.

bedded within B(oLdc)?

What happens to this ordering once Ldc is emIt no longer appears as evident.

Othello does

not merely stand in the believing relation to Land d and c.
believes that Ldc.

Othello

How is the unity that characterizes what Othello be-
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lieves to be preserved? 177
Russell has no answer to this question, although in 1913 he toyed
with the idea that the logical form of what is believed (what
Wittgenstein refers to as structure) might well be added to the objects
of belief.

we are, Russell maintains, able to have "acquaintance with

the form of the complex" (1913, p. 99).

Indeed, at this time Russell is

willing to countenance acquaintance with numerous kinds of "logical objects" (1913, p. 99), including such objects as are referred to by "such
words as 'predicate' , 'relation' , ••• 'or' , 'not' , 'all' and 'some'"
( 1913, p. 101).
These particular passages date from 15 May 1913. 178

They mark the

sharpest contrast between Wittgenstein's and Russell's views.

We know

from the opening remarks in Chapter IV above that elements of the

Grundgedanke occurred to Wittgenstein at various times:

the identity

sign, variable names, and sentence-forming operators fell under his gaze
at different times.

By the third week of May the significance of the

Grundgedanke had occurred to him.

From the twentieth until the twenty-

sixth of May Russell met regularly with Wittgenstein, and the showdown
was underway.

From then until the 19 June 1913 (when he posted the let-

ter to Ottoline Morrell quoted above) the sad recognition spread upon
him that his previous fundamental work in philosophy had been demolished.
There is little question that there were various prongs to
Wittgenstein's attack.

By May 1913 he had made known his arguments con-

cerning the impossibility of an adequate theory of types to Russell~ he
had also explained why such a theory is not even necessary.

Next, the

various aspects of the Grundgedanke had been presented to Russell, as is
For a slightly different description of Russell's troubles, see
Aquila (1977), p. 81.
118 This is based upon the chronology provided with the text (1913, p.
lii). The chronology is based upon Russell's daily letters to Ottolone
Morrell.
177
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evidenced by the way the topic peppers their correspondence.
though would be the final straw:

Here

Russell's theory of judgment suffers

problems even if there are logical objects, because the theory does not
exclude the possibility of judging nonsense.

The recourse ma.de to ac-

quaintance with logical objects (what Russell calls logical intuition)
does not resolve his difficulties in the least bit.
among the objects of Othello's belief there arez
relation of loving, and, now, the form Ldc.
lated (i.e., to be related) to this form?

Let us say that

Desdemona, Cassio, the

Bow are these objects reThe new analysis is compati-

ble with the possibility of ascribing to Othello the belief that Loves

Ldc Cassio Desdemona (which is bad

(l)

nonsense).

Russell has simply

added another object for which the original problem recurs.

Shall we

also add to the objects of Othello's belief the fact that L refers to
loving, d refers to Desdemona, and so forth; shall we add facts concerning the way ordering occurs?
about semantic theory.

It hardly seems that Othello is thinking

But by introducing formal concepts into the

analysis of Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio, it is difficult to see how this slippery slope is to be avoided.

Not insignifi-

cantly, the inclusion of this sort of material would amount to the inclusion of good nonsense.
I said above that, with respect to the question of whether it was
good nonsense or bad nonsense that was being attributed to Russell, that
Wittgenstein's views evolved.

It seems clear from the context in which

the final criticism of Russell (Tractatus 5.5422, cited above) that it
is the more serious nonsense that concerns Wittgenstein in the end.
That remark is the second of three comments upon Tractatus 5.542 with
which we opened this section of this chapter.

However after

Wittgenstein asserts that u,A believes that p' ••• [is] of the form 'P'
says p 91922b, 5.542), but beLore making his comment about Russell's
theory of judgment at 5.5422, he writes:

318

This shows ••• that there is no such thing as the soul--the
subject, etc. as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.
Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul (1922b,
5.421).

The "superficial psychology of the day" would be the naturalistic philosophy of mind gaining prominence with the advent of

Social Darwinism.

In spite of their willingness to posit the existence (or subsistence) of
abstract entities, Russell's and Moore's relational theories of judgment
share with this naturalism the idea that the subject is situated in the
world in such a way as to be able to enter into contingent relations
with the objects, facts, and states of affairs of which it may be
aware. 170

It and the relations into which it may enter (believing, ex-

pecting, desiring, etc.) may, accordingly, be subjected to the very same
treatment appropriate to any scientific investigation.

Thus it is pos-

sible to analyze propositional attitude ascriptions thoroughly in terms
of relations among objects.
However we saw in the previous section that, for Wittgenstein,
discourse about the willing subject must be regarded as nonsensical,
since it is the willing of the subject that makes representation itself
possible.
whatsoever.

There can be no sensical or significant discourse about it
One cannot say anything significant about any of the neces-

sary conditions for representation. 110
Let us distinguish between the ascriptive clause ("S believes ••• "
m The term "naturalism" should be taken here to denote a commitment
to the methodology of science rather than to a materialistic metaphysics. Clearly Russell, like Moore, was willing to countenance universals and other abstract objects that would not fit within a straightforwardly materialistic ontology. Except for a brief flirtation with
Idealism, resulting from McTaggart•s influence at Cambridge, Russell
would remain committed to the philosophical relevance of the scientific
method. Concerning his flirtation with Idealism, cf. Moorehead (1992)
pp. 51-54.
180 The idea is reminiscent of Sartre's claim that any attempt to capture the subject of consciousness by means ot another act of awareness
will be futile (1937, p. 41).
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and the content clause

(u ••• P")

in "S believes that P"

What is

startling about Wittgenstein's treatment of the ascriptive clause is the
way any reference to the subject of belief disappears.

Given the fact

that it is impossible for any of our discourse concerning the necessary
conditions for representation to possess sense, Wittgenstein's move is
not so surprising.

If analysis seeks to elucidate a sentence's truth

conditions by means of sentences with sense, any reference to the willing subject must be out of the question. 111

If sentences of the form "S

believes that P" contain any truth whatsoever, the misleading reference
to s must be removed.

This does not mean that there is nos, in spite

of Wittgenstein's claim that •there is no such thing as the soul--the
subject, etc. as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the
present day" (1922b, 5.421)--a claim that must be interpreted in light
of all he does (try to) say about the subject as such.

What is mislead-

ing is the assimilation of s to an object that enters into contingent
relations.

Its relations--expressed by the formula (P) (P

=>

~)--to the

contingent facts that are signs are necessary ones.
The analysis cannot contain reference to the willing subject.
What however of the rest of the ascriptive clause?

What shall be made

of the verbs "believing," "'thinking," "saying," and the like?

Because

each is an act or mental act that involves representation, each contains
or presupposes the projective relation.

While that common feature of

the attitudes cannot be stated in the analysis, it would seem that an
adequate analysis would have to do justice to what distinguishes believing that P from desiring that P, or remembering that P from expecting
that P, and so forth.

Surely it is a contingent matter whether one has

a particular expectation at a particular time.
181 To anticipate an objection:
no, the willing subject does not do
anything but will, so it is not possible to speak of it in other respects. Phenomena associated with the will, e.g., the occurrence of a
certain desire are "of interest only to psychology" (1922b, 6.423).
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Wittgenstein does acknowledge that there are diverse psycho_logical
phenomena, but he relegates them to a secondary position (1922b, 6.423).
These phenomena are objects for empirical investigation, and as such are
of little consequence to the author of the Tractatus.

In the "Notes on

Logic," for example, he says, "[j[udgment, question and command are all
on the same level.

What interests logic in them is only the unasserted

proposition" (1913b, p. 96).

we might say that what guides his analysis

of propositional attitude ascriptions is a desire to delineate what is
essential and necessary for representation from what is essential but
not so necessary.

The activity of the will is essential and necessary.

so is the existence of a representational medium of one sort or another.
The specific sign used is essential but not so necessary.

That is to

say, that a specific sign is used is essential, but what that sign is
(so long as it contains the requisite isomorphism) is not.

The specific

propositional sign, we must recall, is a fact, a complex configuration
of objects.

It, like any other fact, can be described.

Thus we have

Wittgenstein's idea that it is possible to replace the misleading sentence "S says that P" with a less misleading one about the complex that
says P:

"P" says P.

At this stage it is worth asking whether Wittgenstein is being inconsistent with his dictum that facts cannot be named.

I would suggest

that Tractatus 5.542 does not put matters quite as Wittgenstein would
like.

In an earlier passage he expresses his worry over the manner in

which even "'P' says P" is misleading:
Instead of, "The complex sign 'aRb' says that a stands to
bin relation R," we ought to put: "That 'a' stands to 'b'
in a certain relation says that aRb" ("Oass 'a' in einer
gewissen Beziehung zu 'b' steht, sagt, dass aRb") (1922b,
3 .1432).
There is something very interesting going on here.

Wittgenstein wants

to say what can be said about the propositional attitudes of others.
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However in the very attempt to do so he finds himself trying to say
something about the projective relation itself.

It is not insignificant

that he tries to replace the original sentence (The complex sign ••• ")
with one that begins with the demonstrative "Dass" (which is italicized
in the original German).

While his strategy is not all that successful

(since one could preface the sentence that replaces the original with
.,The fact that ••• "), it is clear what he is attempting to do.

He is

trying to present the symbol in its projective relation to a possible
fact.

("[I]f only you do not try to utter what is unutterable then

nothing gets lost.

But the unutterable will be--unutterably--contained

in what has been uttered." 112 )

However, by Wittgenstein's lights a

propositional sign with one structure cannot say what is said by propositional sign of another structure.

That even his reformulation of the

original sentence can be construed as containing what purports to be the
name of a fact is symptomatic of the problem.

The only way to capture

in words the semantic properties of a propositional sign is by actually
using the sign.

It seems to me that Wittgenstein is acutely aware that

he is trying to say what can only be shown.

Indeed, Tractatus 3.1432

can be traced to a passage in the "Notes on Logic" where it is surrounded by comments on Russell's Theory of Types and considerations pertaining to why facts cannot be named (which, as we saw, is the decisive move

in Wittgenstein's attack upon the thesis that a function can be its own
argument) (1913b, pp. 96 and 98).

The point--the crucial point--is that

even the best attempt to analyze the ascriptive clause results in nonsense.

The ascriptive clause of any propositional attitude ascription

is nonsensical.
I am tempted to describe such a view as disquotational, but in a
way that is dissimilar to Carnap (1947), Quine (1960), Davidson (1968)

1~
This passage, noted earlier asquoted in Monk (1990) p. 151, seems
apt here.
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or Stich (1983).

Wittgenstein's view differs from those of the other

philosophers, precisely because his view entails that no adequate (i.e.,
sensical) analysis can be given for the ascriptive clause in belief and
other PA attributions.

Each of these philosophers, in contrast, hold

out hope for saying what the propositional attitude ascription says-that is, of adequately stating the truth conditions for "S believes that
P.H

For example, in Stich's case, when A utters

us

believes that P," A

is to be understood as asserting thats is in a state similar to the one
which would have played the central causal role were A were to have uttered "P" with a typical causal history (1983, p. 81).

This sort of

analysis is supposed to state the truth conditions for A's utterance,
and the reference made to the "central causal role" of the state that
produces tokens of Pis supposed to be consonant with a thorough causal
analysis of S's belief state.

The possibility of providing a causal

analysis of S's belief state that is in any way philosophically interesting is precisely what Wittgenstein rules out by treating the ascriptive clause as nonsensical.
Nevertheless there is a striking similarity between Wittgenstein's
view and certain of the views of the other philosophers.
parison can be brought out by considering Stich's view.

Again the comFor Stich, the

belief attribution serves as a kind of skit or demonstration.

By saying

"S believes that P" one in effect shows what one would say under certain
circumstances.

The idea is that if one is to convey something of what

another believes or says, one must do something similar to what the believer or speaker does, viz., produce a concrete token of a certain
sort.

Although they are futile in the end, we see in Wittgenstein's at-

tempts to reformulate the original propositional attitude ascription ("S
believes that P") just this kind of approximation to what the speaker or
thinker must do in order to say or think P. The propositional attitude
ascription is an attempt at showing what another says or thinks.
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Ironically, it manages to do so by being a misguided attempt at saying
what can only be shown. m
so far we have only been examining the ascriptive clause within
the propositional attitude ascription.

we see now the depth to which

they must be regarded as nonsensical according to Tractarian semantics.
we have not examined the content clause.
with what is shown by the ascription.

This requires coming to terms

Since the ascriptive clause is

nonsensical, it is tempting to regard as nonsensical whatever is embedded within it.

However, this will not do as an interpretation of

Wittgenstein's view.

At Tractatus 5.1362 we are told that N•A knows

that pis the case• has no sense if pis a tautology."

The context in

which this passage occurs indicates that Wittgenstein is primarily concerned with knowledge and its limitations, so there is a certain amount
of strain involved in exploiting it for our present purposes.

I do not

think, for example, that it should be interpreted as denying the thesis
that the ascriptive clause is nonsensical.

What is relevant here is

that something of the original semantic status of Pis preserved in
spite of being embedded within the ascriptive clause.

Indeed, there is

textual evidence in the "Notes on Logic (1913b, p. 106) that the embedded sentence retains its original status.

Be says there, for example,

that the P embedded within "S believes that P" cannot be a name of a
proposition but must have sense like P itself (i.e., when Pis not embedded) • 1 "

so, apparently the content clause, P, may be either sensi-

,~ Criticism shall be reserved for Section Five below. Let me point
out here, though, that one undesirable consequence of this position is
that unless we limit our notion of the attributor doing the same thing
with a token of P, Pin "S believes that P" becomes truth-functional.
This commits its proponents to analyzing the attribution as us believes
something, and P" where the attributor is construed as asserting or believing P. One way to avoid this is by introducing the appropriate
counterfactuals
1~ Although we cannot pursue the issue here, the fact that the embedded and unembedded P's are equivalent is related to his later treatment
in On Certainty of Moore's Paradox, that is, of the paradoxical nature
of such sentences as "I believe P, but Pis false."
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cal, senseless, or nonsensensical, depending upon whatever status it
happens to have when it occurs unembedded. 185
That this is so actually constitutes fairly good abductive evidence for interpreting the Tractatus as committed, as described above,
to a disquotational analysis for the ascriptive clause.

A disquotation-

al analysis can be true, only if the content clause shares the same semantic status as it has when it is not embedded~ but if the content
clause does not share the same semantic properties (i.e., sense and
meaning), then a disquotational analysis must be false.

Let me explain.

Any disquotational analysis involves exhibiting a sentence token of the
same semantic type as is to be attributed to some subject.
tion is really a kind of prediction:

The attribu-

to assert thats believes that P

is to predict that under the appropriate circumstances swill utter or
think tokens of P.

(Think of the "that" in "S believes that P" as a

demonstrative pronoun, so that the original ascription might be replaced
by "S believes one of these:

Pl")

so, the fact that Wittgenstein

shares this view tends to confirm our earlier interpretation. 111 On the

We exclude bad nonsense or gibberish from the list, since presumably we are dealing with sentences here.
186 I want to emphasize that this is an abductive argument rather than
a deductive one. Viewed deductively it would be an invalid argument in
which the fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs. The argument has
the form: (1) If Wittgenstein accepted a disquotational analysis for
the ascriptive clause within a propositional attitude ascription, then
he would have accepted the thesis that that clause has the same semantic
status regardless of whether or not it is embedded; (2) he accepted the
thesis that that clause has the same semantic status regardless of
whether or not it is embedded; therefore, (J) Wittgenstein accepted a
disquotational analysis for the ascriptive clause within a propositional
attitude ascription. This is a good non-deductive argument, because the
consequent of (1) predicts what we should expect to find, if our hypothesis (what is asserted in the antecedent of (1)) is true. That this is
a good test of the hypothesis depends upon showing that advocates of the
disquotational theory would, whereas its attackers would not, be committed to the thesis that the content clause has the same semantic properties whether embedded or not. Fortunately, we need only prove the weaker claim that Wittgenstein would not have accepted the thesis, had he
not accepted the disquotational analysis.
185
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other hand, had Wittgenstein not accepted a disquotational analysis, he
would hardly have maintained that the content clause shares the same semantic properties whether or not it is embedded.

In all probability he

would have regarded it as nonsensical, since the content clause would
need to be construed as a (presumably) non-truth-functional component
embedded within a nonsensical clause.

The semantic properties of the

embedded clause would then be viewed as 'fused with' or 'parasitic upon'
those of the clause within whose scope it falls.

Being committed to

that sort of claim comes with the territory when it stands opposed to
disquotational analyses, since those analyses (and only those analyses)
present the content clause as a token whose semantic properties are
being exhibited.

The alternative view would have to see the content

clause as mentioning an item whose semantic properties may be instantiated or exemplified by tokens that are not embedded.

Be that as it may,

if Wittgenstein were not committed to a disquotational analysis, he
would be committed to the idea that we cannot ascribe to anyone any belief (etc.) that is not nonsensical.
be nonsensical, and what

we

Our attribution as a whole would

attribute would be nonsensical.

But this

Wittgenstein cannot hold, since it would entail ascribing to s the possibility of believing or thinking or judging nonsense.

Contrary to our

intentions we would be ascribing to the subject nothing but nonsensical
beliefs (etc.), since the analysis of our utterance of the ascription
would again have to treat the clause as nonsensical. 117

But this, we

know, is incompatible with Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's

Multiple Object Theory of Judgment (and so with most everything else
that Wittgenstein believes).

The fact that Wittgenstein is willing to

assign the same semantic properties to the content clause regardless of
whether or not it is embedded is, therefore, a good indication that his

187 We will see in section Five that second-order propositional attitude ascriptions turn out to be very problematic for Wittgenstein.
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is a disquotational analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions. 181
Throughout this section we have been trying to make sense out of
Wittgenstein's scanty remarks about propositional attitude ascriptions.
we were able to note his opposition to the relational theories of judgment of Moore and Russell, and were able to identify his criticism of
Russell.

This allowed us to move to a consideration of how proposition-

al attitude ascriptions are accommodated within the context of
Tractarian semantics.

we saw that their analysis is two-fold.

The as-

criptive clause must be regarded as nonsensical, and the content clause
must be deemed to share the same generic semantic properties as it would

have were it not embedded within the ascription.

This further afforded

us abductive evidence to support the contention that Wittgenstein is
committed to disquotational analyses for propositional attitudes.

We

turn now to an objection that can be raised against the interpretation
of the Tractatus which has been provided in this and earlier chapters.
4.

Accommodating the Remarks on Solipsism.
This dissertation has interpreted the Tractatus in a realist spir-

it.

Even nonsensical sentences are said to have reference of some sort.

Anyone who adopts this interpretation must square off against the remarks on solipsism.

These remarks appear to cast the Tractatus in the

dimmer light of an extreme tom of Idealism or phenomenalism.
marks form the subject matter of the 5.6's.

The re-

Representative are the fol-

lowing:
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world
(1922b, 5.6).
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are
also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, 'The world bas this in it, and
this, but not that.'
For that would appear to presuppose that we were exclud1N We have, of course, throughout this discussion been concerned with
generic semantic properties (to borrow a phrase from Fodor and Lepore
(1992)) like having a sense or being senseless rather than referring to
Socrates or being true of the fact that Scott is the author of ~averly.
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ing certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case,
since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those
limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot
think we cannot say either (1922b, 5.61).
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much
truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means [meint] is quite correct,
only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that
the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world (1922b, 5.62).
The world and life are one (1922b, 5.621).
I am my world (The microcosm) (1922b, 5.63) •
••• The subject does not belong to the world:
is a limit of the world (1922b, 5.632).

rather it

Indeed the very dependence of the world upon the attitude of the subject
seems to be underscored by the famous remark of Tractatus 6.43 that:
••• [t]he world of the happy man is a different one from
that of the unhappy man (1922b, 6.43).
Nevertheless, any thoroughgoing optimism within Idealist or phenomenalist camps concerning the possibility of easily assimilating the
Tractatus must be tempered by such remarks as that:
[t]he world is independent of my will (1922b, 6.373).
and
••• it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications
are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The
self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and
there remains the reality co-ordinated with it (1922b,
5.64).
These sets of comments counsel caution in interpreting Wittgenstein.
Clearly the first set gives prominence to the activity of the will,
while the claim that the world is independent of one's will gives prominence to the constraints under which the will operates.

Not surprising-

ly, I want to argue that the two sets of remarks can only be accommodat-
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ed by the two-sided view of the will-under-constraint presented earlier.
The difficult question, however, concerns how to reconcile the two.
Wittgenstein's view coherent?

Is

The key lies in the final remark concern-

ing the self of solipsism shrinking to a point without extension.
This passage is related to a 15 October 1916 passage of the
Notebooks where Wittgenstein writes:

This is the way I have traveled: Idealism singles men
out from the world as unique, solipsism singles me alone
out, and at last I see that I too belong with the rest of
the world, and so on the one side nothing is left over, and
on the other side, as unique, the world. In this way idealism leads to realism if it is strictly thought out (1914b,
p.· 85).uo
When one reads the entries for the days leading up to this passage, one
gets a feel for what Wittgenstein is after.

11 June 1916 marks the be-

ginning of a lengthy soliloquy within the Notebooks concerning the nature of the subject who thinks and speaks.

By that time the principal

ideas of the Tractatus pertaining to sense and its relation to senselessness were in place.

The last major topic to be worked out concerned

the ontological status of objects and whether there could be simple objects.

After considering both realist and phenomenalist characteriza-

tions of objects, he opts for an agnosticism that leaves the question of
their nature to empirical science. 100

This has the effect of 'pushing'

objects into the realm of what can be said.

The issue of their status

then becomes whether they are phenomena produced by the act of perception or whether they exist independently of the perceptual act.

It is

1•
This entry occurs six days after the passage that becomes
Tractatus 5.64: cf. 194b, p. 82 for the original version of 5.64.
1~
The topic comes to a head on 22 June 1915 (1914b, pp. 68-71).
After that there is a lapse in the notebook entries until 15 April 1916.
Presumably there were one or more notebooks during this time, but they
have been lost. Once the entries resume we find that Wittgenstein has
settled for himself, not only the question of simple objects and atomic
facts, but questions concerning the logical independence of elementary
propositions. Then is when it occurs to him that u • • • the whole
Weltanschauung of the moderns involves the illusion that the so-called
laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena" (1914b, p. 72
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important to see that a certain framework has been established for the
problem.

Regardless of the answer, objects are to be counted among

those things that may enter into contingent relations with one another.
Regardless of whether objects are phenomena produced by perception (a
bodily event that takes place among the contingent events of the world),
they are objective in the sense that they exist independently of the
will of the subject:

"[t)he world is given me, i.e., my will enters

into the world completely from outside as into something that is already
there.

(As for what

my

will is, I don't know yet.)" (1914b, p. 74).

It is worth remembering that these passages were written during
some of the worst shelling of the war.

On the very same day (8 July

1916) as the above comment, he writes:

"[a] man who is happy must have

no fear.

Not even in the face of death.

Only a man who lives not in

time but in the present is happy" (1914b, 74).

The development of his

own character, a matter to which he gave the utmost importance, would
coincide with identifying himself with something independent of the suffering and contingencies surrounding him.

Whatever the subject of the

will is, it "is not an object" that enters into contingent relations
with other objects (1914b, p. 80).
front every object.

As he would say, "I objectively con-

But not the I" (1914b, p. 80).

To determine its nature he would attempt to isolate the will by a
via negativa.

This is the idea behind his remark that if he were to

write a book, The World as I Found It, it would include reports on many
things but not the subject.
are:

Among the things that the world contains

objects and bodies, the observable behavior (including the verbal

behavior) of others, one's own body, and one's own psychological properties (1914b, p. 82).

Indeed among the final passages in the Notebooks

we find him attempting to isolate the will from such conative phenomena
as having a wish (1914b, p. 88).

Even these belong to the world and are

amenable to empirical investigation.
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As a result of the via negativa Wittgenstein is able to isolate

the willing subject--what he refers to as the metaphysical subject
(1922b, 5.633)--as that which possesses one of two attitudes
(Stellungnahmen) toward the world (1914b, p. 87).

It is that which can

experience the world sub specie aeterni (the correct way) or not.
Experiencing the world this way involves, as was mentioned in an earlier
section, experiencing oneself and the world as independent of one another.

The world viewed uas a limited whole" (1922b, 6.45) is a world

viewed in the correct way as being unable to affect one.

The having of

this attitude does not simply come over a person, it is an act one engages in (1914b, pp. 76-77).

And, we should hasten to add, it is a par-

ticularly difficult act to perform in the face of an artillery barrage
that may end one's life. 101
In lieu of the method by which Wittgenstein seeks to isolate the
metaphysical outcome as well as its particular outcome, it is ludicrous
to interpret Wittgenstein as a solipsist in the classical sense.

In the

traditional sense of the word, solipsism holds that everything (including any other mind if exists) depends for its existence on one's own
mind.

What the method and its desired outcome are designed to reveal is

that the will and the world are utterly independent of one another:
N[t]here are two godheads:

the world and my independent I" (1914b, p.

74).
Neither of two extreme views would be regarded as justified for
Wittgenstein.

on the one hand, the view that construes everything as

subjective and dependent for its existence upon the mind or will of the
Wittgenstein distinguishes between willing and being able to exercise one's will (1914b, p. 76). One can will to move one's arm, but
not be able to move it. Similarly, I suppose, one could will psychological phenomena but not be able to exercise one's will, for example,
when one is unable to remember a phone number. This is pure speculation, but perhaps Wittgenstein could have said even someone coming out
of a coma, attempting to regain consciousness and not relapse into unconsciousness, is willing in his sense.
191
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subject is unjustified.

But no less unjustified is the view (which

Wittgenstein terms realism) that takes the contents of the world as exhausting what there is, so that there is no willing subject distinct
from the world as such.

Although Wittgenstein often says such things as

that there is no subject (1922b, 5.631), these must be treated merely as
a way of speaking.

The way in which he always qualifies this and simi-

lar statements shows that what he believes is that there is no subject
of which we may say anything.

In the words of the Wittgenstein of the

Philosophical Investigations:

u •••

a nothing would serve just as well as

a something about which nothing could be said.

we have only rejected

the grammar which tries to force itself upon us here" (1958, 304).
This just leaves one nagging problem.

How are we to interpret the

remarks constituting the last paragraph of Tractatus 5.62, 5.621, and
5.63 which form the core of the remarks with which we opened this section?

I would suggest that the matter become resolved if (l) we treat

statements like "The world and life are one" (1914b, p. 77: 1922b,
5.621) which find there way from the Notebooks into the Tractatus as expressions of what Wittgenstein regards as problematic about the will and
its relation to the world up until the solution (described above) is
reached: and (2) we treat the claim at 5.62 concerning the fact that
"the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand) mean
the limits of my world" as an expression of what we shall call semantic
individualism.
Sentences like "The world and life are one" (1914b, p. 77: 1922b,
5.621) and " ••• [t]he world of the happy man is a different one from that
of the unhappy man" (1922b, 6.43: descended from 1914b, p. 78) should
not be taken as expressions of Wittgenstein's final view on the relation
of the will to the world.

If one examines their position in the

Notebooks, one finds that they occur prior to almost all of the rest of
the entries on this subject.

While this in itself does not provide

332

strong evidence that these do not constitute his final view, we would
expect, if my hypothesis is correct, to find such comments located here
and nothing like them located later in the Notebooks.
the text will bear this prediction out.

An

inspection of

This is not strong evidence,

however, for the very reason that one can state a conclusion at the beginning of an argument.

Perhaps what follows the occurrence of these

remarks is the argument for them.

I think this is unlikely in a text

that has the form of a notebook or journal (since one tends to move on
from one insight to the next and allow one's ideas to unfold naturally
in such a context), but I can appreciate the reader's desire for
stronger evidence.
Stronger evidence consists in the fact that later passages make
clear that "life" (das Leben) refers to, neither the will nor the world,
but to the relation of the one to the other.

Nowhere is this more evi-

dent than when he is contemplating what he calls the happy lite.
life is described as happy (glUcklich) or unhappy (unglUcklich)

That
The

text makes sufficiently clear that happiness and unhappiness consist in
the subject's particular attitude toward the world.

One can either view

the world as a limited whole or not: one can view oneself as independent
from the world or not.
ter is to be unhappy.

To do the former is to be happy: to do the latAt 6.43 Wittgenstein says:

If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the
world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the
facts--not what can be expressed by means of language.
In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether
different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a
whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of
the unhappy man (1922b, 6.43).
The imagery of the world waxing and waning is particularly apt.
think of a distant object that can completely fill our gaze.
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we

The happy

person is able to attain a proper perspective. 102

This perspective does

not change the facts (the sayable) but only brings their limits into
view.

It thereby brings into view the nonsensical.
The point is that when Wittgenstein speaks of the world and life

being one, he is giving expression to what he thinks is problematic in
life.

He is expressing the fact that individual subjects have some con-

trol over the way they represent the world to themselves.
This brings us to our consideration of the claim at Tractatus 5.62
that "the limits of language (of that language which I alone understand)
mean the limits of my world."

The original German within the parenthet-

ical remark (der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe) is ambiguous:

should

it be rendered as the only language that I understand or as the language that only I understand?

Most commentators (Stenius (1964),

Hintikka (1958), Black (1964)) view it the first way, whereas Anscombe
(1959) views it the second way.

The second (so-called private language)

interpretation casts Wittgenstein as a solipsist.

It suggests that the

sayable is to be identified with what is sayable by me.

It suggests

that outside of what I say there is nothing to be said.
While Hintikka (1958, p. 157) does, I believe, sufficiently show
the first translation to be the correct one (by demonstrating that
allein always modifies the word it follows), there is a way that the two
interpretations can be reconciled.

It must be remembered that the pas-

sage within its context in the Notebooks arises in connection with the
process of isolating the willing subject.
Wittgenstein tries to isolate his own will.
will and what it does.

That is to say, it arises as
The emphasis is upon his

Now the fact of the matter is that Tractarian

semantics quantifies over linguistic tokens--concrete structures--that
are used by the individual subject for the purposes of representation.

The use of visual imagery is played out at Tractatus 5.6331 (originally 1914b, p. 80).
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This is what may be called semantic individualism.
individual will's accomplishment.

Representation is an

This does not mean that each individ-

ual represents the world in a wholly different way.

Rather it amounts

to the more mundane claim that speaking and thinking is always done by
individuals.

Mundane it may be, but it underscores the fact that repre-

sentation always presupposes (contrary to the linguistic Platonist) an

involvement in the world, and it contains a major implication: to wit,
even it there were only one thinker or speaker in the world, representation would be possible.

That is the key to the remarks on solipsism,

and it is the final piece of the Tractarian puzzle.

Furthermore, it

serves to distinguish the naturalism of the Tractatus from that of the

Philosophical Investigations where all of the uses of language are
viewed as social phenomena.

That, however, is a subject nwe must pass

over in silence" (1922b, 7).
5.

Criticism.
What are the main criticisms that can be raised against the

Tractatus?

The two most often discussed criticisms are (l) the unintel-

ligibility of the supposition that there could be simple objects, and
(2) the so-called Color Exclusion Problem.
the first of these problems.

we have already dispelled

Before proceeding to the real difficulties

besetting the Tractatus I would like to explain why I believe the Color
Exclusion Problem is not so problematic either.
Some scholars take this problem quite seriously.

For example, P.

M. s. Hacker claims n[o]nce the intractability of this problem became
clear, the main struts of the whole system collapsed" (1972, p. 86).
Here is the typical description given of the problem:
Consider an ordinary color attribution: one points to a
(red) object and says, nThis is red." It is hard to imagine
a proposition less likely to be a truth-functional construction from other propositions, so the color proposition is a
prime candidate for being an elementary proposition of the
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Tractarian sort. Yet it is not inferentially discrete, for
if it is true (at t 1 ) that the object pointed to is red,
then it is false (at t 1 ) that the same object is blue.
Color words form a system: if a color is (truly) predicated
of an object at a given time, then it can be inferred that
none of the others can be predicated of that object at that
time. From "This [object O] is red" it can be inferred that
uThis (object O] is not blue": "This is not green": uThis is
not yellow" and so forth. These inferences ••• undermine the
Tractarian assurance that elementary propositions are logically independent of one another (Edwards, 1985, pp. 77-78).
For our purposes it matters not whether color propositions are candidates for elementary propositions: presumably color phenomena can be analyzed in terms of wave lengths of light.

The temptation to regard them

as elementary probably stems from the fact that color vocabulary typically is learned ostensively in the context of one's childhood rather
than in a physics lab.

I would guess that the conditions under which

one acquires a particular vocabulary item has little to do with whether
it is simple or composite and with whether its name is analyzable, especially for the early Wittgenstein.
What is important is why, and in what sense, elementary propositions must be logically independent of one another.

Wittgenstein tells

us at Tractatus 2.061 that "[s]tates of affairs are independent of one
another," and at 2.062 that theme reemerges in the remarks on probability where he asserts that two elementary propositions give one another
the probability of .5 (1922b, 5.152).
other, as when

Q

When one proposition entails an-

entails P, the truth-grounds for Pare contained within

those of

Q

(1922b, 5.121).

Indeed the sense of Pis contained in the

sense of

Q

(1922b, 5.122).

If elementary propositions were not logical-

ly independent there would be no terminus to logical analysis.

That

would be true, even if it would beg the question were it deployed as a
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premise in the argument for logical atomism. 103

Should there be noter-

minus, however, it is difficult to see how any proposition could effect
the requisite discrimination within reality that allows it to have a
sense.

Commenting on Tractatus 3.25-3.251, Black tells us " ••• only if a

proposition has a unique and complete analysis can its sense be definite" (1964, p. 111).

Unfortunately, in none of the literature on this

subject is there to be found an account of the relation between the two
conditions of uniqueness and completeness.

Clearly it is that "[a]

proposition has one and only one complete analysis (1922b, 3.25, emphasis added) that accounts for its effecting any discrimination within reality.

A proposition for which more than one analysis is possible would

not have a determinate sense.

What is missing from the literature is

any account of why one should believe that an infinitely long analysis
would lack the requisite uniqueness.

On the face of it, being infinite-

ly long and being unique are not mutually exclusive.
ment that could be offered is this:

Perhaps one argu-

if analysis were infinitely long,

then it would be an arbitrary matter at what point one "cuts off" the
analysis~ in that case there could be more than one analysis for a given
proposition, resulting in indeterminateness.

The argument would be a

weak one if we were talking about entailments among levels of analysis,
for then the sense of a proposition belonging to the more general level
would contain that of the proposition belonging to the more particular
level, and no indeterminateness would result.

Here, however, we are

talking about relations among propositions all belonging to the same
level.

Alternative analyses, in this instance, provide us with poten-

tially very dissimilar cross-sections of one and the same stratum of
As we saw in Chapter hree, extracting a non-circular argument from
the Tractatus for the existence of simple objects is no small task. we
must be careful not to conflate the metaphysical issue concerning simple
objects with the purely logical issue that is about to be pursued--namely, that entailments among elementary propositions must be ruled out if
analysis is to be complete.
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reality.

In the end, if sense is to be determinate, the idea of en-

tailment must be restricted to relations between levels of analysis
(these serve as definitions; cf. 1922b, 3.261), and to relations between
molecular propositions belonging to the same level (as these sequents
can be rewritten as tautologies).

Where entailment cannot occur is

among series of elementary propositions.
logical analysis.

An

So there must be an end to

infinity of propositions there may be, but they

must be generated compositionally (through repeated operations) rather
than decompositionally (through analysis).
Let us then grant Wittgenstein's claim that if there are to be elementary propositions, then they must not be able to entail one another.
With that in mind let us return to the Color Exclusion Problem.

The

problem is one which Wittgenstein would raise in his 1929 essay usome
Remarks on Logical Form."

The difficulty arises in consideration of

Tractatus 6.375-6.3751:
Just as the only necessity that exists is logical necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is logical
impossibility.
For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at
the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact,
logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical
structure of colour.
Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics:
more or less as follows--a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two
places at the same time; that is to say, particles that are
in different places at the same time cannot be identical.
(It is clear that the logical product of two elementary
propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction.
The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction) (1922b,
6.375-6.3751).
Notice how the problem arises.

Assume that uThis is red" (or something

like it) is an elementary proposition.
not blue,"

It appears to entail uThis is

But this, so it is maintained, involves entailment among el-

ementary propositions.

The problem reaches its culmination in the final
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paragraph of 6.3751; the two statements within that parenthetical remark
appear to contradict one another.

The product of two elementary propo-

sitions can neither be a contradiction nor entail a contradiction, yet
"This is red, and this is blue" either is a sort of contradiction or at
least entails one, viz., "This is blue, and this is not blue."
The contradiction evident in that parenthetical remark is regarded
by commentators, and indeed was regarded by Wittgenstein himself, as the
worm at the core of the Tractatus.

Scholars are consistent in attribut-

ing to Wittgenstein only two options:

he may renounce the idea of there

being simple objects, or he may modify the Tractarian account of the
truth table in such a way as to make the product of (some) elementary
propositions senseless (Allaire, 1959, p. 192; Hacker, 1972, p. 88).
1929 Wittgenstein opted for the second of these choices.

In

He believed

the problem could be circumvented by introducing numerals into elementary propositions concerning phenomena that admit of degrees (1929a, p.
34), and by eliminating the line of the truth table (for the conjunction
matrix column) that represents both conjuncts as true (1929a, p. 36).
The column representing the conjunction would then represent such a
proposition as false under all conditions--hence, senseless. 104
The solution has been said to be susceptible to objection on the
grounds that a presumably sensical expression such as "It is false that
this is both red and blue" is the negation of, and is thus composed of,
the senseless expression "This is both red and blue" (Allaire, 1959, p.
At the end of "Some Remarks on Logical Form" Wittgenstein remarks
that the construction of such sentences is nonsensical rather than
senseless--a fact noted, and unassumingly taken for granted, by commentators (e.g., Hacker, 1972, p. 91). This is most peculiar however. For
if their construction were nonsensical, why should Wittgenstein be willing to provide a matrix for them at all. The bulk of the article is designed to show how they are senseless. Perhaps this has something to do
with Wittgenstein's denunciation of the article. It was originally to
be presented before the Aristotelian Society; when the time came to give
the paper, he elected not to do so, but to give a more or less extemporaneous discussion on the nature of infinity.
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192).

The presumption upon which this criticism is based is unfounded,

since the negation of a contradiction would be a tautology--hence senseless too.

Another criticism focuses upon the fact that there is an "ab-

sence of any account of the nature of the constraints upon the combinatorial possibilities of objects which are reflected in the syntax of
language" (Backer, 1972, p. 90).

This, however, is a criticism based

upon taking seriously Wittgenstein's claim at the very end of the article that such propositions are nonsensical.
need not do.

This, I have suggested, we

But it is not my concern to analyze the pro's and con's of

the solution offered in 1929, nor to evaluate the criticisms that have
been offered.

The fact is I do not believe there is a Color Exclusion

Problem.
The Tractatus has the resources for dealing with the problem, and
these resources do not consist in what is usually touted as the
"Tractarian solution" to the problem.

What commentators have regarded

as the Tractatus's solution stems from a misreading of 6.3751.

Recall

the claim that:
the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same
place in the visual field is impossible, in fact, logically
impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure
of colour (1922b, 6.3751: emphasis added).
It has generally been accepted that the reference to the logical structure of color is intended to suggest that "red" and "blue" do not denote
simple objects (Allaire, 1959, p. 190: Hacker, 1972, pp. 87-88).

Like

the problem of apparent references to non-existent objects, on this interpretation the problem of the exclusivity of two colors disappears at
the next level of analysis.

Understandably, if one accepts this inter-

pretation, one will want to say (as does Hacker) that "the suggested solution merely pushes the problem back one stage" (1972, pp. 87-88),
since the question simply reemerges as one concerning the compatibility
of two different degrees of the same color.
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In all this the distinction between form and structure has been
forgotten.

While two true elementary propositions are logically inde-

pendent of one another, the same cannot be said of different potentially
true elementary propositions that share the same sense!
symbolism used in Chapters Three and Four.

Return to the

Let us suppose that 11¥A is

an elementary proposition, and that the rules of syntax for the individual terms permit each of the members of the following set to be wellformed:

{11¥A, 11A¥, ¥11A, ¥All, A¥11, All¥}.

The members of this set

are not logically independent of one another1 if they were we would have
to abandon th~ bipolarity of the proposition.us

(And then we would be

in no better position than we were in with Moore's relational theory of
judgment with all of its problems.)

There is an incompatibility among

the members of this set, and it happens to be a pragmatic one: one cannot assert 11¥A at the same time that one asserts 11A¥ (or any other
member of the set that comprises the form of 11¥A).

Both propositional

signs are facts--different facts--that cannot occur at the same place at
the same time.

That incompatibility is what is secured by the logical

structure and form of color.

The Color Exclusion Problem disappears

once we acknowledge that the semantic theory of the Tractatus ranges
over linguistic tokens, i.e., concrete utterances, inscriptions, and the
195

The Philosophical Remarks contain the following illuminating pas-

sage:
Syntax prohibits a construction such as 'A is green and A
is red' (one's first feeling is that it's almost as if this
proposition had been done an injustice1 as though it had
been cheated of its rights as a proposition), but for 'A is
green', the proposition 'A is red' is not, so to speak, an
other proposition--and that strictly is what the syntax
fixes--but another (aspect of the] form of the same proposition •
••• In this way syntax draws together the propositions that
make one determination (1930, p. 86) •
• It is important to see that, for Wittgenstein, the proposition is
not to be identified with any particular structure. The proposition is
really comprised of the whole set of possible structures (comprising the
form) from which one may be selected to be uttered.
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like.

It is little wonder that Wittgenstein would later disown usome

Remarks on Logical Form."
Wittgenstein does of course say in the Tractatus that the truth of
one elementary proposition cannot entail the falsehood of another elementary proposition. But surely this is not intended to hold true for
the potential assertions that comprise the set of propositional signs
comprising the form of 0¥6.

Propositional signs that share the same

form (hence, sense) but differ in terms of truth-conditions must be an
exception, otherwise the Tractatus is just an uninterpretable mess.
What sense can we make of the idea that the truth of a proposition must
be contingent, unless the state of affairs which makes it true is one of

a set of mutually exclusive states of affairs?

What sense would be left

of the idea that propositions contain the possibility having all operations, including negation, performed on them?

What Wittgenstein should

have said at 2.062 is that u[f]rom the existence or non-existence of one
state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another [of different sense]."
The point I am trying to make would later be articulated by
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Remarks (1930)~ recall the passage
cited in Chapter One:
I once wrote: 'A proposition is laid like a yardstick
against reality. Only the outermost tips of the graduation
marks touch the object to be measured.' I should now prefer
to say: a system of propositions is laid like a yardstick
against reality. What I mean by this is: when I lay a
yardstick against a spatial object, I apply all the graduation marks simultaneously. It's not the individual gradua
tion marks that are applied, it's the whole scale. If I
know that the object reaches up to the tenth graduation
mark, I also know immediately that it doesn't reach the
eleventh, twelfth, etc. The assertions telling me the
length of an object form a system, a system of propositions.
It's such a whole system which is compared with reality, not
a single proposition. If, for instance, such and such a
point in the visual field is blue, I not only know that the
point isn't green, isn't red, isn't yellow etc. I have
simultaneously applied the whole colour scale. This is also
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the reason why a point can't have different colours
simultaneously; why there is a syntactical rule against fx
being true for more than one value of x. For if I apply a
system of propositions to reality, that of itself already
implies--as in the spatial case--that in every case only
one state of affairs can obtain, never several.
When I was working on my book I was still unaware of all
this and thought then that every inference depended on the
form of a tautology ( 1930, p. 317). 100
In point of fact, what Wittgenstein was doing was to retrieve the conception of form and structure (and of sense and meaning) that he had
first articulated in his 1912-1913 letters to Russelll

The description

of a system of propositions being laid simultaneously, like a ruler with
all its graduation marks, against reality is nothing other than the
method of projection described in the first section of this chapterl
Wittgenstein had not made the mistake in the Tractatus for which he
later berates himself.

What has happened, however, is that he has be-

come enmired in considerations concerning the inferential relations
among the members of a propositional sign's form.

He seems to have for-

gotten that the relation of a structure to the other members of its form
is one of showing.
form.

The structure, subject to rules of syntax, shows its

This is the first of the conceptions of showing, the one that

pertains to all sentences possessing sense.

Indeed, the negated propo-

sition used in posing the problem does not even belong to the set comprising the form; the presence of the negation sign means it is not elementary at all.

That proposition is arrived at by applying the mechani-

cal operation of negation to an elementary proposition.

It is only be-

cause-Pis defined over the complement of P within P's form that one is
able to draw the problematic inference.

To reach the "inference" from

"This is red" to "This is not blue," one must do at least two things
igs This passage comes specifically from notes of a discussion made by
Waismann between Wittgenstein and members of the Vienna Circle on 25
December 1929. (How fitting that the Vienna Circle would be discussing
the Color Exclusion Problem on Christmas day.) A portion of the passage
is cited in Edwards (1985), p. 78.
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outside of the elementary level:

define -P and perform the operation of

negation on one of the members of the set so defined.
against the grain of the Tractatus.
Exclusion Problem is ill-formed.

None of this goes

So, to a great extent, the Color

101

What then are the real problems with Tractarian semantics?
return to the analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions.

Let us

we saw

that Tractarian semantics is committed to a two-fold analysis for such
sentences.

The ascriptive clause must be regarded as nonsensical,

whereas the content clause possesses whatever semantic properties it
would have were it to occur as an unembedded linguistic token.

So, the

content clause can either have sense, be senseless or be nonsensical.
But now let us consider second-order propositional attitude ascriptions.
The sentence "John believes that Martha thinks that he is rich" would be
an example.

The ascriptive clause, "John believes ••• ," would have to be

treated as nonsensical (although it contains reference to a psychological state amenable to empirical investigation).
though, is problematic.

The content clause,

Since it contains an ascriptive clause

(" .•• Martha thinks •.• "), it should be regarded as nonsensical; but since
that acriptive clause contains a content clause (" ••• he is rich") that
possesses sense, we would need to regard the nonsensical ascriptive
clause as in some way containing sense.

This cannot be dismissed as un-

problematic in the way, say, that a big man can "contain" a small finger
is unproblematic.

The intensional character of the embedded clause(s)

cannot be overlooked.

Wittgenstein is faced here with a real dilemma.

Disquotational analyses tend to have an extensionalizing effect upon the
sentence under analysis.

Their goal is to replace reference to appar-

ently non-truth-functional elements of a sentence with reference to objects or facts that are amenable to scientific investigation.

On the

m Wittgenstein's view remains remarkably consistent with this in
The Blue and Brown Books (1934), p. 56--a point remarked upon by Allaire
(1959), p. 193.
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face of things it would appear that Tractarian semantics is perfectly
compatible with the possibility of doing so, since propositional signs
are facts whose tokening may be exhibited by the propositional attitude
ascription as a whole.

But on Wittgenstein's view all that can be ex-

hibited is the empty shell of the propositional sign itself.

The

proposition in its projective relation cannot be exhibited unless one
says or asserts the proposition oneself.

But in that case how is it

ever possible to truly ascribe false beliefs to others?

This is one of

the difficulties that toppled Moore's theory of judgment.

The analysis

of "John believes that Martha thinks that he is rich" to which
Wittgenstein is committed necessitates John believing of himself that he
is rich, when in fact he may know that he is not rich and is ascribing
to Martha a false belief.
Here it won't do for Wittgenstein to point to the futility involved in saying with one sign what another sign says.

That is, he can-

not simply point to the fact that the content clause of the ascription
only shows but does not say what the person to whom the belief is ascribed believes.

For in that case it would be impossible to truly as-

cribe what one believes to be a true belief to another.

Bow could one

ever say, for example, "Martha knows that I am rich" and consequently
how could a sentence like "John believes Martha knows that he his rich"
ever be accommodated by Tractarian semantics?

The dilemma is unavoid-

able.
The source of the dilemma is the idea that one cannot say what is
nonsensical.

Wittgenstein had criticized Russell's theory of judgment

on the grounds that it did not eliminate the possibility of judging nonsense.

But either one must be able to judge nonsense, or one will have

to deal with the dilemma just posed.

Something has to give here, and it

has got to be the conception of nonsense that runs through the
Tractatus, because the possibility of truly ascribing false beliefs to
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others is a tact.
The task of abandoning the Tractarian conception of nonsense is
not so difficult when one considers just what is nonsensical.

What are

nonsensical are sentences about the necessary conditions for representation.

Those conditions that must be satisfied for a linguistic token to

have meaning or sense are themselves contingent.

we said earlier that

the advocate of Tractarian semantics is committed to accepting (P) (P
W) where P ranges over linguistic tokens and

w ranges

conditions for the possibility of representation.

~

over the necessary

Included under

w,

for

example, would be one's own willing (i.e., one's own selection of a
structure, etc.) when one utters a sentence.

However, the members of

W''s domain do not enjoy the sort of necessary existence enjoyed by the
simple objects that (for Wittgenstein) make up the substance of the
world.

No necessity attaches to one's own existence, the existence of

one's will, one's selection of a particular structure, and so forth!
Even if (P) (P
tingently true.

~

W) is true of all linguistic tokens, it is only conThis fact allows us to pinpoint what can be regarded as

the fundamental inconsistency within the Tractatus~ for the Tractarian
conception of analysis--which entails "[t]o be general means no more
than to be accidentally valid for all things" (1922b, 6.1231)--commits
Wittgenstein to the contingency of (P) (P

~

W).

One could, of course,

instantiate the first variable with particular linguistic tokens and the
second with specific necessary conditions, but the result will still be
a set of contingent truths.

The point is that once one acknowledges

that sentences which ascribe a necessary relation to two things need not
be necessarily true themselves, the problem of not being able to say
what the Tractatus calls nonsensical disappears.
But once this move has been made, nothing stands in the way of a
thoroughgoing naturalistic account of the nature of language and its socalled rules of projection.

Finding the right naturalistic account
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would be a task that would exercise Wittgenstein for the rest of his
life.

But we can already get an idea of how the dominoes begin to fall.

The first to fall is one of the two "godheads," namely the metaphysical
subject.

Its existence is contingent, as indeed is what it wills (since

it chooses to will one thing or another).

This carries significant con-

sequences for the analysis of the ascriptive clause within the propositional attitude ascription.

Stripped of its necessity there is no rea-

son to regard reference to the subject as nonsensical.

The metaphysical

subject is thereby assimilated to the psychological subject which
Wittgenstein dismisses as unimportant to philosophy.

This does not mean

that the production of utterances needs to be viewed as issuing from a
unified subject or self.

Indeed it would become one of the tenets of

the later Wittgenstein's philosophy that belief in such a self is mere
superstition.

As one writer puts it, any attempt to locate a causal

source for meaning and sense
••• are attempts to deny the true depth of philosophy,
which is the true depth of life itself, namely, the pure
contingency and independence of the conditions of all meaning. The deep Pathos of philosophy and life is just that
acknowledgment: that there is no single, central source and
ground for the sense we happen to make to ourselves and one
another~ that sense appears as a face does, constellated out
of elements fortuitously dispersed in a field, with no-thing
as its source and center and guarantor (Edwards, 1990, p.
238).

The "proof" of this would occupy the great body of his later writings on
the philosophy of psychology where he attempts to exhibit the variation
and play that characterizes our use of psychological predicates.

A dis-

cussion of that and his remarks on the impossibility of a private language fall beyond our present concerns.

Suffice it to say that for the

later Wittgenstein the appropriate study of language consists in examining its use within a social context--an idea foreshadowed by the 9
September 1916 Notebooks passage that asserts "[t]he way in which lan-
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guage signifies is mirrored in its use" (1914b, p. 82).

Thus it is the

language user as social agent that is of importance to the later
Wittgenstein.
Since the ascriptive clause does not need to be regarded as nonsensical, neither do content clauses that contain what were formerly
considered nonsensical.

A sentence like uJohn believes that Martha

thinks he is rich" will say something about John.

What it says will de-

pend upon the sort of analysis deemed appropriate for content clauses
generally.

Earlier it was said that the Tractatus construes the content

clause disquotationally.

There is little reason to forsake that claim

in the face of the criticism leveled above.

In fact, the later

Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology resists regarding the content
clause as referring to any sort of inner mental content (as when he says
u[i]f God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see
there whom we were speaking of" (1958, p. 117~ see also p. 231).

This

is not the place to discuss this matter at any length, but it appears
that to the extent Wittgenstein is willing to allow for there to be mental contents, images and so forth, they are reduced to the status of
epiphenomena:

it is never necessary that a particular content or image

pass before the mind's eye (see, e.g., the discussion of reading in
1958, 151ff.).

The implication is that the content clause shows us

something of what is to be expected of a subject's behavior.

A full

consideration of the criterial behaviorism of the later philosophy is
beyond the scope of the present dissertation however.

There is certain-

ly much room for consideration of its strengths and weaknesses.
The other so-called godhead, the world correlated with the metaphysical subject, must be viewed in a different manner as well.

The

later Wittgenstein would become quite critical of his earlier belief in
a world possessing a crystalline logical form (1958, 97).
what the de re necessity of the Tractatus consists.
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Consider in

It consists in the

fact that simple objects are immutable and that they have certain possibilities for being related to one another as constituents of
Sachverhalten.

Even though the obtaining of a given state of affairs is

contingent, the possibility of its obtaining (given what simple objects
there are) is not.

so, if Pis an atomic proposition containing names

of simple objects, then it is necessarily the case that possibly Pis
true.

To say that language and world share the same form (or that the

form of a proposition corresponds to its sense) just is to give expression to the fact that what is necessary within language is determined by
what is necessarily the case in the world.

The tautologies that serve

as rules within language (and contradiction which might be thought of as
proscribing certain inferences or transformations) are grounded in the
de re necessity of the world.

At the bottom of all this is the necessi-

ty that attaches to the existence of simple objects.
Although Wittgenstein would later attack the idea of there being
simple objects on the grounds that simplicity is a relative notion, such
an objection carries no weight against the sort of argument for logical
atomism that we were able to excavate from the Tractatus.

That argument

requires simple objects to be "outside of" time and space in the
Newtonian sense where, presumably, nothing relative (in the proper
sense) is to be found.

we would do well to ask, however, whether the

existence of these immutable objects cannot be regarded in some manner
or other as contingent.

we can certainly imagine the possibility of an

object that exists endlessly in time as possessing existence contingently.

One need but imagine a particle passing through space fortuitously

never colliding with any obstacle.

Similarly, where is the contradic-

tion in saying that immutable objects responsible for spatial and temporal phenomena may be contingent?

This seems to me to be the fundamental

problem with the metaphysics of the Tractatus:

it attributes de re ne-

cessity to objects whose nature, by its author's own admission, must be

349

left to the empirical sciences.

But, by definition, how could the em-

pirical sciences ever disclose what is necessary.
Once we see that the problems of necessity extend all the way to
the substance of the world, we must renounce the idea that the objects
of the world fix once and for all what can be said.

If their own exis-

tence is contingent, then what could be said might be quite different
than what can be said.

Here the isomorphism between structure and mean-

ing, between form and sense--the basic structuralist assumption of the
Tractatus--comes undone. 101

Thus we find the Wittgenstein of the

Philosophical Investigations declaring:
••• if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones ••• then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used
to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual
ones will become intelligible to him (1958, p. 230).
The point is that once shorn of its supposed metaphysical underpinnings,
the rules and practices that comprise the use of language can be seen as
more flexible, more pliable, more subject to human control.

His working

out of the nature of rules and rule-following would occupy him for the
rest of his life and would serve as the unifying theme in his Remarks
on the Foundations of Mathematics and Philosophical Investigations.

The

reader is directed to Levvis (1989) for a fuller treatment of the rulefollowing considerations in the later philosophy and to Levvis (1992)
for an examination of how the general points concerning rules pertain to
our use of psychological predicates.
What remains of Tractarian semantics once the two godheads are
dismantled?

This is what remains:

linguistic tokens are the locus of

meaning, semantic Platonism is false, an appeal to mental contents to
It seems to me that if one wants to retain a structuralist or formalist semantics once its underlying metaphysics has been abandoned,
that one must accept some version of Fregean minimalism. Such is how
this writer would interpret Davidson's formal semantics with its commitment to a coherence theory of truth and Jerry Fodor's computational theory of mind with its commitment to methodological solipsism.
198

350

explain semantic properties and relations is unnecessary, and perhaps
most importantly a distinction between what can be said and what can
only be shown must be recognized.

What can be said, what can be counted

as possibly true or possibly false, stems from rules that are under the
governance of human beings.

The manner in which utterances of rules--

granunatical propositions--show what can be said (how they serve as re-

minders of correct usage and are antecedent to truth) is, however, a
topic for another time.
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Upon completing this dissertation I became convinced that its
chapters contain an inaccurate account of Wittgenstein's conception of
Sinn. This realization came to me through the indefatigable efforts of
Professor John Nolt, to whom I am grateful.
opportunity to append to

my

I would like to take this

earlier discussion an account of the objec-

tion and its implications.
In Chapter One the Sinn of a propositional sign is defined as a
set of possible states of affairs, such that if an elementary proposition is false, then some other elementary proposition composed of the
same singular terms must be true.

This claim was based upon the premise

that the bipolarity of the proposition could only be secured through
positing falsification conditions for elementary propositions.
Consider, however, a world in which there are three objects: a, p, and a
circle. 100
<1 and

Within this world there are four possible states of affairs:

f3 may both

be

inside the circle, a but not p may be in the circle,

f3 but not a may be in the circle, or neither a nor p may be in the circle.
I.

These possibilities are represented by the first column of Figure
Let us now imagine two languages in which a,

p,

and the circle are

denoted respectively by "a", "b", and by a small circle.

The first of

our languages is thoroughly pictorial, so that the various spatial relations among the objects are depicted by similar relations among the
propositional sign's elements.

The second column of Figure I contains

the permissible propositional signs for Language 1, and correlates each
with its truth condition in the first column.

Language 2 is a linear

script in which the small circle followed by "an indicates that a is in
the circle, the small circle followed by "b" indicates that pis in the
circle.

The semantic rule governing the elementary propositions in

Language 2 is:

199

Ox is

true, if and only if what x denotes is in the

This example comes from John Nolt.
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circle.

The third column in Figure I presents the sentences of Language

2 that would serve as translations of those contained in Language 1.

WORLDS

LANGUAGE 1

8

1.

2.

3.

a.

4.

a

0·
fl

Figure I
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LANGUAGE 2

Consider what, with respect to Language 2, must be the case if an
elementary proposition of the form

Ox is

false.

I had asserted that

some other elementary proposition would have to be true.

But if

Oa or

ob is false, there is no other elementary proposition in Language 2
that is thereby true.
falsehood of

Oa and

In Language 2 the only way to characterized the
ob is by means of line

41

the conjuncts of line 4

are, however, molecular rather than elementary. There are no alternative elementary propositions in terms of which we may state what makes
Oa and ob false.

a's and b's being

Here all we can do is speak of the nonobtaining of

O or the negative

fact(s) that a and bare not

0.

Indeed what line 4 of Language 2 demonstrates is that it is possible
within certain languages for some possible states of affairs to only be
represented by molecular propositions. Nevertheless Language 2 and
Language 1 are expressively equivalent: whatever one can say in the
one, one may say in the other.

so, it is not necessary for a language

to contain true elementary propositions in order to represent actual elementary states of affairs, and it is certainly not necessary for a language to possess elementary propositions (or a disjunction of elementary
propositions) that express the very same thing as a false or negated elementary proposition.
It occurs to me that one might want to respond to this objection
by pointing to the fact that Language 2 contains predicative expressions
in addition to singular terms.

Clearly the small circle functions as a
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predicate, so Oa and ob cannot be regarded as Tractarian elementary
propositions. There are, obviously, expressions within a language that
can function either singularly or predicatively.
definite descriptions.

Such is the case with

But we know that Wittgenstein would not treat

definite descriptions as elementary, but would subject them to further
analysis.

Thus one might want to respond to the objection by saying

that a language need not use elementary propositions to state that some
state of affairs obtains, and that it need not contain true elementary
propositions that are equivalent to its false or negated propositions J
nevertheless, it must be possible for such a language to be translatable
into another language where such is the case.

This is precisely how

things stand with regard to Languages 1 and 2.
There is a good reason, however, why we should not respond to the
objection in this manner.

To require that all languages must be trans-

latable in this way seems to be a fairly ad hoc determination. Whether
a language stands in need of translation at all, depends, I suspect,
upon whether it is capable of exhibiting determinancy of sense.
proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives:
(1922b, 4.023).)

( "A

yes or no"

Language 2 would fail in this regard if, for example,

Oa could be false

in more than one way, i.e., by the non-existence of

a, by the non-existence of the circle, or by the failure of a to be in

the circle given that both exist.

But Language 2 rules out the first

two possibilities by requiring each of its terms to be referring terms.
Determinancy of sense does not require anything more than what Language
2 already possesses. 100
200

A language really need only possess the re-

This point is underscored at Tractatus 4.025 where it is asserted:
When translating one language into another, we do not
proceed by translating each proposition of the one into a
proposition of the other, but merely by translating the
constituents of propositions ( 1922b, 4. 025).
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sources by means of which to negate its elementary propositions.

As

Chapter Four argues, this possibility is secured by the fact that any
proposition contains the potential of having any operation whatsoever
performed upon it.
In an important way, my identification of the sense of a proposition with a set of possible states of affairs fails to do justice to the
fact that sense itself effects the directed division within reality
(that is to say, the sense of a proposition must itself exhibit bipolarity).

A set of possible states of affairs, however, is the reality

within which the directed division must occur. Wittgenstein says:
What a picture represents is its sense (1922b, 2.221).
The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality
constitutes its truth or falsity (1922b, 2.222).
A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had
its sense explained to me (1922b, 4.021).
A proposition shows its sense.
A proposition shows how things stand i f it is true.
it says that they do so stand (1922b, 4.022).
We may characterized the sense of

it is uttered (etc.) it asserts

If

Oa is true,

And

Oa in Language 2 by saying that when

Oa is true and that -Oa is not true.

then the Bedeutung of the proposition just is the fact

that a is in the circle, in which case we have the agreement of the
sense of the proposition with reality.

If

Oa is false,

then the

Bedeutung of the propositional sign is the fact that a is not in the
circle, and in that case we have the disagreement of the sense of the
proposition with reality.

This is what Wittgenstein has in mind when he
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asserts that propositional signs P and -P can have the same Bedeutungen
but opposite Sinne (1922b, 4.0621).

That is to say, if Pis true and -P

is false, then it is the fact that P that is their Bedeutung1 if Pis
false and-Pis true, then it is the fact that -P that is their
Bedeutung (1914b, p. 112).

If

Oa is true and -Oa is false,

then it

is the fact that a is in the circle that is their Bedeutung1 if

Oa is

false and -Oa is true, then it is the fact that a is not in the circle
that is their ·sedeutung. 20'
Of course when one asserts

-Oa is not true.

Oa,

one does not say Oa is true and

That is shown by the fact that one employs a partic-

ular propositional sign with its own particular structure. One uses

Oa to say that a
shows the rest.

is in the circle, and one's employment of that sign

This fact is consonant with the central thesis in this

dissertation, namely, that the use of signs makes possible the semantic
properties of language.

Before I would not have said that the use of

signs makes sense possible, given the way that term had been defined.
201 The claim that P (when true) and -P (when false) share a
Bedeutung and that P (when false) and -P (when true) share a Bedeutung,
but that P and -P do not share a Bedeutung regardless of their truthvalue, is supported by conjoining Tractatus 4.0621, in which
Wittgenstein asserts "[t Jhe propositions 'p' and '-p' have opposite
sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality" ( 1922b,
4.0621) with the passage from the "Notes Dictated to Moore" which asserts:
"The Bedeutung of a proposition is the fact that corresponds to it, e.g., if our proposition be "aRb", it it's
true, the corresponding fact would be the fact aRb, it
false, the fact -aRb" (1914a, p.1121 emphasis added).
Clearly this second passage indicates that the Bedeutung of a propositional sign depends upon the sign's truth or falsity.
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Now, however, nothing precludes our saying that such is the case.
one remaining issue concerns the nature of negative states of affairs.

I have maintained that a negative state of affairs cannot merely

consist in the existence of simple objects that are in no way related to
one another.

This assumption is crucial to my proposed solution to the

Color Exclusion Problem.

For if it is true, then it is of no conse-

quence that being red precludes being blue:

"Thie is redn and "This is

blue,n like P and -P, could be said to have opposite Sinne but identical

Bedeutungen. What makes it seem natural to impute to the author of the
Tractatus those views held by the author of the Philosophical Remarks is
the fact that at Tractatus 2.011-2.0131 Wittgenstein asserts (i) that
objects are defined in terms of their potential for concatenation with
one another (1922b, 2.011), and (ii) that objects cannot ever be
regarded in isolation, i.e., as being unrelated or propertyless (1922b,
2.0131).

In that series of passages he tells his readers that "[t]hings

are independent insofar as they can occur in all possible situations,
but this form of independence is a form of conexxion with states of affairs, a form of dependence" ( 1922b, 2. 0122).

Even though it is incor-

rect to identify the range of possible states of affairs with a proposition's sense, and even though the state of affairs that happens to obtain when an atomic proposition is false may not be expressible by another atomic proposition, it still seems that there must be some such
state of affairs that renders (or a set of possible states of affairs
capable of rendering) the elementary proposition false.

What is crucial

to my proposed solution to the Color Exclusion Problem is not that another elementary proposition "with the same sensen is made true by the
falsehood of another elementary proposition, but rather that a language
must have some means to convey what makes an elementary proposition
false.

In the Tractatus this requirement is satisfied through the fact

that P and -P have the same meaning.

That is why ~P can express what
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makes P false.

Of course the relation of P to-Pis not a relation be-

tween elementary propositions, and it is in that regard that my way of
posing the solution is misleading.
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